Download Conflict and Critical Theories - Chapter 7 and more Study notes Conflictology in PDF only on Docsity!
211
CHAPTER 7
Conflict and
Critical Theories
Part I: Conflict Theory: Lewis Coser
Ralf Dahrendorf (1929–)
Randall Collins (1941–)
What do an argument, the Enron case, bidding on eBay, the civil rights movement, and the U. S. invasion of Iraq have in common? They are all forms of conflict with various levels of intensity and violence. We may only think of war or arguments as conflict, but what the theorists in this first part of the chapter want to point out is that society is rife with conflict—conflict is a general social form that isn’t limited to just overtly violent situations. More than that, conflict doesn’t necessarily rip society apart. In fact, it might be one of the most important ways that society holds itself together. Conflict theory has a long history in sociology. Without question, Karl Marx’s work in the early to mid-1800s formed the initial statements of this perspective. As you know, Marx was centrally concerned with class and the dialectics of capitalism. He argued that capitalism would produce its own gravediggers by creating the con- ditions under which class consciousness and a failing economy would come into existence. In this juncture between structure and class-based group experience, the working class revolution would take place.
Seeing Further: Normal Conflict
In the early twentieth century, Max Weber formulated a response to Marx’s theory. Weber saw that conflict didn’t overwhelmingly involve the economy, but that the state and economy together set up conditions for conflict. Of central importance to Weber’s scheme is the notion of legitimation. All systems of oppres- sion must be legitimated in order to function. Thus, legitimation is one of the critical issues in the idea of conflict. Weber also saw that class is more complex than Marx initially supposed, and that there are other factors that contribute to social inequality, most notably status and party (or power). Since that time, a number of efforts have combined different elements from one or both of these theorists to understand conflict. In this chapter, we will consider three of those efforts. Our first theorist is Lewis Coser. Coser’s work is interesting for two reasons. First, he intentionally draws the majority of his theoretical ideas from Georg Simmel rather than Marx or Weber. Coser uses Marx and Weber now and then to frame or elaborate upon what Simmel has to say, but by and large Coser (1956) presents “a number of basic propositions which have been distilled from theories of social conflict, in particular from the theories of Georg Simmel” (p. 8). Keep this in mind as we talk about Coser’s theory: we could easily substitute Simmel’s name for Coser’s. The second reason Coser is remarkable is that he is the first to consider the func- tional consequences of conflict—other than Simmel, that is. Before Simmel, con- flict had been understood as a source of social change and disintegration. Simmel was the first to acknowledge that conflict is a natural and necessary part of society; Coser brought Simmel’s idea to mainstream sociology, at least in America. From that point on, sociologists have had to acknowledge that
groups require disharmony as well as harmony, dissociation as well as associ- ation; and conflicts within them are by no means altogether disruptive factors.
... Far from being necessarily dysfunctional, a certain degree of conflict is an essential element in group formation and the persistence of group life. (Coser, 1956, p. 31)
In terms of the history of social thought and the layout of this book, it is inter- esting to note that Coser (1956) was motivated to consider the functional conse- quences of conflict to address a deficiency in Talcott Parsons’s theory: “Parsons considers conflict primarily a ‘disease’” (p. 21). In the same vein, it is worthy of note that Coser was a student of Merton’s. Our second theorist is Ralf Dahrendorf. He clearly blends elements from Marx and Weber and he sprinkles in elements from Coser to present a new understand- ing of conflict in society. From Marx he takes the idea of dialectical change: “social structures... are capable of producing within themselves the elements of their supersession and change” (Dahrendorf, 1957/1959, p. viii). If you don’t recall Marx’s use of the dialectic, I encourage you to look back at Chapter 1. Dahrendorf also uses Marx’s notion of political interests stemming from bipo- larized social positions. Remember that Marx argued that capitalism contains only two classes that really matter: the owners and the workers. These two positions are
212 ——THEORY CUMULATION AND SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT
Lewis Coser: The Functional
Consequences of Conflict
214 ——THEORY CUMULATION AND SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT
The Essential Coser Concepts and Theory: Variation in Conflict Basic Sources of Conflict Predicting the Level of Violence Concepts and Theory: The Integrating Forces of Conflict Internal Conflict External Conflict Coser Summary
Biography Lewis Coser was born in Berlin, Germany, in 1913. His family moved to Paris in 1933 where he studied literature and sociology at the Sorbonne. Because of his German heritage, Coser was arrested and interned by the French government near the beginning of WWII. He later was able to get political asylum in the
The Essential Coser
Photo: © Reprinted with permission of the American Sociological Association.
Concepts and Theory: Variation in Conflict
Coser argues that conflict is instinctual for us, so we find it everywhere in human society. There is the conflict of war, but there is also the conflict that we find in our daily lives and relationships. But Coser also argues that conflict is different for humans than for other animals in that our conflicts can be goal related. There is generally something that we are trying to achieve through conflict, and there are different possible ways of reaching our goal. The existence of the possibility of dif- ferent paths opens up opportunities for negotiation and different types and levels of conflict. Because Coser sees conflict as a normal and functional part of human life, he can talk about its variation in ways that others missed, such as the level of violence and functional consequences.
Conflict and Critical Theories—— 215
United States and arrived in New York in 1941. Coser did his Ph.D. work at Columbia University, where he studied under Robert K. Merton. His disserta- tion, The Functions of Social Conflict , took conflict theory in a new direction and was later named as one of the best-selling sociology books of the twenti- eth century by the journal Contemporary Sociology. Coser also authored Masters of Sociological Thought , which became one of the most influential sociological theory books in the English language. In addition, Coser estab- lished the Department of Sociology at Brandeis University; founded Dissent magazine; served as president of the American Sociological Association (1975), the Society for the Study of Social Problems, and the Easter Sociological Association (1983); and is honored annually through the American Sociological Association’s Lewis A. Coser Award for Theoretical Agenda-Setting. Coser died in July of 2003.
Passionate Curiosity James B. Rule (2003), writing in memoriam for Dissent magazine, said of Coser,
he always considered himself an intellectual first and a sociologist second. His aim was always to make some sort of comprehensive sense of the human condition—a sense of the best that social life could offer and a hardheaded look at the worst things human beings could do to one another, a vision of possibilities of change for the better and an assess- ment of the forces weighing for and against those possibilities.
Keys to Knowing Crosscutting influences, absolute deprivation, relative deprivation, rational and transcendent goals, functional consequences of conflict, internal and external conflict, types of internal conflict, network density, group boundaries, internal solidarity, coalitions
it is a low-level conflict in terms of violence. People engage in exchange in order to achieve a goal, and that desired end directs most other factors. Another example is a worker strike. Workers generally go on strike to achieve clearly articulated goals and the strikers usually do not want the struggle to become violent—the violence can detract from achieving their goals (though strikes will become violent under certain conditions). The passive resistance movements of the sixties and early seventies are other examples. We can think of these kinds of encounters as the strategic use of conflict. However, conflict can be violent, and Coser gives us two factors that can produce violent conflict: emotional involvement and transcendent goals. In order to become violent, people must be emotionally engaged. Durkheim saw that group interaction could increase emotional involvements and create moral boundaries around group values and goals. He didn’t apply this to conflict, but Coser does. The more involved we are with a group, the greater is our emotional involvement and the greater the likelihood of violent conflict if our group is threatened. Conflict will also tend to have greater levels of violence when the goals of a group are seen to be transcendent. As long as the efforts of a group are understood to be directed toward everyday concerns, people will tend to moderate their emo- tional involvement and thus keep conflict at a rational level. If, on the other hand, we see the goals of our group as being greater than the group and the concerns of daily life, then conflict is more likely to be violent. For example, when the United States goes to war, the reasons are never expressed by our government in mundane terms. We did not say that we fought the First Gulf War in order to protect our oil interests; we fought the war in order to defeat oppression, preserve freedom, and protect human rights. Anytime violence is deemed necessary by a government, the reasons are couched in moral terms (capitalists might say they fight for individual freedoms; communists would say they fight for social responsibility and the dignity of the collective). The existence of transcendent goals is why the Right to Life side of the abortion conflict tends to exhibit more violence than advocates of choice— their goals are more easily linked to transcendent issues and can thus be seen as God-ordained.
Concepts and Theory: The Integrating Forces of Conflict
Coser makes the case for two kinds of functional consequences of conflict: conflict that occurs within a group and conflict that occurs outside the group. An example of internal conflict is the tension that can exist between indigenous populations or first nations and the national government. Notice that this internal conflict is actually between or among groups that function within the same social system. Examples of external group conflicts are the wars in which a nation may involve itself. When considering the consequences for internal group conflict, Coser is con- cerned with low-level and more frequent conflict. When explaining the conse- quences for external conflict, he is thinking about more violent conflict.
Conflict and Critical Theories—— 217
Internal Conflict
Internal conflict in the larger social system, as between different groups within the United States, releases hostilities, creates norms for dealing with conflict, and develops lines of authority and judiciary systems. Remember that Coser sees conflict as instinctual for humans. Thus, a society must always contend with the psychological need of individuals to engage in conflict. Coser appears to argue that this need can build up over time and become explosive. Low-level, frequent conflict tends to release hostilities and thus keep conflict from building and becoming disintegrative for the system. This kind of conflict also creates pressures for society to produce norms govern- ing conflict. For example, most of the formal norms (laws) governing labor in Western capitalist countries came about because of the conflict between labor and management. We can see this same dynamic operating at the dyad level as well. For example, when a couple in a long-term relationship experiences repeated episodes of conflict, such as arguing, they will attempt to come up with norms for handling the tension in a way that preserves the integrity of the relationship. The same is true for the social system, but the social system will go a step further and develop formal authorities and systems of judgment to handle conflict. Thus, frequent, low-level conflict creates moral and social structures that facilitate social integration. Coser also notes that not every internal conflict will be functional. It depends on the types of conflict and social structure that are involved. In Coser’s theory, there are two basic types of internal conflict: those that threaten or contradict the funda- mental assumptions of the group relationship and those that don’t. Every group is based on certain beliefs regarding what the group is about. Let’s take marriage as an example of a group. For many people, a basic assumption undergirding marriage is sexual fidelity. A husband and wife may argue about many things—such as finances, chores, toilet seats, and tubes of toothpaste—but chances are good that none of these will be a threat to the stability of the “group” (dyad) because they don’t contradict a basic assumption that provides the basis of the group in the first place. Adultery, on the other hand, may very well put the marriage in jeopardy because it goes against one of the primary defining features of the group. Conflict over such things as household chores may prove to be functional in the long run for the marriage, while adultery may be dysfunctional and lead to the breakup of the group. However, I want you to notice something very important here: In Coser’s way of thinking about things, adultery won’t break a marriage up because it is morally wrong. Whether the relationship will survive depends on the couple’s basic assumptions as to its reasons for existence. A couple may have an “open marriage” based on the assumption that people are naturally attracted to other people and sexual flings are to be expected. In such a case, outside sexual relations will proba- bly not break the group apart. Couples within such marriages may experience ten- sion or fight about one another’s sexual exploits—and research indicates that they often do—but such conflict will tend to be functional for the marriage because of its basic assumptions. Note also that conflict over household chores may indeed be dysfunctional if the underlying assumption of the marriage is egalitarianism, but the actual division of labor in the house occurs along stereotypical gender lines.
218 ——THEORY CUMULATION AND SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT
In addition, a group experiencing conflict will tend to produce a more central- ized power structure. A centralized government is more efficient in terms of response time to danger, regulating internal stresses and needs, negotiating external relations, and so on. Violent conflict also tends to produce coalitions with previ- ously neutral parties. Again, WWII is a clear example. The story of WWII is one of increasing violence with more and more parties being drawn in. Violent conflict produces alliances that would have previously been thought unlikely, such as the United States being allied with Russia.
Coalition... permits the coming together of elements that... would resist other forms of unification. Although it is the most unstable form of socializa- tion, it has the distinct advantage of providing some unification where unifi- cation might otherwise not be possible. (Coser, 1956, p. 143)
Coser Summary
- Contrary to the claims of most previous theorists, Coser argues that conflict can have integrating as well as disintegrating effects. Conflict functions differently whether it is between unrelated groups (external) or inside a group, between fac- tions (internal).
- For internal conflict, the question of functionality hinges on the conflict being less violent and more frequent, not threatening the basic assumptions of the group at large, and the group having low interactional network density. Under these conditions, internal conflict will produce the following functional consequences: conflicts will serve to release pent-up hostilities, create norms regulating conflict, and develop clear lines of authority and jurisdiction (especially around the issues that conflict develops).
- External conflict that is more violent will tend to have the following func- tional consequences: stronger group boundaries, higher social solidarity, and more efficient use of power and authority. Conflict violence will tend to increase in the presence of high levels of emotional involvement and transcendent goals.
Ralf Dahrendorf: Power and Dialectical Change
We move now to Ralf Dahrendorf ’s theory of power and dialectical change. Like Coser, Dahrendorf sees conflict as universally present in all human relations. But Dahrendorf doesn’t see the inevitability of conflict as part of human nature; he sees it, rather, as a normal part of how we structure society and create social order. In this sense, Dahrendorf is concerned with the same issue as Talcott Parsons: How is social order achieved? However, rather than assuming collective agreement about norms, values, and social positions, as Parsons does, Dahrendorf argues that it is power that both defines and enforces the guiding principles of society. Dahrendorf also follows Coser in talking about the level of violence and its effects, but Dahrendorf adds a further variable: conflict intensity.
220 ——THEORY CUMULATION AND SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT
The Essential Dahrendorf Concepts and Theory: Power and Group Interests Power Latent and Manifest Interests Concepts and Theory: Conflict Groups and Social Change Conditions of Conflict Group Formation Social Change Dahrendorf Summary
Conflict and Critical Theories—— 221
Biography Ralf Dahrendorf was born in Hamburg, Germany, on May 1, 1929. His father was a Social Democratic politician and member of the German Parliament who was arrested and imprisoned by the Nazis during WWII. The younger Dahrendorf was arrested as well, fortuitously escaping death by only a few days. His father continued in politics after WWII in the Soviet-held portion of Germany, but was again arrested, this time by the Soviets. He eventually escaped and fled with Ralf to England. Young Dahrendorf later returned to Germany to study at the University of Hamburg, where he received his first
The Essential Dahrendorf
Photo: Hulton Archives/Getty Images.
And imagine the small political base of a fat dwarf. Nothing to stop us from slapping our knees, rolling on the floor. Let’s apologize to all of them, Roberta said at the spirited dinner table. But by then we could hardly contain ourselves.
—Stephen Dunn (1996, p. 61)*
Power
Power is an uneasy word, a word we don’t like to acknowledge in proper company. Perhaps we may even shy away from it in improper company, because to speak it is to make it crass. It is certainly a word that social scientists are uncom- fortable yet obsessed with. Social scientists understand that power makes the human world go round, but they have a devil of a time defining it or determining where it exists. One of the reasons it is hard to define is that it is present in every social situation. Who has power, where is it located, and how is it exercised? Those questions have proven themselves to be quite difficult for social scientists to answer. Some theorists see power as an element of social structure—something attached to a position within the structure, such as the power that comes with being the president of the United States. In this scheme, power is something that a person can possess and use (see Janet Chafetz, Chapter 8). Other theorists define power as an element of exchange (see Chapter 10). Others see power more in terms of influence. This is a more general way in which to think of power, because many types of social relationships and people can exercise influence. Still other thinkers, as we will see when we get to Michel Foucault (Chapter 14), define power as insidiously invested in text, knowledge, and discourse (see also Dorothy E. Smith, Chapter 13). I want to encourage you to pay close attention to the way our the- orists speak of power and how it is used in society and social relations. It’s an extremely important social factor and one that is multifaceted in the ways it is used. For his part, Dahrendorf (1957/1959), here quoting Weber, defines power as “the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests” (p. 166). Dahrendorf also makes the distinction, along with Weber, between power and authority. Power is something that can be exercised at any moment in all social relations and depends mostly on the personalities of the individuals involved. Because of its uni- versal characteristic, Dahrendorf calls power “factual”: it is a fact of human life. Power can be based on such different sources as persuasion and brute force. If someone has a gun pointed at your head, chances are good that the person has
Conflict and Critical Theories—— 223
*“Power,” from Loosestrife by Stephen Dunn. Copyright © 1996 by Stephen Dunn. Used by permission of W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.
the power in the encounter; that is, if he or she is willing to use it and you’re afraid of dying, then chances are good you’ll do what the person says—those individual features are where personality comes in. Persuasion works subtly as we are drawn in by the personal magnetism of the other person. Persuasion can also be based on skills: if someone knows how interactions work and knows social psychology, then she or he can manipulate those factors and achieve power in the interaction. Again, a specific personality is involved—knowing how to manipulate people and actually doing it are two different things. However, like Weber, Dahrendorf is more interested in authority than this kind of factual power. Authority is a form of power, of course, but it is legitimate power. It is power that is “always associated with social positions or roles” (Dahrendorf, 1957/1959, p. 166). Authority is part of social organization, not individual personal- ity. Please note where Dahrendorf locates authority—the legitimated use of power is found in the status positions, roles, and norms of organizations. Obvious examples are your professors, the police, your boss at work, and so on. Because of its organi- zational embeddedness, Dahrendorf refers to authoritative social relations as imper- atively coordinated associations (ICAs). I know that sounds like a complex idea, but it actually isn’t. If something is imperative, it is binding and compulsory; you must do it. So the term simply says that social relations are managed through legitimated power (authority). While the term is straightforward, it is also important. As I mentioned before, Dahrendorf positions himself against Parsons, and here is where we can see the differences that he wants to accentuate. Dahrendorf (1968) makes the distinction between the “equilibrium approach” to social order and the “constraint approach” (pp. 139–140). Parsons is concerned with what is commonly called the Hobbesian problem of social order , after the philosopher Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes felt that, apart from social enforcement, some kind of glue binding people together, society would disintegrate into continual chaos and confrontation. The problem, then, is to explain how selfishly motivated actors create social order. If all you care about is yourself, why would you cooperate with other people to achieve goals you don’t care about? One solution to the problem is found in exchange theory (Chapter 10); another prominent idea is proposed by both Durkheim and Parsons. Functionalists argue for the equilibrium approach to the problem of social order: society is produced as individuals are constrained and directed through a cohesive set of norms, values, and beliefs. For Durkheim, this took the form of a moral collective consciousness that imposes its will on the indi- vidual members of the group. You’ll remember that, for Parsons, the solution is found in modes of orientation, commonly held cultural belief systems, expressive symbols, value orientations, and recognizable types of action. Dahrendorf (1968) recognizes that “continuity is without a doubt one of the fundamental puzzles of social life” but argues that social order is the result of con- straint rather than some consensus around social beliefs (pp. 139–140). In the con- straint approach, the norms and values of society are established and imposed through authoritative power. Be careful to see the distinction that’s being made. In the equilibrium model, the actions of individuals are organized through a collec- tively held and agreed-upon set of values, roles or types of action, expressive symbols, and so on. In this Durkheim–Parsons model, these cultural elements hold
224 ——THEORY CUMULATION AND SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT
For example, let’s say you are a manager at a local eatery that is part of a restau- rant chain. As manager, you will have a number of employees over whom you have authority and exercise power. You will share that power with other shift or section managers. In the restaurant, then, there are two groups with different power inter- ests: a group of managers and a group of employees. At the same time, you have regional and corporate managers over you. This part of the organizational structure sets up additional dichotomous power interests. In this case, you are the underling and your bosses exercise power over you and others. If you stop and think about it, you’ll see what Dahrendorf wants us to see: Society is set up and managed through imperatively coordinated associations. Society is a tapestry that is woven together by different sets of power interests. Okay, social relationships are coordinated through authority and power is every- where. What’s the big deal? What else does Dahrendorf want us to see? There’s an important distinction and significant question that Dahrendorf wants us to become aware of. Using two terms from Merton, Dahrendorf argues that everyone is involved in positions and groups with latent power interests. People with these similar interests are called quasi-groups. Quasi-groups “consist of incumbents of roles endowed with like expectations of interests” and represent “recruiting fields” for the formation of real interest groups. Interest groups, Dahrendorf tells us, “are the real agents of group con- flict” (Dahrendorf, 1957/1959, p. 180). Everybody is part of various quasi-groups. For example, you and your fellow students form a loose aggregate of interests opposed to the professors at your university. Here’s the significant question that Dahrendorf wants us to consider: How do latent interests become manifest interests? In other words, what are the social factors that move an aggregate from a quasi-group to an interest group?
Concepts and Theory: Conflict
Groups and Social Change
Conditions of Conflict Group Formation
Before we get into these conditions, let me reemphasize an important sociolog- ical point. Every single one of us maintains different positions within social aggre- gates. An aggregate is simply “a mass or body of units or parts somewhat loosely associated with one another” (Merriam-Webster, 2002). For example, you have an economic class position; perhaps you’re working or middle class. Yet, while you share that position with a vast number of others, you may not experience any sense of group identity or shared interests. When, why, and how these aggregates actually form into social groups is a significant sociological question. As an illustration, ask yourself what would have to happen for you and your fellow students to become an active social group that would rise up against the authority of your professors or campus administrators? More significantly, what are the conditions under which disenfranchised groups such as gays and lesbians (in the United States) would challenge the existing power arrangements? Dahrendorf gives us three sets of conditions that must be met for a group to become active in conflict: technical, political, and social conditions. The technical
226 ——THEORY CUMULATION AND SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT
conditions are those things without which a group simply can’t function. They are the things that actually define a social group as compared to an aggregate. The technical conditions include members, ideas or ideologies (what Dahrendorf calls a “charter”), and norms. The members that Dahrendorf has in mind are the people who are active in the organization of the group. For an illustration, we can think of a Christian church. As any pastor knows, within a congregation there are active and inactive members. There are the people who actually make the church work by teaching Sunday school or organizing bake sales; and then there are the people who show up once or twice a week and simply attend. We can see the same thing in political parties: There are those who are active year in and year out and there are those who simply vote. It’s the workers or “leading group” that Dahrendorf has in mind as members. For a collective to function as a group, there also has to be a defining set of ideas, or an ideology. These ideas must be distinct enough from the ruling party to set the conflict group apart. For example, for the students at your school to become an interest group, there would have to be a set of ideas and values that are different from the ones the administration and faculty hold. Just such an ideology was present during the free speech movement at the University of California at Berkeley during the sixties. A friend of mine taught his first introduction to sociology class at Berkeley during this time. He walked in on the first day of class and handed out his syllabus. In response, the students, all 300 of them, got up and walked out. Why? The students believed that they should have had input in making up the syllabus— a value that most professors don’t hold. (My friend, by the way, invited them back to collectively negotiate a syllabus.) A group also requires norms. Groups are unruly things. Without norms, people tend to go off in their own direction either by mistake or intention. There must be some social mechanism that acts like a shepherd dog, nipping at the heels of the sheep to bring them back to the flock. So important are norms to human existence, Durkheim argued that people would commit suicide if there were no clear norms to guide behavior (anomic suicide). Norms are particularly important for interest groups involved in conflict. Conflict demands a united stand from the interest group, and norms help preserve that solidarity. Note also that the existence of norms implies a power hierarchy within the interest group itself—a leadership cadre. The political conditions refer specifically to the ability to meet and organize. This is fairly obvious but is nonetheless important. Using our student revolt example, let’s say that your university administration got wind of student unrest. Now, where is the most logical and the easiest place for a group of students to meet? The college campus would be the best place; many students live there and perhaps have limited transportation, and the campus is also the place that every student knows. However, the administration controls access to all campus facilities and could forbid students to gather, especially if they knew that the students were fomenting a revolt. The administration could further hamper meetings through the way the campus is built. I attended a school that was building a student center while I was there. Everybody was excited, and we students were looking forward to having all the amenities that come with such a facility, such as greater choices in food (we would be getting Burger King, Kentucky Fried Chicken, Pizza Hut, and assorted other
Conflict and Critical Theories—— 227
Social Change
According to Dahrendorf, conflict will vary by its level of intensity and vio- lence. Conflict intensity refers to the amount of costs and involvement. The cost of conflict is rather intuitive; it refers to the money, life, material, and infrastruc- ture that are lost due to conflict. Involvement refers to the level of importance the people in the conflict attach to the group and its issues. We can think of this involvement as varying on a continuum from the level that a game of checkers requires to that of a front-line soldier. Checkers only requires a small portion of a person’s personality and energy, while participating in a war where life and death are at stake will engulf an individual’s entire psyche. For Dahrendorf, conflict vio- lence refers to how conflict is manifested and is basically measured by the kinds of weapons used. Peaceful demonstrations are conflictual but exhibit an extremely low level of violence, while riots are far more violent. While violence and intensity can go together, as in a nuclear war, they don’t nec- essarily covary, and they tend to influence social change in different directions. More intense conflicts will tend to generate more profound social changes. We can think of the life of Mahatma Gandhi as an example of conflict with a high level of intensity but no violence. Gandhi is also a good example of the profound social changes that intense conflict can engender. Not only was he centrally responsible for major structural changes in Indian society, he has also had a profound and lasting impact worldwide. On the other hand, the violence of a conflict will influence how quickly the changes occur. We can think of the recent invasion of Iraq by the U.S. military as an example of violent conflict and rapid social change. The United States invaded Iraq on March 20, 2003. On April 9, 2003, Baghdad fell to the U.S.-led military forces. On that day, U.S. marines pulled down the 20-foot-tall statue of Saddam Hussein, thus symbolically ending his regime. An interim Iraqi government was appointed in 2004 and elections for a permanent government occurred in 2005. How deep these structural changes go remains to be seen, yet there is little doubt that the rapidness of the changes is due to the level of violence the United States government was willing to employ. Important note: the two examples I’ve just given are somewhat outside the scope of Dahrendorf interests. Remember that Dahrendorf is concerned primarily with explaining class conflict within a society. The reason I used those examples is that they clearly point out the differences between the violence and the intensity of conflict. Often class conflict, especially over longer periods of time, involves both intensity and violence and thus they are difficult to empirically disengage from one another. A good example of these factors is the civil rights movement in the United States. I invite you to check out a civil rights timeline by using your favorite Internet search engine; be sure to use a timeline that goes back at least to
- Think about the types of conflict, whether intense or violent, and the kinds of social changes occurring.
Conflict and Critical Theories—— 229
Level of Violence
Within a society, the violence of class conflict, as defined by Dahrendorf, is related to three distinct groups of social factors: (1) the technical, political, and social conditions of organization; (2) the effective regulation of conflict within a society; and (3) the level of relative deprivation. Violence is negatively related to the three conditions of organization. In other words, the more a group has met the technical, political, and social conditions of organization, the less likely it is that the conflict will be violent. Remember, we saw this idea in a more basic form with Coser. While some level of organization is necessary for a group to move from quasi- to interest group, the better organized a group is, the more likely it is to have rational goals and to seek reasonable means to achieve those goals. The violence of a conflict is also negatively related to the presence of legitimate ways of regulating conflict. In other words, the greater the level of formal or infor- mal norms regulating conflict, the greater the probability that both parties will use the norms or judicial paths to resolve the conflict. However, this factor is influenced by two others. In order for the two interested parties to use legitimate roads of con- flict resolution, they must recognize the fundamental justice of the cause involved (even if they don’t agree on the outcome), and both parties need to be well- organized. In addition, the possibility of violent conflict is positively related to a sense of relative deprivation. We reviewed this idea with Coser, but here Dahrendorf is specifying the concept more and linking it explicitly to the level of violence.
Level of Intensity
Within a social system, the level of conflict intensity is related to the technical, political, and social conditions of organization; the level of social mobility; and to the way in which power and other scarce resources are distributed in society. Notice that both violence and intensity are related to group organization and the relation- ship in both cases is negative. The violence and intensity of conflict will tend to go down as groups are better organized—again, for the same reason: better organi- zation means more rational action. With Coser, we saw that people will begin to question the legitimacy of the dis- tribution of scarce resources as the desired goods and social positions tend to all go to the same class. Here, Dahrendorf is being more specific and is linking this issue with conflict intensity. The relationship is positive: the more society’s scarce resources are bestowed upon a single social category, the greater will be the intensity of the conflict. In this case, the interest groups will see the goals of conflict as more significant and worth more involvement and cost. Finally, the intensity of a conflict is negatively related to social mobility. If an ICA (imperatively coordinated associa- tion) sees its ability to achieve society’s highly valued goods and positions systemat- ically hampered, then chances are good the group members will see the conflict as worth investing more of themselves in and possibly sustaining greater costs. In Table 7.1, I’ve listed the various propositions that Coser and Dahrendorf give us concerning the varying levels of conflict violence and intensity. As you can see, the level of violence tends to go up with increasing levels of emotional involvement,
230 ——THEORY CUMULATION AND SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT
