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Con Crim Pro
Introduction. This topic has exponentially increased in the last 50 years. SCOTUS has developed a constitutional floor, interpreting the Constitution to require at least “this” and the state can do more. 4h Amendment – reasonable clause, warrant clause; warrantless searches. 5 th^ – double jeopardy, no compelled self-incrimination, due process. 6th^ – speedy trial, impartial jury, confrontation, compulsory process.
A. Threshold Question: Do we have a Search?
a. Katz v. United States : police attached a listening device to a public telephone booth
a.i. Test up to this point – is there a physical intrusion/trespass? If police didn’t violate a property right, it wasn’t a search.
a.ii. Katz test: (a) Did suspect have an expectation of privacy and, if so (b) was it one society would recognizes as reasonable?
b. United States v. White : 1971 – government informant was speaking to White with a listening device on transmitting their conversation to agents.
a.iii. Holding: you have no expectation of privacy when speaking to another person: when you choose to talk to another person, you do so at your own risk (of them sharing your information, etc.)
c. Smith v. Maryland : police requested phone company to install a pen register to record numbers dialed from petitioners home. Police didn’t get a warrant. Tracked Smith’s phone calls and obtained a warrant to search based on this.
a.iv. Held that he had no legitimate expectation of privacy b/c society would recognize that the numbers they dialed would be publicly accessible at telephone company.
a.v. Similar analogy to White speaking to another individual
d. California v. Ciraolo – police suspected marijuana in backyard so flew over at low elevation & saw the marijuana and took pictures.
a.vi. What is the “curtilage?”
d.1. Area of intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a person’s house
a.vii. U.S. v. Dunn : (1) area’s proximity to the house, (2) is there an enclosure? (3) nature of the use, (4) precautions taken to keep others away.
a.viii. Curtilage is not in itself a bar to all police observation, neither does the fact that an individual has taken measures to restrict the same views of his activities preclude an officer’s observations from a public vantage point where he has a right to be and which renders the activities clearly visible.
d.2. Analysis: b/c this took place in a navigable airspace in a physically nonintrusive manner, where plants were readily discernible, this was somehow “in the public view.” “Any person would have been able to see it”
d.3. Dissent: if a “search” requires an actual physical invasion, there is no real protection against surveillance technology.
d.4. Rule : look at whether the item used is available to the public or only to the police
d.5. Trespass: there is no reasonable expectation of privacy if someone goes in your neighbor’s yard and sees your yard. The neighbor may have a trespass suit against the police but it won’t invalidate the search.
- Even a helicopter at 400 fit was not a search but lower would be (Fl v. Riley)
e. U.S. v. Knotts (note case). Beeper on chemicals was not a search because the police could’ve followed the chemicals. But see Jones : GPS tracker on vehicle for 30 days was an invalid search.
f. Bond v. U.S - border patrol on bus squeezed a piece of luggage, asked to search it, found meth. Court held squeezing bag was too intrusive
a.ix. Theory: police wouldn’t have asked for consent if he hadn’t squeezed the bag first.
d.6. But a public bus where people touch your bag? Court says more intrusive than normal public touching. Expect people to see, push/move your luggage, not squeeze
g. Kyllo v. U.S. – 2001 – indoor marijuana discovered with thermal imagery device.
a.x. Not a device in public use. Once a device is in public use, using it isn’t a search.
h. Fla. Vv. Jardines – 2013 – investigation with dogs on porch was a search. Grady v. N.C. – 2015 – satellite monitoring for sex offender was a search; physically intruded on subject’s body. Didn’t matter the purpose (for civil, not criminal).
B. Probable Cause
B.a. The 4th^ Amendment applies to state or federal; any government actor, typically police, but can be more than that (even HSLDA social workers). No warrant w/o PC, oath or affirmation, particularly describing things observed. Neutral magistrate examines affidavit by police officer. If there is probable cause, then he will grant a warrant.
B.i. the first ½ of the 4th^ Amendment doesn’t say warrant but default setting for reasonable search has been to require a warrant by complying w/ 2nd^ part of 4 th Amendment.
B.ii. There are warrant exceptions, covered later.
B.iii. Probable cause to arrest : exists where the facts and circumstances within the officers knowledge and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested.
B.ix. Why get rid of A-S? too much required before police can act, negative effect. The two prongs are still highly relevant but not to be rigidly applied
B.x. Standard for P.C.: “fair probability,” or “substantial chance.”
B.xi. Even under Gates , if the tip is simply conclusions with no facts to back it up, it won’t establish P.C.
B.f. Whren v. U.S. – in a high-drug area, the police stopped Δ’s for small traffic violation b/c they suspected drugs (argued, pretextual) and saw drugs in their laps & confiscated them and arrested them.
B.xii. Rule: it doesn’t matter why the police arrested defendants, as long as they had PC for even a minor traffic violation (objective PC) the stop and search is valid without a warrant.
B.xiii. We’re not going to psycho-evaluate the police.
B.xiv. Fla v. Harris – drug-sniffing dog – when is an alert enough for P.C.? Use totality of the circumstances.
C. Warrant Requirement/Reasonableness
B.g. Johnson v. U.S. 1948: a confidential informant reported unknown persons smoking opium at a Hotel. Police went and smelled the opium, didn’t get a warrant, went in the room, arrested & searched and found opium. Definitely a search.
B.xv. Held unconstitutional; a neutral magistrate’s determination to search is necessary.
B.11. Another opinion is more neutral, protects against some unreasonable searches.
B.12. There is a strong presumption in favor of warrants for searches.
B.h. U.s. v. Watson : 1976 – Postal inspector – stolen credit cards. They arrested him w/o a warrant but Watson was in a public place, lured there by informant with police investigation.
B.xvi. Rule: officers may arrest without a warrant one believed by the officer upon reasonable cause to have been guilty of a felony. Anywhere where person doesn’t have a reasonable expectation of privacy
B.13. More danger/harm in felon arrests
B.14. CL history
B.15. Felonies used to be a small subset of crimes
B.i. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista 2001 – Mrs. Atwater protests being taken to jail for an offense punishable only by a fine.
B.xvii. Rule: if an officer sees a crime (even a misdemeanor) committed in his presence, he can arrest, no matter how minor the offense, even if it doesn’t punish with a jail term.
B.j. Maryland v. King – 2013 – arrest by PC – a DNA swab was allowed
D. Knock and announce rule – police officers must knock and announce before breaking in
B.k. Banks – how long must they wait before opening?
B.xviii. At a motel – a few seconds
B.xix. Larger residence – 15-20 seconds
B.xx. Big house – several minutes
B.xxi. Why must they wait?
B.16. Protect property
B.17. Privacy of home
B.18. Innocents
B.19. Safety of officers and residences
B.xxii. Why do they not want to wait?
B.20. Evidence could be destroyed
B.21. Perpetrators could escape
B.xxiii. Rule: must allow a reasonable amount of time to let a person get to the door and open it.
B.l. Richards v. Wisconsin , felony drug investigation – police said it was the strongest case for an exception to the knock-and-announce rule. SCOTUS disagreed. Must analyze each case
B.xxiv. But, exigent circumstances could apply. If the police can establish that there were strong reasons to enter without knocking and announcing, it may be okay. Court was very willing to give an absolute per se rule, though most felony drug arrests will meet exigent circumstances.
E. Searches Incident to Arrests
B.m. Exceptions to search warrants
B.xxv. Include exigent circumstances, car doctrine searches, inventory searches, consent, and plain view
B.n. Chimel v. California : Police arrived at home of petitioner with a warrant for his arrest for coin burglary. They arrest him and searched his whole house for coins. Ruled unconstitutional search.
E.b. Justification: lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interests arrestee may have had
B.q. AZ v. Gant – acting on an anonymous tip for an unrelated crime, the police officers found Gant at a home and found he had an outstanding warrant for his arrest for driving with a suspended license. They arrested him and searched his car, finding drugs.
B.xxxiii. Rule: rejected a broad reading of Belton and held that Chimel rationale authorizes police to search the vehicle incident to recent occupant arrest only when arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of passenger compartment at time of search.
B.31. Rule: police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search OR it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest
B.32. when justifications are absent, a search of a vehicle is unreasonable w/o a warrant, or showing another exception to the warrant requirement
F. Warrant Requirement/Reasonableness – Particularity Requirement
B.r. U.S. v. Grubbs – Grubbs ordered child porn from undercover postal inspector who got an anticipatory search warrant. The triggering condition would be someone coming to the door to get the package. The constitutional issue – do anticipatory warrants contravene P.C. b/c the evidence to be searched wasn’t there when the warrant was issued?
B.xxxiv. Why not wait?
B.33. Videotape is portable and could disappear
B.34. Anticipatory warrant – judge issues warrant when we know proof isn’t there yet but will be
B.35. “based on probable cause” doesn’t require 100% certainty
B.36. Regular warrant – a magistrate determines P.C. Anticipatory warrant – a police officer makes the decision.
B.xxxv. what puts us in probable cause world?
B.37. Rule – if officers play by the rules, they can get whatever (even in a mistaken apartment since they got the search warrant & only while inside discovered there were two)
B.38. Rule – “Good faith standard” – a GF mistake won’t hurt the case
E.c. Requires good faith through the whole chain.
B.s. Andresen v. Maryland 1976 – fraudulent real estate practices with a general warrant obtained a lot of documents and Δ said it was a “General” warrant.
B.xxxvi. Was the language “together with fruits, instrumentalities, & evidence of crime sufficiently particular?
B.xxxvii. Court – it described “Lot13T documents” and thus was read to relate only to the crime with respect to Lot 13T; therefore, it was sufficiently particular
B.xxxviii. Does the fact that part of it is particular make it okay?
B.39. If you exceed the scope of the warrant, you can’t keep it unless under plain view doctrine
B.xxxix. Particularity is a sliding scale, based on circumstances
G. Searches incident to arrest & searches for arrestees
B.t. Payton v. New York : Payton and Riddick were both in their homes at the time of the arrest, they didn’t consent to an entrance, and the police did not have warrants. Their arrests were unconstitutional
B.xl. Arrests of felons in public places are allowed
B.xli. Behind closed doors arrests are unconst’l
B.u. Steagald : big-time drug offender. The DEA were contacted by Confidential Informant (CI) who told them Lyons, a federal fugitive, was at a certain number. Lyons was the subject of a -month-old arrest warrant. Two days later, twelve police drove to the address matched by the phone company to search for Lyons. They frisked petitioner Steagald and others then went to the house and searched and found cocaine. Upon being informed of this discovery, an officer went to obtain a search warrant. In the meantime, an officer searched and found additional incriminating evidence. During a third search with a warrant, the agents found 43 pounds of cocaine. The search was unconstitutional
B.xlii. Fruit of the poisonous tree: Everything that derives from an illegal search is excluded
B.xliii. If Lyons was in the house, they may violate Gaultney (homeowners) rights to get evidence of him, and Gaultney may have a suit but suspect would not because his 4 th^ Am. rights haven’t been violated
B.xliv. Rule of Payton and Steagald : when police make an entry into a home to arrest for a felony , assuming no exigent circumstances or consent, the arrestee is entitled to two things :
B.40. An arrest warrant with PC determined by a magistrate; and
B.41. A PC determination that he is inside the dwelling (made by police).
arrested him for DUI. government relied on exigent circum. Exception to justify warrantless nighttime entry but S. Ct. rejected
B.l. Exigent Circumstances rarely applies to a minor offense
B.li. Hot pursuit was unsuccessful b/c there was no “immediate and continuous pursuit of petitioner from the scene of the crime”
B.49. They had PC but it was a 4th^ Am. violation because
E.h. Threat was diminished (not in car anymore)
B.y. Brigham v. Stuart – warrantless entry justified after witnessing fight between 4 adults and 1 juvenile
B.z. Il. v. MacArthur – officers went to get warrant, left one officer at house with Δ, outside, made him wait outside for 2 hours, (PC to believe drugs inside house). This was valid, a lesser intrusion than just going in to the house
B.aa. MI v. Fisher – fisher was inside his house going crazy, officer stepped in w/o warrant, justified
B.lii. Rule: if there is a threat of danger to people inside the house, it is an exigent circumstance allowing people to enter
B.bb. Mich. V. McNealy – blood drawn from suspect on way to hospital. Wouldn’t create a per se rule that blood alcohol content/DUI offense was an exigent circumstance. Court wants case-by-case basis
B.cc. Summary: 3 categories of exigent circumstances
B.liii. “Hot pursuit” – Hayden – fairly reasonably behind suspect
B.liv. Any level of danger to anyone’s life
B.lv. Imminent destruction of evidence
I. Vehicle and Container Searches
B.dd. Chambers v. Maroney – Δ was convicted of armed robbery. Witnesses saw a blue station wagon earlier and reported it. Police found and took the car to the station and searched it without a weapon, finding weapons and ammunition.
B.lvi. Rule: when there is PC to search an automobile stopped along a highway, an immediate warrantless search is constitutionally permissible
B.50. Always requires probable cause
E.i. Opportunity to search is fleeting
E.j. Inherent mobility of cars justifies this exception
B.lvii. The 2 questions not answered after Chambers was how much time could pass and must the search take place at the point of the stop?
B.ee. Coolidge v. N.H. – murder conviction, police were investigating Δ’s house. Δ was cooperative. They came back later to search with warrants signed by the Attorney General , which were not valid.
B.lviii. Does the exception apply to vehicles parked on private property?
B.51. Plurality said no (no longer good law according to Professor Jacobs)
B.lix. Where must the search take place?
B.52. Rule: Where they may stop and immediately search a car, they can also take the car back to the station to search.
B.ff. Texas v. White – upheld warrantless search, arrested Δ in his car, searched car and found checks.
B.lx. Clear holding that warrantless car searches that could be done at the site could also be taken back to the station to search
B.gg. Cal. V. Carney – Δ lived in a mobile home in a city parking lot. He was living inside. Police witnessed him sell drugs to a boy in exchange for sex. They went in and arrested and searched without a warrant and found drugs.
B.lxi. This was a vehicle parked on public property, so the automobile exception applied
B.lxii. Motor homes?
B.53. If it is more or less permanent, not subject to car exception
B.54. If it could move at a moment’s notice – with an engine/ motor, no cab necessary, not on stilts – subject to automobile exception
B.lxiii. If a vehicle is on private property, this seems to still apply the automobile exception, allowing the car to be searched
B.hh. Summary: what is need for a valid automobile search?
B.55. Probable cause
B.56. Readily movable vehicle
B.57. Subject to search regardless of where it is
B.58. Some time limit
E.k. Less than a year, but three days is okay
J. Container Searches and Inventory Searches
was unlocked and inventory searched, finding marijuana. Inventory of a car is generally reasonable:
B.lxx. Must be following standard operating procedure;
B.lxxi. Must have a reason to lawfully impound the vehicle
B.lxxii. Scope – anything accessible in the vehicle, not typically into engine or under door panels
B.61. Protection of owner’s property while it’s in custody;
B.62. Protection of police against claims of lost/stolen property;
B.63. Protection of police from hidden dangers
B.nn. Illinois v. Lafayette – Rule: it’s reasonable for police to search the personal effects of a person under lawful arrest.
B.lxxiii. Administrative procedure
B.lxxiv. 4 th^ Am. doesn’t require additional steps like putting the bag in lockers, just assuring against violations of the Constitution, and standard operating procedures don’t violate the constitution
B.oo. California v. Bertine – police officer arrested Bertine for DUI. After B was taken and before tow truck arrived, police inventoried contents of van and found drugs. This was reasonable.
B.lxxv. Rule: Reasonable police regulations relating to inventory procedures administered in good faith satisfy the 4th^ Amendment
B.lxxvi. It’s the police’s judgment to give him other opportunities or not; to impound r not.
B.64. Fla v. Welli stated that inventories do NOT need to be either always or never; police has the latitude to decide.
L. Consent Searches
B.pp. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte – pulled over a car with 6 men. Officer asked to search. Alcala said, “Sure, go ahead.” The officer asked if the trunk opened; A said “Yes” and opened it. Police found 3 stolen checks.
B.lxxvii. What must the prosecutor prove to demonstrate consent was voluntarily given?
B.65. Consider the totality of the circumstances, a consent is a consent. The subject’s knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account but the prosecution does not have to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing voluntary consent
B.qq. United States v. Matlock – Mr. Matlock was arrested in his backyard. Mrs. Graff opened the door with her baby in her arms and consented to search; she lived in the same bedroom with Matlock. They found money from robbery in the diaper bag. Matlock alleges that her consent was not enough.
B.lxxviii. Rule: common authority is not to be implied from the mere property interest a 3rd^ party has in the property, but … 3rd^ party consent rests on mutual use of property by persons generally having joint custody or control for must purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognizes them as cohabitants with the right to permit the inspection in his own right; others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched.
B.lxxix. Could a co-occupant give consent to another person’s closet?
B.lxxx. A joint occupant cannot consent to the entire property
B.66. Roommates with separate bedrooms can’t consent to the search of another’s bedroom
B.67. Roommates with same bedroom, separate closets may be able to consent to search of other’s closet
B.rr. Georgia v. Randolph (2006): Randolph and his wife were separated. She had taken their son to Canada and return for a time. Randolph hid the son, she called the police and told them so and that he had drugs inside. Over his objection while present, she consented to a search of their living spaces. It was invalid.
B.lxxxi. Rule: Consent given by one occupant is not valid in the face of the refusal of another occupant who is physically present at the scene to permit a warrantless search.
B.68. “Shared social expectations” dictate that this would not satisfy consent
B.69. Any search over present objector would only be valid against the person who gave the consent
B.ss. Fernandez v. California (2014) – Δ was arrested and taken away, co-occupant then gave consent to search, validly.
B.lxxxii. So Sharla could object, be arrested and taken away, then Jenitza, roommate, could give valid consent to search
B.70. Court won’t question police officer’s motive or subjective intent
B.tt. Illinois v. Rodriguez
B.lxxxiii. Woman claims she shared apartment with Δ and has a key, but she is no his live-in girlfriend. Police think she is and go in with her consent.
B.71. Rule: as long as it reasonably appears that the person giving consent has valid access to the apartment, the police can enter with their consent
B.aaa. Fla. v. Bostnick – search on a bus of Bostick’s bags. Florida wanted a per se rule that searches on a bus were unconstitutional because the passenger can’t leave and end the interaction; the Court rejected.
B.xc. Rule: a person can prove the situation was coercive but fact that their movement is constrained on a bus is their fault so cannot be determinative in and of itself of whether a search was consented to validly.
B.bbb. Cal. V. Hodari : police in unmarked vehicle in high-crime area approach youth, who scatter. A police officer chased a boy who dropped a package of cocaine along the way. The question was: was the boy “seized” for purposes of a Terry stop when he was still running? The court said no; therefore, the package could be seized and used against him.
B.xci. Physical touching by police is always a seizure
B.xcii. Express words such as yelling “Stop” is just a show of authority and not a seizure until the person actually submits.
O. Reasonable Suspicion
B.ccc. This requires less than PC but more than an inarticulate hunch
B.ddd. Il. v. Wardlow : 2000: officers were last of a 4-car caravan in a high-crime area and saw Wardlow standing with an opaque bag. When he saw them, he fled. They eventually corned him and did a pat-down search, finding a gun. The government argued for per se rules that unprovoked flight in a high crime area always satisfies, the court refused to apply a per se rule but did hold the stop was justified
B.eee. Rule: Look to all the circumstances to determine reasonable suspicion; an unprovoked flight in a high-crime area was enough to establish R.S. here.
B.fff. Do police always have the authority to do a frisk when they do a stop?
B.xciii. This has never been clearly answered, but later cases have moved in the direction of allowing it.
B.ggg. Alabama v. White : an anonymous tip that White was leaving a certain apartment, at a certain time, in a Brown Plymouth, to a motel and with cocaine inside was enough to establish R.S.
B.xciv. What supports veracity & basis of knowledge?
B.73. Predictive activity
B.xcv. Rule: an anonymous tip by itself cannot satisfy R.S. much less P.C.; However, if the police can corroborate the level of info in White or more it can give Reasonable Suspicion (not PC)
B.hhh. Fla. v. J.L. (2000): An anonymous tipster called and said there would be a young black man wearing a plaid shirt at a bus stop, carrying a gun. This was not enough to justify R.S. There needed to be some indicia of illegal activity or predictive information. Rejected a “weapon” exception.
B.iii. Reid v. G.A. – when the reason for the frisk was that the two airport travelers had no luggage, just shoulderbags, and travelled as if they didn’t know each other, the circumstances described innocent travellers and wasn’t enough for R.S.
B.jjj. Fla v. Royer – when a suspect paid $2100 in cash, travelled under an assumed name, destination was Miami (source city for drugs) and stayed there only 48 hours through roundtrip from Honolulu took 20 hours, checked no luggage, S.Ct held it gave rise to R.S.
B.kkk. Navarette v. Cal. – an anonymous 911 caller run off the road by truck, says where, officer followed truck for 5 minutes and noticed nothing suspicious but still pulled him over and smelled weed, the tip alone would not have established R.S. but the contemporaneous call to 911 and the fact that it could be raced helped establish R.S.
P. Scope of Stops, Frisks, Sweeps
B.lll. Hayes v. Florida (1985): after a series of burglary-rapes, the police found latent fingertips they believed belonged to assailant. They had little information to tie petitioner to the crime. After interviewing him, they visited his house & told him they’d arrest him if he didn’t voluntarily accompany them to the station. They did so w/o his consent.
progress going back to his car, patted him down, shone the light inside and saw a pouch. They took it out and it was marijuana. They also found 75 pounds of marijuana in trunk.
B.civ. Entered trunk : he’d been arrested with PC after seeing the d rugs in the car
B.cv. The search of interior of car:
B.78. Not an inventory search b/c it wasn’t yet impounded
B.79. Not a search incident to arrest because no one had been arrested
B.80. Was it an automobile search? Automobile exception is an exception to warrant requirement. Did they have Probable Cause? Not an automobile exception b/c you still need PC and they only had reasonable suspicion.
B.81. This is a Terry stop, frisk of the car, all they had was reasonable suspicion
B.cvi. Rationale of Terry : to protect officers from large weapons when there is a reasonable suspicion of crime afoot. Here, was the same danger present?
B.82. They can clearly search him but S.Ct. let them search the car. “the officers didn’t act unreasonably in taking preventive measures to ensure that there were no other weapons within Long’s immediate grasp before permitting him to re-enter his vehicle.”
B.83. Officers can search passenger compartment to uncover weapons as long as they possess an articulable & objectively reasonable belief that suspect is potentially dangerous
B.cvii. Rule: reasonable suspicion allows searches of passenger compartment, generally assume container there is treated the same
B.rrr. Minnesota v. Dickerson : Patdown search and police felt a small lump. Can officers seize small contraband, clearly not a weapon. Court holds the seizure of cocaine unconstitutional
B.cviii. Pat-down of outer clothing, fells something
B.84. This was fine; a garden variety Terry search w/ reas. suspn
B.cix. Manipulates the small lump
B.85. This was not allowed. The nature of the evidence was not readily apparent. Terry frisks to go beyond initial pat-down, require 1 of 2 things: (1) PC to believe that there is some evidence of a crime, orReasonable suspicion of a large weapon.
B.cx. Reaches in and takes it out
B.86. This step was not problematic. Once the officer removed the package, he had PC to believe it was crack.
B.cxi. If you’re an officer who has a R.S. person has drugs, pat-down, pull it out and said he KNEW it was crack then this would be okay. The police officer just needs to say that during the limited pat-down, based on his experience, he knew it was crack.
B.cxii. Rule: if you’re legally doing a Terry frisk & in the process you touch an object that your experience takes you to PC = fine
B.sss. Maryland v. Buie : two men had committed an armed robbery. The police had an arrest warrant for both and went into Buie’s house when they knew he was home to arrest him. After calling downstairs, he came out of basement. The officer then went down to see if someone else was there and seized a running suit seen at the crime scene, sitting in plain view. This was a constitutional seizure under the “protective sweep” doctrine.
B.cxiii. Rule : as an incident to arrest, officers can, without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look even in closets and places immediately adjoining the place of an arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched.
B.87. Extends only to a cursory inspection of those places
B.88. This does not extend Chimel ; supposedly, it is a more limited intrusion
B.cxiv. Chimel is a search incident to an arrest, which needs only a valid arrest to search the individual and the immediate reach. A protective sweep requires reasonable suspicion that a threat occurs in an area, plus the arrest of someone. In most cases, it is reasonable to check for accomplices. Bailey rule (note case) if police have a warrant but an individual leaves the premises before they execute it, they can’t detain and search the person.
Q. Special Needs/Balancing Contexts
B.ttt. N.J. v. T.L.O: 2 girls were caught smoking in a bathroom. The principal searched TLO’s purse, found cigarettes and noticed rolled papers implicating marijuana. He found other evidence that implicated TLO of marijuana dealing. First Issue: whether search by public school teacher applies 4th^ Amendment? Yes. A search of a child’s purse or bag is a severe violation of subjective expectation of privacy
B.cxv. Second issue: was the search reasonable? Yes, it was permissible in scope when:
