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“Democratic Challenges in Latin America:
Institutionalization, Corruption and Economic Inequality”
Prepared for Democracy at large.
Gerardo L. Munck
April 27, 2006
Latin America has made great strides toward democracy since 1978, the year when a regional wave of transitions from authoritarian rule began. Never before have so many countries in the region been democratic and never before has democracy lasted for so long. Yet Latin America faces important political challenges. The democratic gains made over the last twenty- five years are not guaranteed and need to be consolidated. Moreover, some enduring problems, such as corruption and economic inequality, need to be tackled. These political challenges are momentous and of critical important for the future of Latin America. Indeed, what is at stake is whether democracy will endure and whether further democratic changes will be pursued. Thus, it is imperative to understand these political challenges and, based on that understanding, to act in ways that secure democratic gains and promote further democratic change in Latin America.
1. Consolidating Democratic Gains: Democratic Institutions as Channels for Conflicting Interests The impressive process of democratization in Latin America during the 1980s in particular, well before any inklings of change in the communist East, starkly altered the region’s political landscape. If in 1977 only three countries merited the label democratic—Costa Rica, Venezuela and, with some caveats, Colombia—in 2006 only Cuba is widely seen as authoritarian. These changes initiated the first serious experience with democracy in the entire history of several countries: the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and Paraguay. For other countries, which re-democratized, it inaugurated the longest period of democracy in their histories. Democratic landmarks have been set in country after country. Reservations concerning constraints imposed by the electoral process itself have also been dispelled. The spate of recent electoral victories by leftist candidates, though a matter of concern in many circles, is actually proof of the vitality of electoral politics. In addition, the role of elections as mechanisms to anoint new leaders has been demonstrated by the election as president of a trade unionist of Brazil in 2002, an Aymara indian in Bolivia in 2005, and a woman in Chile in 2006. Yet the institutionalization of democratic politics is not assured. The tendency of popular leaders to reform constitutions so as to allow for their immediate reelection—Lagos, of Chile, is the only exception in recent times—and the numerous “failed presidencies”—during 2000- eight elected presidents did not reach the end of their legal mandate—is only the tip of the iceberg. Indeed, many actors have refused to abide by the principle that, in democracy, all political conflicts must be channeled through democratic institutions. The military plotted coups or rumors of coups were credible in Haiti in 1991, Paraguay in 1996 and 2000, Ecuador in 2000, Venezuela in 2002, and Bolivia in 2005. Elected leaders
seeking to perpetuate their grip on power or to ensure the election of allies oversaw outright fraudulent elections in Panama in 1989, the Dominican Republic in 1994, and Haiti and Peru in
- Moreover, elected presidents launched auto-golpes (self-coups) aimed at closing down congress in Peru in 1992 and Guatemala in 1993; and elected congresses instigated “impeachment coups,” most clearly in Nicaragua in 2005. Finally, the people took to the streets, pushing for the displacement of elected presidents, in actions that resemble “popular coups” more than the recent “civil society revolutions” in post-communist countries, in Ecuador in 2000 and 2005, Argentina in 2001, Venezuela in 2002, Bolivia in 2003, and Haiti in 2004. Politics in Latin America has hardly been tranquil. But these threats to democracy have largely been contained. The classic military coup d’etat—so common in the region in the 1960s and 1970s—has become an atypical event. The only successful post-1978 military coup occurred in Haiti in 1991 and it was reversed three years later when Aristide was restored to power. The coup against Chávez in Venezuela in 2002 was turned back after two days and hence was unsuccessful. The military junta set up in Ecuador in 2000 lasted a day and a half, relinquishing power to the elected vice president. And attempted, threatened or rumored coups in Paraguay in 1996 and 2000, and in Bolivia in 2005, were altogether prevented. The undemocratic actions of elected leaders, likewise, were largely controlled. Fraudulent elections were strongly resisted or otherwise corrected. The winner of the 1989 election in Panama was installed in office following a US invasion. A negotiated outcome, involving the shortening of the presidential term, was the response to the disputed 1994 election in the Dominican Republic. The fraudulent 2000 election in Peru was washed out within six months when the president resigned. Thus, only the results of the questionable 2000 elections in Haiti were allowed to stand. The “self-coup” in Peru in 1992 was also successful. But elections for congress were held seven months later, and the copycat act in Guatemala in 1993 failed from the outset. Finally, the political crisis in Nicaragua in 2005 was mostly resolved through diplomatic intermediation. The popular mobilizations in the streets against elected presidents were actually the hardest to diffuse and left some significant lingering effects. None of these situations evolved into military-led governments or triggered, as a reaction, military coups. But the targeted presidents were brought down in all instances except Venezuela in 2002. As analysts have noted, in all cases civilians eventually assumed the presidency; to a large extent, these civilians were constitutionally in the presidential line of succession; and these selected presidencies concluded with the installation of elected presidents.i^ Yet these popular actions were launched in defiance of the will of the citizenry as expressed institutionally through the ballot box, in free and fair elections. Their instigators sometimes operated in alliance with leaders of political parties who had lost the previous election for president and in two cases—Ecuador in 2000 and Venezuela in 2002—in concert with the military. And they involved the use of violence on the part of demonstrators (as well as state repression) in Argentina in 2001, Venezuela in 2002, Bolivia in 2003, and Haiti in 2004. Overall, Latin America offers a democratic success story. Dictators have been removed and authoritarian regimes ended. Unambiguous violations of democracy have been rare and brief. Most of the time, elections are held regularly and winners take office, and losers and new players prepare for the next election. But political conflicts are not always channeled through democratic institutions and hence democratic politics is partially institutionalized. Latin America still faces the challenge of consolidating its democratic gains.ii
equality brought about by any translation of economic power into political power. But when economic inequality reaches high levels, as in many Latin American countries, there is reason to worry about the impact of economic power on democracy. The weakening of the principle of political equality can be due to the excessive weight given to the preferences of the wealthy, as manifested in their ability to run more successfully for office, to set the agenda via media ownership and control, and to influence legislation through lobbying.iv^ It can also be the result of the filtering out of the preferences of the poor, who may stumble into legal hurdles that make it hard to register to vote, who may work far from home and be required to travel a considerable distance to a designated polling stations to cast a vote, who may face significant inducements to sell their vote, and who are overall less prepared to speak the language of political power. Yet the result is the same. Competitive elections and alternation in power notwithstanding, if either the rich have undue influence on the political process or the poor are shut out or shunned aside, the claim that all citizens have equal standing and an equal opportunity to affect government policy loses some of its meaning. In sum, corruption and economic inequality have an impact, direct or indirect, on democracy and thus constitute democratic challenges. Thus, Latin America not only faces the challenge of consolidating its democratic gains. It also faces the challenge of pursuing further democratic change.
3. Transforming Democracy: The What, How and Who of Democratic Change To respond to its democratic challenges, Latin America needs a new political agenda. Indeed, innovative analysis and bold action is required to transform Latin American democracies. Any such agenda will necessarily have to be tailored to the specifics of each country. Nonetheless, as a way to begin constructing a road map that could be used to enter this uncharted territory, I would make the following suggestions regarding questions to be addressed, leads to be followed, and pitfalls to be avoided. A first question that should be addressed is, what is the agenda? Responding to this question is harder that might appear at first sight. Indeed, there is a strong temptation to think that the core issue is to figure out what institutions are needed or, even worse, to pin hopes on one institution of the overall structure of the state. Yet the shortcomings of such an approach must be recognized. To be sure, institutional change is one of the tools reformers can use. But proposed solutions must go beyond institutional fixes.v^ After all, part of the problem is that institutions are weak, and that many actors are quite adept at working around laws or gaining protection from the laws. Thus, framing an agenda requires, most fundamentally, not skirting around the nature of problems such as corruption and economic equality, and coming to terms with the fact that what is involved are deep-seated practices and the interests of powerful actors, some operating legally and other illegally. In other words, a proposal for change must not lose sight of the big picture and must factor in the strategic, adaptive behavior of actors. A second question to be addressed is, how should this agenda be fostered_?_ In this regard, it bears emphasizing that democratic change requires a reversal of the recent trend toward the privatization of public affairs and a recovery of the sense of politics as a noble endeavor. That is, the procedures through which change is sought, even though the agenda for change is decidedly radical, must be consistent with the overall goal of strengthening democracy. The new political agenda requires a renunciation to any sort of violence and a commitment to resolve differences within the framework of democracy.
Finally, a third question that should be addressed is, who is capable of promoting such an agenda? This is, ultimately, the key question, because it gets at the central problem that those actors who have an interest in change do not have the power to bring about change, while those actors who have the power to introduce change do not have an interest in doing so. And it is a question that invites pessimism. Yet this uphill battle can be won. At its core, getting change going is a matter for small, cohesive and committed groups of people. The first task of these change teams is to show, largely through example, that it is possible to alter entrenched practices; their larger task is to modify, through the exercise of political power, the incentives for others. In a nutshell, the prospects of democratic change hinge on the emergence of such change teams and the formation of a broad coalition for change, including political parties, NGOs and other civil society groups, and international democracy promoters.
4. Conclusion: Lessons from Regional Models Recent discussions about the direction of Latin America have focused on the rising electoral fortunes of leftist parties and the distinction between two lefts: one represented by Chávez, who became president of Venezuela in 1998 and still holds that office, the other by Lagos, who was president of Chile from 2000 to 2006. There is much to this distinction. Chávez came to the presidency as an outsider, is close to Castro, and favors strong state intervention in the economy. Lagos assumed the presidency as the leader of a coalition of parties with a long history; was not close to Castro; and put an emphasis on how the state can assist the global competitiveness of private business. Moreover, these regional models exercise a powerful influence. Latin American politicians learn from each other, and the viability of reforms and policies are gauged in part by considering the experience of neighboring countries. Yet the lessons to be drawn from Venezuela and Chile are not, as is frequently portrayed, that leaders should pick one rout or the other. Rather, these two cases offer complementary lessons. Venezuela shows that the cause of social justice remains a potent one in Latin America and that, when the established political elites ignore it, anti-oligarchic political movements in the populist tradition of Perón are formed. Such movements can be successful in the electoral arena, as is attested by the victories of Chávez and then Evo Morales in Bolivia in 2005, and the strong first round showing by Ollanta Humala in Peru in 2006. Yet Chávez’s record in office suggests that the rise to power of such an outside leader has a negative consequence for the institutionalization of democratic politics, does not reduce corruption, and does not bring growth and equity. Thus, probably the key lesson of Venezuela is that politicians cannot afford to ignore the situation of the grupos postergados (neglected groups) who have been waiting to participate fully in politics and to claim a larger share of the wealth of their societies. Chile, in turn, is rightfully held up as an example to emulate. It has enacted reforms that removed the authoritarian legacies of the Pinochet-led military regime, and it has strong democratic institutions. It has shown, probably better than any other country in the region, how corruption can be dealt with effectively when government and opposition parties work together on the problem. Moreover, it has shown that a Latin American country can manage its relationship with a globalized economy in a way that leads to increased overall welfare. Yet Chile’s democracy has failed to reduce the high levels of economic inequality it inherited from Pinochet in 1990. Thus, the lesson of Chile is that even in the best of political circumstances, some of the democratic challenges faced in Latin America are likely to persist stubbornly.
