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The solution to problem set 5 for the course 'introduction to game theory' at universitat pompeu fabra. It covers various zero-sum game scenarios, including the 'even or odd' game, the 'holmes and moriarty' game, and two additional 2x2 zero-sum games. The solutions include the analysis of the players' strategies, the calculation of the game values, and the identification of the most likely outcomes. The document serves as a comprehensive study resource for students enrolled in this course, providing them with the necessary understanding and problem-solving skills to excel in the subject of game theory.
Typology: Exercises
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In this game, players 1 and 2 simultaneously call out one of the two numbers "one" or "two." Player 1's name is Odd, and he wins if the sum of the numbers is odd. Player 2's name is Even, and she wins if the sum of the numbers is even.
The strategy spaces are S1 = S2 = {1, 2}, and the payoffs are given by the following table:
| \ | 1 | 2 | |---|---|---| | 1 | -2, 2 | 3, -3 | | 2 | 3, -3 | -4, 4 |
(a) The maxmin strategies are σ1 = (3/5, 2/5) for player 1 and σ2 = (7/12, 5/12) for player 2. (b) With the strategy σ1 = (3/5, 2/5), player 1 can guarantee a nonnegative expected payoff. (c) With the strategy σ1 = (7/12, 5/12), player 1 can guarantee an expected payoff of 1/12. (d) The maxmin strategy for player 2 is σ2 = (7/12, 5/12), and she can guarantee an expected payoff of -1/12. (e) The value of the game is v = v1 = 1/12 > -1/ = -v = v2, so player 1 is advantaged in the game.
In this version of the game, the loser pays the winner the product, rather than the sum, of the numbers called (who wins still depends on the sum).
(a) The payoff matrix is:
| \ | 1 | 2 | |---|---|---| | 1 | -1 | 2 | | 2 | 2 | -4 |
(b) The maxmin strategies are σ1 = σ2 = (2/3, 1/3), and the value of the game is zero, making it a fair game.
Sherlock Holmes boards a train from London to Dover to escape from Professor Moriarty, who can catch him at Dover. However, Holmes may detrain at the intermediate station of Canterbury to avoid Moriarty.
The payoffs to Moriarty (and the negatives to Holmes) are given by the following matrix:
| Moriarty\Holmes | Canterbury | Dover | |-----------------|------------|-------| | Canterbury | 100 | -50 | | Dover | 0 | 100 |
(a) The maxmin strategies are σM = (2/5, 3/5) for Moriarty and σH = (3/5, 2/5) for Holmes. (b) The value of the game is v = vM = 40. (c) The most likely outcome is that Moriarty goes to Dover and Holmes to Canterbury, which occurs with a probability of approximately 0.36.
The payoffs in a 2x2 zero-sum game are given by:
| \ | L | R | |---|---|---| | T | -2 | 3 | | B | 3 | -4 |
(a) The pure security strategies are s1 = T for player 1 and s2 = L or R for player 2, both securing a value of -3. (b) With mixed strategies, player 1's maxmin or security strategy is σ1 = (7/12, 5/12), guaranteeing a security payoff of v1 = 1/12. (c) The minmax value for player 1 is v1 = 1/12, which is the lowest value player 2 can force player 1 to accept. (d) The value of the game is v = v1 = v1 = 1/12.
The payoffs in another 2x2 zero-sum game are given by:
| \ | L | R | |---|---|---| | T | 0 | -10 | | B | 1 | 2 |
(a) Player 1 has a dominant strategy to play B, which is also his security strategy. Player 2's security strategy is to always play L, although he has no dominant strategy. (b) The value of the game is v = 1.
Consider the following 2x2 game:
| \ | L | R | |---|---|---| | T | 5, -1 | 2, 2 | | B | 1, 3 | 8, -4 |
(a) The sum of payoffs (u1(s) + u2(s)) is 4 for every profile of the game (s ∈ S). (b) The maxmin strategies are σ1 = (7/10, 3/10) and σ2 = (3/5, 2/5). (c) The values are v1 = 19/5 and v2 = 1/5.