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Applications and Extensions
of Realistic Conflict Th eory:
Moral Development and
Confl ict Prevention
Jessica McKenzie and Gabriel Twose
The study of intergroup conflict is of central concern to social scien- tists. Conflict is an inevitable result of human interaction, and learning how to reduce or prevent destructive disputes is vitally important. Few theorists have contributed to the field to the extent of Muzafer Sherif, whose realistic conflict theory states that contradictory goals lead to group conflict and cooperation-requiring superordinate goals reduce it (Sherif, 1958). Blending psychological and sociological frameworks, his Robbers Cave experiment (which would form the basis of realistic conflict theory) remains influential to this day. Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, and Sherif (1954/1988) postulated that intergroup conflict arises as a result of situational variables, personality characteristics, interindividual differences, and group psychology. While we are aware that most readers will be familiar with the work, we will begin with a brief overview of Sherif’s seminal Robbers Cave study and the theory that it grew. We will then delineate subsequent research that has built on Sherif’s findings, and finally, turn to an ex- tension of his work, incorporating research from multiple disciplines. Our proposed extension involves a moral education that utilizes concepts similar to those suggested by Sherif and by those that have built on his foundations. We argue that such a moral education offers a promising conflict resolution strategy by way of curtailing conflict before its initiation.
Norms, Groups, Conflict, and Social Change
Robbers Cave Summary Sherif’s three-stage Robbers Cave experiment took place in 1954 in Southeastern Oklahoma. Stage one of the study involved the experimental formation of two distinct groups. Twenty-two boys ap- proximately 11 years of age were carefully selected so as to preclude differences in socioeconomic, religious, or family backgrounds, as well as any psychological abnormality or maladjustment. None of the par- ticipants knew each other prior to the experiment. The boys were sepa- rated into two groups before ever meeting each other, and bussed to an isolated summer camp. For the first week, the groups were functionally isolated from one another, as the individuals coalesced into two groups with defined hierarchies and norms. More specifically, members faced a series of problems (such as cooking, improving a swimming hole, and playing sports), which they solved through coordinated action, resulting in the formation of two delineated in-groups. Leaders and followers became apparent within each group, norms such as “toughness” or “being a good sport” formed, and names (Eagles, Rattlers) and places (camping grounds, swimming holes) were claimed. In stage two, the groups were placed in zero-sum competitive situations with one another so that victory for one meant defeat for the other. Competitions included baseball games, treasure hunts, and tugs-of-war. Relations quickly became antagonistic, with negative stereotypes prevalent, and arguing and fighting common. Intergroup relations were assessed through participant observation, sociometric indices, and a series of experimental interventions. In the all-important final stage, intergroup hostility was reduced. Sherif et al. (1954/1988) first showed that contact alone (for example, watching a movie, eating a meal) did nothing to decrease the friction between the two groups. A further strategy was necessary in order to effectively reduce intergroup hostility. After considering several options, Sherif and colleagues elected to focus on the introduction of superordinate goals, or “goals of high appeal for both groups, which cannot be ignored by the groups in question, but whose attainment is beyond the resources and efforts of one group alone” (Sherif et al., 1954/1988, p. 204). The groups were forced to cooperate in order to overcome situations such as a broken truck and a blocked water pipe. Similar intergroup relations measures to those employed after stage 2 showed a reduction of negative stereotypes and an increase in liking between the groups.
Norms, Groups, Conflict, and Social Change
In this case, competition led to some out-group stereotyping, but did not result in outright hostility. Psychologists have similarly found that competition may lead to hostility in a variety of contexts. For example, Worchel, Axsom, Ferris, Samaha, and Schweitzer (1978) conducted a laboratory-based study in which two groups either competed or acted independently, wearing either similar or different uniforms. Inter- group attraction was lowest for groups that wore distinctive uniforms and competed with one another. Subsequent intergroup cooperation increased intergroup liking, particularly when the groups succeeded in their task, were not distinguished by dress, and had not previously competed. Realistic conflict theory has also been tested in more real world settings. Blake and Mouton (1961) studied win–loss contests in an industrial conflict between management and a union, concluding that zero-sum competition should be replaced by an orientation stressing mutual problem solving. In an extended application, Bobo (1983) investigated the reasons behind opposition to busing during the civil rights movement. Although some have disagreed with his analysis of the data (see Kinder & Sears, 1981), Bobo extended Sherif’s idea that competitive goals can lead to conflict, finding that perceived threat was by far the strongest predictor of Whites’ opposition to busing. Other factors such as a general dislike for blacks or a strong belief in segrega- tion proved insignificant. Simply the perception that Black Americans could be a competitor for scarce resources, or could challenge valued norms, was enough to incite opposition. Studies within other disciplines have also provided support. An- thropologists Divale and Harris (1976) studied a number of smaller societies, finding that competition over limited resources, such as land, is a primary driver of intergroup conflict. Sociologists have stressed the divisive potential of unequal resource distribution, even when such re- sources are abundant (Cummings, 1980). This array of mixed-methods, interdisciplinary, and international support has convincingly validated the basic tenets of realistic conflict theory. Many more recent psychological theories also draw from or build upon Sherif’s realistic conflict theory. Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) is based on the premise that intergroup conflict need not arise from interpersonal variables. This theory shares the basic tenet of Sherif’s theory: that conflict can arise simply due to the sheer existence of two groups, without the necessity of overt compe- tition. Addressing the amelioration of conflict, the contact hypothesis
Applications and Extensions of Realistic Conflict Theory
(Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1971; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006) also aligns with Sherif’s belief that contact alone is not enough to eliminate con- fl ict. The contact hypothesis argues that in addition to superordinate goals, additional factors such as equal status, egalitarian norms, and cooperative independence are necessary to change cognitive represen- tations of out-groups and to reduce conflict. These positive forms of contact may result in what has become known as a common in-group identity.
Common In-Group Identity Model The influential common in-group identity model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) is heavily indebted to realistic conflict theory, building from and expanding upon Sherif’s ideas. This model shows that many factors—social and structural—may alter cognitive representations of group membership. Essentially, we may move from an exclusive “us” and “them” mentality to an inclusive “we,” utilizing three basic mechanisms: mutual intergroup differentiation, decategorization, and recategoriza- tion (which do not necessarily occur in any specific order). Mutual intergroup differentiation, rather than seeking to change the structure of the groups involved, involves an acknowledgement and appreciation of group differences. Problem solutions that are “win–win” rather than zero-sum are emphasized, and group goals and boundaries are respected. For example, during the course of an eight-day intervention, members of the Taibesi and Becora rival youth groups in East Timor were successfully encouraged to cooperatively work together without being asked to abandon their separate identities (Nasroen, 2011). Using semi-structured interviews and observation, researchers found that the success of mixed groups depended on trust, superordinate goals, and interactive problem solving. Decategorization involves thinking of people as individuals, stressing the plurality of our identities. Often resulting from friendly one-on- one interactions, people may relate to each other in terms of personal interests rather than those that are important to each of the groups. Comparisons are made on an individual—rather than a group-level, and there is a general lack of uniformity in terms of attitude and treat- ment. For example, arguing in part against Huntington’s (2011) Clash of Civilizations theory (a thesis which relies on the permanence of group differences), Amartya Sen (2006) states that he is “an Asian, an Indian citizen, a Bengali with Bangladeshi ancestry, an American or British resident, an economist, a dabbler in philosophy (or) an author”
Applications and Extensions of Realistic Conflict Theory
may be seen as mutual intergroup differentiation (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). A second superordinate goal was the preparation of a meal. One boy, McGraw (an Eagle) was put in charge of cutting the meat, and another, Simpson (a Rattler) was tasked with making the Kool Aid. Although McGraw was successful (and congratulated by both groups) and Simpson was not (and commiserated with by both groups), what is noteworthy is that they were treated as individuals, not as members of the Eagles or Rattlers. They were congratulated or commiserated with on the basis of their success or failure, rather than along group lines. Th is may be thought of as an example of decategorization (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). And fi nally, as described above, Sherif et al. (1988) were relatively successful in the creation of a common group identity, or recategori- zation. Th e groups were forced to cooperate in order to start a stalled truck, pulling it with the very rope that had previously been used in a tug-of-war competition between them. “Let’s get our tug-of-war rope and have a tug-of-war against the truck... 20 of us can pull it for sure” (Sherif et al., 1988 p. 172). The use of “our” and “us” signifies the conceptualization of the boys as one larger group. This impression was furthered by later seating arrangements in which the boys intermingled relatively freely, overcoming previous group demarcations (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000).
Conflict Prevention Sherif’s Robbers Cave experiment is crucial in pointing to competi- tion for limited resources as an origin of intergroup conflict. This ex- periment, and subsequent support, also demonstrates that one effective means of confl ict resolution is the recognition of a superordinate goal, which enables the transcendence of excessive concern with one’s nar- rowly defined in-group. One of the more commonly cited post-Sherif frameworks, as outlined above, is Gaertner and Dovidio’s common in- group identity model (2000). Gaertner and Dovidio’s conflict resolution strategies (mutual intergroup differentiation, decategorization, and recategorization) are primarily intervention-based. Thanks to Sherif and his successors, we now have a great deal of knowledge regarding the origin of intergroup conflict and various ways through which to resolve such conflict once it has arisen. An area in which there has been less research, however, is the circumvention of conflict, rather than the bandaging of preexisting disputes. Gaertner and Dovidio
Norms, Groups, Conflict, and Social Change
have expressed concern about the long-lasting benefits of inducing a one-group representation. They write: Whether a common superordinate identity can produce positive intergroup orientations for the long term or only temporarily also re- mains an important issue... we do not believe that recategorization as one group, at least by itself, would be capable of sustaining favorable intergroup relations over the long term (p. 162). We posit that conflict prevention may be more effective than conflict resolution in implementing stable longer-term reductions in intergroup hostility. In order to truly effect long-term change in intergroup conflict, it is important to address the process of in-grouping and out-grouping prior to the eruption of conflict. In the sections that follow, we suggest that one way to approach conflict prevention is through moral edu- cation. Such an education would focus on fostering individuals (and ultimately, societies) in which destructive conflict is less intuitive, irrespective of situational variables. This education would involve sys- tematic moral discourse regarding an expanded conception of one’s in- group, a focus on members of the out-group as individuals with needs and desires, and awareness building about a variety of worldviews. Effectively, we encourage processes such as decategorization, mutual intergroup differentiation, and recategorization before the outbreak of destructive conflict. We argue that such moral language should make a systematic appearance in early education, rather than when a partic- ular crisis occurs. We will return to this conception at the end of our chapter, linking this suggestion to a set of moral dimensions that could be incorporated into educational curricula. Ultimately, we suggest that we as social scientists should turn our attention to appropriate moral socialization and education in order to effect more enduring conflict prevention. We now turn to a review of relevant literature on moral reasoning and development as it relates to conflict.
Conflict Resolution and Moral Development Some research—albeit scant—has examined the relationship be- tween conflict resolution and moral development. Stanley’s (1978) study on the effects of family conflict resolution training on adolescent moral reasoning is a pioneer article of this sort. In this article, Stanley discusses the effects of a 10-week long democratic conflict resolution course with parents and their children on: the family’s moral atmo- sphere and the moral development of the adolescents engaged in these sessions. Results showed that the intervention positively impacted
Norms, Groups, Conflict, and Social Change
and that in order to effect real change in often-problematic intergroup relations, the educational climate should be revamped. In addition to encouraging critical thinking and reasoning, educators should aim to build affective skills and positive moral emotionality. Heydenberk et al. (2003) draw a link between morality and conflict resolution, emphasizing moral reasoning level. The emphasis on level of moral reasoning is born from developmental psychologists such as Piaget (1965) and Kohlberg (1971) whose theories hold that one’s moral reasoning abilities progress through a series of progressive stages. According to Kohlberg, moral reasoning is ultimately a justice-based endeavor revolving around concerns such as respect and reciprocity. While in some cases it may be helpful to examine morality from Kohl- berg’s levels of moral reasoning, the mere possession of finely tuned reasoning abilities does not ensure the prevention of conflict, the resolution of conflict, or empathic decision making. Research has suggested, for example, that we often act on quick emotional reactions (e.g., sympathy, disgust) more so than on carefully reasoned moral decision-making processes (e.g., Frank, 1988; Haidt, 2001). In fact, it has been argued that our behaviors often do not involve careful reasoning processes at all (Haidt, 2001), but rather, instinctive and oftentimes indescribable intuitions. Moreover, Kohlberg’s model, which posits that the highest stages of moral reasoning revolve around typically Western concerns of justice and equality, has been called into question for its relevance across diverse cultures (Dien, 1982; Huebner & Garrod, 1991; Jensen, 2008; Shweder et al., 1997). This cross-cultural limitation becomes particularly problematic when considering inter- group conflict’s transnational impact. We now turn to a discussion about the role of moral emotions and ethics as promising directions in conflict resolution and peace build- ing, particularly as strategies that may facilitate the common in-group identity model.
Moral Emotions and Ethics Various theorists have pointed to the link between moral emotions and moral behaviors. Over a century ago, Darwin (1874) suggested that sympathy is integral to the evolution of morality. Batson (1991) has since persuasively argued that empathy engenders altruistic behav- ior. We contend that this has direct implications for fostering conflict prevention. Given that, as described above, we often act on emotional reactions rather than carefully reasoned moral decision-making
Applications and Extensions of Realistic Conflict Theory
processes, it may actually be more important to foster positive moral emotions than to build moral reasoning level. As Kohlberg’s theory of moral development assumes that justice- and fairness-based concerns drive moral reasoning, emotions are generally absent from Kohlbergian research. Hence, a separate moral paradigm may be helpful. People seldom utilize their most sophisticated forms of moral reasoning in their day-to-day lives (Krebs & Denton, 2005), so one may profitably focus not on levels of moral reasoning, but on ethics used when coming to moral decisions. According to the three ethics theory of moral reasoning (Shweder et al., 1997), justice and fairness is a small piece of the moral reason- ing puzzle. Shweder and colleagues suggest that across a wide array of cultures, there are three overarching ethical concerns (see Table 1) upon which moral decisions are based. The Ethic of Autonomy focuses on the individual self and includes concepts such as individual rights, fairness, and responsibility for oneself; the Ethic of Community fo- cuses on the social self and includes concepts such as group welfare and social harmony; the Ethic of Divinity focuses on the spiritual self and includes concepts such as spiritual purity and virtues of holiness. A great deal of research has shown the presence of these three ethics across diverse cultures such as India, Brazil, the Philippines, and the United States (e.g., Arnett, Ramos, & Jensen, 2001; Haidt et al., 1993; Jensen, 1995, 1998; Shweder et al., 1997; Vasquez, Keltner, Ebenbach, & Banaszynski, 2001), although the relative importance and the manner and frequency of use vary widely.
Table 1 The Three Ethics
Ethic Focus Moral Concepts Ethic of Autonomy Individual self • Individual rights
- Harm to individuals
- Equality between individuals Ethic of Community Social self • Group welfare, role obligations
- Duties to others
- Concern with group interests Ethic of Divinity Spiritual self • Divine and natural law
- Scriptural injunctions
- Closeness to purity, holiness
Applications and Extensions of Realistic Conflict Theory
competition and winning. In short, Staub encourages the creation of societies whose core value is that of interconnection. Such a societal level value transformation as a means to reduce violence would likely involve a large-scale moral socialization and education reformation, which requires more than adding a superordinate goal. Staub (2011) goes on to suggest that this may be approached through public edu- cation by way of seminars, workshops, courses in schools, radio and television programs, and newspaper and internet articles. Exposure to such messages may have long-term value, particularly when “the goal is to change deep-seated beliefs, attitudes, norms, and behaviors. As these change, slowly the culture changes, including the standards of acceptable conduct” (p. 378). We suggest that systematically incor- porating community-based values into the educational sphere would serve a key role in conflict prevention. Finally, the Ethic of Divinity (which is not necessarily God-directed in nature, but can also involve concerns about upholding virtues, the authority of natural law, interest in one’s and others’ soul) may also aid in conflict resolution, prevention, and peace building. While psy- chologists often turn a blind eye to religion (Staub, 2010), it not only plays a powerful role in many people’s sense of morality (Huebner & Garrod, 1991; McKenzie & Jensen, 2012; Walker, Pitts, Hennig, & Matsuba, 1995), but it can also play a key role in conflict resolution and peace building (Abu-Nimer, 1996, 2001; Johnston & Sampson, 1994; Lederach, 1999; Staub, 2010). In his article on conflict resolution, culture, and religion, Abu-Nimer (2001) suggests that because religion is central to the cultural identity of many people engaged in enduring conflict (e.g., Northern Ireland, the former Yugoslavia, the Middle East), it is crucial to consider religion as a motive for both fighting and reconciliation. As such, we suggest that turning a blind eye to the role of religion, or the Ethic of Divinity, in conflict resolution is myopic. Religion, according to Abu-Nimer, can be hugely influential in people’s cognitions and behaviors, and may bring social, moral, and spiritual resources to the process of peace building. He persuasively argues that spirituality can foster engagement and commitment to peace building, and can inject an important dimension to conflict resolution models. In some cases then, emphasizing the Ethic of Divinity may effectively facilitate peace building and conflict resolution. Based on workshops and interviews with participants from a wide range of religious backgrounds, Abu-Nimer found support
Norms, Groups, Conflict, and Social Change
for interreligious peace building training, which was modeled after Bennett’s (1986) multi-stage intercultural sensitivity model. This model charts a progression of various stages of openness to cultural differ- ence, moving from “ethnocentric stages” of resistance (stages 1–3) to “ethnorelative stages” of openness (stages 4–6). The stages include:
- Denial
- Defense
- Minimization
- Acceptance
- Adaptation
- Integration
We focus on stages 3 and 4, the highest stages for which Abu-Nimer (2001) has found support, as they link directly to the common in-group identity model. Minimization involves the invocation of transcendent universalist conceptions, aiming to minimize religious differences. As this phase includes an emphasis on commonality, with language such as “we all pray” and “we are all children of God,” minimization echoes concepts emphasized in Gaertner and Dovidio’s recategorization. Ac- ceptance involves the acknowledgement and respect of interreligious differences. As statements such as “we all see God through our different belief systems” typify this phase, acceptance echoes concepts utilized by mutual in-group differentiation. Of his participants who were exposed to multi-phase interreligious peace building training, Abu-Nimer found that many participants were able to refrain from judging the values, beliefs, and behaviors of others. Hence, Abu-Nimer’s model, which integrates intercultural sensitivity and conflict resolution training techniques, also incorporates divinity discourse socialization and uti- lizes techniques similar to those suggested by Gaertner and Dovidio. We also suggest that incorporating divinity-based discourse at the pre-conflict stage would likely serve as a preventative aid. That is, incor- porating information about a range of religious perspectives into school curricula—rather than either covering only one religious perspective or wholly avoiding the topic of religiosity—is one way in which divin- ity dialog could be incorporated in order to assist conflict prevention. Moreover, incorporating elements of Abu-Nimer’s interreligious peace building training (e.g., minimization and acceptance) may also aid in the pre-conflict phase. Working to cultivate an understanding of the religious practices of others will likely propel perspective taking and humanization of those who are very different from us. Ultimately, this
Norms, Groups, Conflict, and Social Change
emotions and ethics. In addition to short-term conflict resolution approaches such as the imposition or recognition of superordinate goals, we must work to build a sustainable plan regarding long-term conflict prevention, however daunting a task. Such a long-term conflict resolution strategy, we suggest, should include the work of social psy- chologists (Gaertner & Dovidio; Haidt; Sherif; Staub), developmental psychologists (Eisenberg; Jensen), cultural psychologists (Shweder et al.), biologists and evolutionary psychologists (Darwin; Krebs), peace building and conflict resolution specialists (Abu-Nimer; Lederach) and education specialists (Heydenberk et al., 2003). Sherif et al. (1954/1988) provide an invaluable base from which to think about destructive con- fl ict and its amelioration; now we must aim to advance their theory, particularly as relating to conflict prevention.
References
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