








Study with the several resources on Docsity
Earn points by helping other students or get them with a premium plan
Prepare for your exams
Study with the several resources on Docsity
Earn points to download
Earn points by helping other students or get them with a premium plan
Community
Ask the community for help and clear up your study doubts
Discover the best universities in your country according to Docsity users
Free resources
Download our free guides on studying techniques, anxiety management strategies, and thesis advice from Docsity tutors
E Dale Searcy, University of Dayton (OH), Law, Estate and Gift Tax, Exam Fall 1991, Trustee,net income,actuarial values,Corporate Stock,CS,Adjusted Basis,AB,Fair Market Value,FMV,Entire fact situation,,Corporate Stock and reinvest,tax litigation,federal court.
Typology: Exams
1 / 14
This page cannot be seen from the preview
Don't miss anything!
Searcy
ESTATE AND GIFT TAX Fall 1991
Prior to the facts below, D never made any gifts. In November 1987 Donor D created a new inter vivos irrevocable and nonamendable trust obligating Trustee T to pay all net income to A for A's life, thereafter if D is living to pay all net income to Donor D for D's life, and upon the death of the latter to die of A or D to deliver all trust property outright to R and his heirs. In November 1987 D transferred to Trustee T some nondepreciable shares of Corporate Stock (CS). D died in 1991 survived by T, A, and R. A died in 1996 survived by T and R. T correctly paid $7,000 of income to A in 1987 (the trust began in late November, so that was all the net income for 1987) and about $75,000 per year net
income in 1988 through 1996.
Assume that the actuarial values of the various interests in the trust at various dates were as follows:
A's Interest D's Interest R's Interest
*The asterisk percentages are computed based upon the life expectancy of the decedent without considering the fact of decedent's death. Of course the actuarial value of a life
income interest at the time of the life tenant's death would be zero if the fact of death were to be considered, and such zero value would cause all of the value of the entire property to be allocated to or among the other interest(s).
Assume that the Adjusted Basis (AB) and Fair Markek
Value (FMV) of the Corporate Stock CS were as follows:
$ 700,000 D's 1983 cash cost and D's 1987 AB
1,000,000 FMV 1987 when D transferred to T
1,500,000 FMV 1991 when D died
At the time of D's death in 1991 the only asset that D owned was a $1,000,000 cash Certificate of Deposit registered in D's name alone. D's will left his entire estate to his Sister S. D had no debts at the time of his death.
In 1990 Donor D made an outright gift of nondepreciable unimproved Land to C. The dollar factors are:
$ 300,000 D's 1975 cash cost and D's 1990 AB
400,000 FMV 1990 date of gift
600,000 FMV 1991 date of D's death
A. $10,000 by reason of the gift made to T
B. Zero, provided D's Executor E can establish that D's gift of Land was not made with contemplation of death
thoughts or motives.
C. The amount of the GT due as determined in #3.
you need not limit your answer to those amounts.)
your answer to that amount).
A. Zero
C. $700,000 plus some increase by reason of D's 1987 GT
A. Zero because a GT has already been paid upon D's 1987 transfer to R.
B. The actuarial value of a person A's age at the time of A's death (disregarding the fact of A's death) multiplied by the $1,600,000 FMV at the date of A's death.
D. Zero, because although A has a sec. 2033 "interest", the sec. 2031 value includible is zero, because a Life Estate has a zero FMV on the date of death of the measuring life.
E. Zero because A has no sec. 2033 "interest"
After a lengthy trial with extensive briefs submitted by all parties, the trial court decides that (1) the legislature intended to permit disclaimer of JT interests, but merely failed to expressly designate JT in the statute, (2) N's written disclaimer is adequate in all respects, (3) the disclaimed JT property was owned one-half by the survivor before the death of the other JT, and such one-half
ownership continues after death regardless of any disclaimer, and (4) the other half, which was effectively disclaimed, passes to the disclaimant's would-be heirs. None of the parties appealed the final judgment, which therefore
became binding on all parties.
The IRS auditor is attempting to assert a GT deficiency against N based upon invalidity under local law of N's disclaimer. Assume that the validity under local law of N's disclaimer is necessary as a first element of N avoiding GT under Sec. 2518. The IRS agent claims that the state trial court decision is entitled to no weight in a federal court hearing N's GT litigation, and N contends that the state trial court's final judgement on the issues there decided is binding on the government in tax litigation. Where the federal government was not a party to the state court proceeding, the best statement would be:
A. The principal U.S. Supreme Court opinion on point deals with the ET, and that opinion is therefore not relevant to a GT controversy.
B. If there was no fraud or collusion in the state court proceeding, all proper parties were present and participated, and all are fully bound by the final state trial court judgment, then the federal government is also bound in tax litigation as to issues so decided by the state trial court.
C. The state courts are more likely to be familiar with local law than are federal courts in tax litigation, and such federal courts are to accept the correctness of state court proceedings which are final and binding upon the parties where it is shown that the state court judgment proceeded from a genuinely adversary proceeding in which all proper parties had notice, appeared, and made bona fide efforts to prevail.
T's absolute discretion decide; no apportionment or reduction in any descendant's future share is required by reason of any distribution of corpus by T prior to L's death. T is the next door neighbor of L. Grantor G had no right to revoke, but G retained the power to eliminate any of the living descendants of L from being treated as a beneficiary at L's death or permissible designee of corpus distributions upon L's death, and to reinstate any beneficiary so deleted. In addition, G reserved the right to at any time during G's life and without cause remove T as trustee and substitute himself G as trustee. Assume that in 1987 the actuarial value of L's life estate was 70% of the aggregate value of all trust corpus. In 1987, G transferred irrevocably $1,000,000 cash to T, which T promptly invested in income producing property. Grantor G died in 1991 when the FMV of all trust property was till $1,000,000 and the actuarial value of L's life estate was 60%. G was survived by T, L, and several descendants of L; T never made any distributions of corpus to anyone, and G never exercised his power to eliminate any descendant of L from beneficiary status. The trust instrument grants T the discretion to select investments of his choice and to allocate trust receipts between principal (thus to be accumulated and held for ultimate distribution after L's death) or income (thus to be distributed currently to L).
will require the following in G's GE:
A. No inclusion because the powers which C retained are nonbeneficial to G.
B. No inclusion because G's power is not a general power of appointment.
C. No inclusion because the power to distribute is
limited by an ascertainable standard which a court of equity will enforce and which is therefore not a sufficiently extensive power to require inclusion.
D. Inclusion of only $400,000.
E. Inclusion of $1,000,000.
reason of Sec. 2038(a)(1) (check as many as are applicable):
A. G's ability to substitute himself as Trustee will cause G to be considered to hold at the time of G's death all of the powers of the Trustee even though G never exercised his ability to substitute anyone as Trustee.
B. No inclusion by reason of the power to distribute corpus to L's descendants during L's life because that power is limited by an ascertainable standard.
C. No inclusion by reason of the investment decision making discretion, which may favor income beneficiaries over remaindermen to a considerable extent and vice versa, because this is an administrative power which does not amount to a Sec. 2038(a)(1) power.
D. No inclusion by reason of broad general powers to allocate receipts between principal and income because such powers are generally interpreted to require fair treatment of all beneficiaries and therefore does not amount to a sec. 2038(a)(1) power.
E. No inclusion by reason of any other facts.
to H's probate estate, and distribute all remaining trust property to R and his heirs. The Testamentary Trust also specified that H could, by delivering to H's written inter vivos designation, provided H was not judicially declared mentally incompetent at any time before his death, direct T to immediately pay any or all trust property to H outright or to any of H's living descendants, and the Trust stated that any such direction by H shall supersede the remainder gift to R.
A. On the lapse of time or on the occurrence of an event H's interest in this trust will terminate or fail.
B. H's income interest is illusory because the VL produces no income and the X stock currently pays no dividends.
C. An interest in the Testamentary Trust passed from W to R.
D. R's interest may be enjoyed by R after H's interest
fails.
A. Assuming H has the power under local law to compel T to sell unproductive and underproductive assets and invest in assets which produce an appropriate periodic flow of income, H's income interest satisfies the LE portion of the LE/GPOA exception provided H promptly demands that T do so.
B. Same as A except whether or not H at any time in fact
makes any demand upon T to sell and reinvest.
C. H's right to direct T to deliver trust corpus immediately to H or his descendants meets the GPOA
requirement of the LE/GPOA exception.
D. Same as C except H's right does not meet the GPOA requirement by reason of the fact that H may appoint not
only to himself but also to his descendants.