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Daniel Beckwitt v. State of Maryland , No. 794, September Term 2019. Opinion by Beachley, J. GROSS NEGLIGENCE INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER—RECKLESS DISREGARD FOR HUMAN LIFE—LESS CULPABLE FORM OF SECOND- DEGREE DEPRAVED HEART MURDER SECOND-DEPRAVED HEART MURDER—EXTREME DISREGARD FOR HUMAN LIFE—HEIGHTENED FORM OF GROSS NEGLIGENCE INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER—REQUIRES LIKELIHOOD OR CERTAINTY OF DEATH Askia Khafra met Daniel Beckwitt in an internet chatroom where Khafra was seeking investors for his business idea—Equity Shark—a smartphone application that streamlined the process for ordinary people to invest in starter companies. Beckwitt agreed to invest in Equity Shark, and for approximately $10,000 he received a 5% stake in the business. When Equity Shark failed to take off as expected, Khafra needed to repay Beckwitt for the $10,000 investment. Because Beckwitt feared a nuclear war between the United States and North Korea, he had been digging tunnels and a bunker underneath his home. Beckwitt allowed Khafra to repay the $10,000 debt by digging such tunnels at Beckwitt’s home. On numerous occasions in 2017, Beckwitt would pick up Khafra and drive him back to his house to dig. Concerned with his privacy and in order to conceal his actual address, Beckwitt required Khafra to wear a blindfold during such drives. Additionally, Beckwitt did not allow Khafra into the first and second floors of the residence; Khafra was free to roam in the basement and the tunnels. Because Beckwitt did not own a cellular phone, he generally communicated with Khafra by using computer programs. On September 10, 2017, in the early morning hours, Khafra sent Beckwitt a text message indicating that the power had gone out in the tunnels, that there was no airflow, and that he believed he smelled smoke. Khafra shortly thereafter clarified that he no longer detected smoke, but asked Beckwitt to fix the issue. Beckwitt, who was sleeping, did not see the messages until the next morning. When he saw the messages, Beckwitt notified Khafra that there had been a “pretty major electrical failure” and then switched power to the tunnels over to a different circuit. Beckwitt then went back to sleep. Beckwitt awoke in the afternoon at approximately 3:00 p.m. and headed to the kitchen for some food. At about 4:00 p.m., he heard a beeping sound which he understood to be the carbon monoxide detector indicating a loss of power. After waiting twenty to
thirty minutes for the breaker to automatically reset, Beckwitt went to the basement to manually reset the breaker. While in the basement, Beckwitt did not see Khafra. Beckwitt reset the breaker and as he headed upstairs, he heard an explosion and immediately saw smoke rising out of the kitchen floor. Beckwitt immediately returned to the basement to tell Khafra about the fire. Although Beckwitt did not see Khafra, he heard him yell “yo dude.” Beckwitt was soon overcome by smoke and had to exit the basement. Once outside, Beckwitt yelled for his neighbors to call 9- 1 - 1. Firefighters quickly responded to the scene, but noted unusual challenges in putting out the relatively small fire. The unusual challenges stemmed from the fact that Beckwitt was a hoarder, and the floor of his basement was completely covered with trash, debris, and other objects that rendered navigation difficult. When the smoke cleared, the firefighters found Khafra’s body in the middle of the basement. The State charged Beckwitt with second-degree depraved heart murder and two theories of involuntary manslaughter: gross negligence and failure to perform a legal duty. Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as to second-degree depraved heart murder, and guilty as to involuntary manslaughter. The verdict sheet did not distinguish between the two theories of manslaughter. Beckwitt timely appealed. Held : Conviction for second-degree depraved heart murder reversed. Conviction for gross negligence involuntary manslaughter affirmed. The evidence is insufficient to support a conviction for depraved heart murder, but is sufficient to support a conviction for gross negligence involuntary manslaughter. Whereas gross negligence involuntary manslaughter, the “junior varsity” of depraved heart murder, requires a reckless disregard for human life, second-degree depraved heart murder requires an extreme disregard for human life. The evidence in this case shows that Beckwitt demonstrated a reckless disregard for human life by hiring Khafra to dig tunnels underneath his home where Khafra was completely dependent upon Beckwitt for food and supplies, there was a history of electrical failures in the tunnels, the basement was completely cluttered with trash and debris making escape difficult in the event of an emergency, Khafra could not easily call for or receive emergency assistance because Beckwitt had sought to conceal his location, and the door leading from the basement to the outside may have been locked. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for gross negligence involuntary manslaughter. Although the case law fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between “reckless disregard” and “extreme disregard,” the cases discussing the sufficiency of evidence for depraved heart murder intimate that the likelihood or certainty of death distinguishes it from mere gross negligence involuntary manslaughter. Although the circumstances in this case were dangerous enough to sustain a conviction for gross negligence involuntary
Circuit Court for Montgomery County Case No. 133838 C REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 794 September Term, 2019
DANIEL BECKWITT v. STATE OF MARYLAND
*Meredith, Kehoe, Beachley, JJ.
Opinion by Beachley, J.
Filed: January 28, 2021 *Meredith, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member of the Court. He participated in the adoption of this opinion after being recalled pursuant to Maryland Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A.
Following a trial that spanned over two weeks, a jury in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County found appellant, Daniel Beckwitt, guilty of second-degree depraved heart murder and involuntary manslaughter. The court sentenced appellant to twenty-one years’ imprisonment, suspending all but nine, for depraved heart murder, and merged the conviction for involuntary manslaughter. Appellant timely appealed and presents the following four issues for our review:
- Was the evidence legally sufficient to sustain [appellant’s] convictions for depraved heart murder and involuntary manslaughter?
- Did the trial court err by giving flawed jury instructions on murder and manslaughter?
- Did the prosecutor’s repeated improper remarks during closing and rebuttal closing arguments result in reversible error?
- Did the suppression court err in denying [appellant’s] request for a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware [^1 ]? We hold that the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain appellant’s conviction for gross negligence involuntary manslaughter, but was insufficient to sustain the depraved heart murder conviction. We reject appellant’s remaining allegations of error. We shall therefore reverse appellant’s conviction for depraved heart murder and remand for sentencing on the previously merged involuntary manslaughter conviction. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND This case involves the tragic death of Askia Khafra, a twenty-one-year-old who died while trying to escape a fire in appellant’s basement. At the time of the fire, appellant was (^1) Franks v. Delaware , 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
In order to repay appellant’s $10,000 investment, Khafra agreed to dig tunnels underneath appellant’s house. Appellant had been building tunnels and an underground bunker beneath his home because he apparently feared a nuclear war with North Korea. Khafra was not the first person to dig tunnels for appellant. Douglas Hart, who was approximately twenty years old at the time,^4 dug tunnels on several occasions from approximately October 2016 to April 2017. Logistically, Hart would drive his car to Maryland,^5 meet appellant at a McDonald’s, and then appellant would require Hart to wear sunglasses with duct tape on them to obscure Hart’s vision while appellant drove the two to appellant’s home. Despite the fact that appellant actually lived in Maryland, he gave Hart the impression that they were going to Virginia. When Hart visited appellant to dig tunnels, he typically stayed in the tunnels and basement area for approximately a month at a time and understood that he was not allowed into the rest of the house. Hart indicated that he was physically incapable of leaving the basement/tunnel area, and that although there was a door from the basement leading directly to the outside, that door was kept locked and appellant always had the key. When Hart communicated to appellant that he wanted to go outside for fresh air or to get food, however, appellant would oblige him. Nevertheless, appellant required Hart to wear the duct-taped sunglasses upon going outside to prevent Hart from learning the location of appellant’s house. (^4) Hart testified at the April 2019 trial that he was twenty-three years old. From this fact we extrapolate that he was approximately twenty years old when he began working in appellant’s tunnels in October 2016. (^5) At trial, Hart indicated that he was living in New York.
In early 2017, Khafra began digging tunnels at appellant’s home for $150 a day. Appellant typically picked Khafra up at Khafra’s parents’ house in the early morning hours, around 3:00 a.m., and like Hart, required Khafra to be blindfolded during the trip to appellant’s house.^6 Khafra would dig underneath appellant’s home approximately once a month to every two months, and would stay anywhere from a few days to a few weeks at a time.^7 During his stays, Khafra mostly remained in the bunker area in the tunnels. According to appellant’s brief, “Khafra roamed freely in the basement and the tunnels, but he was not permitted to come up to the first or second floors of the residence.” Rather than take showers, Khafra cleaned himself using disposable wipes. To relieve himself, Khafra would urinate and defecate in a bucket he kept in the tunnels. Every few days, Khafra and appellant used a winch system to haul the bucket from the basement to the first floor, where appellant himself would dispose of its contents in the first-floor bathroom. Because appellant did not own a phone, Khafra could only communicate with appellant from the basement and tunnels using Google apps such as Google Voice and V Chat.^8 Appellant (^6) During a trip to appellant’s home, Khafra learned that appellant actually lived in Bethesda, Maryland. (^7) Khafra’s father testified at trial that he recalled Khafra going to appellant’s house in January, February, March, April, and September of 2017. (^8) “Google Voice” is a program that “gives you a phone number for calling, text messaging, and voicemail.” https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.google.android.apps.googlevoice&hl= en_US&gl=US (last visited Jan. 8, 2021). “V Chat” is a private messenger service that allows users to “communicate instantly while avoiding [text messaging] fees[.]” https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.wVChat_9255903 (last visited Jan. 8, 2021).
On his way up the stairs from the basement to the first floor, appellant heard an explosion, which he believed to be either the refrigerator’s compressor or the air conditioner. Appellant went to the kitchen to see if the refrigerator’s compressor was working, and immediately saw smoke rising out of the kitchen floor. Appellant promptly headed back to the basement to tell Khafra that there was a fire, and that Khafra needed to get out. Appellant heard Khafra yell “yo dude,” but he could not see him through all of the smoke. Fearing that he would not be able to take the basement stairs to the first floor, appellant exited the basement by unlocking the basement door that led directly to the outside.^9 Because he did not have a cellular phone, and because it would have been dangerous to return to his second-floor bedroom to call 9- 1 - 1 from his computer, appellant began to yell for help. Appellant’s neighbors called 9- 1 - 1. Firefighters from Montgomery County Fire and Rescue Service responded to appellant’s home at approximately 4:23 p.m. The firefighters struggled to navigate through appellant’s home to extinguish the fire, however, because, as appellant concedes, “[t]he home by all accounts was a hoarder’s home.” Put simply, appellant’s home was filled with an extreme amount of debris, trash, and other objects that made navigation difficult. In fact, it took firefighters approximately a minute and a half to two minutes to traverse the short distance from the basement’s side entrance to the fire. Firefighters extinguished the fire with two or three sprays of water lasting approximately fifteen to thirty seconds each. (^9) Although he could not remember for certain, appellant indicated that he “[thought he] had to” unlock the basement door to exit. Appellant could not recall whether the key was already in the door or whether he had it at the time, but told police it was “common” to keep the key in the door.
When the steam finally cleared, firefighters found Khafra’s lifeless body in the middle of the basement. DISCUSSION I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE Appellant first argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions for depraved heart murder and involuntary manslaughter because his conduct was not, as a matter of law, sufficient to meet the elements of those crimes. When reviewing a criminal conviction for sufficiency of the evidence, [w]e will consider the evidence adduced at trial sufficient if, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Coleman , 423 Md. 666, 672 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Facon v. State , 375 Md. 435, 454 (2003)). Our task, then, is to determine whether any rational trier of fact, after viewing the entire record in a light most favorable to the State, could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, the essential elements for depraved heart murder and involuntary manslaughter. A. A Primer on Depraved Heart Murder and Gross Negligence Involuntary Manslaughter We begin with an examination of the rather murky legal landscape of depraved heart murder and involuntary manslaughter. Depraved heart murder has been described as “one of the ‘unintentional murders’... that is punishable as murder because another element of blameworthiness fills the place of intent to kill.” Alston v. State , 101 Md. App. 47, 56 (1994) (quoting Robinson v. State , 307 Md. 738, 744 (1986)). “The critical feature of
On the matrix of blameworthy states of mind that will support a verdict of either civil liability or criminal guilt on the part of an unquestioned homicidal agent, one of those mental states is that in which the homicidal agent causes an unintended death by carelessly or negligently doing some act lawful in itself. 127 Md. App. 271, 276 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dishman , 352 Md. at 291 ), aff’d 361 Md. 528 (2000). The bottom of the negligence “matrix” represents the least culpable form of homicide—civil negligence. Id. Civil negligence may give rise to “heavy civil liability,” but such negligence is “still something less than criminality.” Id. Moving up the scale of blameworthy negligence, the next culpable level “are those more ‘gross deviations’ from the standard of care used by an ordinary person where the negligent conduct can reasonably be said to manifest ‘a wanton or reckless disregard of human life.’” Id. at 277 (quoting Dishman , 352 Md. at 291). Such conduct constitutes gross negligence involuntary manslaughter. Id. Finally, the most culpable conduct on the negligence scale are “those acts of a life- endangering nature so reckless that they manifest a wanton indifference to human life.” Id. Such conduct constitutes second-degree depraved heart murder. Id. Regardless of the degree of reprehensible negligence, however, the standard is an objective one: the conduct must “[manifest] such a gross departure from what would be the conduct of an ordinarily careful and prudent person under the same circumstances so as to furnish evidence of an indifference to consequences.” Albrecht , 336 Md. at 500. Additionally, the State must prove a causal connection between the negligence and the death. Id. at 499 (quoting Mills , 13 Md. App. at 200); see also Thomas , 464 Md. at 152. “This includes actual, but-for causation and legal causation.” Thomas , 464 Md. at 152.
Regarding the line of demarcation between depraved heart murder and gross negligence involuntary manslaughter, Judge Moylan has noted that, Definitionally, the Maryland case law has yet provided no meaningful distinction between those last two levels of culpability. “[O]ur cases have not drawn a precise line between depraved heart murder and involuntary manslaughter.” Dishman v. State , 352 Md. at 299, 721 A.2d 699. As an abstract matter, however, we know that there is—somewhere—such a line. There must be or else there is no legally cognizable distinction between murder and manslaughter. Pagotto , 127 Md. App. at 277. We agree with and shall explore Judge Moylan’s astute observation on this subject. In In re Eric F ., this Court defined the indispensable component of depraved heart murder, stating, “The essential element of depraved heart murder is that the act in question be committed ‘under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life .’” 116 Md. App. 509, 519 (1997) (emphasis added) (quoting Robinson , 307 Md. at 745 ). We explained, The question is whether the defendant engaged in conduct that created a very high risk of death or serious bodily injury to others. The murder may be perpetrated without the slightest trace of personal ill-will. Instead, the willful doing of a dangerous and reckless act with wanton indifference to the consequences and perils involved, is just as blameworthy, and just as worthy of punishment, when the harmful result ensues, as is the express intent to kill itself. Id. at 519- 20 (emphasis added) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). As to gross negligence involuntary manslaughter, the Court of Appeals has stated, In determining whether a defendant’s actions constituted gross negligence, we must ask whether the accused’s conduct, under the circumstances, amounted to a disregard of the consequences which might ensue and indifference to the rights of others, and so was a wanton and reckless disregard for human life. Stated otherwise, the accused must have
As we shall explain, despite the cloudy line of demarcation between the two criminally culpable levels of negligence, we conclude that appellant’s conduct satisfies the criteria for gross negligence involuntary manslaughter, but falls short of what is required for depraved heart murder. B. Appellant’s Conduct Demonstrated Wanton and Reckless Disregard for Khafra’s Life (Involuntary Manslaughter) Gross negligence involuntary manslaughter generally occurs in four contexts: automobiles, police officers, failure to perform a duty, and weapons. Thomas , 464 Md. at
- In Thomas , however, the Court of Appeals posed a unique question: “[U]nder what circumstances the dangers of heroin would justify holding a dealer liable for involuntary manslaughter for supplying the means by which his customer fatally overdoses.” Id. at
- In an effort to resolve that question, the Thomas Court considered cases involving automobiles, police officers, and weapons to “create a helpful tableau” to guide its analysis. Id. at 154. Thomas began by discussing automobile cases. An easily identified form of gross negligence occurs where a driver operates a vehicle in a reckless manner, such as by gratuitously speeding in a heavily congested residential area, and strikes and kills a pedestrian.^11 Id. at 154-55 (citing Duren , 203 Md. at 588 - 89). In Duren , the State produced evidence that the defendant was driving in a “heavily congested residential and business (^11) The Thomas Court recognized that a criminal statute for “manslaughter by vehicle” preempts prosecution for common law gross negligence manslaughter, but noted that the cases concerning that statutory offense were still relevant in analyzing “gross negligence” in this context. Thomas , 464 Md. at 154.
area” of Baltimore City at 7:00 p.m. at a speed of at least 60 miles per hour—approximately 30 miles per hour above the speed limit. 203 Md. at 588-89. Notably, after Duren’s vehicle skidded approximately 72 to 89 feet, it struck the victim with such force as to hurl him into the air and onto “the trunk of a car a number of feet away.” Id. at 589. The evidence there sufficiently manifested “a wanton and reckless disregard for human life.” Id. at 590. Likewise, in State v. Kramer , 318 Md. 576 (1990), the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for gross negligence manslaughter by vehicle. There, on a rural two- lane road, Kramer attempted to pass another vehicle in a no-pass zone, striking an oncoming vehicle while driving at least 75 miles per hour. Id. at 586-89. The facts also showed that Kramer was distracted while performing this maneuver. Id. at 589. Under such circumstances, “the evidence was legally sufficient for the jury to find on Kramer’s part a wanton and reckless disregard of the rights and lives of others and so a state of mind amounting to criminal indifference to consequences.” Id. at 593. In Johnson v. State , however, the Court found that the circumstances were insufficient to support a conviction for gross negligence vehicular manslaughter. 213 Md. 527, 533-34 (1957). The evidence showed that Johnson was driving on a one-way, four lane highway in a non-residential area with “very light” traffic. Id. at 533. Additionally, there was contradictory evidence of Johnson’s speed. Id. at 530. Relying on Duren , the Court focused on “whether, by reason of the speed in the environment, there was a lessening of the control of the vehicle to the point where such lack of effective control [was] likely at any moment to bring harm to another.” Id. at 532-33. The Court concluded
racking a shotgun fitted with a bandolier and bringing it to bear, with his finger on the trigger , on an unarmed individual who did not present a threat to the officer or to any third parties, in a situation where nearby bystanders were exposed to danger.” Id. at 505. Lastly, the Thomas Court looked to Mills v. State , 13 Md. App. 196 (1971), a weapons case, to help map the contours of gross negligence involuntary manslaughter. 464 Md. at 159. In Mills , a sixteen-year-old boy took his father’s pistol to a dance, then went into a bathroom with some friends to drink liquor. 13 Md. App. at 197. Mills, aware that there was a bullet in the chamber, pointed it at another boy, who slapped the gun out of Mills’s hand, causing it to discharge and kill another boy. Id. at 198-99. In sustaining Mills’s conviction for gross negligence involuntary manslaughter, this Court stated that “the introduction of the loaded weapon into a small room among five youths drinking liquor from a bottle, and the handling of the weapon by a person unfamiliar with its operation, including its loading and unloading, is plainly a grossly negligent act dangerous to life... .” Id. at 202. With this “tableau” of cases in mind, the Thomas Court then considered whether the unique facts present there—the dangers of a specific heroin sale—constituted the wanton and reckless disregard for human life necessary to sustain Thomas’s conviction. In Thomas , the agreed findings of fact showed that the victim, twenty-three-year- old Colton Matrey, died of a heroin overdose.^12 464 Md. at 14 7. Thomas, a heroin dealer (^12) Thomas entered a “hybrid plea,” wherein Thomas agreed to the ultimate facts of the case, but maintained the ability to argue legal issues and evidentiary sufficiency on appeal. Thomas , 464 Md. at 140.
and user himself, would typically consume twelve bags of heroin a day, using four bags for a single shot. Id. at 148. Prior to Matrey’s death, Thomas had sold heroin to Matrey “[a] few times.” Id. at 149. Just hours before he was found dead in the early morning of June 26, 2015, Matrey called Thomas approximately twenty-seven times in a twenty-two- minute span. Id. at 145. This was unusual because Matrey typically called Thomas earlier in the day to purchase heroin. Id. at 149. Thomas sold Matrey four bags of heroin. Id. Thomas later told police that he believed Matrey was nineteen years old. Id. at 150. After discussing numerous gross negligence involuntary manslaughter cases, including those mentioned above, the Court of Appeals provided the following guidance for determining the sufficiency of evidence for gross negligence involuntary manslaughter: there is no scientific test or quantifiable probability of death that converts ordinary negligence to criminal gross negligence. Rather, the inherent dangerousness of the act engaged in, as judged by a reasonable person... is combined with environmental risk factors, which, together, make the particular activity more or less “likely at any moment to bring harm to another.” Id. at 159 (quoting Johnson , 213 Md. at 533). The Court echoed the standard established in earlier cases: In sum, when determining whether an individual has acted with the requisite grossly negligent mens rea to be found guilty of involuntary manslaughter, the State must demonstrate wanton and reckless disregard for human life. This requires a gross departure from the conduct of an ordinarily careful and prudent person and a disregard or indifference to the rights of others. It also involves an assessment of whether an activity is more or less likely at any moment to bring harm to another, as determined by weighing the inherent dangerousness of the act and environmental risk factors. Id. at 160-61 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
