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Theory Field Exam
Summer
Instructions
You must complete two of the four areas (the areas being (I) contract theory, (II) game theory A, (III) game theory B, and (IV) psychology & economics). Be sure to indicate clearly what you are answering. Try to be succinct in your answers, especially with respect to those questions that ask for discussion. Write legibly.
Area I: Contract Theory Question (Econ 206)
Instructions: Answer all parts. Consider the following principal-agent relation. At all points in time the princi- pal has all the bargaining power. Among other implications of this, the principal makes the agent a tioli offer of employment. If the agent rejects the offer, the game ends and the payoff to each party is zero. If the agent accepts, he chooses an action p 2 [0, 1]. Then the principal receives a stochastic benefit b. Assume b is drawn from the binary set f 0 , Gg R+, where 0 < G < 1. The probabil- ity that b = G is p. The principal’s payoff is b w, where w is compensation paid the agent. The agent’s payoff is w c(p), where c : [0, 1]! R+ is twice continuously differentiable. Let c′() denote the derivative of c(). Assume that c′(0) = 0 and that c′() is a strictly increasing function, with c′(p)! 1 as p! 1.
(a) Characterize the first-best level of the action. Call this level p.
Assume, henceforth, that the agent is protected by limited liability; that is, his compensation (payment) at the end of the game must be non-negative.
(b) Assuming b is verifiable and p a hidden action, what contract would the principal offer in equilibrium?
(c) Will that contract achieve the first best? Why or why not?
Suppose, now and until further notice, that p is immediately observable to the principal, but it is not verifiable.
(d) Suppose, for this part only, that there is a delay between when the agent chooses his action and when b is realized. What is the equilibrium of this game?
Suppose, now and henceforth, that the game set forth above is infinitely re- peated. Let δ 2 (0, 1) be the relevant discount factor.
AREA I: CONTRACT THEORY QUESTION (ECON 206)
(e) Suppose, for this part only, that b is not verifiable (indeed, b may not even be observable to the agent). Derive a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the repeated game, with appropriate conditions on δ, such that the agent chooses p^ in every period on the equilibrium path.
(f) Return to the assumption that b is verifiable. How does this change your analysis in part (e)? Discuss briefly.
Suppose, now, that p is once again a hidden action. Assume that b is observable, but not verifiable.
(g) Derive a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the repeated game, with appro- priate conditions on δ, in which the agent chooses p > 0 in every period on the equilibrium path.
AREA II: GAME THEORY A (ECON 207B)
(b) What are h 1 and h 2 when neighborhoods are formed in percentages that correspond to the shares of the two groups in the total population?
(c) How your answers to questions 1 and 2 change if the social network is represented by a directed graph?
AREA III: GAME THEORY B (ECON 209A)
Area III: Game Theory B (Econ 209A)
Instructions: Answer all three of the following questions.
Question 1: Consider the variant of the Hawk-Dove game
D H
D 1 , 1 0 , 2
H 2 , 0 1 c, 1 c
(when c > 1 the game has the standard Hawk-Dove structure).
(a) Find the set of all Nash and trembling hand perfect equilibria for all values of c. Are the equilibrium strategies evolutionary stable?
(b) Let α^ be an evolutionary stable strategy. Does α^ necessarily weakly dominates every other strategy? Is it possible that some strategy weakly dominates α? Does it matter if α^ is pure or mixed?
Question 2: Consider a two-player extensive game of perfect information where player 1 moves only at the start of the game and player 2 moves once after player 1. Denote by Si the set of pure strategies available for player i = 1, 2.
(a) Suppose that player 2 is never indifferent between pairs of outcomes, and that if the two players move simultaneously, then there exist a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in which the payoffs are (ω 1 , ω 2 ). Show that player 1’s payoff in any subgame perfect equilibrium of the extensive game is at least ω 1.
(b) Show by counter-examples that (i) if player 2 is indifferent between a pair of outcomes or (ii) the strategic game has a unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, then player 1’s subgame perfect equilibrium payoff can be lower than ω 1.
Question 3: A bargaining problem is a pair ⟨S, d⟩ where S R^2 is compact and convex, d 2 S and there exists s 2 S such that si > di for i = 1, 2. The set of all bargaining problems ⟨S, d⟩ is denoted by B. A bargaining solution is a function f : B! R^2 such that f assigns to each bargaining problem ⟨S, d⟩ 2 B a unique element in S.
(a) Show that Kalai bargaining solution
f K^ (S, d) = fs 1 = s 2 : s 2 Sg \ W P O(S)
does not satisfy IN V.
AREA IV: PSYCHOLOGY AND ECONOMICS QUESTION (ECON 219A)
Area IV: Psychology and Economics Question (Econ
219A)
Instructions: Depending on how you count, there are 36 parts to this question, so manage your time properly to have plenty of time for other material, and don’t sweat not getting through this. Certainly do Part I before Part II.
Part I Max will live for 3 periods. He has $y 0 to spend on consumption in his life; he has the money initially, and can freely save it at no interest. Max has no long-term discounting, so δ = 1 everywhere below.
His utility functions in each of the three periods are given by:
u 1 = ln (c 1 c 0 ) = ln (c 1 ), u 2 = ln (c 2 c 1 ), u 3 = ln (c 3 +c 2 ),
where c 0 = 0 by assumption throughout. Max has habit-forming preferences, where his pleasure from consumption is solely relative to the previous period’s consumption, and it is as if he were born with no past consumption.
Max chooses consumption levels each period, without commitment. Because he will simply choose c 3 = y c 1 c 2 in period 3, he is essentially only making choices in periods 1 and 2.
This problem simply asks you to solve for Max’s behavior for each of 6 different personalities he can have, depending on his present bias, sophistication about that present bias, and projection bias. In each case, you’ll be asked to solve for his lifetime consumption profile as a function of y. You should circle your answer to each part to the prediction by filling in “(c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) = ”. But for each case, you also must state and circle the maximization problem the person is doing in each of the two substantive periods: “In Period 2, Max will choose c 2 = arg max ”, where this will of course take y and c 1 as given (since Max will have y c 1 in savings). And then describe his Period- 1 maximization problem similarly, where Max will clearly embed a prediction of his c 2 and c 3. That is, write “In period 1, Max will choose c 1 = arg max ” where your expression must include nothing but y. Two important notes:
- There should not be any quadratic equations or nasty math involved, every case ought eventually simplify to easy algebra (and the answers should always be rational numbers). If you are not able to simplify it thusly, either you are in error, or the question is in error; you should move without too much time; but
- some maximization problems may make relatively little sense— there may not be a well-defined answer to some parts of some ques- tions. If you decide that some part is indeterminant, say so; and
AREA IV: PSYCHOLOGY AND ECONOMICS QUESTION (ECON 219A)
answer the questions you can. All math here is reflecting an under- lying choice problem, so don’t punt on giving answers to parts that there is a logical and determinant answer for.
Remember, for each of the 6 parts below, be sure to circle exactly and only each of three answers (in any order): 1) “(c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) = ”, 2) “In period 2, Max will choose c 2 = arg max ”, 3) “In period 1, Max will choose c 1 = arg max ”.
The 6 different personalities Max can have are:
a) Max is fully rational, with no present bias and no projection bias. b) Max has no present bias, but he has full projection bias, where each period t he projects his current state of habit level, ct 1 , on to future periods. c) Max has no projection bias, but is present biased, with β = 12. Max is naive about this present bias. d) Max has no projection bias, but is present biased, with β = 12. Max is sophisticated about this present bias. e) Max has both full projection bias and is present biased, with β = 12. Max is naive about this present bias. f) Max has both full projection bias and is present biased, with β = 12. Max is sophisticated about this present bias.
Please don’t mess up the order (e.g., reverse sophisticate vs. naivety an- swers); or, as a safeguard, repeat Max’s personality when you present the an- swers. You don’t need to explain or interpret your answers except if you are worried they are ambiguous—devote all your intuition to making sure you get the right answers. And always circle exactly and only intended answers.
Part II Now we consider the same 6 personalities of Max, with the same utility function as above. But now we assume that Max lives in a world where there is 100% interest between periods. This means that if he consumes c 1 in period 1, he’ll have savings of (2(y c 1 ) going into period 2, and (more importantly) if he consumes c 1 and c 2 , then his savings entering period 3, and hence his consumption c 3 , will be s 3 = c 3 = 4y 4 c 1 2 c 2.
So re-do (a) through (f) in this new situation.
(h) Consider the risky asset which is a claim to next periodís total endowment Ct+1. Express
the price of this asset, Pt, with the key asset pricing equation. Compute log [Pt=Ct].
(i) Show that logE[1 + Rt+1] = logE[Ct+1=Ct] log [Pt=Ct], and express this quantity using
your results. Compute the expected excess return ERt+1 Rf logE[1 + Rt+1] rf. Compare
your result to the expected excess return in (e). Is the equity premium higher now? Why?
