Brown University Course Registration: Addressing the Issue of Class Registration Imbalance, Slides of School management&administration

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BROWN COURSE REGISTRATION

Manas Gabriel, Meera, Timothy

THE PROBLEM

THE BASIC MODEL

THE BASIC MODEL

• During preregistration each student is allowed to select up to five classes.
• Students have a set of preferences over the classes such that:
• The student's utility is the sum of their utility for each individual class:

BUYING AND SELLING SEATS

• Students can also buy and sell their preregistration spots.
• The seller receives a payment and the buyer acts as if they were able to preregister for that class (adding it to their other five).
• To reflect this exchange the utility function behaves in the following manner:
• In our model it is mandatory for students to preregister for 3 classes, so a maximum of 2 spots may be sold.

EXAMPLE

• Alison (senior), Dylan (junior), and Mike (junior) are 3 students.
• Each student can register for 5 out of the 6 available classes. D: A: M:
• Class 5 fills up before juniors are allowed to preregister. Because Dylan bought a seat in the class he is preregistered for it, but Mike is not.

SOLUTION 1- REGISTER FOR WAITLIST IMPLEMENTING THE MODEL

THE WAITLIST

• Students MUST sign up for minimum of 3 classes o 3 classes are needed to be a "full-time" student
• Can be on waitlist for maximum of 2 classes because they account for the 5 spots
• Automatically know spot on waitlist when register on Banner
• Can't trade spots on waitlist o when spot is dropped by student registered for class, first person on waitlist automatically gets that spot
• When signing up for class that has a waitlist, the student is placed at bottom of the waitlist
• The only way to move up waitlist is for students ahead of you to drop the class

REVISIT EXAMPLE WITH THE WAITLIST

• Using the same preferences as the earlier example: A : D : M :
• Class 5 fills up before the juniors, Dylan & Mike, can register
• Dylan and Mike are now placed on the waitlist and their utility functions are:

CHANGING PREFERENCES & THE WAITLIST

• With the new preferences, D will drop off waitlist for
• M will move up on the waitlist for
• A is not affected by the change is D's preferences
• The new utility functions are:
• is lower now, so is higher
• M is now better off o Compared to when change occurs without waitlist o Same result as without trading

SOLUTION 2- CREATING A THICK MARKET

MARKET THICKNESS

• Once an already registered seat is dropped during registration

period, one cannot register for it till the following day at 8 AM.

• This will prevent students from maliciously scheming amongst

themselves and swap classes by meeting clandestinely

• Will also lower the amount of time students spend planning with

friends

• By creating a thicker market, everybody has a fair shot at getting

the class in the morning of the next day

EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

• Survey students to determine if there is an existing problem, and to see if students have ever colluded in the past.
• See if anyone has given up on trying to get into a class before the end of registration, and was disappointed about not getting into the class.
• Given administration permission one can analyze banner data and see how many students drop and add a class within a small period of time
• This data will be compared to the average and we will determine the probability of a class being dropped and added within a small timeframe.
• Run a fake pre-registration on students with a wait list system is implemented