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Introduction to Remedies in Contract Law: Key Concepts and Case Studies, Study notes of Contract Law

A comprehensive introduction to remedies in contract law, covering key concepts such as expectancy, reliance, and restitution damages. It explores various types of contracts, including express, implied, and unilateral contracts, and examines the formation of contracts through case studies. The document also delves into the concept of repudiation and its implications for contract enforcement.

Typology: Study notes

2023/2024

Uploaded on 11/20/2024

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INTRODUCTION TO REMEDIES
R §1: a contract is “a promise or set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the
performance of which the law in some way recognizes a duty”
R § 2(1) “manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify the
recipient of the promise in understanding that a commitment has been made”
Whether a contract is enforceable is determined at the time of exchange.
UCC §1-201(3): “agreement” means the bargain of the parties in fact, as found in their language or inferred
from other circumstances, including course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade
UCC §1-201(12): “Contract” means the total legal obligation that results from the parties’ agreement as
determined by the UCC as supplemented by any other applicable laws
UCC §2-104: Merchants: fairly flexible definition; if someone represents that they have skill or knowledge then
they will be considered a merchant by law
UCC §2-105: Goods: all things which are movable at the time of the contract
TYPES OF CONTRACTS
-Express Contract: the parties manifest their agreement by words, whether written or spoken
oReasonable excuse may exist when initial contracting was impracticable (i.e. aid given to
unconscious patient who couldn’t have consented to contract)
-Contract Implied in Fact: a contract established by conduct (see Taco Bell)
oWhere intention of parties not expressed, but agreement implied or presumed from conduct,
which, according to ordinary course of dealing and the common understanding of man, show
mutual intent to contract
- Option Contract: promise to hold the offer to sell open until the end of a period of time specified for
exchange of money
- Bilateral K: a promise for a promise – binding upon formation of contract
oStatements of future intent that commit the parties to doing something in the future
-Unilateral K (“if” contract): a promise for an act – binding if and when the services are rendered
oTakes the form usually of something like a reward offer
oEx. If you find my dog and return her to me, I will pay you $500
-Void Contract: agreement has NO legal effect
-Voidable Contract: one party may either enforce or not enforce
-Unenforceable Contract: no immediate right to judicial relief, but some legal status – may be
converted into fully binding contract by act of one of the parties
FORMS OF DAMAGES
-Expectancy: P ex post whole (offset expected costs) – damages what you would expect at time of
contract – put party in position they were in if contract were performed
-Reliance: ex ante whole (before breach) – measured from time of breach, brings P back to position prior
to breach had it never occurred (what $ they spent relying on this K)
-Restitution: D ex post whole – puts D back where they would be had they not breached
oBenefit must be conferred, must be measurable, must be able to be returned
-Disgorgement: forces D to “disgorge” all profit from breach (D ex post whole); usually when D
behaves egregiously
-Injunction: “specific performance”; available if damages are inadequate or immeasurable
-Punitive: generally not available for breach of contract, you get commercial loss not punitive damages
FORMATION OF A CONTRACT
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INTRODUCTION TO REMEDIES

R §1: a contract is “a promise or set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes a duty” R § 2(1) “manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify the recipient of the promise in understanding that a commitment has been made” Whether a contract is enforceable is determined at the time of exchange. UCC §1-201(3): “agreement” means the bargain of the parties in fact, as found in their language or inferred from other circumstances, including course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade UCC §1-201(12): “Contract” means the total legal obligation that results from the parties’ agreement as determined by the UCC as supplemented by any other applicable laws UCC §2-104: Merchants: fairly flexible definition; if someone represents that they have skill or knowledge then they will be considered a merchant by law UCC §2-105: Goods: all things which are movable at the time of the contract TYPES OF CONTRACTS

  • Express Contract: the parties manifest their agreement by words, whether written or spoken o Reasonable excuse may exist when initial contracting was impracticable (i.e. aid given to unconscious patient who couldn’t have consented to contract)
  • Contract Implied in Fact: a contract established by conduct (see Taco Bell ) o Where intention of parties not expressed, but agreement implied or presumed from conduct, which, according to ordinary course of dealing and the common understanding of man, show mutual intent to contract - Option Contract: promise to hold the offer to sell open until the end of a period of time specified for exchange of money - Bilateral K: a promise for a promise – binding upon formation of contract o Statements of future intent that commit the parties to doing something in the future
  • Unilateral K (“if” contract): a promise for an act – binding if and when the services are rendered o Takes the form usually of something like a reward offer o Ex. If you find my dog and return her to me, I will pay you $
  • Void Contract: agreement has NO legal effect
  • Voidable Contract: one party may either enforce or not enforce
  • Unenforceable Contract: no immediate right to judicial relief, but some legal status – may be converted into fully binding contract by act of one of the parties FORMS OF DAMAGES
  • Expectancy: P ex post whole (offset expected costs) – damages what you would expect at time of contract – put party in position they were in if contract were performed
  • Reliance: ex ante whole (before breach) – measured from time of breach, brings P back to position prior to breach had it never occurred (what $ they spent relying on this K)
  • Restitution: D ex post whole – puts D back where they would be had they not breached o Benefit must be conferred, must be measurable, must be able to be returned
  • Disgorgement: forces D to “disgorge” all profit from breach (D ex post whole); usually when D behaves egregiously
  • Injunction: “specific performance”; available if damages are inadequate or immeasurable
  • Punitive: generally not available for breach of contract, you get commercial loss not punitive damages FORMATION OF A CONTRACT
  1. Bolin Farms v. American Cotton Shippers Association a. Facts Bolin Farms wanted to nullify their “forward selling” contract on the grounds that cotton prices had skyrocketed after they contracted. b. Holding a subsequent change in price of goods does not relieve seller of contractual obligations. i. a contract is commitment whether things go well or not
  2. Sullivan v. O’Connor a. Facts O’Connor, plastic surgeon promised to improve Sullivan’s nose. But he disfigured her. O’Connor was given out of pocket expenses that she incurred while trying to remedy the nose, plus pain and suffering. b. Rule of Law: Physician who breaches contractual obligation to effect particular result is liable to patient for cost of any measures or treatment necessitated by physician’s breach and for any pain and suffering resulting therefrom i. General rule is no psychological harm for damages for breach of contract cases – exception for medical cases like this ii. Uncertainty in medical science, Dr. can rarely promise specific results in good faith iii. Applied reliance damages iv. R § 353 Loss Due to Emotional Disturbance Recovery for emotional disturbance will be excluded unless the breach also caused bodily harm or the K or breach is of such a kind that serious emotional disturbance was a particularly likely result c. Holding Two types of remedies Restatement §344: i. restitution- an amount equal to the value of the benefit conferred on D for performing the operation, whatever they made from the breach, usually too little 1. Disgorgement - Makes D ex-post whole, paying back the benefit that was conferred. 2. expectation recovery- amount intended to put P in the position he would have been if the contract was performed properly, usually too much 3. reliance- putting P back in the position she occupied before the agreement, a middle ground especially for med mal cases.
  3. Hadley v. Baxendale a. Facts – P (mill operator) sought to have D (carrier) ship broken mill shaft to engineer for repair; P loss when D unreasonably delayed shipment causing mill shut down for longer than anticipated b. Holding – Special circumstances must be communicated to recover i. When one party breaches a contract, the other can only recover damages from special circumstances if they were communicated to and known by all parties at contract formation c. Rule of law: injured party may recover damages for breach of contract that reasonably may be considered as arising naturally from breach + damages for breach that may reasonably be presumed the parties contemplated at the time of contract d. 2-part Test for Recovery of Lost Profits: i. Imputed/actual knowledge of what would naturally be expected to flow in the ordinary course of things as damages of breach of Ks of this kind ii. Special loss that the other party is aware of
  4. Hochster v. De La Tour a. Facts – P (courier) engaged by D to accompany him on a tour on the terms in K i. A few weeks before they were supposed to leave, D told P he changed his mind, declined his services, and refused to pay ii. P obtained another engagement, but it wouldn’t start for over a month after the previous K would start b. If you’ve promised to do something on a certain day, under the nature of the contact, you don’t have to do anything until the day arrives

i. Cannot make her perform (contracts for personal services are not specifically enforceable  can’t force people into personal relationships_ MUTUAL ASSENT

  • Mutual Assent: A requirement of a valid K that the parties possess a mutuality of assent as manifested by the terms of the agreement and not by hidden intent o It is the objective meaning of words and behaviors that give effect to an agreement o Requires meeting of the minds, determined by expressed intentions o How would a reasonable person construe the words and behavior of the parties involved? o **Common law and UCC differ on agreement  common law seeks mirroring of minds  UCC allows for non-mirroring - Manifestation of Mutual Assent (Objective Test): o 1. Reasonable person could understand it that way o 2. That is how it is understood by the offeree/promise o Ambiguities are read against the stronger/drafting party (Restatement 2 § 206) o Look at the context, parties and circumstances
  • R § 17(1) – contract needs mutual assent
  • R § 18 – manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange requires that each party either make a promise or begin or render a performance
  • R § 22(1) – mutual assent is an offer and acceptance
  • R § 21 – Intention to be legally bound o Neither real nor apparent intention that a promise be legally binding is essential to the formation of a K, but a manifestation of intention that a promise shall not affect legal relations may prevent the formation of the K  For contracts implied in fact, look to prior course of dealings, length of relationship, trade practice, behavior of parties, existence of request, transmission of benefit, general conduct of parties
  • UCC 2-204, 2-206, 2-207 – a K can be formed in any manner that is reasonable, you don’t need formal offer and acceptance
  • UCC 2-204 – no need for mirrored offer and acceptance, flexible rule; formation can be in any manner reasonable
  • CL – mirror image rule, need offer that is precisely mirrored in the acceptance and nothing short of mirroring
  1. Embry v. McKittrick – enforceable contract w/o intent a. Facts – P allegedly rehired by D manager, after his employment K had expired, and D manager denied rehiring b. Holding – A reasonable person looking at the objective outward manifestation in its context would say it was a K, so it’s a K i. A meeting of the minds is determined by expressed intentions ii. Mutual subjective intent is not required for the formation of a K – it’s irrelevant iii. Here, a reasonable person would’ve interpreted the President’s words as assent to P’s demand for yearlong K (there was mutual assent) c. Rule of law: The secret feelings, intentions, or beliefs of a party will not affect the formation of a contract if the party’s words and acts indicate that the party intended to enter into a binding agreement
  2. Lucy v. Zehmer – enforceable contract w/o intent a. Facts – D claimed his offer to sell farm to P was made as a joke (they were in a bar drinking)

b. Holding – Lucy entitled to specific performance of agreement (Zehmer’s outward actions, when interpreted by a reasonable person, indicate willingness to be bound in his agreement to sell his farm to Lucy) i. Give words their objective, plain meaning unless evidence that parties intended otherwise ii. One cannot say he was merely joking when his conduct and words would warrant reasonable belief that a real agreement was intended (Reasonable person test)

  1. There were also signatures and lengthy discussions of terms of sale iii. P, according to D’s objective acts, was justified in believing that D was acting in good faith and intended to be bound by his promise iv. A social presumption can always be rebutted, and Lucy overturned the presumption based on the facts (length of time spent negotiating, written twice, signed by both parties, formal language) in light of all factors there’s a K v. Can’t just claim it’s a joke, the other party must know it’s a joke c. Rule of law: The objective, outward expression of a party’s intent to be bound in an agreement, as opposed to that party’s subjective mental assent to the agreement, is all that matters when determining the existence of a valid and enforceable contract. d. R § 3 – manifestation of intent e. R § 21 – manifestation of intent must be in reference to the other party
  2. Raffles v. Wichelhaus – (the “Peerless Case”) no contract, mutual misunderstanding as to the meaning of the term – UCC would apply today a. Facts – K for shipping of cotton is ship-specific i. There is one “Peerless” that leaves in October and arrives in February and this is the ship they want it to be on. b. Holding – Court could not determine which ship named “Peerless” was intended in the K – so there was no meeting of minds as the two parties did not agree to the same thing and therefore no binding K. i. D’s prevailed. No K, so no action can be taken. c. Rule of law (still applied today): where parties attach materially different meanings to important contract terms, and neither knows nor has reason to know of the misunderstanding, no contract results - there is no manifestation of mutual assent i. Where there is a latent ambiguity as to meaning, parties may offer parol evidence to explain the terms ii. This is a futures contract.
  3. At the time of the contract the parties speculated as to the price of the cotton at the time of its arrival. The cotton that arrives is below the speculated price, so they don’t want it. d. R § 20 – if the parties attach materially different meanings to their manifestations  no mutual assent, no contract
  4. Wrench v. Taco Bell – K implied in facts a. Facts – D approaches P re: initial idea of using psycho Chihuahua in ad campaign. i. Extended course of negotiations between two parties. ii. D requests boards to show to execs etc. iii. No written K ever made. iv. P is replaced with different company who “came up” with basically same idea. b. Rule of law: a K implied in fact is created where P discloses an idea to D at D’s request and D understands P expects compensation for the use of the ideas i. No express acceptance or rejection from D but they utilized the ideas / materials from P ii. P presented enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether an implied in fact K existed iii. If you don’t have a writing, the next best thing is proof of request and proof of other party’s knowledge that you want to be paid if they use this idea

a. Facts – D wishes to sell land in CA and puts it in an ad i. Sent P a form letter describing the land and one other letter stating he was negotiating with others b. Holding: ad was not an offer i. There was no price ii. Too indefinite iii. Offered to the world at large (multiple acceptance problem c. Rule of law: There can be no contract unless the minds of the parties have met and agreed upon some specific thing i. Whether a reasonable person in the position of the offeree would interpret this ad as an offer ii. The reasonable person wouldn’t have seen there’s an offer because D had sent back a letter saying it was not an offer and told P to hurry up cause there’s someone else interested iii. If promise knows or has reason to know the promisor doesn’t intend the offer as an expression of his fixed purpose until he has given a further expression of assent, the promisor hasn’t made an actual offer d. R § 24 Offer Defined e. R § 26 Preliminary Negotiations

  1. Southworth v. Oliver – valid offer  enforceable contract a. Facts – letters exchanged between parties re sale of land; all that was missing was the price i. Once they had price, they already have mutual consent (price set contract in motion) b. Holding: i. Don’t care what you intended, a reasonable person would think there’s an offer ii. Contract can be constructed from series of communication/context of the whole negotiation iii. An examination of all the facts and circumstance sis needed when determining whether a statement by a party containing a price quote is an offer c. Rule of Law: an offer has been made if, under all of the facts and circumstances existing at the time, a reasonable person in the position of the alleged offeree would’ve been led to believe that an offer was being made i. Court gives 3 criteria to determine if it is an offer or just negotiations 1. Language of commitment 2. Limited class of offerees (multiple acceptance problem) 3. Definite terms d. R § 22 (2) – a manifestation of mutual assent may be made even though the moment of formation can’t be determined (can look to context) e. R § 24 Offer Defined f. R § 26 Preliminary Negotiations g. R § 45 h. R § 50 ADVERTISEMENTS AS OFFERS
  • General Rule: ad does not constitute an offer – can be an offer if it is clear, definite, explicit, no MAP problem, and leaves nothing open for negotiations
  • R § 26 (comment b) – we don’t see ads (radiot, tv, newspaper, etc) as offers
  • R § 46 Revocation of general offer: here an offer is made by advertisement in a newspaper or other general notification to the public or to a number of persons whose identity is unknown to the offeror, the offeree's power of acceptance is terminated when a notice of termination is given publicity by advertisement or other general notification equal to that given to the offer and no better means of notification is reasonably available.
  1. Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store – AD = Offer  enforceable K a. Facts – 2 ads (a) 3 fur coats worth $100 for $1; (b) stole worth $139.50 – “first come first serve” i. P first person at store, D refused to sell because offer intended for women only b. Rule of law: when an ad is clear, definite, explicit and leaves nothing open for negotiation, it constitutes an offer, acceptance of which will complete the contract c. Holding: i. P fulfilled condition of ad by being first to arrive – therefore accepted D’s offer 1. Store cannot impose additional and arbitrary conditions on the offer after the fact ii. The value of what is being offered needs to be definite and known to collect damages iii. Damages awarded to P: the amount of the value of the fur minus the $1 purchase prize iv. No MAP problem b/c first come first serve v. Demonstrates how to differentiate solicitation to offer invitations from an actual offer
  2. Offer = definite, reasonable person assured of commitment if they accept vi. Rebuts presumption that newspaper ads are not offer (R§26 comment B) - but the ad meets criteria and is a valid offer
  3. Language of commitment – yes
  4. Limited class of offerees – first come first serve
  5. Definite terms – stole amount given, fur not definite
  6. Leonard v. Pepsico Inc – no offer  no contract a. Facts – P sought performance of “offer” for Harrier Jet for Pepsi Points in Pepsi commercial b. Holding: not an offer because not seriously intended. A reasonable person wouldn’t interpret a joke as an offer c. Rule of Law: an ad doesn’t constitute an offer unless its terms are sufficiently clear and leave nothing open for negotiation i. An ad intended to be a joke cannot be sufficiently clear ii. MAP – anyone can collect Pepsi points iii. Definiteness problem – the ad didn’t have definite terms and you must read catalogue to know you can buy the Pepsi points
  7. Catalogue – consumer making offer to Pepsi iv. No language of commitment to show seriousness of intent d. R § 26(b) – ads aren’t offers e. UCC 2-206 b1 – order form construed as an offer from consumer to Pepsi AUCTIONS
  • Parties bidding at an auction are making offers
  • With reserve – the item can be withdrawn anytime (default, most common)
  • Without reserve – must sell to highest bidder (creates a collateral contract) – generates more interest b/c can’t be pulled down due to low bids
  • Default rules – R § 28, UCC §2-328 = unless the auction is specifically advertised as being without reserve, the goods are with reserve o R § 28(2) – when goods are put up without reserve, they cannot be withdrawn unless no bid is made
  • Collateral Contract (not the main K) – by advertising the auction without reserve, the owner requests an act, which is attendance at the auction o People who attend the auction have relied to their detriment on the promise and that is sufficient to constitute acceptance of the collateral offer o The highest bid is effective upon acceptance – when the hammer falls o If auctioneer withdraws the lot after bidding has started, the auctioneer is in breach of their collateral K with highest bidder

e. R § 60 Acceptance of Offer Which States Place, Time or Manner of Acceptance – if an offer prescribes the place, time or manner of acceptance it’s terms must be complied with in order to create K Notification of Acceptance

  • R § 56 Acceptance by Promise; Necessity of Notification to Offeror: Except as stated in § 69 [where silence is sufficient acceptance] or where the offer manifests a contrary intention, it is essential to an acceptance by promise that the offeree notify the offeror of acceptance.
  • Default rule – the offeror can opt out of it, making acceptance effective upon signing rather than notification (Hendricks is the general rule, La Salle is the exception)
  1. Hendricks v. Behee (1990) a. Facts: Transfer of real estate i. Before D is notified of P’s acceptance of their offer, D withdraws by notifying real estate agent b. Rule of law: an agreement is a meeting of the minds, so implicit in the concept of a promise is the notion of communication of that promise (offer, acceptance, revocation etc. have to be communicated to the other party – only effective upon communication) ii. If P mailed it a minute before D called, it would’ve been a K (mailbox rule) iii. An agent is legal a part of the person they’re representing – but notifying your own agent doesn’t do anything (if had communicated to other party’s agent – valid acceptance) iv. Exception (applies in La Salle)” Offeror can waive this right to have acceptance communicated by putting in the offer v. Offeror can withdraw his offer until offer is accepted b/c there’s no consideration to keep the offer open c. R § 56 d. R § 41 Lapse of Time: An offeree’s power of acceptance is terminated at the time specified in the other offer, or, if no time is specified, at the end of a reasonable time
  2. Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Co. (1893) a. Facts: D company advertised a reward to any person contracting influenza after using the Smoke Ball but refused to pay after P caught influenza after using the ball b. Court says that with unilateral K (offer for performance), there’s no need to notify other party of accepting the offer c. Rule of Law: an advertised reward to anyone who performs certain conditions specified in the ad is an offer, and the performance of such conditions is an acceptance which creates a valid K i. Newspaper ad rebuts presumption that its not an offer here 1. No MAP 2. Yes, language of commitment (put $ in a bank account) 3. Yes, definite terms ii. Inconvenience sustained by P and money earned by D was enough to create consideration (rejects D’s nudum pactum argument) d. R § 54 (1) Acceptance by Performance; Necessity of Notification to Offeror – where an offer invites an offeree to accept by rendering a performance, no notification is necessary to make such an acceptance effective unless the other requests such a notification
  3. Corinthian v. Lederle (1989) a. Facts: P learns of impending price increase and places large order; D ships part of the order and letter saying its an accommodation and the remainder was to be shipped later at higher price b. Rule of law: A seller’s price quote and a partial shipment of the buyer’s order aren’t a valid offer and acceptance to form an enforceable contract i. Automated telephone machine can’t accept a letter – automated acts can’t constitute acceptance ii. The letter included was an accommodation per UCC 2-206 which makes it a counteroffer

iii. Opportunism – Corinthian found out about the price increase and tried to take advantage of a cheaper rate iv. It’s possible to have an acceptance that also operates as a breach which is valid under shipping non-conforming goods rules

  1. Ex. You order 100 pens and they shipped back 50 pens – accepted offer but breached
  2. This case is the exception to this rule – if you notify the other party that you don’t mean to accept the offer & you are shipping as a courtesy – no acceptance v. Under the UCC, a price list isn’t an offer c. UCC 2-204 – you can form an agreement in any reasonable manner (no mirror image rule) d. UCC 2-206 (1)(a) – offer can be accepted in any reasonable manner e. UCC 2-206 (1)(b) – offer can be accepted by shipping non-conforming goods unless you say it’s just accommodation f. *** if offeror stipulates unique mode of acceptance unambiguously, 2206 is irrelevant**
  3. Industrial America v. Fulton Industries a. Facts: P was a broker, specializing in mergers. P saw an ad by D that indicated they wanted to purchase a company like BH. P set up a meeting, BH And D merged without communicating with P and P sued for commission. b. Rule of law: If an offer invites acceptance by performance, an offeree’s performance will be deemed an acceptance unless a contrary intention on his part is shown to the offeror (R§53) i. In unilateral Ks, you don’t have to intend to accept an offer ii. Objective manifestation = performance of the act requested – don’t care about the intent unless it’s contrary to performance c. R § 53(3): Where an offer of a promise invites acceptance by a performance, the rendering of the invited performance doesn’t constitute an acceptance if the offeree manifests an intention not to accept i. Don’t need to intend to accept the offer when you do performance d. R § 18 : the intention to accept is unimportant except as manifested
  4. Glover v. Jewish War Vets a. Facts: an ad in the paper offered a reward for information leading to the arrest and conviction of person responsible for a murder. A few days later P was questioned and gave information regarding the murder. She later learned about the reward and tried to claim it. b. Here the court requires i. Knowledge of the offer ii. Intent to accept the offer iii. * in Industrial, all that was required was performance* c. Rule of law : you have to have knowledge of the offer to be able to accept it i. If you don’t have knowledge, that’s seen as intention NOT to accept d. R § 23: Offer and acceptance must refer to each other, but provided that you know about it, doesn’t matter why you manifest your intent to accept i. Exception: if there’s a standing offer by a govt. agency for info leading to apprehension there can be acceptance w/o knowledge Unilateral Acts - Unilateral acts are accepted only by full performance – cannot accept an offer you don’t know about - R § 53: if you know of the offer and manifest intent, there’s presumption of acceptance
  5. Ever-Tite Roofing Corp. v. GT Green a. Facts: Agreement written by D for roof work stated: binding upon written acceptance OR commencing performance. P arrives to job site and see diff company doing work. P commenced performance of the act and thereby fulfilled one of the modes of acceptance stipulated in the offer. D notified P’s workers that he had hired other company to perform the work.

d. R § 69(2): an offeree who does any act inconsistent with the offeror’s ownership of offered property is bound e. Comment e: But the offeree isn’t ordinarily permitted to avoid contract obligation by asserting that he’s a tortfeasor, rather than a promisor and at the option of the offeror he may be held to an acceptance despite the manifestation of contrary intent. Such an obligation may fairly be characterized as quasi-contractual f. R § 53(3): rendering the invited performance doesn’t constitute an acceptance if before the offeror performs his promise, the offeree manifests an intention not to accept g. UCC § 2-602(1) and 1(c): seller of goods in buyer’s possession can treat improper use of those goods as either tort or acceptance

3. Ammons v. Wilson – silence IS acceptance a. No communication for 12 days can be considered acceptance because of prior dealings between parties b. Rule of law: where offeree fails to reply to offer, silence or inaction may constitute acceptance due to previous course of dealings that would give offeror reason to understand silence or inaction as manifestation of acceptance i. Previous dealings are most usual way of implying a promise/contract c. R § 69(c): where because of previous dealings it’s reasonable that offeree should notify the offeror if he doesn’t intent to accept d. UCC 1-303(b): course of dealings = common understanding – sequence of conduct 4. Beneficial National Bank v. Peyton – silence IS acceptance a. Facts: P seeks to compel arbitration based on arbitration provision contained w/in K signed by D; D’s account transferred between banks, acknowledged new K, continued using card and now disputes arbitration b. Rule of law: a mandatory arbitration provision added to credit card agrmt is binding upon cardholder so long as he receives notice of the change i. D argues the OG agrmt he signed didn’t allow P the right to add new terms (only make changes to existing terms)  court says no distinction between those ii. There was valid acceptance by silence because D contracted with them when he originally signed up for the credit card and he agreed that silence can operate as acceptance iii. D didn’t timely notify P that he rejected the change c. R § 69 TERMINATION OF OFFERS & RELIANCE INTERESTS How is an offer terminated? (§36)

  • Stipulation of the offeror – must be accepted by certain date
  • Reasonable amount of time (§41) o Lapse of time if no date is set
  • Rejection – final once communicated (§38, 39)
  • Counteroffer operates as rejection (ex. New price) (§39)
  • Withdrawal (revocation by offeror) (§42) 1. Dickenson v. Dodds a. Facts: D offers to sell P house and says offer is open until Friday at 9; P’s agent informed P that D is planning to sell house to someone else; P gives acceptance; D didn’t need to withdraw since P knew he was selling to someone else b. Holding: the memo was an offer, nudum pactum (bare promise) and was not binding before a complete acceptance by P

c. Rule of law: offer may be withdrawn by indirect revocation where offeree receives reliable information from a third party that the offeror has engaged in conduct indicative to a reasonable person that the offer has been withdrawn i. No consideration to keep the promise open – no option contract ii. If the offer isn’t accepted by Friday, offer lapses. Offeror can terminate offer before that but has to notify offeree iii. When offeror takes action inconsistent with his offer, the offer is terminated iv. If P saw D before D said anything and said he accepts, there’d be a K d. What conditions must be met for indirect communication to be effective? i. The information must be definite ii. The definite info has to unequivocally manifest contrary intent iii. The mode of relay has to be reliable e. R § 43: an offeree’s power of acceptance is terminated when the offeror takes definite action inconsistent with intention to enter the proposed K and the offeree acquires reliable info to that effect f. UCC 2-205: an offer by a merchant in a signed writing which gives assurance that it will be held open is not revocable OPTION CONTRACTS

  • Option K: Promise to keep an offer open that is paid for
    1. The offer is not permitted to revoke the offer because with the payment, he’s bargaining away his right to revoke the offer
    2. Must be in writing
    3. Sometimes called a firm offer
  • Option K require:
    1. Consideration (nominal or recited)
    2. Specification of time of exercise
    3. Mode of acceptance
  • In Option K…
    1. Nominal and recited consideration are sufficient consideration
    2. Mailbox rule doesn’t apply
    3. Letter of acceptance of an option needs to be received to be effective
    4. Helps buy you time to continue negotiating
    5. Nothing kills an option except the passage of time
  • R § 37 – Termination of Power of Acceptance in Option Contract: the power of acceptance is not terminated by rejection or counteroffer, by revocation, or by death of offeror
  • R § 87(1)(a): you need consideration, but can be nominal or recited
  • UCC 2-205: if in writing, don’t need consideration to hold offer open
  • When can reliance be consideration for holding an offer open?
    1. R§45: when the offeror requests a performance and not a promissory acceptance, when the offeree tenders or begins the performance, the offer becomes irrevocable as an option K (commentary says it’s because part of the consideration has been performed)
    2. R§87(2): an offer which the offeror should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a substantial character on the part of the offeree before acceptance and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding as an option K to the extent necessary to avoid injustice
  • First refusal: giving the party with an option a chance to match 3rd^ party offer
    1. Optionor has obligation if and only if he sells it, he has to offer it to the offeree 1. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Westside Investment Corp.
  1. Re-draft the offer conditional upon a promise to perform paying a $1 for that option (option K) iii. This is an offer that expressly can’t be accepted until after P has been awarded K – offer can be revoked at any point prior to award of general K d. R § 35: an offer gives to the offeree a continuing power to complete the manifestation of mutual assent by acceptance of the offer e. UCC 2-205: all you need to do is make firm offer in writing i. Linoleum is a good so you look at UCC 2. Drennan v. Star Paving Co. a. Facts: P, contractor, preparing bid on project, used the bid for paving by subcontractor D; after P was awarded contract, D informed P their bid was in error b. Rule of Law: an offer which the offeror should reasonably expect to induce definite and substantial reliance by the offeree is binding on the offeror and enforceable even without consideration if enforcement is necessary to prevent injustice to the offeree i. D, in making the bid, knew they might be lowest bidder; D’s offer constituted promise to perform if D was lowest bidder, and induced action on part of P ii. When reasonable reliance on the offer by offeree results in foreseeable negative change in offeree’s position, a promise not to revoke the offer is implied c. Traynor: law should conform to business practice – where law is out of sync with commercial reality, the law should change d. R § 87(2): an offer which generates reasonably foreseeable reliance detriment will be held open to extent necessary to prevent injustice (irrevocable for a short period of time and the consideration for making it firm is the detrimental reliance) MAILBOX RULE
  • If reasonable to accept by mail, acceptance is effective upon placing acceptance in mail. Even if the letter never arrives, there’s been acceptance & contract formed upon mailing
  • Mailbox Rule Limitations
  1. It must be reasonable to use mail to accept
  2. Any indication in an offer that acceptance must be received negates the mailbox rule
  3. Acceptance must be valid (no counteroffers)
  4. If the rule applies, it applies strictly
  5. Rule will not be applied if it leads to absurdity
  6. Rule applies to fax and electronic wire transfers, but not to email
  7. Rule does not apply to acceptance of option contracts R§63(b)
  8. Allocates risk to the offeror who could have specified the means of acceptance
  9. Mailed counteroffers or revocations are effective upon receipt
  10. Once acceptance is sent, it’s too late to reject even by a faster mode of deliver – however, if the rejection would be received first then offeree can be estopped from accepting if offeror relied on the rejection
  • R§40: Rejection or counteroffer by mail does not terminate the power of acceptance until received by the offeror
  • R§42: an offeree’s power of acceptance is terminated when the offeree receives from the offeror a manifestation of an intention not to enter into the proposed K (withdrawal)
  • R§63(a): an acceptance made in a manner invited by an offer is operative and completes the manifestation of mutual assent as soon as put out of offeree’s possession, without regard to whether it reaches the offeror
  • R§65: Unless circumstances known to the offeree indicate otherwise, a medium of acceptance is reasonable if it is the one used by the offeror or one customary in similar transactions at the time and place the offer is received
  1. Morrison v. Thoelke : if acceptance is mailed, but rejection is communicated by telephone prior to receiving acceptance, mailed acceptance is still valid 2. Adams v. Lindsell a. Facts: One day after P mailed acceptance of D’s offer to sell wool, D sold wool to another (R§63) i. In this case, the offer was mailed and misdirected and therefore arrived 3 days late – acceptance came after expected by the offeror and the day before the acceptance was received/arrived, the offer sold it to someone else – if you misdirect an offer, you’re responsible for any delay in receipt of communication of acceptance ii. We allocate the risk to the offeror because he could have stipulated that acceptance is effective upon receipt – if he chooses to communicate via mail, then he bears the risk b. Establishes the mailbox rule – letter of acceptance is binding to the other party upon dispatch, not receipt c. R§63(a): if you accept by reasonable method, valid when it leaves offeree’s hands i. So if he sends it out by mail, then can respond by mail ii. Reasonable method is just as quick as method used in offer iii. Offeror can stipulate that acceptance is not valid until receipt (master of offer) d. R§63(c): if reasonably rely on communication from other party, reliance can be estopped e. R§40 – Time when rejection or counteroffer terminates the power of acceptance: rejection or counteroffer by mail does NOT terminate power of acceptance until received. But if acceptance is sent by mail AFTER it’s a counteroffer unless received before rejection COUNTEROFFERS, BATTLES OF FORMS & UCC 2-
  1. UCC applies, a K is formed; terms of contract depend on whether the parties are:  Non-merchants: terms are those contained in the offer; additional/different are not part of it  Merchants: move to #
  2. Are the terms of the K different or additional?  Different: Knockout rule: different terms do not become part of the agrmt; the K terms are only those the parties agreed upon  Additional: additional terms will be part of K unless:  Offer expressly limits acceptance to terms of offer  Additional terms materially alter terms  Offeror notifies offeree within reasonable time of objection to additional terms 1. Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Co. v. Columbus Rolling-Mill Co. a. Facts: P inquired about prices; D made offer; P counter-offered but D refused; P accepts initial offer; D refuses and claims no existence of K b. Rule of Law: Acceptance of an offer that doesn’t assent to the offer made is rejection by the offeree and counteroffer to the offeror, who then acquires the right to accept or reject the counteroffer i. Offeree, having rejected original offer, cannot afterwards revive the original offering by tendering acceptance ii. The moment the counteroffer is communicated, the original offer is destroyed iii. A K is not complete without the mutual assent of the parties, and an offer to sell imposes no obligation until it’s accepted according to its terms iv. No option K here, just a lapse time. Otherwise it couldn’t be rejected
  3. Today, under UCC 2-205 there would be an option contract because it was signed and counteroffer wouldn’t destroy offer c. R§39(2): Counter offers with material differences (like this case) d. R§59: Counter offers with non-material differences (i.e. mirror image rule) 2. DTE v. Briggs a. Facts: P contended that a forum-selection clause which was sent to D as part of an order acknowledgement for generators, in response to D’s purchase order, was enforceable i. Purchase order = offer, order acknowledgement = acceptance  strike out material alterations (blank purchase order is a solicitation for an offer, buyer who sends back and signs purchase order is the offer itself) b. Rule of Law: under the UCC, a forum-selection clause in a contract between merchants will not be enforced where it’s contained in fine print, is considered an additional term, and materially alters the parties’ contract i. K stands because no unless proviso (no conditional acceptance), but forum selection seen as substantive change therefore stuck out ii. In order for a written confirmation of an offer to amount to a rejection and or counteroffer, the written confirmation must be expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms iii. Under UCC 2-206: defines purchase orders as offers (once signed) iv. According to UCC 2-206: adding new terms still acts as an acceptance unless the offeree accepts it specifically based on the offeror assenting to the new terms in which case it is a counteroffer v. There is no unless proviso (no conditional acceptance) but there is acceptance with additional/different terms and a materially alteration to the terms – so without express assent, these new terms do not become part of K 3. Textile v. ABMH

a. Facts: P and D entered into series of transactions where seller would send invoice and order acknowledgement form containing additional terms including arbitration clause; after receiving defective shipment and refusing to pay, seller submitted to arbitration which buyer disputed b. Rule of Law: additional terms to K that the other party hasn’t assented to will be knocked out i. Seller’s arbitration clause was additional term, thus governed by UCC 2- ii. Because the invoice said it was conditioned on the buyer’s assent, the unless proviso, of UCC 2-207(1) is in effect and the invoice becomes a counteroffer iii. Since P has never signed it, no expressed assent  there’s no K under 2-207(1) or (2) iv. But under 2-207(3), their 38-fold course of dealings creates a K, but only under the terms agreed upon by both parties, which means that the forum selection clause drops out and is not binding v. Under the UCC, if the K is silent then the law will put in the fillers from UCC

4. Pro-CD v. Zeidenberg a. Facts: Company collects data for commercial use from database – consumers of which are subject to an end user license agreement, agreeing not to sell the product. The notification of terms (shrink wrap) is contained on the outside of the CD. Court held that this notification was sufficient b. Must reject additional terms or they will be accepted c. Where someone is deliberately exploiting the other party, such as is the case here, and the price they bought at shows this, then they’re clearly acting opportunistically, and a court will be highly motivated to find they are bound d. UCC 2-207 doesn’t apply because there’s only one form and so UCC 2-206 applies (K can be made in any manner reasonable – K with terms to follow is ok), which allows for shipment of goods with different terms – the K included the restriction e. Where buyer has opportunity to inspect the goods and reject them, and doesn’t, he’s bound i. The notification was outside the package, so you knew about it before you opened it – you also know it before opening, so before contracting ii. No effective rejection = acceptance 5. Rich Hill v. Gateway a. Facts: P orders computer via phone; receives computer with terms in package said to govern unless computer is returned within 30 days; P kept computer then brought suit in court b. Shrinkwrap terms on the outside is sufficient notice of terms on the inside K formed when buyer receives and keeps goods c. Rule of Law: Under the UCC, a purchaser may be bound to terms included in product packaging if the purchaser has an opportunity to review the agreement and reject it by returning the product i. Gets around 2-207 by saying it irrelevant because only one form = no battle of the forms 1. Extension of ProCD to consumer ii. Applies 2-204: Reasonable because notice in ads that extra terms would accompany purchase iii. As long as you know there will be terms in the box, then you have notice and can ask sales rep to read them to you – it need not be reads to be effective d. Jurisdictions vary but tips toward hill e. Rolling contracts = pay now, terms later 6. Klocek v. Gateway a. Facts: same as Rich Hill except buyer needed to reject within 5 days. Court says arbitration agreement is not enforceable (does not follow Hill ) b. UCC 2-207: applies to acceptance with additional terms, even if the offer did not have a form – court finds that the act of keeping the computer past 5 days wasn’t sufficient to demonstrate that P’s expressly agreed to standard terms i. 2207 applies because it applies to confirmatory memoranda