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JUDICIAL POWER – ARTICLE III: pages 1-7
Section 1 one SC and inferior lower courts if congress choses
Section 2 judicial power limited by SBJ : scope of jurisdiction
**can eliminate lower court, unsure ab appellate ct jurisdiction [mccardle/ klein] , but def cant
mess with original ct jurisdiction **
Original jurisdiction: limited, only state party and foreign diplomats [ambassadors,
public ministers] & can’t be expanded // only SCOTUS can hear rllllly important cases at
first instance
Appellate jurisdiction: all other cases, can be changed/expanded
oCertain subject matters so states retain their sovereignty: 9 subjects:
1) law and equity under fed law – only fed
2) admiralty and maritime – only fed
3) assortment of state law especially diversity – both state and fed
Bigger portion hear and decide cases and making binding judgments on them, given the law
[take the law that’s given]
Smaller portion judicial review: rules “created” by construing the law when controversies
arise over what has been or has not been done under it
-Why? CUZ CONSTITUTION DOESN’T SAY SCOTUS CAN DECLARE AN ACT OF
CONGRESS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. BUT COURT SAYS YOU CAN:
-Marbury v Madison : [marshall v Jefferson]
oEven tho judiciary act [s 13] says marbury has a remedy via writ of mandamus =
judicial remedy compelling some1 to do a duty obligated 2 do [bc didn’t get
physical commission from adams midnight judge appointments and this
appointment was valid], this original jurisd grant to do so is not constitutional
because its not consistent w/ article III s 2
oArticle III s 2 doesn’t give SCOTUS original jurisdiction over power to issue
writs of mandamus [other “textual” support for judicial review: VI s 2 =
constitution is supreme]
oOnly orig jurisdiction for cases affecting ambassadors, public ministers, etc.
or cases where a state is a party
oCONGRESS CAN ONLY MAKE LAWS THAT AFFECT APPELLATE
JURISDICTION [writs of certiorari = judicial review of lower ct decisions].
oMarbury loses bc no jurisdiction TO HEAR THE CASE!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Constitution
is supreme and any act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void
-Cooper v Aaron: federal judiciary has final say on const. interp. So every state [and
congress/president kinda too] must follow SCOTUS’ interp even if not a party to case.
oNo question that states are bound to SCOTUS Martin v Hunters Lessee
Why? Cuz SCOTUS HAS APPELLATE POWER TO REVIEW A
STATE COURT DECISION
Textual/formalistic support: Article VI supremacy clause [const/fed
trump state laws = “in pursuance thereof”]: the Constitution, federal
laws made pursuant to it, and treaties made under its authority,
constitute the "supreme Law of the Land", and thus take priority
over any conflicting state laws], article III appellate jurisdiction [power
to hear state ct decisions] and §25 judiciary act [SCOTUS has power to
hear state ct decisions under appellate jurisdiction]
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JUDICIAL POWER – ARTICLE III: pages 1-

Section 1  one SC and inferior lower courts if congress choses Section 2  judicial power limited by SBJ : scope of jurisdiction **can eliminate lower court, unsure ab appellate ct jurisdiction [mccardle/ klein] , but def cant mess with original ct jurisdiction **  Original jurisdiction: limited , only state party and foreign diplomats [ambassadors, public ministers] & can’t be expanded // only SCOTUS can hear rllllly important cases at first instance  Appellate jurisdiction: all other cases, can be changed/expanded o Certain subject matters so states retain their sovereignty: 9 subjects:

  1. law and equity under fed law – only fed
  2. admiralty and maritime – only fed
  3. assortment of state law especially diversity – both state and fed Bigger portion  hear and decide cases and making binding judgments on them, given the law [take the law that’s given] Smaller portion  j udicial review: rules “created” by construing the law when controversies arise over what has been or has not been done under it
  • Why? CUZ CONSTITUTION DOESN’T SAY SCOTUS CAN DECLARE AN ACT OF CONGRESS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. BUT COURT SAYS YOU CAN:
  • Marbury v Madison : [marshall v Jefferson] o Even tho judiciary act [s 13] says marbury has a remedy via writ of mandamus = judicial remedy compelling some1 to do a duty obligated 2 do [bc didn’t get physical commission from adams midnight judge appointments and this appointment was valid], this original jurisd grant to do so is not constitutional because its not consistent w/ article III s 2 o Article III s 2 doesn’t give SCOTUS original jurisdiction over power to issue writs of mandamus [other “textual” support for judicial review: VI s 2 = constitution is supreme] o Only orig jurisdiction for cases affecting ambassadors, public ministers, etc. or cases where a state is a party o CONGRESS CAN ONLY MAKE LAWS THAT AFFECT APPELLATE JURISDICTION [ writs of certiorari = judicial review of lower ct decisions]. o Marbury loses bc no jurisdiction TO HEAR THE CASE!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Constitution is supreme and any act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void
  • Cooper v Aaron: federal judiciary has final say on const. interp. So every state [and congress/president kinda too] must follow SCOTUS’ interp even if not a party to case. o No question that states are bound to SCOTUS  Martin v Hunters Lessee  Why? Cuz SCOTUS HAS APPELLATE POWER TO REVIEW A STATE COURT DECISION  Textual/formalistic support: Article VI supremacy clause [const/fed trump state laws = “in pursuance thereof”]: the Constitution, federal laws made pursuant to it, and treaties made under its authority, constitute the "supreme Law of the Land", and thus take priority over any conflicting state laws], article III appellate jurisdiction [power to hear state ct decisions] and §25 judiciary act [SCOTUS has power to hear state ct decisions under appellate jurisdiction]

Practical/functionalist support: uniformity of decisions and interpretations or else const wld have no effect and be diff in every state

  • But see: McCullough v Maryland: President is independent of both. So despite SCOTUS saying congress can charter a bank, President (Jackson) can veto bank on constitutional grounds o But states cant tax fed bank o Also Lincoln didn’t follow Dred Scott SCOTUS decision recognizing a constitutional right to property rights over slaves - Other forms of judicial restraint [besides pol Q below]congressional stripping of appellate [not original – Marbury v Madison] jurisdiction!!!!!! o Abortion: SCOTUS cannot review abortion cases given right to privacy … every congress has proposed HR 6042 sanctity of life act – how does this interact w/ roe v wade???????????????  there is a right to abortion but im a pro life president… I am ordering them to not fund abortion  Then they get sued… they are free to adopt different interpretations of what the constitution means  Judicial view more aggressively, once supreme court resolves it you cannot second guess them… congress can pass a law that doesn’t have the same view
  1. §1 “MAY ordain and establish lower federal courts”  can def change this jurisdiction, even eliminate it = broad powers to adjust or eliminate lower court jurisdiction : Sheldon
  2. §2“Appellate jurisdiction and under such regulations as the Congress shall make”  can change, but Marbury says can’t change orig. jurisdiction : Ex Parte McCardle  even if deliberately directed at one issue and one subject matter and one case, as long as ur [congress is] not mandating a particular finding of fact, as in Klein… - passed Repealing act 3 days after McCardle argued tht shld get a writ of habeas corpus for being falsely imprisoned for publishing an article the military didn’t like]  Congress can do this, even if clear agenda ** its ok to prescribe substantive rules of decisions to rules applicable in pending cases: - can make them retroactively applicable as long as it does so through otherwise valid statutes that change the substantive law [ not telling ct how to apply existing law ] and DO NOT VIOLATE SOME PART OF THE CONSTITUTION OTHER THAN ARTICLE III ********
  3. BUT limitations to appellate ct = uncertain scope of power to remove all appellate jurisdiction bc Klein says if u stripped jurisdiction in this way, ok [if u removed jurisd for all pardons, ok but u only removed jurisd for presidential pardons mccardle was ab mccardles rights and since writ of habeas corpus avail in orig juris, it was ok ]: 4 established limits… ( 1) congress can eliminate SCOTUS appellate jurisd OVER A PENDING CASE as long as there is another jurisdiction available – shows McCardle is limited [ clda still petitioned for an original writ of habeas corpus]

(1) POLITICAL QUESTION/”judicial restraint doctrine” and ( 2) STANDING (1) POL Q = beyond the jurisdiction of the court // non-justiciable for court to answer the Q. Only time court is not final arbiter on a constitutional issue: ok for courts to look at racial gerrymandering, one-person one-vote, apportionment scheme when EP clause shows under Baker [vs. not if partisan gerrymandering / legislative redistricting under Rucho v Common Cause and Vieth v Jubelirer = no judicially enforceable stds ] , excluding HOR who mets all art 1 s2 cl 2 requirements [ Powell v McCormack = not a pol Q bc Q was whether congress possed a power to exclude a member based on criterion other than qualifications listed in const ] vs. NOT OK treaty/impeachment = usually not whether have tht power, but how 2 best exercise tht power = pol Q [impeachment = both (1) and (5)]

  • Baker factors that Court shld consider: policy determmmmms // lots of time foreign relations (1) textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to another coordinate political department = ANOTHER BRANCH HAS THE POWER under CONSTITUTION
    • Impeachment  Nixon v US: court cant review because Article I §3 cl 6 gives senate power to “ try all impeachments” o even tho not “sole” it’s read into const/implied a paradigmatic commitment to give power to try completely to senate [senate has sole power to try impeachments so they can delegate a rule XI/special impeachment commitment to try an impeachment if they want to.. court wld only interfere if senate acted in a manner threatening integrity of impeachment]
    • Amendment  Coleman v Miller: states can ratify/reject amendments
    • Regulating the milita  Giligan v Morgan: article I §8 cl 16 gives congress this [subject to civilian control, legisl/exec branches and periodically subject to electoral accountability, too] – in addition to (2) and (3) (2) lack of judicially manageable or discoverable standards for resolving Q = circular: too little grounding in const to be judicially discoverable // no workable stds or judicial tests to enforce, even if a constitutional norm - Partisan gerrymandering  also (1) see Rucho v Common Cause & Vieth v Jubelirer: though EP clause shows norm not to hv this [theres no workable std to implement this const norm], less clear of a constitutional command VS. COURTS CAN: racial gerrymandering under 14th^ amend [courts can do] or one-person, one-vote [courts can also do]
    • “War”  not a lot of judicial examples where courts called upon so evidence not judicially manageable [circular]
    • Recognizing a country  no prior case law / nature of determination makes it hard to come up w/ a std tht is judicially manageable
    • High burden: dismiss if problem
    • Voting  how to decide if voting district is fair or not : IN BAKER  OK FOR COURT TO CHALLENGE APPORTIONMENT SCHEME b/c one-person one-vote is something const. says [allocation of pol power in state] under EP clause but not ok for a court to judge if it’s a fair district / engage in a Q of whether partisan gerrymandering exists !!!!! [ rucho v common cause]

(3) impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination [ like recognizing that a state exists] (4) impossibility of a courts undertaking independent resolution w/o expressing a lack of respect due to a coordinate political branch (5) an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made [ is there a war or not ???? what the court means when it says it cannot determine what “war” means] (6) potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one Q [ to create a unified front]  Theme 1 : Q’s given to some other branch/dpt or some other branch/dpt has more authority to decide it – 1, 3-  Theme 2: lack of judicially manageable std: if it’s a pol, not legal, Q, then there’s no way for the court to come up w/ a legal std [Rucho v Common Cause] – 2
“theme” 3: foreign affairs : under (6) and (4) and first 2 always

  • Cant review whether referendum under a republican form of gvt clause is constitutional  Pacific States Tel v Oregon [article IV gives congress power to decide what gvt is established in one state]
  • Cant review whether president may terminate a treaty w/o senate approval  Goldwater v Carter [so looks like a president can unilaterally rescind a treaty]
  • Cant review whether a soldier is serving in a war tht was constitutionally authorized  Campbell v Clinton
  • Cant say whether unconstitutional to hv war in Syria when Obama ordered w/o congress  Smith v Obama
  • CAN REVIEW whether president can declare Jerusalem capital of Israel  Zivotofsky v Clinton. Even tho not textually dem commitment, there is a judicially manageable standard even tho it’s a highly contested pol Q [even tho foreign affairs]!!!!!! (2) STANDING: ( 1) particularized, concrete injury (2) caused by D (3) which can be redressed by the courts
  • why? b/c primarily role of court is to decide cases not to interpret the law: Article III § language/ textual/formalistic support: “judicial power extends to all “cases and controversies” = NOT ANYTHING ELSE. NO POWER TO INTERPRET THE LAW IF OUTSIDE THE CONTEXT OF A CASE.
  • Plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendants allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief…. Not a question of merits or const rights. Q of the sufficiency of the litigants injury and interest in litigation and whether a concrete harm to an identified indiv has been asserted or whether it’s a policy-reform campaign or impeding exec power Rooted in separation of powers: o cant use constitution as a sword to establish affirm rights against the gvt [generalized grievances more appropriately addressed by leg or exec branch ]… less likely to hv standing if tryna get an exec official [like IRS] to do so o mething, o can only use it as a shield against invasion of traditionally recognized property/liberty

(3) likely to be redressed by requested relief / injury linked to relief = relief from injury must be LIKELY TO FOLLOW FROM A FAVORABLE DECISION Not: o bank on future chokeholds cuz wont redress injury from past chokehold – Los Angeles v Lyons o making IRS take away tax exemptions might not get their kids into those private schools // they might discriminate anyways - Allen v Wright o timing matters: NYS rifle & pistol assn v city of NY: cnt say I wld be barred from transporting weapons besides 7 ranges when NY adopted an amended ordinance tht allowed direct transpo to other gun ranges and second homes Can say: o affirm action reversal will give u an equal chance to compete in every spot even tho might still not get into school – UC v Bakke if against 3rd^ party: [not b4 court, prob too speculative] The HHS Secretary is a third party – not before the court – whose actions are beyond that court’s control ( see Allen v. Wright ). Or, one might argue that the problem is redressability. Even if a federal court were to grant the relief sought (declaratory and injunctive; money damages are foreclosed see below), those remedies would only invalidate President Trump’s executive order. The HHS Secretary would still have discretion to “fast track” under the statute CANT: Doctor cant assert patients rights  tileston v ullman Cant assert rights as a retired beneficiary for plan’s beneficiaries on the plans mismanagement even if ERISA act authorizes suits by beneficiaries  theole v US bank But CAN: 1) Litigant Has A Concrete Injury And Interest In Outcome 2) Close Relation To 3rd Party And Either 3a) Hinderance To 3p Ability To Protect Self Or 3b) 3p If Asserting “Derivative Rights”: But abortion doctor can assert rights of patients when statute requires doctors who perform abortions to have admitting privileges at nearby hospitals  June medical services v russo Assignments can: Assignee when collection firm standing in shoes of assignor: Spring Communications co v APCC CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS CAN ASSERT RIGHTS OF PROSPECTIVE JURORS DISMISSED BC OF RACE – powers v ohio Store owner in shoes of would-be customers when breach, not observance, of EP rights – craig v boren If war powers  prob not if a senator

  • if intelligence officer in kuwait, no standing to challenge obamas decision to deploy forces to Syria bc not asserting an injury in fact during war, asserting a violation of oath due to illegal war if taxpayer  must show 1) logical link btwn status of taxpayer and leg enactment and 2) a nexus btwn tht status and precise nature of const infringement of enactment [Flast v Cohen]

CONGRESSIONAL POWERS – ARTICLE I: pages 7-

Section 8  tax & borrow $ for the general welfare [ clause 1 ], regulate commerce [ clause 3 ], naturalization, coin money & punish counterfeiting, post offices [ clause 7 ], copyright & patents [clause 8], lower fed cts/ inferior tribunals [ clause 9 ], declare war/define and punish offenses against law of nations [ clause 11 ], raise armies/navies and call forth militia [ clause 12 ] … and under Article II, w/ advice and consent of senate to make treaties , D.C. [District of Columbia], necessary & proper [clause 18 ] Biggest debate under N&P  we know it goes to states if its not enumerated expressly. What if its implied under N&P clause?

  • Vast powers have inferior powers implied to give ample means for their execution. N&P TO CARRY OUT/EXECUTE ENUMERATED POWERS !!!! Never const interest to clog/embarrass execution by withholding the most appropriate means Vs.
  • 10 th^ amendment: if not delegated to Congress [or exec] via “herein granted”, and not prohibited to states, reserved to states: marriage, fam law, adoption, divorce, tort law [unless in section 8], public health, etc… NECESSARY AND PROPER = “IMPLIED”: - McCulloch v Maryland: says authority to create Bank of US under n&p clause because “necessary” to carry out taxing power. - Marshall says “necessary” = not only absolutely necessary means [not I cant carry out taxing power w/o bank] but those that are more “convenient, useful or essential to carry out another” [power or help the general welfare, for ex.] o Something appropriate to carry out enumerated powers [in art 1 § clause 1-18] that benefit country as a whole o Adds to / enlarges congressional powers, does not limit other powers Modern analysis on “necessary” = US v Comstock: for fed civ commitment of sex offenders, mentally ill beyond max sentences = BASICALLY ANYTHING U CAN RATIONALLY RELATE TO IT, very few limitations… STEP 1: find some §8 power: MUST BE TETHERED TO §8 IN SOME WAY. A rational link to the law and the §8 power. Can I justify this as N&P to carry out __? 1. is fed statute a rational means to carry out some constitutional end / constitutional grant of congressional authority? [here, commerce clause] STEP 2: shows its necessary to carry out constitutionally enumerated power: [ HERE, STATUTE IS A RATIONAL MEANS TO CARRY OUT ENDS OF JAILING SEX OFFENDERS BEYOND PUNISHMENT] o Why? Cuz congress has long had an ability to criminalize conduct under N&P clause that interferes w/ enumerated powers. Fed crimes in constitution defined  fed prisons created  regulation of fed prisons

(2) instrumentalities –airplane/trains/cars/trucks b4 takes off, phone or internet

or other communication infrastructure / even non-profit and abortion clinics bc

produce goods and have clients in other states: MEDIUM FOR TRAVEL /

COMMUNICATION / whats needed for travel [ Shreveport]

  • but doesn’t need to be traveled // its ok if threat is intrastate right now

[Shreveport: “seminal case” on “effects” doctrine] if eventually / destined

to cross borders [Daniel Ball]

  • doesn’t matter purpose: can be morals, for ex. [Atlanta]
  • can allow sweeping authority 4 non-economic, intrastate activities: mail

and wire fraud require use of mail or phone once

people or things moving in interstate commerce ( having travelled or predictably will travel ) are instrumentalities of interstate commerce. With respect to the channels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce there is no need to show economic activity , see Art. I, sec. 8, “among the several states.”

(3) now, only non-economic activity that substantially affects interstate

commerce [Darby [1941]/Jones]  UNTIL: Lopez principles [1995]: 1) non-

economic intrastate, 2) no jurisd element 3) no cong findings 4) attenuated link 2

interstate commerce [or is rationally related to a comprehensive interstate

economic scheme ] … BUT SEE: Morrison [2000: only commercial activity, like

wheat, can be aggregated = not rape/intrastate violence]

  • if its something traditionally reserved to states [health/divorce/etc] by 10th

amendment  too bad if there’s subs effects [tht means fed gvt can do it too]

CAN REGULATE:

  • directly regulating wages, hours, labor relations [even if goods didn’t enter interstate commerce yet] of FLSA
  • even wages/hrs FLSA for hospitals, nursing homes and educational institutions , whether private or public [Maryland v Wirtz]
  • public accommodations like hotels and local BBQ’s that racially discriminate [Atlanta]
  • intrastate railway rates [ Shreveport Case]
  • consumer credit protection acts ban on purely intrastate credit transactions [Perez v US]
  • even after interstate commerce ends : pill bottles w/o warning labels sold [articles from moment enter to moment delivered to actual consumer in US v Sullivan] …
  • fed rent control long after hostilities ended [Woods v Cloud W Miller Co]
  • grant a privilege from pretrial discovery [ aimed at improving safety in channels/ increasing protection 4 instrumentalities: Pierce County v Gullen]
  • sit ins [racial discrim] at convenience stores [Hamm v Rock Rill]

- land regulation for surface mining regulations [Hodel] // coal mining

  • -All activity is covered – > crime to possess firearm if felon , nexus w/ commerce doesn’t matter when as long as min nexus at some time in commerce [Scarborough v US] - USE OF machine guns [possession near schools, alone, not under lopez but can prob make argument tht theres a “comprehensive scheme”] AGGREGATING FUNGIBLE COMMODITIES W/ INTERSTATE MARKET: rejects commercial vs. non- commercial activity distinction when non-economic, intrastate activity aggregated tg in a LARGER FEDERAL SCHEME FOR REGULATION OF THE INTERSTATE MARKET / “COMPREHENSIVE SCHEME APPROACH” to regulate/aggregate non-economic activity Yes. Congress had power to enact the provision at issue if the provision is necessary to ensure that a comprehensive scheme for regulating interstate commerce is not undercut, even if the provision by itself would reach conduct that does not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Correct. Because Congress has created a comprehensive scheme that directly regulates economic, commercial activity, a court cannot excise individual applications of the scheme even when they apply to local, non-economic conduct. Gonzales v. Raich (2005).
  • despite no agriculture growing, can regulate weed cultivation [Raich]
  • despite no agriculture growing , can regulate wheat + SIMILARLY SITUATED products like corn, cotton, rice, peanuts and tobacco. [Wickard]
  • can always regulate selling agriculture
  • can regulate agriculture growing if aggregated tg, subs effect [ same w/ manuf and production: alone, not allowed. But in the aggregation, yes] CANT REGULATE:
  • gender motivated crime and possessing handguns near school o fed civil remedies for gender motivated violence [Morrison], o possession of guns near schools [lopez], wb age minimum? Background checks?
  • Manufacturing liquor [or anything else!] – Kidd v Pearson
  • issuing insurance policies [a policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce] = state law so cnt be an article of commerce [Paul v Virginia],
  • non-navigable, isolated intrastate waters to prevent migratory birds [solid waste] but see gibbons v ogden……….
  • AGRICULTURE ALONE. [growing agriculture]UNLESS WHEN AGGREGATED TG, SUBSTANTIALLY AFFECTS
  • pre-darby u cant exclude goods from interstate commerce but now can
  • Banning birth control/abortions wld be too attenuated, prob. - Freeze evictions
  • Compelling activity [mask mandate / health insurance in

rate in Texas because ppl use Texas rate to manipulate where shipments go in Texas… interstate rate wld be disregarded if don’t regulate intrastate ]

  • similar to Wisconsin RR Comm’n Chicago v Chicago in 1922 : can raise Wiso-prescribed intrastate railroad passenger fares
  • Stanford v Wallace in 1920: can regulate stockyard rates / meatpackers locally bc congress has a reasonable fear tht if it didn’t, wld directly have an undue burden on interstate commerce LIMITATIONS…. [1918-1936]
  1. Hammer v Dagenhart in 1918  overrules Shreveport but OVERRULED BY DARBY!!!!!!!
  • FEAR OF NATIONAL POLICE POWER DROVE DECISION: cant prohibit interstate transportation of goods from factories employing child labor because harm is child labor, not goods and interstate transpo is not necessary to have child labor
  • skeptical of congress motive: think public policy = morality, not economic fairness.
  1. Schecter Poultry Corp [1935]  fed law regulating wages, prices and collective bargaining of NY poultry market is not ok.
    • since no “direct effect” on interstate commerce. While his activities affect competitors, not enough of an effect to be substantial
  2. Carter Coal in 1936 = biggest limitation on commerce power.
  • " commerce" is plainly distinct from "production" = so coal mining wasn’t a part of this [ since the labor provision primarily fell upon production]:
    • Employing workers, setting wages and working hours, and mining coal were found to be part of the local process of production, separate from any trade of goods that could be regulated under the Commerce Clause
    • since local effects from wages/collective barg/working conditions  indirect effect and does not pass Shreveport direct effects test EXPANSION OF COMMERCE POWER [ BTWN 1936 AND 1995, NO LIMITATIONS ] = AFTER DARBY, HEART OF ATLANTA OR WICKARD, CONGRESS CAN BASICALLY DO WHATEVERRRRRRR
  1. US v Darby [ 1938-40 ish]: fully overturns Dagenhart ] = MOTIVE DOES NOT MATTER. congress can set a national minimum wage AND REGULATE GOODS PRODUCED BY EMPLOYERS WHO DO NOT CONFORM TO FAIR LABOR/FAIR STDS ACT [wages and hours provisions have a subs effect on interstate commerce bc states w/ lower ones have an unfair advantage…. can exclude goods manuf under substandard labor conditions, even if aren’t even making commerce tht goes interstate. Can still regulate wages directly bc of subs effect and although manuf is not interstate commerce, shipment across state lines is ].
    • Overrules Dagenhart  prohibition or regulation on interstate commerce no longer needs to be necessary to achieve goals/harmful activity/objectives [interstate commerce does not need to be necessary to accomplish activity]
    • also , no longer limited to articles which themselves have a harmful or deleterious property [doesn’t matter if the harm is child labor, not the goods, for ex.  as long as can prevent child labor by regulating these otherwise permissible goods we ok] - doesn’t matter motive/purpose, as long as substantial effect on interstate commerce

- we defer to congress if its substantial, but this has been a bit overruled by Morrison and lopez [ cong findings are fine, but were not bound by it]

  1. Wickard v Filburn [ 1942 ]: aggregated together with others, this local/intrastate activity has a subs effect on interstate commerce
  • here, regulating amt of wheat a local farmer can produce, mostly for himself, to regulate the price of wheat / increase market price of wheat.
  • if all actors like filburn didn’t conform, price of wheat as a whole wld be subs effected
  • essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity in which reg scheme undercut unless intrastate activity regulated
  1. Heart of Atlanta [ **1964]: As long as rational basis for concluding that this prohibition/regulation [w/ non-economic motive] will subs effect interstate commerce, its allowed = MOST FLEXIBLE / BROAD STD
  • here,** hotel discriminating on the basis of race very close to highway. It’s a PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION [like restaurants, even local BBQs – Katzenbach, even if one person affected – Wickard, if it affects navigation/travel - Gibbons], NOT like golf/yacht clubs or private-membership type places, private homes or public accoms not open to public **- rational basis std of review = racial discrimination in public accomms, always *don’t care about motive [DNT CARE IF CONGRESS DIDN’T THINK THIS BUT AS LONG AS COURT CAN SHOW IT]: AS LONG AS U CAN IMAGINE A LINK / RATIONAL BASIS ********  Hodel v Virginia Surface in 1977: congress had a rational basis for concluding that surface coal mining has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, given legislative’s detailed consideration, evidence avail to congress…etc. STILL EXPANDED FROM 1995-2013, HOWEVER, just 3 important cases that didn’t !!!!!!!! US v Lopez: commerce clause interp changes as nation develops [ greater latitude : but here couldn’t regulate guns in school zones under commerce power], but Laughlin warns tht regulatory authority is not without effective bounds [ effects on interstate commerce cannot be so indirect and remote tht all gvt is centralized and no local/state powas // no limit on what can regulate leading up to what u want to stop] NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co. 1937 : test = “close and substantial relation”: even tho prod/manuf itself is not commerce [and unfair labor practices engaged therein], close/subs relation to interstate commerce when considered tg
  1. US v Lopez in 1995: fed crime to knowingly possess firearms in a school zone = FIRST TIME SINCE LATE 1930’S THAT SCOTUS OVERRULED CONGRESS ECONOMIC LEG under CC jurisdiction: 4 non-exclusive factors for substantial effects analysis [ so its not a channel or instrumentality]: (1) non-economic or economic intrastate activity?: only non-economic can be aggregated if public accommodation .. [Heart of Atlanta] - but see “comprehensive scheme” approach in Wickard and Raich [ MURKY: court wants to draw a line / doesn’t want to aggregate activities, especially if no interstate market for it]
  • Not gender motivated crime
  • Not possessing a handgun near a school

11 th^ case) U.S. v Morrison in 2000: only intrastate economic activity regulation ok [and intrastate rape is not commercial]. Woah what!!!!! Well no Raich [weed] yet, only Wickard..

  • violence against women act / gender-motivated violence and crime deterring women from traveling does not substantially effect interstate commerce and cant be aggregated … yes crime doesn’t matter bc don’t care if its commercial activity as long as aggregated effects tg….
    • But aggregated non-economic activity is too attenuated and “rational basis test” wld be bad here [ vs Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer and Stevens = mountain of gvt data]. - SOMEONE WLD HAVE TO DECIDE NOT TO TRAVEL BECAUSE THERES NO FEDERAL CIVIL REMEDY FOR GENDER-MOTIVATED CRIME. don’t care that passes (3) test = congressional findings. Doesn’t pass (4) = attenuated link.
    • motive was an usurpation of state police power: if u can regulate Q [gender motivated crime], can regulate XXXY leading up to Q = this is a state police power and boundaries wlda been blurred … slippery slope!!!!!!!!!!!!!
  1. NFIB v Sebelius in 2013 says cant compel ppl to buy health ins and then call it a subs effect – shows shift away from “rational basis test” in Wickard/atlanta …. Until….Raich…
  • OBAMA CARE INDIV MANDATE. REJECTED UNDER COMMERCE CLAUSE & , ACCEPTED UNDER TAXING POWER - ANALYSIS = [no] SUBS EFFECTS [since its not regulating article of commerce or instrumentality]: (1) slippery slope  if concerned w/ obesity, can mandate ppl eat broccoli [“broccoli” argument is that they can make u buy broccoli lol]. (2 ) CANNOT JUSTIFY ON MERE POSSIBILITY THAT PPL WILL ENTER MARKET IN FUTURE. [distinguishing Wickard and Raich]  farmer/weed already in market. Here, forcing ppl to enter market not already in (3) can only use N&P power to do things incidental to some enumerated powers [Comstock]  CANT say N&P to carry out a regulation when ur forcing that regulation // cant force u to do something & then say N&P to regulate that // POWER TO REGULATE IS NOT POWER TO CREATE (4) IT DOES SUBSTANTIALLY EFFECT INTERSTATE COMMERCE, costs fall elsewhere/spread out  but still not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity // CANT COMPEL ACTIVITY! BOTTOM LINE
  1. Gonzales v Raich: 2005: reaching in and regulating local cultivation of medical marijuana // growing weed is ok, even if not selling it, because “ rational basis” /aggregation test + economic intrastate activity + big market for weed consumption so any cultivation can subs effect the interstate market
    • Definition in Raich majority tht “production, distribution and consumption of commodities for which there is an established and lucrative interstate mkt” is grossly under-inclusive: excludes all services [also over inclusive: consumption of commodities not economic]
    • Scalia concurrence [interesting because majority in Lopez and Morrison]: Congress’s power to regulate activities having a “substantial effect” on interstate

commerce is derived not only from the Commerce Clause, but primarily from the Necessary and Proper Clause, which allows Congress to do whatever it deems necessary to accomplish its regulatory objectives. In deference to this constitutional provision, Congress may regulate even those intrastate activities that do not substantially affect interstate commerce. Congress’s power under the Necessary and Proper Clause is far- reaching.

Tax $ - a lot than u can tax u cant regulate under CC power : biggest // broadest one = “to

lay and collect taxes, to pay the debts and provide for the general welfare and common defense” = §8, cl. 1

  • No capitation or direct tax shall be laid unless in proportion to the census or enumeration = §
  • Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among sev states = 16 th^ amendment
  • Q for us = can congress use taxing power/spending power to regulate [aka to make ppl do things and not just raise money]??
  1. Bailey v Drexel: child-labor tax law: taxing employers 10% on net profits who knowingly use child labor to make goods = INVALID
  • penalty, not a tax. Key difference = not the purpose, but rather there must be SOME motivation to raise revenue /money/tax motivation [bc all taxes are motivated by deterring behavior]
  • penaltySCIENTER REQUIREMENT: had to “knowingly” employ child labor  this is associated with a crime or a penalty, not associated with a tax
  • primary goalto deter companies from using child labor, not to raise or collect $ Can also tax : - what is being taxed is within their congressional authority [increasing taxes to protect the national currency aka get ppl to stop using these state notes and use federal notes = can tax circulating bank notes from 1 cent to 10 cents ]  valid under Veazie Bank v Fenno: no evidence “going after” states just wanted to strengthen and protect national currency - narcotic drug act valid [$1 annual tax on manuf, importation and sale of named narcotics ]  valid Doremus: “cannot be invalid just bc another motive is to deter behavior since all taxes are in part in place to deter behavior” something like that // NFIB: “taxes that influence behavior are nothing new” - 10 cent per pound tax on yellow margarine [vs old tax was ¼ of a cent per pound]  valid under McCray v US because gvt did not seem to have an ulterior motive
  • sozinsky: taxing firearms, ok = regulation does not go beyond mere registration provisions which is pvviously in aid of revenue purpose / just because congress chose a certain subject over another doesn’t mean a penalty even tho firearm dealers to pay 200$ a year or be subject to fine and imprisonment
  1. NFIB v Sebelius : tax, not a penalty [even tho used the word “penalty”] on those opting out of coverage bc: 1) amt due far less than cost insurance 2) no scienter 3) collected thru IRS and no criminal penalty [and everyone wld have to pay, not just certain groups]
  • some tax motivation [even tho primary motivation is health ins]  generates a lot of $ = so its VALID

IF YOU CANT GET IT UNDER COMMERCE: Commerce Clause does not give Congress the power to violate other provisions of the Constitution. Under Tenth Amendment principles, Congress does not have power to order states to adopt laws.--> TRY SPENDING CLAUSE! SPENDING CLAUSE from art I, §8, cl. 1: like taxing, need to say what its for, can be for the “general welfare” ********

  • Can ALWAYS spend $ on post office, army, commerce, including lighthouse [foreign commerce = waterways, maritime jurisdiction], etc.
  • Very few limits… The choice of how to spend money belongs to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power [ limited by 10th^ amendment limits but its still broad].
  • Can USUALLY engage in reimbursement spending: specify purpose for which fed funds are to be spent and reimburse states tht expend for that purpose
  • Tax/spending limits [Dole]: 1) gen welfare, defer to congress 2) unambiguous /clear conditions 3) conditions must be related to national interest in the partic fed program
    1. conditions cant conflict w/ other const provisions 5) no coercion *****if you see 10% of funds / will withhold unless /  PROB SPENDING CLAUSE!!!!!*** Spending Power Limits: First, obvi, CANNOT COERCE, bc this wld be regulating, not spending. [cant force ppl to do something congress couldn’t otherwise force ppl to do]
  • Coercion = contract options of beneficiary class, earmarked for special indiv groups [ 5% withholding not enough to be coercion in Dole, 100% of existing Medicaid enuf to be coercion in NFIB]
  • expending beneficiary options to resist + no benefits or comply + benefit = inducement and coercion as per NFIB
  • if states cannot participate on their own [voluntarily] w/ full knowledge of consequences = coercion
  • NO “gun to head” allowed. *****5th**^ case) South Dakota v Dole [1987] = establishes 4 factors for valid spending power.
  • USC §158 withholding 5% of fed highway funds otherwise allocable from states in which it is lawful to possess alcohol < 21 yrs old = OK to use spending power to induce cooperation by states in areas that it couldn’t otherwise regulate directly (1) yes, for gen welfare – legit national interest bc evidence thru congress tht lack of uniformity in drinking ages encourages driving to other states (2) conditions unambiguous– conditions enacted across all states (dissent: no specifications to requirement so regulation) (3) conditions must be related to fed interest in the spending pgm - yes, conditions are directly related to one of the main issues to which highway funds are expended [ safe, interstate travel] and (4) no independent const bar ** BIG Q = R CONDITIONS CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE??? [ hints that there can be an unconstitutional condition placed on the states, making it coercion]

- aka = power cannot be used to induce/COERCE states to engage in activities that would themselves be unconstitutional [ NOT that it’s a prohibition on indirect achievement of objectives which Congress cannot directly achieve = that’s ok, Congress can do that]

  • ex indep const bar: grant of fed funds conditioned on discriminatory state action or the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment (a) here = 21st^ amendment is ok even tho cant directly regulate under 21st^ , can condition spending on it [not unconstitutional simply by its success in achieving the congressional objective] (b) 10th^ amendment is ok because not coercive: 5% is not a lot, espec for states as a whole. [only 8% education funds come from fed gvt].. also highway funds is not a big part of states budget [cld keep highways if didn’t comply – only 20% state budget spent on education] (5) and not coercive In South Dakota v. Dole (1987), the Supreme Court recognized that Congress could use conditional spending to influence a state to take a particular action. The Court, however, identified several requirements for the use of conditional spending to be constitutional. Which of the following are not requirements? (1) The exercise of the spending power must be in pursuit of “the general welfare” (2) Conditions imposed upon the states’ receipt of federal funds must be limited in duration (3) The conditions must be related to the federal interest in the spending program (4) The conditions must not violate any independent constitutional bar (5) The financial inducement must not entice a state to act in an area beyond the enumerated powers of Congress A (1) only Incorrect. Requirement (1) is one of the requirements identified in South Dakota v. Dole (1987). Arguably, the Supreme Court should have said that the spending must be either for the “general welfare” or for the “common defense” because both of these subjects are mentioned in Article, section 1, clause 1. But in South Dakota v. Dole (1987), the Supreme Court only mentioned “general welfare.” B (2) and (5) Correct. The requirements in (2) and (5) are misstated. The actual requirements are (2) conditions imposed upon the states’ receipt of federal funds must be unambiguous; and (5) the financial inducement offered by Congress must not be so coercive as to pass the point at which “pressure turns into compulsion.” South Dakota v. Dole (1987). (1) must be a national purpose: in pursuit of the “general welfare” (AKA CANNOT BE LIMITED BY 10th AMENDMENT STATE SOVEREIGNTY CONCERNS.. if purpose is unrelated to national policy/power prob unconstitutional )
  • states cant do it themselves bc that wld give them a relative economic disadvantage to neighboring states if did –
  • in Butler: local agriculture was an area traditionally reserved to states
  • If congress thinks its general welfare, substantially defer to congress’ opinion because this is largely a political consideration
  • Conditions must be related to a national/fed gvt interest: if not, limit on what can spend at least (2) Conditions = if conditioning states on receipt of fed funds, must do so unambiguously and in a very clear way so states are cognizant of the consequences [MUST BE A CONTRACT]
  • cannot put conditions on engaging in unconstitutional conduct – Butler