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World Database of Happiness Measures of happiness Introductory text
2 CONCEPT OF HAPPINESS
Ruut Veenhoven^1
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2/1 Definition of happiness
2/2 Components of happiness
2/2.1 Hedonic level 2/2.2 Contentment 2/2.3 Relative impact in the overall evaluation of life
2/3 Difference with related concepts
2/3.1 Difference with other qualities of life 2/3.2 Difference with other satisfactions
2/4 Variable aspects of happiness
2/5 Focus on ‘present’ happiness
2/6 Why this concept?
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The word 'happiness' is used in various ways. In the widest sense it is an umbrella term for all that is good. In this meaning it is often used interchangeably with terms like 'wellbeing' or 'quality of life' and denotes both individual and social welfare. This use of words suggests that there is one ultimate good and disguises differences in interest between individuals and society. Here the word happiness is used in the more limited sense of subjective satisfaction with life.
(^1) Last update May 2015
Below I will first present a formal definition of happiness (section 2/1). Within this concept of overall happiness, I then distinguish two ‘components’ of happiness: hedonic level and contentment (section 2/2). Then I delineate happiness from related notions, first from other qualities of life (section 2/3.1) and next from other concepts of satisfaction (section 2/3.2). I go on to note the variable aspects of this concept, that is, dimensions that are not included in the concept as such (section 2/4). The concept is restricted to present life (section 2/5). Finally section 2/6 summarizes the reasons to define happiness in this way. This matter is discussed in more detail elsewhere. See Veenhoven 1984 (chapter 2) and in Veenhoven 2000 (section 1).
2/1 Definition of happiness
Overall happiness is the degree to which an individual judges the overall quality of his/her own life-as-a-whole favorably. In other words: how much one likes the life one leads. The key terms in this definition may be elucidated as follows.
Degree The word 'happiness' is not used to denote positive appreciation of life only. It refers to a degree, like the concepts of 'length' or 'weight', it denotes more or less of something. When we say a person is happy, we mean that he or she judges his of her life favorably rather than unfavorably.
Individual The term happiness is used to describe the state of an individual person only; it does not apply to collectivities. Thus, a nation cannot be said to be happy. At best, most of its citizens consider themselves happy.
Subjective Happiness denotes a subjective appreciation of life by an individual. So there is no given 'objective' standard for happiness. A person who thinks he/she is happy, really is happy, even if that person is misinformed.
Judgment The word 'happiness' is used where somebody has made an overall judgment about the quality of his or her life. This implies an intellectual activity. Making an overall judgment implies assessing past experiences and estimating future experiences and estimating average quality of life. One consequence of this conceptualization is that the word 'happiness' cannot be used for those who did not make up their mind. One cannot say whether a person is happy or not, if that person is intellectually unable to construct an overall judgment. Thus, the concept cannot be used for animals or small children. Nor is the
affective experience. As such it is more characteristic of the affective component of happiness (cf. section 2/2.1) than of overall happiness itself.
2/2 Components of happiness
When evaluating the favorableness of our life, we tend to use two more or less distinct sources of information: our affects and our thoughts. One can decide that one feels fine most of the time and one can also judge that life seems to meet ones (conscious) demands. These appraisals do not necessarily coincide. We may feel fine generally, but nevertheless be aware that we failed to realize our aspirations. Or one may have surpassed ones aspirations, but nevertheless feel miserable. Using the word 'happiness' in both these cases would result in three different kinds of happiness, the overall judgment as described above and these two specific appraisals. Therefore the latter specific appraisals are seen as ‘components’ of happiness. To mark that difference I refer to the encompassing judgment (the core concept) as overall happiness. A synonym for overall happiness is 'life-satisfaction'. The components are referred to as 'hedonic level of affect' (affective component) and 'contentment' (cognitive component). The distinction between ‘affective’ and ‘cognitive’ aspects of happiness is quite common in the literature, but seeing these as components of overall happiness is not.
2/2.1 Hedonic level of affect Hedonic level of affect is the degree to which various affects that someone experiences are pleasant in character. Hedonic level of affect is not the same as 'mood'. We experience different kinds of mood: elated moods, calm moods, restless moods, moody moods, etc. Each of these moods is characterized by a special mixture of affective experiences, one of which is 'hedonic tone' or 'pleasantness'. The concept of hedonic level concerns only the pleasantness experienced in affects; that is, the pleasantness in feelings, in emotions, as well as in moods. So a high hedonic level may be based on strong but passing emotions of love, as well as on moods of steady calmness. A person's average hedonic level of affect can be assessed over different periods of time: an hour, a week, a year, as well as over a lifetime. The focus here is on 'characteristic' hedonic level. That is so to say: the average over a long time-span such as a month or a year. The concept does not presume subjective awareness of that average level.
2/2.2 Contentment Contentment is the degree to which an individual perceives his/her aspirations are met. The concept presupposes that the individual has developed some conscious wants and has formed an idea about their realization. The factual correctness of this
idea is not at stake. The concept concerns the individual's subjective perception. When we assess the degree to which our wants are being met, we may look both backwards and forwards. We may assess what life has brought up to now and may estimate what it is likely to yield in the future. The concept concerns the case where someone combines both the past and the future in an assessment.
2/2.3 Relative impact in the overall evaluation of life If these components serve as subtotals in the overall evaluation of life, what is then their weight? Most scholars stress contentment, for instance Andrews & Withey (1976) suggest that individuals compute a weighted average of earlier life-aspect evaluations, while Michalos' (1985) multiple discrepancy theory assumes comparisons of life as it is with various standards of how it should be. Yet there are good reasons to assume that overall life-satisfaction is mostly inferred from affective experience. One reason is that life-as-a-whole is not a suitable object for calculative evaluation. Life has many aspects and there is usually not one clear-cut ideal model it can be compared to. Another reason seems to be that affective signals tend to dominate; seemingly cognitive appraisals are often instigated by affective cues (Zajonc 1980). This latter point fits the theory that the affective system is the older in evolutionary terms, and that cognition works as an addition to this navigation system rather than a replacement. This issue has important consequences for the significance of happiness. If appreciation is a matter of mere comparison with arbitrary standards, there is little of value in a positive evaluation; dissatisfaction is then an indication of high demands. If, however, happiness signals the degree to which innate needs are met, life- satisfaction denotes how well we thrive. This issue is considered in more detail in Veenhoven (2009). The latest research suggests that hedonic level dominates in the overall evaluation of life (Kainulainen e.a. 2015).
2/3 Difference with related concepts
This concept of happiness can be further clarified by noting the difference with related notions. Below we will first distinguish enjoyment of life from other qualities of life (section 2/3.1) and then discern happiness from other enjoyments (section 2/3.2). Note that many these different concepts are often called by the same name.
2/3.1 Difference with other qualities of life The term ‘quality of life' suggests that all merits can be integrated in one final scale of worth. This is not the case. The term is merely an umbrella for different notions of what is good. Below I will delineate four qualities of life and show that the concept of happiness fits only one of these.
welfare state. Current notions emphasize close networks, strong norms and active voluntary associations. The reverse of this livability concept is 'social fragmentation'. Secondly, livability is seen in one's position in society. For a long time, the emphasis was placed on the 'under-class' but currently attention has shifted to the 'outer-class'. The corresponding antonyms are 'deprivation' and 'exclusion'. Livability is not what is called happiness here. It is rather a precondition for happiness and not all environmental conditions are equally conducive to happiness.
Life-ability of the person The right top quadrant denotes inner life-chances. That is: how well we are equipped to cope with the problems of life. Sen (1992) calls this quality of life variant 'capability'. I prefer the simple term 'life-ability', which contrasts elegantly with 'livability'. The most common depiction of this quality of life is absence of functional defects. This is 'health' in the limited sense, sometimes referred to as 'negative health'. In this context, doctors focus on unimpaired functioning of the body, while psychologists stress the absence of mental defects. In their language, quality of life and wellbeing are often synonymous with mental health. This use of words presupposes a 'normal' level of functioning. Good quality of life is the body and mind working as designed. This is the common meaning used in curative care. Next to absence of disease, one can consider excellence of function. This is referred to as 'positive health' and associated with energy and resilience. Psychological concepts of positive mental health involve autonomy, reality control, creativity and inner synergy of traits and strivings. A new term in this context is 'emotional intelligence'. Though originally meant for specific mental skills, this term has come to denote a broad range of mental capabilities. The training professions favor this broader definition. A further step is to evaluate capability in a developmental perspective and to include acquisition of new skills for living. This is commonly denoted by the term 'self-actualization'. From this point of view a middle-aged man is not 'well' if he behaves like an adolescent, even if he functions without problems at this level. Since abilities do not develop alongside idleness, this quality of life is close to the 'activity' in Aristotle's concept of eudaimonia. This quality concept is also currently used in the training professions. Lastly, the term 'art of living' denotes special life-abilities; in most contexts this quality is distinguished from mental health and sometimes even attributed to slightly disturbed persons. Art of living is associated with refined tastes, an ability to enjoy life and an original style of life. Ability to deal with the problems of life will mostly contribute to happiness as defined here, but is not identical. If one is competent in living one has a good chance at happiness, but this endowment does not guarantee an enjoyable outcome.
Usefulness of life The left bottom quadrant represents the notion that a good life must be good for something more than itself. This assumes some higher values. There is no current generic for these external outcomes of life. Gerson (1976: 795) refers to these effects as 'transcendental' conceptions of quality of life. Another appellation is 'meaning of life', which then denotes 'true' significance instead of mere subjective sense of meaning. I prefer the simpler 'utility of life', while admitting that this label may also give rise to misunderstanding. When evaluating the external effects of a life, one can consider its functionality for the environment. In this context, doctors stress how essential a patient's life is to its intimates. The life of a mother with young children is given higher value than the life of a woman of the same age without children. Likewise, indispensability at the workplace figures in medical quality of life notions. At a higher level, quality of life is seen in contributions to society. Historians see quality in the addition an individual can make to human culture, and rate for example the lives of great inventors higher than those of anonymous peasants. Moralists see quality in the preservation of the moral order, and would deem the life of a saint to be better than that of a sinner. In this vein, the quality of a life is also linked to effects on the ecosystem. Ecologists see more quality in a life lived in a 'sustainable' manner than in the life of a polluter. In a broader view, the utility of life can be seen in its consequences for long-term evolution. As an individual's life can have many environmental effects, the number of such utilities is almost infinite. Apart from its functional utility, life is also judged on its moral or esthetic value. For instance, most of us would attribute more quality to the life of Florence Nightingale than to that of a drunk, even if it appeared in the end that her good works had a negative result in the end. In classic moral philosophy this is called 'virtuous living', and is often presented as the essence of 'true happiness'. Here the focus is on mere 'experiential' happiness; on how much one likes the life one lives. The difference is well expressed in the earlier mentioned statement of Mill that he preferred an unhappy Socrates to a happy fool. Moral excellence is clearly not the same as feeling good.
Core meaning: Subjective satisfaction with life Finally, the bottom right quadrant represents the inner outcomes of life. That is the quality in the eye of the beholder. As we deal with conscious humans, this quality boils down to subjective satisfaction with life. This is commonly referred to by terms such as 'subjective wellbeing', 'life-satisfaction' and 'happiness' in a limited sense of the word. Humans are capable of evaluating their life in different ways. We have in common with all higher animals that we can appraise our situation affectively. We feel good or bad about particular things and our mood level signals overall adaptation. As in animals these affective appraisals are automatic, but unlike other animals it is known that humans can reflect on this experience. We have an idea of how we have felt
enjoyment of a piece of art. I refer to this category as 'instant-satisfactions'. Kahneman (2000:4) calls it 'instant-utilities'. This quadrant represents hedonistic happiness, especially when the focus is on sensory experience. The concept of happiness used here is broader however. It concerns both overall satisfaction and life-as-a-whole. Though fleeting enjoyment obviously contributes to a positive appreciation of life it is not the whole of it.
Domain satisfaction The top right quadrant denotes enduring appreciation of life-aspects, such as marriage satisfaction and job-satisfaction. This is currently referred to as domain- satisfactions. Though domain-satisfactions depend typically on a continuous flow of instant-satisfactions, they have some continuity of their own. For instance, one can remain satisfied with one's marriage even if one has not enjoyed the company of the spouse for quite some time. Domain-satisfactions are often denoted with the term happiness: a happy marriage, happy with one's job, etc. Yet here the term happiness is used in a broader sense, not for the satisfaction with aspects of life, but for the satisfaction with life-as-a-whole. One would not call a person happy who is satisfied with marriage and job, but still dissatisfied on the whole because his health is failing. It is even possible that someone is satisfied with all the domains one can think of, but nevertheless feels depressed.
Top-experience The bottom right quadrant denotes the combination of passing experience and appraisal of life-as-a-whole. That combination occurs typically in top-experiences, which involve short-lived but quite intense feelings and the perception of wholeness. This is the kind of happiness poet's write about. Again this is not the kind of happiness aimed at here. A moment of bliss is not enduring appreciation of life. In fact such top-experiences even seem detrimental to lasting satisfaction, possibly because of their disorientating effects (Diener et. al. 1989).
Core meaning: lasting satisfaction with one's life-as-a-whole Lastly, the bottom-right quadrant represents the combination of enduring satisfaction with life-as-a-whole. This is what I mean with the word happiness. A synonym is 'life- satisfaction'. This is the meaning the utilitarian philosophers had in mind when talking about happiness. When speaking about the 'sum' of pleasures and pains they denoted a balance over time and thus a durable matter.
2/4 Variable aspects of happiness
Happiness judgments may differ in several respects. I mention some to illustrate what is not in the definition used here.
One difference is in their certainty: some people are rather definitive about their appraisal of life, whereas others vacillate. Though one may attribute less value to the latter appraisals, the concept applies. Doubtful happiness is still happiness. Another point of variation is how well considered the judgment is; some people judge rather intuitively, while others engage in elaborate contemplation. Likewise, appraisals of life are probably not always equally appropriate. Like any perception they can be distorted in various ways, such as by misattribution and self-deceit. This is commonly referred to as `false happiness'. Distorted judgments of life are clearly less valuable as an indicator of apparent quality of life. Nevertheless, inappropriate happiness is still happiness. I do not preserve the word for denoting the 'truly good'
2/5 Focus on 'present' happiness
Evaluations of one's life may concern different periods of life: earlier life, current life and (expected) future life. This database is restricted to evaluations of 'present' life. These evaluations are probably colored by reminiscences of past happiness, and by hopes for the future. Yet they are not the same; one can be satisfied with present life in- spite, or even because of, earlier misery. Likewise, one can be unhappy now, but optimistic about the future.
2/6 Why this concept?
We have considered how happiness is defined above. Now I will discuss the reasons why that conceptualization is preferred above the many other definitions of happiness that have been proposed. In answering this question I return to the above discussion, in particular to that on the difference with related concepts in section 2/3.
Why not include life-chances? In scheme 2/3.1 happiness is placed as an actual outcome of life, and distinguished from concepts that denote good chances. In this respect the present conceptualization differs from current associations of the term with paradise and good health. The main reason for limiting to outcomes is to be found in the purpose of this study. The goal is to find out which conditions are most conductive to happiness. If we include conditions in the definition of happiness we get into circular reasoning. Happiness must be conceptually distinguished from its possible determinants. A second reason is that the quality of life-chances cannot be grasped comprehensively. Another look at scheme 2/3.1 may help to explain why not. Each of the top quadrants involves different qualities that cannot be meaningfully aggregated. In the livability quadrant one cannot add 'fresh air' to 'social justice'. Neither can one sum 'physical health' and 'school intelligence' in the life-ability
Why not emphasize short-lived pleasure? A focus on subjective enjoyment of life (the bottom right quadrant in scheme 2/3.1) does not necessarily imply a restriction to the ‘overall’ enjoyment of ones ‘life-as-a- whole’ (right-bottom quadrant in scheme 2/3.2). Happiness is often described as short-lived satisfaction (left quadrants in scheme 2/3.2), in particular in poetry and advertisement. The reason to focus on enduring enjoyment is obviously that we use the concept to learn more about the merits of lasting conditions, such as the organization of society and of personal lifestyles. If we define happiness as short-lived delight we will not become much wiser. The concept leads us then to shortsighted pleasure seeking. This is fact a common arguments against utilitarianism. A false reproach however, since the utilitarian concept of happiness does not restrict to passing pleasure. Jeremy Bentham (1789) defined happiness as the ‘sum of pleasures and pains’. He used these words ’pleasure’ and ‘pain’ to denote all enjoyable and aversive experience. Not only sensory feelings, but also higher appraisals such as the joy of understanding and ones remorse when looking at personal failure. The word ‘sum’ refers to the whole of this experience and would involve all the criteria for appraisal used (overall) and application on all life-domains (life-as-a-whole). The most basic reason for focusing on overall enjoyment of life is that this brings us closest to the most relevant biological signal. In our biological signal system short-lived likes and dislikes lead us toward or away from particular things, for instance a liking for sweet tastes guides to nutritious foods and a dislike of bitter tastes keeps us away from most poisonous fruits. Yet these sensory experiences tell us little about our wider adaptation. This is rather the function of the hedonic level in moods, which is not linked to specific objects of appreciation. As noted above, mood level signals typically whether we are in a 'right pond' or not, it indicates to what extent the whole of our needs is being met, and this is precisely what we want to know. In this line of reasoning we could even restrict to the hedonic level (the affective component described in section 2/2.1).
Why focus on life-as-a-whole? Next the question why satisfaction with work or marriage is not denoted as happiness. One answer is again that the aim of the endeavor requires an encompassing concept. If people are quite satisfied with their marriage and work but not with their children, family and the government, there is clearly something missing. Such lacks reflect in the overall judgment of life, at least when these latter domains bear relevance. Another reason is that domain-satisfactions are largely cognitive constructs, and hence quite vulnerable to social comparison and fashion. This is particularly true for satisfaction with easily comparable things such as income. Reversibly, estimates of overall enjoyment of life draw typically on unreasoned affect. This point is discussed in more detail in Veenhoven 2009).
Why focus on present happiness? Lastly, why does this database limit to present happiness? The main reason is that present happiness bears most information about how well the individual is doing. Since it draws on recent affective experience it is the most likely to reflect need gratification (remember section 2/2.3). Notions of past and future happiness can be mere dreams. In fact there are indications that present unhappiness can give rise to rosy views of happiness in earlier periods and instigate wishful expectations of future happiness.
Scheme 2/3. Difference with other satisfactions
Passing Enduring
Life aspects Pleasure Domain satisfaction
Life as a whole Peak experience Life satisfaction (happiness)
Scheme 2/3.1a Illustrative use of scheme 2/3.1 to sort contents in a well-being questionnaire: Sheeney’s (1982) ‘Wellbeing Scale’
Outer qualities Inner qualities
Life chances Has love relation In control over life
Life results
Lives usefully (vs. ordinary) Contributes to society
Interested in life Satisfied with life-domains Satisfied with life as a whole Feels to realize dreams
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