Download Alimony Dispute in a Divorce Case: Judy Juhl vs. Jeffrey Juhl and more Lecture notes Anesthesiology in PDF only on Docsity!
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
Filed October 3, 2012^ No. 2-465 / 11-
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF JUDY KAY JUHL AND JEFFREY JOHN JUHL Upon the Petition of JUDY KAY JUHL, Petitioner-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, And Concerning JEFFREY JOHN JUHL, Respondent-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County, Timothy J. Finn, Judge.
Appeal from the economic provisions of the dissolution of the parties’ marriage. AFFIRMED ON APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL.
John K. Vernon of Dickinson, Mackaman, Tyler & Hagen, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant. Brian D. Miller of Miller & Miller, P.C., Hampton, for appellee.
Heard by Eisenhauer, C.J., and Doyle and Tabor, JJ.
EISENHAUER, C.J.
Jeffrey Juhl appeals and Judy Juhl cross-appeals from the economic provisions of the decree dissolving their marriage and the court’s rulings on their post-decree motions. Jeffrey contends the court miscalculated his income, did not divide the marital assets equitably, and ordered excessive alimony. Judy contends the court ordered inadequate alimony. We affirm on appeal and cross- appeal. I. Background Jeffrey (born in 1964) and Judy (born in 1959) met in the 1980s, married, and had a son in 1989. During their marriage, Judy earned a degree in horticulture. She worked at various jobs during the marriage, but stopped working in 2006 when the family moved to Marshalltown. Her highest income during the marriage was about $28,000. Jeffrey also worked at various jobs and served in the National Guard. His highest income before attending medical school was about $28,000. In 2001 Jeffrey earned his medical degree. After Jeffrey completed an internship in Des Moines and a residency in anesthesiology in Omaha, he accepted a position in Marshalltown, and the family moved there in
- They bought a 6700 square foot home. In 2006 Jeffrey earned about $160,000. In 2007 Jeffrey took a new anesthesiology position in Burlington. The parties purchased a small home there, but Judy and their son stayed in the home in Marshalltown so their son could finish high school. Working in Burlington and also substituting for anesthesiologists on vacation, Jeffrey earned about
$20,000 too high. He also challenged the court’s determination of Judy’s monthly expenses. Jeffrey asked the court to reduce the amount of alimony and terminate it when Judy reaches age sixty-five. He also asked the court to assign Judy’s credit card debt to her and to correct the inequitable division of marital property. He asked the court to use the parties’ 2010 income tax refund to pay certain debts before dividing the remainder and to require Judy to leave the Marshalltown home in “a showable condition” when she moves out. Judy asked the court to modify the division of certain investment accounts, to divide the 2010 income tax refund equally, to modify or correct the division of certain vehicles and debts, and to correct the division of household goods. The court granted the requests to divide the investment accounts equally, to pay certain joint debts from the 2010 income tax refund, to correct the allocation of motor vehicles, and to direct Judy to leave the house in showable condition. Concerning the household goods, the court ordered the parties to submit a proposed division to the court. It denied all other requests. Following submission of the proposed division of personal property, the court divided the remaining property. II. Scope and Standards of Review Dissolutions of marriage are equitable proceedings, and our review is de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.907; In re Marriage of Brown , 776 N.W.2d 644, 647 (Iowa 2009). Although we decide the issues raised on appeal anew, we give weight to the trial court’s findings, especially concerning credibility of the witnesses. In re Marriage of Witten , 672 N.W.2d 768, 773 (Iowa 2003). We defer to the district court’s credibility determinations because of the trial judge’s
superior ability to measure witness demeanor. In re Marriage of Pundt , 547 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996). “Precedent is of little value as our determination must depend on the facts of the particular case.” In re Marriage of White , 537 N.W.2d 744, 746 (Iowa 1995). We need not separately consider assignments of error in the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, but make such findings and conclusions from our de novo review as we deem appropriate. In re Marriage of Wade , 780 N.W.2d 563, 566 (Iowa Ct. App. 2010). III. Merits A. Jeffrey’s Income. Jeffrey contends the court’s determination his annual income was $480,000 is $20,000 too high. At the time of trial, Jeffrey’s employment agreement in Burlington set his base pay at $430,000, plus medical director pay of $50,000, plus eligibility for a bonus of $20,000. The agreement ran through June 2011. Jeffrey points to a letter from his employer setting forth the terms of a proposed new employment agreement to begin in July 2011 with a base pay of $420,000, plus medical director pay of $40,000, and no bonus. Jeffrey also argues he no longer has his military pay because he retired in 2009, he no longer has income from working as a substitute, and he no longer has the forgivable loans from his Marshalltown job. The district court discussed at length the difficulty in determining Jeffrey’s income. The court considered the parties’ income tax returns, the social security statements, the creative accounting used in preparing the income tax returns, the forgivable loans from Jeffrey’s employers, the contributions to retirement accounts, the parties’ exhibits and testimony. The court found Jeffrey was earning $479,998 at his employer in Burlington at the time of the dissolution. The
alimony award should either terminate or be reduced if Judy remarries. He raised these same arguments in his post-decree challenge to the alimony award. On cross-appeal, Judy contends the alimony is inadequate given the “extremely disparate incomes of the parties” and requests an increase to $11, per month. She argues the court failed to consider the contribution she made to Jeffrey’s medical degree and that she now is unable to enjoy the benefits. See In re Marriage of Francis , 442 N.W.2d 59, 63 (Iowa 1989) (“Moreover, the spouse who sacrificed so the other could attain a degree is precluded from enjoying the anticipated dividends the degree will ordinarily provide.” (citation omitted)). Alimony is an allowance to the former spouse in lieu of a legal obligation to support that person. In re Marriage of O’Rourke , 547 N.W.2d 864, 866 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996). Alimony is designed to accomplish one or more of three general purposes. Rehabilitative alimony serves to support an economically-dependent spouse through a limited period of education or retraining with an objective of self-sufficiency. Francis , 442 N.W.2d at 63-64. An award of reimbursement alimony is based on the economic sacrifices made by one spouse during the marriage that directly enhance the future earning capacity of the other. Id. Traditional alimony is payable for life or for so long as a dependent spouse is incapable of self-support. Id. Alimony is not an absolute right. In re Marriage of Anliker , 694 N.W.2d 535, 540 (Iowa 2005). An award of alimony depends on the particular circumstances of each case. In re Marriage of Roberts , 545 N.W.2d 340, 343 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996). In analyzing an award of alimony, we look not only at the parties’ earnings, but also at their individual earning capacity, as directed by
section 598.21A. See In re Marriage of Wegner , 434 N.W.2d 397, 399 (Iowa 1988). We also may consider the property division in connection with an alimony award. Iowa Code § 598.21A(1)(c); In re Marriage of Probasco , 676 N.W.2d 179, 184 (Iowa 2004). We will not disturb the district court’s determination unless there is a failure to do equity. Anliker , 694 N.W.2d at 540. This was a twenty-two year marriage. See Iowa Code § 598.21A(1)(a). Both parties are in good physical health. See id. § 598.21A(1)(b). The court divided the marital property giving Jeffrey most of the major assets, but also nearly all the parties’ debts. See id. § 598.21A(1)(c). Both parties earned college degrees during the marriage. Jeffrey earned a medical degree in 2001. See id. § 598.21A(1)(d). Judy never earned more than about $25,000 during the marriage and did not work after Jeffrey began working as an anesthesiologist. An expert testified given Judy’s age, education, and experience, she probably would not be employable at a level above her past earning experience. See id. § 598.21A(1)(e). The parties’ standard of living during the last quarter of their marriage was vastly greater than during the first three-quarters of the marriage and also exceeded their earnings. Judy’s earning capacity would not allow her to be self-supporting at any standard of living reasonably comparable to what the parties enjoyed later in the marriage. See id. § 598.21A(1)(f). Even with the debt assigned to Jeffrey in the property division, he is able to pay some alimony without any significant diminution in his standard of living. At the time of the dissolution Jeffrey was earning about nineteen times as much as Judy had ever earned. We believe Judy’s monthly expenses listed in her financial affidavit are inflated and do not justify the amount she seeks. See id. § 598.21A(1)(j).
Given the circumstances we, like the district court, decline Jeffrey’s request to make the reduction or elimination of alimony automatic if Judy remarries. Concerning the duration of the alimony as Judy reaches retirement age and is eligible for social security, pension, and retirement benefits, we conclude the statutory factors discussed above, the amounts of retirement benefits Judy is eligible to receive, and the great disparity in their incomes all militate against removing or reducing Jeffrey’s alimony obligation before he reaches age sixty- five. We affirm the duration of the alimony ordered. In our analysis of the amount and duration of the alimony awarded, we also considered Judy’s cross-appeal request for alimony of $11,000 per month. For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the district court. C. Property Division. Jeffrey contends the court did not divide the parties’ property equitably. He argues the court erred in ordering him to pay Judy’s debts, not just their joint debts. Jeffrey also argues the net result of the property division is inequitable because it results in Judy having a net worth of over $102,000, while his net worth is about minus $270,000. Judy argues the property division was equitable when the statutory factors are considered. She contends Jeffrey is seeking an equal division of assets and debts, without regard to the statutory factors or what is equitable. Partners in a marriage are entitled to a just and equitable share of the property accumulated through their joint efforts. In re Marriage of Dean , 642 N.W.2d 321, 323 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002). An equitable division does not necessarily mean an equal division of each asset. In re Marriage of Robison , 542 N.W.2d 4, 5 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). The property should be divided based on
what is equitable under the circumstances and with attention to the criteria listed in section 598.21(5). Id. The determining factor is what is fair and equitable in each particular circumstance. In re Marriage of Miller , 552 N.W.2d 460, 463 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996). We look to all the provisions of the decree in determining what is equitable. Dean , 642 N.W.2d at 325. We value the property and debts as of the date of trial. In re Marriage of Driscoll , 563 N.W.2d 640, 642 (Iowa 1997). We afford the district court wide latitude, and we will not disturb the property distribution unless there is a failure to do equity. In re Marriage of Schriner , 695 N.W.2d 493, 496 (Iowa 2005). The district court carefully evaluated the statutory criteria set forth in section 598.21(5), including the interplay of alimony and property division, in determining an equitable distribution. The parties’ real and personal property, excluding bank accounts, balanced with the debt on that property, left a negative net value to be divided at the time of the dissolution decree. The court evenly divided the bank and retirement accounts, including correcting a mistake in the total amount in the accounts. The court encouraged the parties to agree on the division of household goods and other personal property such as vehicles and trailers. It divided the few assets the parties could not agree on. Jeffrey received all the real property. In large part because of Jeffrey’s ability and Judy’s inability to service the debt accumulated by the parties, the court assigned the debt (except for Judy’s student loans and her car loan) to Jeffrey. There are several credit cards in Judy’s name only that had a total balance of just over $20,000 at the time of the dissolution. Jeffrey seeks to have those debts assigned to Judy. From our de novo review of the evidence and
