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Robert Tannenwald
Assistant Vice President and Econo- mist, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
Devolution:
The New Federalism—
An Overview
I
n recent years, a growing number of scholars and policymakers have concluded that the federal government has become too large and powerful, intruding into affairs better handled by states and munic- ipalities. Based on this premise, they have argued for a reduction in federal aid, the conversion of matching grants to block grants, greater flexibility for states in implementing federally funded programs, and curtailment of federal mandates. Their program is popularly referred to as “devolution,” the “devolving” of federal responsibilities to lower levels of government. The controversy that devolution has generated is the latest chapter in a debate over optimal intergovernmental arrange- ments that is as old as the nation itself. Last September, the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston and the National Tax Association organized a one-day colloquium on the devolution movement. In attendance were experts on intergovernmental relations; business executives; former and current local, state, and federal policy- makers; and leaders of national interest groups and private social service organizations whose constituents are significantly affected by devolution. In one session, participants focused on the devolution movement’s fundamental tenets; its philosophical, political, social, and economic origins; and its progress to date in achieving its goals. In another session, they assessed devolution’s probable impact on the behavior of states and municipalities, especially the capacity of lower levels of government to assume devolved responsibilities. During both sessions, participants vigorously debated devolution’s merits, drawbacks, and likely future course. The only point that virtually all participants agreed upon was that the devolution movement has not proceeded very far. Most participants agreed that a mix of federal control and state and local autonomy was desirable, the optimal arrangements varying from function to function. They tended to reject extreme centralization and decentralization of governmental responsibilities. Participants disagreed over the move-
ment’s advantages and disadvantages, its probable success in achieving its goals, and the likely behavior of states and municipalities under a more devolution- ary scenario.
I. The Objectives, Roots, and Current
Status of Devolution
John Kincaid opened the deliberations by pre- senting his paper, “The Devolution Tortoise and the Centralization Hare.” He specifies six objectives of devolution: “(1) more efficient provision and produc- tion of public services; (2) better alignment of the costs and benefits of government for a diverse citizenry; (3) better fits between public goods and their spatial characteristics; (4) increased competition, experimen- tation, and innovation in the public sector, (5) greater responsiveness to citizen preferences; and (6) more transparent accountability in policymaking.”
Kincaid concludes that what is currently referred to as devolution is more accurately called “restoration” or “rebalancing” of powers between the federal government and the states to conform more closely to what the authors of the Constitution had in mind.
Kincaid distinguishes devolution from similar but subtly different transformations such as “decentraliza- tion,” “delegation,” and “deregulation.” Devolution connotes a surrender of a function by a superior government to a subordinate government that is gen- erally complete, permanent, and of “constitutional magnitude.” As such, strictly speaking it cannot occur between the federal government and the states under the U.S. Constitution. Since our federal system is one of dual sovereignty, in which the federal government and the states each have constitutionally specified powers, the federal government lacks the authority to devolve responsibilities. Kincaid concludes that what is currently referred to as devolution is more accu-
rately called “restoration” or “rebalancing” of powers between the federal government and the states to conform more closely to what the authors of the Constitution had in mind. To underscore the degree of imbalance, he notes that, while the Constitution spec- ifies only four criminal offenses punishable by the federal government, today it can punish individuals for more than 3,000 different felonies. After clarifying terms, Kincaid analyzes factors, both proximate and remote, that have stirred interest in rebalancing the federal system. The most signifi- cant, immediate factor was the attainment of a major- ity by the Republican Party in both the House and Senate after the 1994 midterm elections. The GOP’s assumption of congressional control, combined with the election of 32 Republican governors, brought to power men and women committed to realizing long- frustrated Republican desires to limit federal power. Kincaid’s paper traces the roots of the rebalancing movement further back to the suburbanization of America; migration to the Sunbelt; spreading disillu- sionment with the federal government and skepticism regarding its long-run fiscal capacity; increasing re- spect for state and local governments; and a ground- swell of support around the world for decentraliza- tion, deregulation, and free enterprise. He argues that, since suburbanites value local autonomy, they are especially receptive to doctrines advocating a weak- ening of federal authority. The growing proportion of the nation residing in the suburbs and “exurbia” has therefore bolstered the devolutionary cause. For sim- ilar reasons, the migration of Americans to the South and West, regions that have historically championed states’ rights, has also engendered support for devo- lution. A spreading disrespect for the federal govern- ment, evident in recent public opinion polls, has also promoted sentiment for restoring state powers. The electorate is particularly concerned that the federal government lacks the fiscal resources to sustain its wide array of programs. Kincaid also sees the decline of the federal government’s popularity partially as a reflection of the revenge of the “silent majority”—a revolt against the perceived growth of federal pro- grams designed to protect various minority interests. In his view, the silent majority is receptive to devolu- tion because it would transfer powers and functions to levels of government more in touch with the majori- ty’s wishes. While doubts about the federal government have grown, so has confidence in the capabilities of state and local governments. Kincaid attributes state and
has breathed new life into constitutional federalism through emerging doctrines pregnant with implica- tions for future umpiring more supportive of state sovereignty.” Why has devolution proved to be a “tortoise” compared to the centralization “hare”? Kincaid cites political, administrative, and philosophical reasons. All devolutionary plans would create winners and losers. The potential losers have been sufficiently pow- erful and politically adept to thwart legislation calling for more extensive restoration of powers to the states. The intense, focused opposition of interest groups has been more than sufficient to neutralize the more general, diffuse support for devolutionary principles. Ironically, one especially powerful, politically active group with potentially much to lose from devolution is state officials. Uncertain about how much federal assistance they would actually receive if devolution were to proceed, many have been among the most ardent defenders of the status quo. In addition, Congress and the President have had difficulty resisting opportunities to claim credit for programs that enjoy a high degree of support among the public at large, such as civil rights, environmental protection, middle-class entitlements, and crime con- trol. This is true even though one might argue persua- sively on economic or constitutional grounds that the programs should be crafted and administered at the state or local level. Unfunded mandates are especially attractive to elected federal policymakers because they further popular causes without requiring the federal taxpayers to pay for compliance. Congress’s stubborn predilection to preempt state law reflects to some degree a desire to enhance nation- wide economic efficiency and international economic competitiveness through interstate uniformity. These considerations have made Republicans at least as aggressive “preemptors” of the states as Democrats, especially in such policy areas as state product liabil- ity, food and drug labeling, Internet taxation, and medical malpractice laws. Underlying the retention and expansion of fed- eral power in many areas, even in the face of what Kincaid terms “a discernible crawl” toward devolu- tion, has been a fundamental change in the way America views itself. Kincaid argues that, during the 1960s, the United States began to think of itself less as a union of sovereign states and more as a union of individuals. Supreme Court decisions requiring “one person, one vote” ( Reynolds v. Syms 1964; Wesberry v. Sanders 1964) in the creation of legislative districts were instrumental in fostering this change. The devel-
opment of nationwide media organizations and party primaries also contributed. The major consequence of these developments was a severing of historical elec- toral ties between members of Congress and their state and local political party organizations, leading U.S. representatives and senators to depend on and to respond to their voters directly, rather than indirectly through state and local officials. Kincaid argues that these developments contributed more to centraliza- tion of power in the hands of the federal government than either the New Deal or the Great Society. Kincaid concludes by evaluating two widespread concerns of devolution’s opponents: the dangers of intensified interstate competition and the potential inability of states to take on functions devolved from the federal government. According to the former concern, states would fail to take over devolved social responsibilities for fear of becoming a magnet for welfare migrants. They would compete with each other for employers by cutting social welfare pro- grams and offering tax subsidies. Kincaid asserts that predictions of such a “race to the bottom” are prema-
With respect to the states’ ability to assume devolved responsibilities, Kincaid argues that they can be as capable as its citizens want them to be.
ture and probably unfounded. He sees little evidence of a race to the bottom in welfare programs and environmental protection since the introduction of devolutionary initiatives in these policy areas. The potential for destructive competition in welfare is constrained by TANF provisions allowing states with high benefit levels to give migrants during their first year in-state the lower benefits they received in their previous state of residence. With respect to environ- mental protection, fostering a high quality of life has proved to be a more compelling competitive strategy than lowering taxes at the cost of environmental degradation. Kincaid maintains that competition in the form of state and local subsidies, especially in the form of tax abatements and low-cost loans, is already rampant. If such forms of competition were sup- pressed, states would find other, equally deleterious
avenues through which to compete, such as vying for increased federal aid through lobbying and other forms of political pressure. With respect to the states’ ability to assume de- volved responsibilities, Kincaid argues that they can be as capable as its citizens want them to be. Tax and expenditure limits, which constrain states’ fiscal ca- pacity, could be removed should voters want state government to pick up where the federal government leaves off. In a devolutionary scenario, voters might support an expansion of state programs if they believe that they can hold state governments more account- able for their actions than the federal government. In sum, Kincaid finds compelling arguments in favor of devolution but powerful political forces re- tarding its progress. In his view, while the devolution movement may proceed further, the federal govern- ment will continue to preempt the states in many policy areas and to impose conditions on its intergov- ernmental assistance. Of the three branches of govern- ment, the judiciary is the most likely to further the devolutionary cause.
Panelists’ Comments
In reacting to Kincaid’s paper, David Beam of- fered his perspective on the roots, likely extent and duration, and desirability of devolution. He ques- tioned the degree to which the recent political suc- cesses of the Republican Party have been responsible for the rise of devolutionary sentiment. Some key intergovernmental proposals in the Contract With America, such as curtailment of unfunded mandates, were nearly enacted by the preceding Congress and enjoyed support among governors even when the majority were Democrats. In his view, disillusionment with all levels of government, not just the federal government, lies behind the devolution movement. He lamented this cynicism, arguing that it reflects a fundamental misinterpretation of constitutional in- tent. He maintained that, although the nation’s founders sought to limit the national government, they wanted it to be effective within its restricted sphere. Beam doubted that the current devolution move- ment will significantly alter current federal-state rela- tionships, noting that interest in reforming those rela- tionships intensified and waned under Presidents Eisenhower, Nixon, and Reagan. Each reform cam- paign fell far short of its ambitious objectives. Beam asserted that recently enacted devolutionary propos- als, such as welfare reform, are not clearly supported
by economic, political, or administrative theory. Policy analysts have long held that redistribution should be a national function, while economic development should be a state and local function. David Ellwood ’s comments focused on the ori- gins and devolutionary implications of the TANF
In Beam’s view, disillusionment with all
levels of government, not just the federal
government, lies behind the devolution
movement. He laments this cynicism.
Ellwood noted that the welfare program no
longer is just about redistribution; an
important goal is to facilitate the transition
from welfare to work. Some federal role is
still appropriate, given the wide disparities
among states.
Fox maintained that interstate disparities in
service levels are appropriate if they reflect
differences in preferences, and that
interjurisdictional competition can enhance
efficiency in service delivery.
Modahl reminded participants that the
authors of the Constitution purposely
imposed constraints on the power of the
federal government, wary of the potential for
all levels of government to misuse their “legal
monopoly on coercion.”
Latimer maintained that the nation’s high
degree of “spatial inequality” is a significant
problem whose solution demands considerable
federal input.
program. He traced TANF’s origins to a mixture of political compromises and normative concerns. In crafting welfare reform, Congress considered three principal plans, one imposing time limits and work requirements but otherwise maintaining the status quo, one imposing severe federal conditions on wel-
tributed the lack of progress in resurrecting this vision to a poorly informed public that gives little thought to normative issues of governance. How- ever, based on the first tentative steps toward dev- olution, he is optimistic about the future. George Latimer (moderator of the session) main- tained that the nation’s high degree of “spatial in- equality” is a significant problem whose solution demands considerable federal input. A large number of people in need of employment, especially those residing in the inner city, cannot find jobs near where they live. Latimer questioned whether the free market and state and local governments can solve this prob- lem alone.
II. How Will State and Local Governments
Respond to the Challenges and
Opportunities of the New Federalism?
Robert Tannenwald began the second session by presenting his paper, “Come the Devolution, Will States Be Able to Respond?” His study investigates the following empirical issues, all central to the devolu- tion debate: How easily could state governments and their municipalities expand their fiscal domain should devolution proceed and should they choose to do so? Which states would have the most difficulty? How disparate would be the capacity of states to respond? Would those least able to respond tend to prefer relatively low levels of state and local public services anyway? Tannenwald begins by explaining why the ques- tion posed in the title of his paper is important. Some opponents of devolution fear certain states and mu- nicipalities lack the ability and will to assume respon- sibilities devolved from the federal government. Tax- payer resistance, a dearth of taxable resources, growing public problems traditionally addressed at the subnational level, and interjurisdictional competi- tive pressures are the most often cited constraints on the ability of state and local governments to enlarge their role in the U.S. federal system. These constraints are especially troublesome to those who believe that many programs currently undertaken by the federal government should not wither away. Evidence that states could and would pick up where the federal government leaves off would mitigate their concerns. Tannenwald first looks for clues about states’ likely fiscal response to devolution in the historical pattern of the aggregate state and local revenue bur- den. Revenue burden is a measure of general state and
local revenues, net of federal aid, as a percentage of nationwide personal income. The most recently re- vised data indicate that between 1977 (FY77) and FY revenue burden rose by 0.8 percentage point. While this increase might indicate mild support for state and local expansion, the burden of state and local taxes declined over this period by 0.7 percentage point. The two fastest-growing categories of state and local rev- enue were non-tax sources—miscellaneous revenue (much of which is interest income) and user fees and charges. The rapid growth in miscellaneous revenues reflects, depending on the year in question, increases in interest rates (temporary windfalls outside of state and local control), expansion of borrowing, and changes in the definition of interest income made by the Census Bureau. Thus, the implications of the historical trend in revenue burden are inconclusive.
Tannenwald first looks for clues about states’ likely fiscal response to devolution in the historical pattern of the aggregate state and local revenue burden, a measure of revenue as a percentage of personal income.
Tannenwald then examines recent trends in the aggregate surplus of state and local governments, reasoning that they might be building up reserves as a contingency against potential reductions in federal assistance. He finds that the ratio of the surplus to spending in the state and local sector has increased since the last recession and has remained at between 4 and 5 percent. However, this percentage has been in long-term decline and pales in comparison to its value 30 years ago. Nevertheless, the recent persistence of the surplus-to-spending ratio in the 4 to 5 percent range differs from the historical pattern, in which the ratio falls sharply one to three years past peak. Per- haps, Tannenwald surmises, states are “bulking up” partially to offset federal aid cuts. Tannenwald cites evidence that states have amassed deeper reserves and achieved higher surplus- to-spending ratios than local governments. This asym- metry presents problems for devolution advocates in that local governments are at the bottom of the fiscal
food chain. If federal aid to the states were cut, state governments might respond by reducing their assis- tance to local governments. If municipalities lacked reserves or the capacity to raise taxes, they would be forced to cut spending, in effect bearing the brunt of the reduction in federal aid to the states. States are most likely to cut local aid during recessions, when demand for state social services is high and growth in state revenue especially slow. Federal matching en- titlements, such as Medicaid, mitigate recession- induced stress on states by automatically increasing disbursements in response to rising caseloads. The substitution of block grants for open-ended matching grants would make federal aid less responsive to the business cycle, thereby reducing the states’ capacity to maintain aid to local governments during economic contractions.
Tannenwald estimates the relative fiscal comfort of each state in FY94, defined as fiscal capacity relative to fiscal need. He finds wide disparities among the states.
Having analyzed the fiscal strength of state and local governments in the aggregate, Tannenwald then turns to the issue of interstate disparity in fiscal comfort. Many who question the wisdom of devolu- tion are concerned about the potential inadequacy of government spending in fiscally “uncomfortable” states, those with low fiscal capacity relative to the needs of their citizens for public services. They also worry that, should devolution proceed, the least fis- cally comfortable states would be at a disadvantage in interstate competition, forcing them into a vicious circle of reduced public services, loss of labor and capital, intensification of their fiscal problems, and further tax increases or further spending cuts. The less the dispersion in fiscal comfort across states, the less likely that further devolution would create or exacer- bate such a problem. Tannenwald estimates the relative fiscal comfort of each state in FY94 (the latest year for which all relevant data were available). He uses methodologies originally developed and refined by the now-defunct
U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Re- lations. He defines fiscal comfort as fiscal capacity rela- tive to fiscal need. Fiscal capacity measures the richness of a state’s taxable resources. Fiscal need measures the extent to which a state, through no fault of its own, faces conditions that increase per unit costs of provid- ing state and local public services or augment the scope of services that its governments must provide. Examples of such conditions include a high rate of poverty and a high ratio of school-age children to total population. Tannenwald finds wide disparities in fiscal com- fort. The most fiscally comfortable state, Nevada, enjoyed a comfort level more than twice that of the most fiscally stressed state, Mississippi. The most fiscally comfortable states tend to be those with the highest fiscal capacity, including, in addition to Ne- vada, Hawaii, Connecticut, New Jersey, Wyoming, and Delaware. The least comfortable states tend to be concentrated in the South. Dispersion in fiscal comfort has narrowed since FY87, the only other year in which estimates for both fiscal capacity and fiscal need have been undertaken. Historical trends in the dispersion of fiscal capacity can be analyzed in more detail, since state-specific estimates of capacity have been under- taken for most fiscal years since FY75. Dispersion has been narrowing since FY88, a trend supporting devo- lution’s proponents. Tannenwald then uses his estimates of fiscal com- fort and fiscal capacity to evaluate the degree of diversity among states in preferences for the level of state and local public spending. He reasons that, in the absence of significant diversity, the intensity with which states exploit their taxable resources should vary inversely with fiscal comfort. This intensity— referred to as tax effort—is equal to actual state and local taxes collected as a percentage of tax capacity. Fiscally comfortable states should be able to achieve a given level of per capita state and local spending with less tax effort than fiscally stressed states. In fact, Tannenwald finds that tax effort and fiscal comfort are uncorrelated, implying that as a whole fiscally stressed states have a preference for relatively low levels of spending. Both sides of the devolution debate can find encouragement in this finding. Proponents of devolution can argue that, with evidence of diversity in preferences, states should be free to vary their spending levels without federal interference. Oppo- nents can argue that, without federal intervention, residents of fiscally stressed states with an acute need for public services would suffer at the hands of their state’s tight-fisted majority.
ence as a Massachusetts state senator, she advised participants that politicians sense the public’s “discon- nect” at the federal level and their desire to do things “closer to home.” She believed that, because these feelings are widespread and deep, devolution, al- though slow-paced, will continue to progress. She was confident that state governments have the creativity, independence, and expertise to respond effectively under any devolutionary scenario. Should the states pick up where the federal gov- ernment leaves off? McGovern was skeptical. States should think carefully about which programs should be kept and which discarded. Some federal programs have become so complicated and wasteful that per- haps the states should just let them die. Isabel Sawhill asserted that the two most signif- icant recent changes in U.S. intergovernmental rela- tions have been the enactment of a long-term plan for eventual reduction in federal aid to state and local governments and the substitution of block grants for matching grants. The potentially adverse ramifications of aid reduction have yet to surface because the strong economy has shrunk welfare caseloads and TANF offers states generous short-term increases in assis- tance relative to what they would receive under the old AFDC program. However, states would probably lower their levels of welfare benefits if the economy fell into recession, the incidence of single-parent fam- ilies and poverty among children continued to rise, and the long-run caps on federal discretionary spend- ing began to “bite.” The substitution of block grants for matching grants will accentuate likely future re- ductions in welfare spending by severing the relation- ship between the amount a state spends and the amount of federal aid it receives. Moreover, this substitution will accentuate interstate disparities in welfare because un- der AFDC, matching rates were inversely proportional to a state’s per capita personal income. Sawhill identified three underlying widely held beliefs revealed by the successes and failures of the devolutionary movement to date: 1) the era of big government should be ended; 2) decentralization is good; nevertheless 3) it is acceptable to embed moral principles in legislation. As an example of this third position, Sawhill noted the strict workfare require- ments imposed by TANF and the underlying public concern about the demise of the work ethic and traditional family values. John Shannon was perhaps the most upbeat of all the colloquium’s presenters and discussants. He was not as pessimistic as Tannenwald about the future revenue prospects of state and local governments. He
found that the ratio of state and local general own- source revenue to Gross Domestic Product has risen steadily since the Korean War. By contrast, the com- parable ratio for the federal government has trended downward over the same period. While acknowledg- ing Tannenwald’s point that state and local revenue growth during the 1980s was partially attributable to ephemeral interest income, Shannon asserted that nonetheless state and local governments have usually obtained the revenue they have needed, one way or another. State and local revenue growth has been all the more impressive because the ability of states and municipalities to tax high-income individuals is lim- ited by the constraints of economic competition. Con- sequently, they are forced to obtain their revenue from taxes on the politically powerful middle class. Shannon believed that the current movement to restore the balance between federal and state powers reflects the triumph of the analytic school of policy analysis alluded to by John Donahue. From 1789 to 1933, the U.S. system of intergovernmental relations was dominated by the states, much as the authors of the Constitution envisioned. The Great Depression, World War II, and the Cold War led to a centralization that tipped the balance to the opposite extreme. Only now, according to Shannon, are we moving away from “lopsided” federalism toward a system in which each level of government does what it does best. Like Ellwood, he warned that this sorting out of responsi- bilities will be a difficult task. Helen Ladd (the moderator of this session) ques- tioned whether the conclusions Tannenwald draws from his empirical analysis are warranted. If the state and local tax burden has fallen since the late 1970s, then perhaps states and municipalities have room to raise taxes if they need more revenue to take on devolved fiscal responsibilities. The damage that a state would do to its competitive tax standing might not be as serious as is often asserted, given that marginal tax rates applicable to high-income taxpay- ers have fallen in recent years. She urged researchers to analyze interstate differences in marginal tax rates to improve our understanding of the issue of interstate competition. Ladd also called for a dynamic analysis of state and local fiscal capacity, as opposed to Tannenwald’s static analysis, to provide insight into the ability of state and local governments to augment their fiscal resources in a recession. Ladd noted that states have been substituting relatively elastic revenue sources for inelastic sources. The result may be a greater-than- expected revenue shock, should the economy con-
tract. Ladd also raised the issue of whether local governments are likely to suffer the most fiscal stress in scenarios entailing more extensive devolu- tion. She wondered whether states would try to shift devolved responsibilities to fiscally strapped local governments.
III. General Discussion
As noted in the introduction to this overview, the only point generating a consensus among participants was that devolution’s progress has been limited. Nev- ertheless, the general discussion following both the morning and afternoon presentations tended to coa- lesce around a few themes and issues. Participants offered several reasons why, for bet- ter or for worse, the federal government will probably retain a strong role in our federal system.
- In certain policy areas, especially in taxation and regulation, interstate uniformity significantly en- hances economic efficiency.
- A widespread public consensus has developed around certain federal programs, such as those devoted to crime control and promoting “work- fare.” The public would worry that the programs would be curtailed or lost if the federal govern- ment abandoned them.
- Many nonprofit organizations benefiting from current federal programs have become strong, powerful stakeholders favoring federal involve- ment.
- If devolution proceeded, state governments might fail to solve the intractable public policy problems that have been turned over to them. Some federal officials advocate devolution be- cause they are tired of being blamed constantly for failing to solve many of the nation’s ills. After the states become targets for similar criticism (so the argument goes), they will want the federal government to reassume control.
- A widespread belief that interstate competition inhibits redistribution will keep this function in the hands of the federal government. Considerable discussion was devoted to the abil- ity of state governments to fulfill the role envisioned in the devolutionary paradigm. In general, partici- pants were less sanguine than Patricia McGovern or John Shannon about the capabilities of subnational governments. One participant argued that many states and municipalities were corrupt and inept. However, discussants disagreed on the implications of this as-
sessment for the desirability of devolution. Some felt that wide interjurisdictional disparities in integrity and capability militate against geographic redistribu- tion by the central government. People living in places with effective governments do not want to donate money to ineffective governments.
Considerable discussion was devoted to the ability of state governments to fulfill the role envisioned in the devolutionary paradigm. Some felt that wide interjurisdictional disparities in integrity and capability militate against redistribution by the central government.
One participant even questioned the need for state governments, in theory. Ultimately resources should flow from the central government to individ- uals, who should then bid in the marketplace for needed public goods and services. Intermediate-level governments exist only because of market failures inherent in the allocation of goods, generating exter- nalities. In the analytical tradition described by Donahue, the geographic scope of intermediate jurisdic- tions should largely reflect the geographic pattern of externalities. The appropriate scope might be municipal, metropolitan, or regional, but not necessarily state. This theory elicited a sharp response from adher- ents to the constitutional tradition. They pointed out that the Constitution affirms states’ sovereignty and invests them with considerable authority, if only to protect citizens against centralized tyranny. On the other hand, it was pointed out that over the past 40 years the federal government has been the primary defender of liberty against state tyranny, one of the reasons underlying persistent support for federal ac- tivism. One participant noted that vouchers were the logical extension of the individualist theory described above. Fraud has plagued food stamps, the largest federal voucher program, an indication of the diffi- culty of implementing the “Fund nationally, act lo- cally” doctrine.
