



Study with the several resources on Docsity
Earn points by helping other students or get them with a premium plan
Prepare for your exams
Study with the several resources on Docsity
Earn points to download
Earn points by helping other students or get them with a premium plan
Community
Ask the community for help and clear up your study doubts
Discover the best universities in your country according to Docsity users
Free resources
Download our free guides on studying techniques, anxiety management strategies, and thesis advice from Docsity tutors
Hobbes leviathan in rights and laws of nature, obligation and consents.
Typology: Summaries
1 / 5
This page cannot be seen from the preview
Don't miss anything!
Phil 114 , February 1, 2012 Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch. 14, 15 , 20–21, 31, 43 Right and Laws of Nature: A law of nature “requires” us to do what we believe we need to do in order to survive… …but this just means that we will do what we believe we need to do in order to survive. The right of nature “allows” us to do what we believe we need to in order to survive… …but this just means that there is no law forbidding us from doing what we believe we need to do in order to survive… …but this just means that it is not the case that we will not do what we believe we need to in order to survive. First Problem : How is Hobbes advising us by telling us about the right and laws of nature, if these are simply claims about how we in fact behave? Shouldn’t advice say that we ought to follow these laws? The specific laws of nature are essentially causal claims of the form: this kind of action, e.g., keeping your promises, makes you more likely to survive. How then can such claims serve as advice? Because, as the general formulation of a law of nature says, you will do whatever you believe you need to do in order to survive. When Hobbes gets you to believe that, if you keep your promises, you will stay alive, this will lead you to keep your promises. In sum, then, Hobbes’s laws of nature are simply (i) descriptive claims that certain actions have a certain effect (=survival), that are (ii) addressed to an audience that wants the effect. Second Problem : The right of nature and the laws of nature are exceptionless. So Hobbes appears to be assuming that we will never do what we believe undermines our survival. Is this plausible? Consider: (i) desires for the survival of one’s loved ones, (ii) desires for the comforts of life, (iii) desires for the fulfillment of one’s religious duties, and (iv) desires associated with glory: to exercise power over others and not to be dishonored. How does Hobbes respond? The right of nature The right of nature is a right everyone has to do whatever he thinks will help him survive. Since in the state of war, one might think that anything could help one to survive, in the state of war everyone has a right to everything. This may seem incoherent. Distinguish two meanings of: “S has a right to X” (1) S has a claim to X = Others have a duty not to interfere with S’s use of X. (2) S has a liberty to X = S does not have a duty not to interfere with others’ use of X.
The right of nature = the fact that no one has a duty to let anyone else use anything = the fact that no one will let anyone else use anything. The first and second laws of nature The first law of nature is: “that every man ought to endeavor peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it, and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use all helps and advantages of war.” From which follows the second law of nature : “that a man be willing, when others are so too, as often as provision has been made for the peace and his own defence, to lay down his right to all things, and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself.” In short, we should accept constraints on our conduct when others are willing to accept similar constraints. If others are not willing to constrain their conduct, then—the first law tells us—one should not constrain one’s own. The third law of nature Hobbes claims that people can, by certain voluntary acts, leave the situation in which everyone has a right to everything.
What point is there in obeying that command, given that the person making it is one’s natural equal? But after a covenant to obey another, the picture changes. Now—if the reply to the fool succeeds—it does jeopardize one’s self-preservation not to do what that person commands. It jeopardizes our self-preservation in the same way that not performing any other covenant jeopardizes our self-preservation. God can rightfully command men without their consent.