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Hunting for Huntington’s Evidence: An
Empirical Reassessment of The Clash of
Civilizations Theory
John Daniel Shindelar
Department of Political Science
Bemidji State University
I inquire into Samuel P. Huntington’s clash of civilizations theory as outlined in his landmark The Clash of Civilizations****. I explore conflicts starting at the end of the Cold War to 2007 in order to examine whether Huntington’s theory has been materializing (there is a marked increase in conflicts between Civilizations and they have become more intense) or if the face of conflicts has stayed relatively similar to Cold War era clashes.
I use International Crisis Behavior data on conflicts since the fall of the U.S.S.R. which Huntington cites as the end of a bipolar world and the beginning of a new era of conflicts. I show that there is not a marked increase in the clash of civilizations that Huntington predicted.
Faculty Sponsor/Editor: Dr. Patrick Donnay
INTRODUCTION
Whether you are analyzing the present world or looking into the history of the world’s civilizations, conflict has always been a major player in world change. Conflict Theory is an important aspect of foreign policy and international relations. Opinions towards the matter cover a broad range of beliefs, and much controversy surrounds this topic.
Conflict has often been the catalyst for inventing and implementing new technologies, a push for better efficiency, better resource management, uniting
people in groups against a common enemy, and prompting new medical discoveries as doctors strive to find the best way to treat injured and wounded soldiers. However conflict often devastates families, neighborhoods, nations and economies through direct harm, refugees, disease, rape, and the strain required to “maintain the fight” or carry out war.
Determining why a certain crisis arises can be challenging due to the major accumulation of grievances a conflict can involve. This is further complicated when considering that conflict may be in
the process of changing or may have already changed.
As stated by President Ronald Reagan, “Peace is not absence of conflict; it is the ability to handle conflict by peaceful means.” It is therefore our responsibility as citizens to explore the possibilities and determine what can be done to prevent conflict and crisis from arising as best we can. It is recognizable that not all crises can be averted; however, it is our duty in those situations to work on understanding how best to reconcile and attain peace.
Conflict Theory is a highly debated topic and much research is done to understand it and how it has developed. Several scholars have done quantitative research of the clash of civilizations theory. However, their research is limited in the scope of data they used while others used incorrect approaches on how to operationalize and test the theory.
I explore whether or not there is empirical evidence for Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilizations theory. Previous studies used the Correlate of War (COW), Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID), State Failure, Minorities at Risk (MAR), and Kosimo datasets. I use a new dataset, the International Crisis Behavior project dataset, for my analysis. This dataset has not formerly been used in assessing Huntington’s theory. This dataset covers more years in the post-Cold-War era than previous studies, almost doubling the longest study by Chiozza (2002) by adding 10 years.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The Theory of Clash of Civilizations
The Next Pattern of Conflict
Many intellectuals over the past two decades have speculated how the end of the Cold War has changed global politics. Many have pondered at what new systems are coming to light. There is much controversy over how to explain how the world functions in a global political sense at its most basic functions. Many scholars are questioning the importance of nation states and their influence.
In the late 1980’s and early 1990’s Samuel Huntington started looking for new ways for explaining the reasons for conflict. He called his concept “the clash of civilizations”. Huntington theorized that the main source of conflict in the new world order would not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. Instead Huntington puts forth the idea that the dominating source of conflict will be
cultural. He concedes that nation states will still remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but that conflicts concerning global politics will primarily be due to civilizational difference. Huntington theorized that nation-states were fading in influence and argued that nation-states are no longer reflective of actual borders. Huntington divides the world into eight civilizational groupings: “Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and possibly Africa”. ( The Clash of Civilizations , Huntington,
- Huntington includes Africa because although there is a lack of solidarity among the African nations they do have common cultural ties. The possible African civilization does not have a core state to lead them and bind them together, and there is a more diverse culture base. These civilizations may seem like just another sociological way in which to categorize people but Huntington says, “Civilizations are nonetheless meaningful entities, and while the lines between them are seldom sharp, they are real.” (Huntington, 1993, p. 24)
Civilizations
Conflict has in the past several centuries taken place between multiple nation-state entities which Huntington tries to explain with civilizations. Civilizational commonality is a way of grouping together nations with common cultural identities; this includes ethnicity, religion, history, and values, and economics. Huntington argues that basic cultural backgrounds bind people together beyond what any nation-state can hope to achieve.
Huntington points out that you cannot change your ethnicity. And although you can be born half- French and half-Arab and be a citizen of two countries, you cannot be half-Catholic and half- Muslim. Religion is another key discriminator because there is no middle ground. A people’s history, although you may change the way you look at it or write it, is also a binding factor among peoples. Your values mostly stem from religion, history, or ethnicity or from any combination of the three. Huntington also pointed out that economic regionalism is increasingly leading to more consciousness of civilizational identity.
People naturally think like mindedly within their civilization and have much more in common than they would with people from another civilization. People having a common cultural background, way of thinking, and a similar worldview will have stronger loyalty to one another than people just brought together in a nation-state by lines drawn on a
countries that share in Western Christianity and have a common history and link to Europe. This includes the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, the Germanic speaking countries, the Baltic States, the Nordic countries, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungry, Slovenia, Croatia, as well as Australia, New Zealand, Papa New Guinea, some Pacific Islands, and the middle islands of the Philippines. The Philippines are included because of the western influence brought by Spain and America when they colonized. Israel is also included by Huntington saying it is an island of the West. Huntington also includes French Guiana as having Western civilizational ties from colonization.
The Latin American civilization is made up of Central and South American countries with a past of a corporatist, authoritarian culture. The majority of countries are of a Catholic majority. This civilization includes all of Central America, most of the Caribbean, and Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela and Brazil. Huntington leaves out Guyana, Suriname, and French Guiana because of their mixed cultural influences brought in through colonization.
While the continent of Africa lacks a sense of a pan-African identity, Huntington claims that Africans are also increasingly developing a sense of African Identity making a possible African civilization. This includes Madagascar, all of Southern Africa up to the Saharan desert, Ethiopia, and the bottom halves of Chad, Nigeria, Togo, and Benin. This civilization excludes the eastern coasts of Tanzania, Kenya, and all of Somalia due to Islamic influence.
Fault Lines
There are several other aspects that are essential to know in order to understand the clash of civilizations theory. Huntington’s concept theorizes that most wars will now occur within nation-states and/or between the civilizations. Huntington argues that with the fall of the Iron Curtain and end of the Cold war we have new divisions that define groups. We will begin to see a shift in conflict taking place along the “fault lines of Civilizations.” (Huntington, 1993, p. 22) These fault lines run directly through some nation-states and run in between civilizations.
One of the most noticeable fault lines exists across the middle of the African continent and along its’ eastern coast between the African and Islamic civilizations. This is due to the North and Eastern coast having a largely Islamic population and Arab ethnicity while the Southern half of Africa’s faith is mostly Christian with tribal ethnicities.
Another prominent fault line stretches down through Eastern Europe from the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. This is between the Orthodox and Western civilizations. Huntington explains the rift as occurring due to peoples west of this line experiencing the common European history including feudalism, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution. This line also represents the farthest eastern boundary of Western Christianity circa 1500. In the Balkans we see another mix of civilizations. This can be explained historically through the boundaries between the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires.
The northern border of the Islamic civilization is also a fault line. This runs across the Caucuses above Azerbaijan, and goes through central Asia above Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. These countries used to be held together in the U.S.S.R. as Soviet Republics but have largely Muslim populations. To the north of this fault line are Georgia, Russia, and Kazakhstan which are mainly Orthodox populations. Conflicts in this region are usually between Ossetians and Ingush, Armenians and Azeris, and Russians and Muslims.
Another fault line is the Pakistani/India border. The differences come from the development of different religions. In the past, Muslim invaders came into India introducing Islam and today there are large Muslim populations within India, however this is a minority. Hinduism developed in India and is still central to their way of life. Although India is Hindu and Hinduism believes in the tolerance of all religions, Islam is monotheistic and has a low tolerance for other religions. Pakistan has a Muslim majority population and the two civilizations are in continual tension.
The Buddhist civilization has many fault lines along its borders. Buddhism started in India and spread up into China and down into South East Asia. Although it was suppressed and faded away in India and much of China, it remained strong in Tibet, Mongolia, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Myanmar.
The former Yugoslavia has the Orthodox, Western, and Islamic civilizations within its former boundaries which Huntington asserts could explain why so much conflict has flared up in that region. Other areas such as the Philippines, Papa New Guiana/Indonesia, Suriname, Guyana, and French Guiana all have fault lines cutting through their countries.
Core States
Another important component of Huntington’s theory is core states. Huntington describes core states as the central leader of the civilization and the nations considered being the most prominent members of that civilization. According to Huntington’s theory there are five civilizations that have core states. The Orthodox, Confucian, Japanese, Indian, and Western civilizations all have core states.
The Orthodox civilization has Russia as its core state. Russia is by far the most advanced nation of the Orthodox civilization. Its economy is strong; it has a lot of diplomatic clout internationally being a prominent member of the U.N. and sitting on the U.N. Security Council, it has one of the largest militaries in the world, is a nuclear power, and vast resources.
The Confucian civilization has China as its core state. China is the most prominent nation on mainland South East Asia and among the Confucian countries and has the biggest population in the world. China like Russia has a lot of diplomatic power and is on the U.N. Security Council, vast resources, is a nuclear power, and was a large military.
The Japanese civilization has Japan as its core state. This is obvious because Japan is the only member of the Japanese civilization according to Huntington. Japan is also a big international player, technologically advanced, has a large economy, large population and advanced military.
The Hindu civilization has India as its core state. The Hindu religion is centered on India and developed there and it is natural that it be the core state. India is also a major international power, the largest democracy, large military, is a nuclear power, and a large population competing with China.
While there are only five civilizations with core states there are actually eight core states. The Western civilization is the only one in which Huntington suggests there are multiple core states. The U.S. naturally is a core state due to being the super power militarily, economically, and technologically, and diplomatically. Huntington also includes Britain, France, and Germany as core states. This is because they are the central elements holding together and leading Europe. They all are nuclear powers, have large militaries, advanced technology, developed economies, and very strong diplomacy.
Huntington stated that although Africa doesn’t have a core state, South Africa could easily rise to that position by taking on more leadership among the
African nations and restoring its previous nuclear power.
TESTS OF “THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS” THESIS
Some, such as Kenichi Ohmae in his book The End of The Nation State (1995, p. VIII), say “nation states are falling away to regional economic groupings. “The forces now at work have raised troubling questions about the relevance-and effectiveness-of nation states as meaningful aggregates in terms of which to think about, much less manage, economic activity. Ohmae presents examples of economic zones that function cross culturally and across borders while prospering greatly such as Hong Kong, the Catalonia region of Spain, and the Kansai region around Osaka in Japan. This research as well as Huntington’s research questions the role of the modern nation state.
Huntington’s clash of civilizations theory, however, is surrounded by much controversy and debate. Scholars debate the validity of this concept and the extent to which explains contemporary world affairs.
Fox (2002) published a study on the relationship between ethnic conflicts and civilizational conflicts. Fox used the Minorities at Risk dataset with conflicts from the years 1985 to 1998. Fox’s study focuses on the post-Cold-War period for which he uses the year 1989 as the starting point. This covers nine years of post-Cold War era and is a good start at empirically testing Huntington’s theory. He found no support for Huntington’s theory. Instead he found that civilizational conflicts were only a small portion of ethnic conflicts and that ethnic conflict was more likely to occur within the same civilizations.
However this study’s post-Cold-War focus of 9 years came directly after the end of the Cold War and Huntington said there would be a transition into Civilizational Clashes. Therefore these 9 years may be too short of a time period to measure the theory empirically. The study also only focuses on fighting between ethnic minorities and ethnic majorities and therefore limits the scope of conflicts.
Fox (2003) published another empirical study one year later dealing with the clash of civilizations. This time he used the State Failure dataset and focused on state failures that were intense and internal conflicts. Fox used data from the period covering 1950 to 1996. His study found that there were far fewer civilizational clashes after the end of the Cold-War. He also found that civilizational state
years and provide 18 years in total for the empirical study. This should be enough to cover the transition period that Huntington says will occur after the end of the Cold-War.
Also by studying international crises this study has more ability to test the intensity and severity of civilizational conflicts versus non-civilizational because it encompasses international conflicts ranging from full-scale wars, serious clashes, minor clashes and even crises with no violence involved.
METHODS AND ANALYSIS
Dataset
For this research study I used the ICB Datasets otherwise referred to as ICB. I use the 10th^ version of the datasets which were released in July of 2010. They are available through the University of Maryland’s Center for International Development and Conflict Management or CIDCM site. These datasets were developed by the combined work of Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Michael Brecher, Joseph Hewitt, Kyle Beardsley, and Pelin Eralp. The datasets contain information on all international and foreign policy crises including 455 international crises and 1000 crisis actors covering a period of 1918-2007. I only use crises information from the years 1989-2007 since it is post-Soviet Union which complies with Huntington’s theory.
Crises Definition
The ICB dataset defines an International Crisis with two conditions: “ (1) a change in type and/or an increase in intensity of disruptive, that is, hostile verbal or physical, interactions between two or more states, with a heightened probability of military hostilities; that, in turn, (2) destabilizes their relationship and challenges the structure of an international system – global, dominant, or subsystem. An international crisis begins when an event triggers a foreign policy crisis for one or more states. A foreign policy crisis is a situation with three necessary and sufficient conditions deriving from a change in the state’s internal and external environment. All three are perceptions held by the highest level decision makers of the state actor concerned: a threat to one or more basic values, along with an awareness of finite time for response to the value threat, and a heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities. (Brecher, 1997, p. 4 and 5)
Independent and Dependent Variables
Independent Variables
In Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilizations Theory, he first theorizes that we will see a marked increase in the intensity of violence between sides in a civilizational clash, referred to as the civilizational clash claim. Second, he theorizes that fault line conflicts will become more common and be the most intense type of conflict since the actors are not as easy to separate due to their geographical proximity; this is referred to as the fault-line claim. And finally, Huntington says that core states involved in a crisis will likely rally member nations of its own civilization (kin nations) to its side in a crisis and create more clashes between civilizations. This is referred to as the core state claim.
To operationalize the civilizational clash claim and core state claim I use civclash as the independent variable. I created the civclash variable by looking at the actors involved in the crisis by using the ICB’s crisis actor dataset and determining according to Huntington whether or not they were a civilizational clash. The civclash variable, measures if a crisis is a civilizational clash or not. A value of 1 is given if the crisis is a civilizational clash meaning that it involves nations from a minimum of two separate civilizations. A value of 0 is given if the crisis is not a civilizational clash and the nations involved are only within the same civilization.
To operationalize the fault line claim I use the fault line variable. I created this variable by looking at the actors involved in the crisis and determining whether or not according to Huntington if they were fighting across a faultline. For this variable I assigned a value of 1 to crisis that involved actors located on a civilizational fault-line that were fighting against each other. A value of 0 was given to crisis that involved actors that were not located on opposite sides of a fault-line, they may however still be civilizational clashes while not being fault-line clashes.
The corestate variable I created of violence measure by looking at the actors involved in the crisis by using ICB’s crisis actor dataset and determined according to Huntington’s classification whether or not they were a core state. A value of 1 is given to the crisis if 1 or more core states were involved in the crisis. A value of 0 is given to the crises if no core states were involved in the crisis.
Dependent Variables
The sevviosy variable measures the intensity of violence at four levels of increasing intensity. This
starts with the lowest intensity at a value of 1 where the conflict management technique did not involve violence. Then a value of 2 is used for Minor Clashes which categorizes crisis in which minor clashes or skirmishing occurred between actors, such as the South Ossetia-Abkhazia crisis of 2004. A value of 3 is used for Serious Clashes which categorizes crisis in which serious clashes or fighting just short of full scale war occurred, such as the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989. A value of 4 is given for Full Scale Wars which categorizes crisis in which a Full Scale War occurred such as the Israel-Lebanon War 2 of 2006. This variable was added to cenviosy because their measurements together would measure the increasing totality of violence as their combined value progressed since they represent the intensity and violence of a crisis.
WarIndex3 and was created to measure a crisis’ totality of violence. This variable was constructed by combining the variables cenviosy and sevviosy multiplied by the variable protract and then added to the variable brexit binned.
The brexit variable was in the ICB dataset already and is a measurement of the duration of the international crisis in days. This is an interval measurement which I binned by making two cut points at the 55 and 180 days marks. By doing this I was able to group the cases into three separate equal groups. A crisis falling before the first cut point is given a value of 1, while a crisis in the middle group is given a value of 2, and finally those crises after the second cut point were given a value of 3. I binned them in order to make their influence on the Index a more accurate representation of their effect on the totality of violence. They were added to the results from cenviosy and sevviosy after they were multiplied by protract which is described below. This represented the totality of violence as the duration of conflict occurred.
The cenviosy variable measures the centrality of violence to the crisis if violence was used as a crisis management technique or CMT. This starts with the value of 1 for No Violence when violence was not a central part of the crisis. Then a value of 2 is used if
Minor Violence was central to the crisis. Then a value of 3 is used if Violence was an important as a CMT. Finally a value of 4 is assigned to crisis where Violence was preeminent as a CMT as in the case of a full-scale war. This variable is not to be confused with the intensity of violence measure which focuses on the degree to which the fighting during the crisis reaches.
The protrac variable is from the ICB dataset and measures whether a crisis situation is a part of a larger group of crisis making up an extended duration of hostility which is interrupted but consistent enough to make a pattern. A value of 1 is given to a crisis that is not a part of a protracted conflict. A value of 2 is given to a crisis that is part of a non-long-war protracted conflict. An example of this would be the conflicts involving Ethiopia and Somalia including the East Africa Confrontation (1980), the Todghere Incident (1987), and Ethiopia’s Invasion of Somalia (2006). Finally a value of 3 is assigned to crises that are part of a long-war protracted conflict. However no crises during the post-Cold-war period fell into the category of long-war protracted conflicts so that value was ignored. This variable was multiplied with the combinations from the addition of the cenviosy and sevviosy variables because when a crisis is part of a long history of crises between the same nations there is greater totality of violence due to unresolved grievances left over from the previous encounters.
In order to carry out my empirical assessment of Huntington’s theory I ran cross-tabulations to evaluate the relationships.
Huntington theorizes that we will see a marked increase in the intensity of violence between sides in a civilizational clash. To test this relationship I ran a cross-tabulation with civclash as my independent variable and sevviosy (intensity of violence) as my dependent variable. If Huntington’s theory is correct the table should show a positive correlation with intensity of violence and the number of crises that were civilizational clashes. This should also be significant compared to non-civilizational crises and their intensity of violence.
Comparing the two columns, we see a sizable difference in core state crises that are or are not civilizational clashes. Only five of the crises that had a core state involved were not civilizational clashes compared to 21 that were civilizational clashes. This difference is significant enough to point to Huntington’s theory that core state involvement is more likely when a crisis is a civilizational clash. We also see that out of the crises that had no core state involved, there were more non-civilizational clashes than civilizational clashes.
Looking further at the test we see the Chi- Square value of 8.399 yields significance at .005. With a Phi value of .346 we have a moderate association. With these results we can safely argue
that civilizational clashes do indeed have an effect on crisis involving a core state and this test supports Hunting’s theory on Core States.
Huntington also theorizes that Fault-Line Conflicts will become more common and be the most intense type of conflict since the actors are not as easy to separate due to their geographical proximity. To test this relationship I ran a cross-tabulation with faultline as my independent variable and sevviosy as my dependent variable. If Huntington’s theory is correct the table should show a positive association between intensity of violence and fault line conflicts that were fault line clashes. This should also be significant compared to non-fault line crises and their intensity of violence. Table 3 presents this analysis.
Table 3. Cross-tabulation of Fault Line Conflicts and Intensity of Violence.
Although we see little difference in fault-line crises’ level of intensity of violence, we see quite a difference in the non-fault-line crises levels of intensity. 37.5% of the non-fault-line crises involve no violence as opposed to 6.2% at the level of full scale war. These results point towards Huntington’s theory that fault-line conflicts will be more intense in violence.
When we look at the data further we see that the Cramer’s V value of .260 tells us there is a weak association. The P-Value with a high value of. telling us that there is little significance. Although there is no significance and a weak association between Intensity of Violence and Fault-Line conflicts, we can still argue that this test does point towards supporting Huntington’s theory.
U.S. Involvement
As an alternative to Huntington, I theorize that the United States involvement might be discounting the statistical results because of its disproportionate role of power in global affairs. To operationalize this I used the variable USINV.
The variable USINV is a measurement of the Content of U.S. Activity in the crisis. A value of 1 is given to the crisis if the U.S. was not active. A value of 2 is given if the crisis contained Low-Level U.S. activity, this could be political activity, financial aid or withholding of aid, economic involvement, propaganda involvement. A value of 3 is given if the U.S. was covertly active or semi-militarily active, this includes support for anti-government forces, military aid, and sending advisors, and all other means short of actual participation in the fighting. A value of 4 is given if the U.S. was a direct military participant in the crisis with either troops dispatched, bombings of targets, or naval assistance to an actor in the crisis.
Intensity of Violence Fault-Line Conflicts No Yes No Violence 37.5% (18) 22.7% (5) Minor Clashes 29.2% (14) 31.8% (7) Serious Clashes 27.1% (13) 22.7% (5) Full Scale War 6.2% (3) 22.7% (5) Total 100% 100%
Chi-Square 4. P-Value. Cramer’s V .260 Approx. Sig .:. N 70
To test the relationship I ran a cross-tabulation with USINV as my dependent variable and civclash as my independent variable. If my hypothesis is
correct then U.S. involvement will be significantly higher in civilizational clashes than in non- civilizational clashes.
Table 4. Cross-tabulation of U.S. Involvement and Civilizational Clash.
At first glance it becomes apparent that there are large differences between the categories. There are many (41.4%) non-civilizational clashes that have no U.S. involvement while there are no civilizational clashes without any U.S. involvement. Looking at direct military involvement by the U.S. we see 3.4% (1) are not civilizational clashes while 24.4% (10) are civilizational clashes. This first evaluation points toward supporting the U.S. involvement theory.
When we look further we see the Chi-Square value is quite high at a value of 22.766 yielding significance at .000. According to the Crammer’s V value of .57 we know that there is an association. We then know that the U.S. involvement does have a strong effect on the Civilizational Clash variable with a moderate association and significance and that this may give cause to why there is this many civilizational clashes.
CONCLUSION
Huntington’s theory is that we will see a marked increase in the intensity of violence between sides in a civilizational clash does not have significant association and although my analysis does not completely support Huntington’s Theory, it does point in that direction when looking at the full-scale war level of intensity of violence. Huntington’s theory that Core States involved in a crisis will be prone to create more clashes between civilizations is supported by my analysis.
Huntington’s theory that Fault-Line Conflicts will become more common and be the most intense
type of conflict is shown to have no significance and a weak association. Although this test doesn’t have significance, the trends of the test do point toward supporting Huntington’s theory.
My analysis also supported Jonathan Fox’s previous finding that countries within the same civilization are more likely to have an ethnic crisis. My theory that the United States involvement might an outlier in comparison to other nations in foreign intervention had a moderate association and high significance which we can conclude may give cause to why there are this many civilizational clashes.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank Dr. Patrick Donnay for his time, patience, and knowledge that made this thesis possible. I would also like to thank Center for International Development and Conflict Management for making their International Crisis Behavior data available online for use in this thesis.
LITERATURE CITED
Brecher, M., & Wilkenfeld, J. (1997). A Study of Crisis. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
Chiozza, G. (2002, Spring). Is there a clash of civilizations? Evidence from patterns of International conflict involvement, 1946-97. Journal of Peace Research, 39, 711-734.
Fox, J. (2002). Ethnic Minorities and the Clash of Civilizations: A Quantitative Analysis of
Content of U.S. Involvement Civilizational Clash No Yes No Involvement 41.4% (12) 0.0% (0) Low Involvement 41.4% (12) 56.1 (23) Semi Military-Covert 13.8% (4) 19.5% (8) Direct Military Involvement 3.4% (1) 24.4% (10) Total 100% 100%
Chi-Square 22. P-Value. Cramer’s V .570 Approx. Sig .:. N 70
IRAQ NO-FLYZONE Yes No No GEORGIA/ABKHAZIA No No No NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR 1 Yes Yes No OPERATION ACCOUNTABILITY No No No CAMEROON/NIGERIA 3 No No No HAITI MILITARY REGIME No Yes No IRAQ DEPLOYMENT/KUWAIT No Yes No ECUADOR/PERU 5 No No No SPRATLY ISLANDS No No No TAIWAN STRAIT 4 No Yes No REDSEA ISLANDS No No No AEGEAN SEA 4 Yes No Yes OPERATION GRAPES OF WRATH Yes No Yes DESERT STRIKE Yes Yes No NORTH KOREAN SUBMARINE No No No ZAIRE CIVIL WAR No No No UNSCOM 1 Yes Yes No CYPRUS/TURKEY MISSILE Yes No Yes ERITREA/ETHIOPIA 1 Yes No Yes INDIA/PAKISTAN NUCLEAR TESTS Yes Yes Yes DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO CIVIL WAR No No No US EMBASSY BOMBINGS Yes Yes No SYRIA/TURKEY No No No UNSCOM 2 Yes Yes No KOSOVO Yes Yes Yes KARGIL Yes Yes Yes EAST TIMOR 2 Yes No No CASPIAN SEA Yes No Yes AFGHANISTAN/USA Yes Yes No INDIA PARLIAMENT ATTACK Yes Yes Yes KALUCHAK Yes Yes Yes MYANMAR-THAILAND No No No PARSLEY ISLAND Yes No No PANKISI GORGE No Yes No IRAQ REGIME CHANGE Yes Yes No NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR 2 Yes Yes No IRAN NUCLEAR 1 Yes Yes No HAIFA SUICIDE BOMBING Yes No Yes DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO/RWANDA No No No SOUTH OSSETIA/ABKHAZIA No Yes No ETHIOPIA-ERITREA 2 Yes No Yes CHAD-SUDAN 1 No No No IRAN NUCLEAR 2 Yes Yes No CHAD-SUDAN 2 No No No NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR 3 Yes Yes No ISRAEL LEBANON WAR 2 Yes No Yes ETHIOPIA INTERVENTION SOMALIA Yes No Yes CHAD-SUDAN 3 No No No ETHIOPIA-ERITREA 3 Yes No Yes CHAD-SUDAN 4 No No No
