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Judicial Review and the Power of the Courts, Quizzes of Civil Law

The supreme court's interpretation of article 21 of the indian constitution, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. The court had previously held that during the emergency declared in 1975, no person had the right to challenge the legality of detention orders under article 226 (habeas corpus) due to the suspension of fundamental rights. The document also covers the court's rulings on the power of parliament to amend the constitution, including fundamental rights, as well as the issue of judicial review and the role of tribunals established under articles 323a and 323b. The court ultimately held that the jurisdiction of the high courts under articles 226/227 and the supreme court under article 32 must be retained, even if the power to test the validity of legislation is conferred upon tribunals. Insights into the court's interpretation of fundamental rights and the scope of judicial review in the indian constitutional framework.

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1. A.D.M. Jabalpur v. Shiv Kant Shukla (The Habeas Corpus Case)
2. Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab
3. Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra
4. Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab
5. BALCO Employees Union v. Union of India
6. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India
7. Budhan Choudhary v. State of Bihar
8. Chief Forest Conservator (Wild Life) v. Nisar Khan
9. D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal
10. Daniel Latifi v. Union of India
11. Dr (Mrs.) Vijaya Manohar Arbat v. Kashirao Rajaram Sawai
12. Dr. Mahachandra Prasad Singh v. Chairman, Bihar Legislative Council
13. Dr. Pradeep Jain v. Union of India
14. Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India
15. Forum, Prevention of Envn. and Sound Pollution v. Union of India
16. Gaurav Jain v. Union of India
17. Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar
18. I.C. Golak Nath v . State of Punjab
19. In re, Vinay Chandra Mishra
20. In Re: Death of Sawinder Singh Grover
21. Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India
22. Indra Sawhney v. Union of India
23. L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India
24. Laxmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India
25. M/s Modi Cements Limited v. Shri Kuchil Kumar Nandi
26. M/s Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khimalal Totame
27. Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. Ltd. v. Audrey D'costa
28. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India
29. Minerva Mills v. Union of India
30. Mr. X v. Hospital Z
31. Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani
32. Narayan Prasad Lohia v. Nikunj Kumar Lohia
33. Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India
34. Poonam Verma v. Dr. Ashwin Patel
35. Parmanand Katara v. Union of India
36. PUCL v. Union of India
37. Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab
38. Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra
39. S.P.Sampath Kumar v. Union of India
40. Sakshi v. Union of India
41. Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra
42. Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Miss Subhra Chakraborty
43. Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab
44. Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India
45. Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement
46. State of Gujarat v. Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat
47. State of Rajasthan v. Union of India
48. Sunil Batra (II) v. Delhi Administration
49. Vincent v. Union of India
50. Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan
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  1. A.D.M. Jabalpur v. Shiv Kant Shukla (The Habeas Corpus Case)
  2. Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab
  3. Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra
  4. Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab
  5. BALCO Employees Union v. Union of India
  6. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India
  7. Budhan Choudhary v. State of Bihar
  8. Chief Forest Conservator (Wild Life) v. Nisar Khan
  9. D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal
  10. Daniel Latifi v. Union of India
  11. Dr (Mrs.) Vijaya Manohar Arbat v. Kashirao Rajaram Sawai
  12. Dr. Mahachandra Prasad Singh v. Chairman, Bihar Legislative Council
  13. Dr. Pradeep Jain v. Union of India
  14. Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India
  15. Forum, Prevention of Envn. and Sound Pollution v. Union of India
  16. Gaurav Jain v. Union of India
  17. Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar
  18. I.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab
  19. In re, Vinay Chandra Mishra
  20. In Re: Death of Sawinder Singh Grover
  21. Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India
  22. Indra Sawhney v. Union of India
  23. L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India
  24. Laxmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India
  25. M/s Modi Cements Limited v. Shri Kuchil Kumar Nandi
  26. M/s Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khimalal Totame
  27. Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. Ltd. v. Audrey D'costa
  28. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India
  29. Minerva Mills v. Union of India
  30. Mr. X v. Hospital Z
  31. Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani
  32. Narayan Prasad Lohia v. Nikunj Kumar Lohia
  33. Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India
  34. Poonam Verma v. Dr. Ashwin Patel
  35. Parmanand Katara v. Union of India
  36. PUCL v. Union of India
  37. Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab
  38. Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra
  39. S.P.Sampath Kumar v. Union of India
  40. Sakshi v. Union of India
  41. Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra
  42. Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Miss Subhra Chakraborty
  43. Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab
  44. Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India
  45. Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement
  46. State of Gujarat v. Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat
  47. State of Rajasthan v. Union of India
  48. Sunil Batra (II) v. Delhi Administration
  49. Vincent v. Union of India
  50. Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan

(1) A.D.M. Jabalpur v. Shiv Kant Shukla (The Habeas Corpus Case), (1976) 2 SCC 521

FACTS IN BRIEF :- On June 25 th, 1975 the President in exercise of powers conferred by clause (1) of Articles 352 (Proclamation of Emergency) of the Constitution declared that a grave emergency existed whereby the security of India was threatened by internal disturbances. On June 27 th, 1975 in exercise of powers conferred by clause (1) of Articles 359 the President declared that the right of any person including a foreigner to move any court for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Article 14, Article 21 and Article 22 of the Constitution and all proceedings pending in any court for the enforcement of the abovementioned rights shall remain suspended for the period during which the proclamations of emergency made under clause (1) of Article 352 of the Constitution on December 3 rd, 1971 and on June 25 th, 1975 were in force. The Presidential Order of June 27, 1975 further stated that the same shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any order made before the date of the aforesaid order under clause (1) of Article 359 of the Constitution.

On January 8 th, 1976 there was a notification passed in the exercise of powers conferred by clause (1) of Article 359 of the Constitution whereby the President declared that the right of any person to move any to court for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Article 19 of the Constitution and all proceedings pending in any court for the enforcement of the abovementioned rights would remain suspended for the period during which the proclamation of emergency made under clause (1) of Article 352 of the Constitution on December 3 rd, 1971 and on June 25 th, 1975 were in force. Several illegal detentions were thereupon made across the country, pursuant to which various writ petitions were filed throughout the country. Nine High Courts gave decision in favour of detunes, holding that that though Article 21 cannot be enforced, yet the order of detention was open to challenge on other grounds such as that the order passed was not in compliance of the Act or was mala fide. Against these orders, many appeals were filed before the Supreme Court. Disposing of all the appeals together, the Supreme Court set aside that the decisions of the High Courts which had held the declaration and the subsequent detentions as illegal and upheld the declaration and suspension of the said rights.

ARGUMENTS:- Before the Supreme Court, the Attorney General pleaded that Article 21 of the Constitution, fundamental right which provides for security of life and liberty of any person, had been suspended and therefore, the suspension of that Article meant that the detenu had no remedy even against an illegal detention i.e. all the remedy to secure life and the personal freedom ended with the suspension of Article 21. The detunes agued that they had a right to seek remedy under Article 226 (Power of HC to issue Writs) and therefore a remedy against illegal detention was available to them despite the suspension of Article 21 as the remedy under Article 226 which provided for enforcing any other legal right, was not suspended by the Presidential Order.

general candidates who had reached the level to which the reserved candidates had reached earlier.

At that point of time, another three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held that the general rule in the Service Rules relating to seniority from the date of continuous officiation would be attracted even to the roster point promotees as otherwise there would be discrimination against the reserved candidates. In light of above two contrary decisions, State was in a quandary what to do and the same was brought before the Supreme Court wherein the issues inter alia were;

 Could the roster point promotees (reserved category) count their seniority in the promoted category from the date of their continuous officiation vis-à-vis the general candidates who were senior to them in the lower category and who were later promoted to the same level?  Whether the 'catch-up' principles claimed by the general candidates are tenable?

JUDGMENT:- The judgment of the Court can be summarized as follows;

 The roster point promotees (reserved category) could not count their seniority in the promoted category from the date of their continuous officiation in the promoted post vis-à-vis the general candidates who were senior to them in the lower category and who were later promoted. On the other hand, the senior general candidate at the lower level, if he reached the promotional level later but before the further promotion of the reserved candidate would have to be treated as senior, at the promotional level, to the reserved candidate even if the reserved candidate was earlier promoted to that level.  The Apex Court held that decision of Jagdishlal v. State of Haryana (AIR 1997 SC 2366) arrived at an incorrect conclusion because of applying a rule of continuous officiation which was not intended to apply to the reserved candidates promoted at roster points. There was no conflict in the principles laid down in the two judgments of Union of India v. Virpal Singh (1993) 6 SCC 685 and Ajit Singh Januja v. State of Punjab (1996) 2 SCC 215. In Ajit Singh the Court had to consider the validity of such a Circular dated 19.7.69 which positively declared that the "roster points were seniority points. Thus, the decision in Ajit Singh was correct.  In case any senior general candidate at initial level (suppose L-3) reached next level before the reserved candidate (roster point promotee) at next level (i.e. L-2) goes further up to higher level (L-1), then the seniority at next level (i.e. L-2) had to be modified by placing such a general candidate above the roster promotee, reflecting their inter se seniority at Level 2. Further promotion to higher level (L-

  1. must be on the basis of such a modified seniority at L-2, namely, that the senior general candidate of L-3 will remain senior also at L-2 to the reserved candidate, even if the latter had reached L-2 earlier  After decision in Ajit Singh , it becomes necessary that a reserved candidate who has been promoted to higher level (say level 2) under reservation quota and the general category candidate (senior to reserved candidate at level 3) who was

promoted to same level (i.e. level 2) later and for promotion to next level (level 1) the reserved category candidate was promoted to disregard of general category candidate who was promoted to same level (level 1) later, then in such situations it become necessary to review the promotion of the reserved candidate to level 1 and reconsider the same, without causing reversion to the reserved candidate who reached level 1. As and when the senior reserved candidate was later promoted to level 4, the seniority at level 4 was also to be re-fixed on the basis of when the reserved candidate at level 3 would have got his normal promotion, treating him as junior to the senior general candidate at level 3

FOR COMMON MAN:- After the above decision, it is clear that r eserved Category promotees cannot count their seniority in the promoted category from the date of their continuous officiation in the promoted post vis-à-vis general candidates who were senior to them in lower category and were later promoted.

(3) Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, AIR 1999 SC 625

FACTS IN BRIEF :- The respondent was removed from his post as an employee of the appellant council after the relevant disciplinary authorities found him guilty of sexually harassing X, a junior female employee. He filed a writ petition before the High Court challenging his dismissal. A single judge allowed the petition, finding that the respondent‟s dismissal was unjustified on the grounds that he had only tried to molest X and had not actually established any physical contact with her. The appellant was ordered to be reinstated. This was upheld by a Division Bench of the High Court. This judgment was challenged by the dismissing organisation.

JUDGMENT:- The Supreme Court held as follows;

  1. In the absence of procedural irregularity, the High Court was wrong to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the disciplinary authorities and with the punishment which they had imposed. It is a well-settled principle that, in exercising the power of judicial review, the court is not concerned with the correctness of findings of fact which are reasonably supported by evidence, but with the decision-making process itself.
  2. Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination projected through direct or implied unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature. It is exacerbated when submission to or rejection of such conduct by the female employee may affect her employment, unreasonably interfere with her performance at work and create an intimidating or hostile working environment for her.
  3. Each incident of sexual harassment in the workplace is incompatible with the dignity and honour of women and violates the fundamental rights to equality, life and liberty. In this case, the Apex court observed;

“ Each incident of sexual harassment at the place of work, results in violation of the fundamental right to gender equality and the right to life and liberty – the two most

JUDGMENT:- The Apex Court dismissed the challenge to the constitutionality of Section 302 of IPC in so far as it provided for the death sentence and also the challenge to the constitutionality of Section 354(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court propounded the principle of “rarest of rare cases” in awarding of the death penalty wherein it was stated by the Court that a real and abiding concern for the dignity of human life postulated a resistance to taking a life through law's instrumentality. However, that ought not to be done save in the rarest of rare cases when the alternative option is unquestionably foreclosed. Therefore the constitutionality of the provisions imposing death penalty was upheld

FOR COMMON MAN:- The apex court laid down the doctrine of “rarest of rare case” for the purposes of awarding of death penalty. Thus the case laid down a strong foundation for sorting out an extraordinary case with prevailing special circumstances, whereupon death penalty be imposed on the accused, his case being a rarest of rare one. Thus a significant limitation on the arbitrary imposition death penalty was solidifying in the form of the “rarest of rare” principle which has now become the yardstick for awarding death penalty by Indian Judiciary.

(5) BALCO Employees Union v. Union of India , AIR 2002 SC 350

FACTS IN BRIEF :- During the process of the ongoing economic reforms, the Public Sector Disinvestment Commission advised the Government of India that BALCO, one of the Government Companies, needed to be privatized by transferring 40% of its shares immediately and to bring down its holding to 26% within a period of two years, with the aim to fully disinvest it stake in favour of investors at the appropriate time. Later the recommendation was revised such that 51% of the government‟s stake in BALCO‟s would be transferred along with a transfer of management. The same was approved by the Cabinet Committee on Disinvestment.

Consequently, advertisements were issued and a detailed process followed, resulting into the selection of M/S Sterling Co. as the Strategic Partner to whom the 51% stake of the Government would be transferred for Rs. 551 crores. Discussions on the same also took place in the Rajya Sabha and the Lok Sabha wherein motion to disapprove the proposed disinvestment failed. Thereupon the said transfer of stake was challenged before the Supreme Court and other High Courts. Clubbing the claims, the Court framed the following issues;

 Whether Executive Policies are reviewable by the Judiciary?  Whether the decision to disinvest BALCO is constitutionally valid?

ARGUMENTS:- Those challenging the disinvestment argued that (a) by reason of disinvestment the workmen had lost their right and protection under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and as this was an adverse civil consequence, they had a right to be heard before and during the process of disinvestment and (b) normally in cases of this nature 5% of the shares were disinvested in favour of the employees which was not so done in the present case. Thus the disinvestment was unsustainable. To this the counter

argument was, (a) public sector companies were constantly sinking into an increasing difficulties and it was in public interest to disinvest them, and (b) the wisdom and advisability of economic policies of Government are not amenable to judicial review.

JUDGMENT:- The Apex Court held that (a) it could not look into the executive wisdom which enacts a policy, specially matters regarding economic management and (b) the legal challenges made to the disinvestment of BALCO were not valid and consequently, the decision to disinvest BALCO is constitutionally valid. The reason for the said decision, the Apex Court gave as follows;

 Non-government employees working in a company cannot claim a superior right than a government servant and impugn its change of status in terms of social security measures and protection of their employment and rights.  In taking of a policy decision in economic matters at length, the principles of natural justice have no role to play which would require a hearing of the workers prior to decision making.  When the government chooses to run an industry by forming a company and it becomes its shareholder then under the provisions of the Companies Act as a shareholder, it would have a right to transfer its shares.

FOR COMMON MAN:- In the course of delivering this judgment, the Court came down heavily on frivolous Public Interest Litigations (PILs). In fact this case has set the trend for in lemine dismissal of PILs if the petitioners are not able to establish that a substantial public interest is involved in the petitions. The Court also declared that public interest is the paramount consideration in national governance and therefore if in the public interest the Government thought it fit to take over a sick company to preserve the productive unit and the jobs of those employed therein, the government can do so reducing the continuing drain on its limited resources. This decision is in tune with the growing recognition of the efficiencies of market mechanism.

(6) Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 802

FACTS IN BRIEF :- The Petitioner wa s an organization dedicated to the cause of release of bonded laborers. It made a survey of stone quarries in Faridabad District near Delhi and found that there were a large number of labourers from Maharashtra , Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan who were working in these stone quarries under "inhuman and intolerable conditions" and many of whom were bonded labourers. The petitioner therefore addressed a letter to the Supreme Court stating the circumstances and filed a Public Interest Litigation alleging that hundreds of workmen were living in bondage and under inhuman conditions. The Court appointed a Commissioner to look into the matter in 3-4 days and to submit a report to the Court.

JUDGMENT:- Upon a report given by the Commissioner entailing violations of various constitutional and human rights of the poor labourers, the Apex Court declaring that Article 21 of the Constitution assures right to live with human dignity free from exploitation held that State was under a constitutional obligation to ensure that there is no

JUDGMENT:- The Apex Court held that Section 30 of the Cr. P.C. did not violate the right to equality guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution of India as,

 Article 14 did not prohibit a reasonable classification. The only requirement is that the differentia on the basis of which the classification was made must be intelligible and should have a reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the Statute. The Court also held that a classification could be based on geographical or territorial considerations.  The risk of being tried by a Section 30 Magistrate fell alike upon all persons committing such an offence. Therefore, there is no discrimination in the Section itself.  The discretion to try the offence under Section 30 or otherwise rested with the Magistrate and not with the police as it was upon the Magistrate to commit the accused to the Court of Session, instead of disposing of the case himself if he thought that the ends of justice will be met.  In case of any intentional or purposeful discrimination against the appellants by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or the District Magistrate or the Section 30 Magistrate, the law provided for revision by superior Courts of orders passed by the Subordinate Courts.

FOR COMMON MAN:- The importance of this judgment lies in the fact that it establishes that even Judiciary comes within the definition of „State‟, as under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, for the purposes of enforcing Fundamental Rights and in case of any infringement on them by the judiciary, the superior courts are entitled to scrutinize such actions.

(8) Chief Forest Conservator (Wild Life) v. Nisar Khan, AIR 2003 SC 1867

Sumit Agrawal, VII Semester

FACTS IN BRIEF :- In the initial proceedings t he respondents had approached the High Court of Allahabad through a writ petition inter alia for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the appellants to grant a license for carrying on business as a dealer in birds which were bred in captivity. The same was allowed by the High Court. The same was challenged before the Supreme Court.

ARGUMENTS: The contention of the respondent, as also before the High Court was that he had been dealing in birds of several varieties specified in the Schedule IV appended to the Wild Life (Protection) Act 1972, wherefore he had applied for an had been granted a license. But his application for renewal of the said license had been rejected. Since there had been no change in the fact situation, he was entitled to be granted the extension. However the appellants argued that having regard to the Amendment made in Section 9 of the said Act whereby 'hunting' included 'trapping' of birds (specified in Schedule IV of the Act), no license for dealing in them could be lawfully granted. The appellant also stated that although dealing in birds in captivity was

as such is not prohibited, no license could be granted in terms of Section 44 of the Act if by reason thereof the licensee would violate any of the provisions of the Act.

JUDGMENT:- The Apex Court, while setting aside the judgment of the High Court, observed that when hunting of birds was prohibited, there remained no doubt that no person could be granted license to deal in birds in captivity which were procured for hunting, a term which also included trapping. The Court distinguishing the two situations observed, “it is one thing to say that by reason of breeding of birds in captivity their population increases, but it is another thing to say that birds are trapped before they are made captive so as to enable the license to deal in them.” Thus the Court came to a conclusion that if a finding of the fact having regard to the past transactions of the licensee showed that the purpose of breeding of captive birds was necessarily for hunting, it justified the refusal of a license.

FOR COMMON MAN: Through this judgment the Court declared that „trapping‟ of birds is an offence. If any one does it, it is against Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 and he can be sent to jail. Also, before granting license for dealing in birds, the licensing authority will have regard to the source and manner in which supplies are made, the implications of the license on hunting and trade and the past transactions of the licensee.

(9) D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal ,AIR 1997 SC 3017

FACTS IN BRIEF :- A letter was written by the Chief Executive Chairman of Legal Aid Services, West Bengal to the Chief Justice of India referring to certain newspaper reports wherein mistreatment of prisoners by the police was alleged. This letter was treated as a writ petition and notice was issued to all the State governments seeking their views on the same. Thereupon, the Court gave various guidelines to be observed by the police while securing arrest of persons.

JUDGMENT:- The Apex Court detailed eleven measures to be observed by the police to secure arrest of accused. They can be summerised as,

 Arresting or interrogating official have to bear identification badge.  There has to be a preparation of memo of arrest in the presence of a family member or local person.  Arrestee has a right to have his relative or friend informed of his arrest as soon as practicable.  Details of arrest are to be informed within 8-12 hours to his relative or friend in case the arrestee lives outside the district or town of arrest.  The arrestee must be told of his rights to have someone informed soon after the arrest.  The details of arrest and transmission of information to the next friend or relative have to be entered in the police diary.  In case arrestee requests for examination of bodily injuries at the time of arrest, the request has to be complied with.

remedy thereunder could not be denied to a Muslim woman otherwise it would amount to violation of not only equality before law but also equal protection of laws (Article 14) and inherent infringement of Article 21 as well as basic human values. (c) That the Act was un-Islamic, unconstitutional and had the potential of suffocating the Muslim women while also undermining the secular character, which was the basic feature of the Constitution. And thus there was no rhyme or reason to deprive the Muslim women from the applicability of the provisions of Section 125 Cr.P.C.

Defending the validity of the enactment, it was argued on behalf of the respondents that (a) if the legislature, as a matter of policy, wanted to apply Section 125 Cr.P.C. to Muslims, it also meant that the same legislature could, by necessary implication, withdraw such an application of the Act and make some other provision in that regard. (b) Parliament could amend Section 125 Cr.P.C. so as to exclude it application and apply personal law instead. (c) That the policy of Section 125 Cr.P.C. was not to create a right of maintenance dehors the personal law and therefore could not stand in the way of the Act.

JUDGMENT:- U pholding the validity of the Act, the Supreme Court held as follows;

o A Muslim husband is liable to make reasonable and fair provision for the future of the divorced wife which obviously includes her maintenance as well. Such a reasonable and fair provision extending beyond the iddat period must be made by the husband within the iddat period in terms of Section 3(1)(a) of the Act, o Liability of Muslim husband to his divorced wife arising under Section 3(1)(a) of the Act to pay maintenance is not confined to iddat period, o A divorced Muslim woman who has not remarried and who is not able to maintain herself after iddat period can proceed as provided under Section 4 of the Act against her relatives who are liable to maintain her in proportion to the properties which they inherit on her death according to Muslim law from such divorced woman including her children and parents. If any of the relatives being unable to pay maintenance, the Magistrate may direct the State Wakf Board established under the Act to pay such maintenance. o The provisions of the Act do not offend Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

FOR COMMON MAN:- It is unfortunate to note that the Court did not strike down the Act which purports to exclude Muslim women in particular from the beneficial treatment of Section 125. The legislature to appease the Muslim gentry may have passed the Act on political consideration but that same has rendered an indirect classification of people of the basis of religion, which is against the fundamental aspect of Secularism which we have adopted in out Constitution.

(11) Dr (Mrs.) Vijaya Manohar Arbat v. Kashirao Rajaram Sawai, AIR 1987 SC

FACTS IN BRIEF :- Dealing with Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), the issue involved in the present appeal was whether Respondent were entitled to claim maintenance from the appellant. The Appellant was a medical practitioner and the married daughter of Respondent by his first wife. Her mother died in 1948. Thereafter, the Respondent remarried and was living with his second wife. He filed an application before the Judicial Magistrate claiming maintenance from the appellant on the ground that he was unable to maintain himself.

ARGUMENTS:- The A ppellant had argued that under clause (d) of Section 125(1) a father was not entitled to claim maintenance from his daughter whether married or out. She contended that the use of the word “his” in clause (d) clearly indicated that it was only the son who was burdened with the obligation to maintain his parents. It was submitted that if the legislature had intended that the maintenance could be claimed from the daughter as well, it would not have used the pronoun 'his'.

JUDGMENT:- The Apex Court held that Section 125(1) Cr.P.C. conferred power on the Magistrate to order a person to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of some of his close relations like wife, children, father and mother under certain circumstances. The Court held that while there was no doubt that it was the moral obligation of a son or a daughter to maintain his or her parents, it was not desirable that even though a son or a daughter had sufficient means, his or her parents would starve. The use of the word “his” did not exclude the parents claiming maintenance from their daughter. The Court took clue from Section 8 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 13(1) of the General Clauses Act wherein “he” was interpreted to include “she” as well. Therefore the Court held that the pronoun 'his' as used in clause (d) of Section 125(1) Cr.P.C. included both male and female and thus the parents were entitled to claim maintenance against their daughter under the said Section provided that other conditions of the Section were fulfilled.

FOR COMMON MAN:- This case clearly lays down that a daughter, even after her marriage, does not cease to be a daughter of the father or mother. It is the moral obligation of the children to maintain their parents and this has been concretized into a legal duty by Section 125(1) (d) of Cr.P.C which imposes a legal duty on both the son and daughter to maintain their father or mother who are unable to maintain themselves.

(12) Mahachandra Prasad Singh v. Hon. Chairman, Bihar Legislative Council, AIR 2005 SC 69

FACTS IN BRIEF :- The petitioner was elected as a member of the Bihar Legislative Council (BLC) as a candidate of Indian National Congress. Thereafter the notification for holding elections the Lok Sabha was issued. The petitioner contested the said election from another constituency as an independent candidate. One Salman Rageev, a member of BLC, sent a petition to the Chairman of the Legislative Council stating that the

(13) Dr. Pradeep Jain v. Union of India , AIR 1984 SC 1420

FACTS IN BRIEF :- The issue for consideration before the Apex Court in this case was whether admissions to a medical college or any other institution of higher learning situated in a state could be confined to those who had their 'domicile' within the State or those who were resident within the State for a specified number of years or could any reservation in admissions be made for them so as to give them precedence over those who do not possess 'domicile' or residential qualification within the State, irrespective of merit.

ARGUMENTS:- The Petitioners challenged the said policy of admission on the ground of domicile pressing the equality clause as provided for under Article 14, 15, 19 and Art.301 of the Constitution of India. It was argued that the residential requirement as a condition of eligibility for employment or appointment to an office under the State was unconstitutional having regard to the expansive meaning given to the word 'State' in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India.

The Respondents defended the said policy on the ground that Article 16(2) had no application so far as admissions to an educational institution such as a medical college were concerned. It was argued that what Article 16(2) provided was invalidation of discrimination on ground of place of birth and since the condition in the present case was as regards residence, it was not hit by the said Article.

JUDGMENT:- Dismissing the petition, the Apex Court held that e ach and every kind of discrimination was not a violation of the constitutional concept of equality and did not necessarily undermine the unity of India. The validity of any discrimination was to be tested on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution wherein appropriate classification may form the very core of equality and promote unity in the true sense amidst diversity. Thereby the Court upheld reservation to seats on the grounds of domicile.

FOR COMMON MAN:- The message of the Court in this case is loud and clear. While an arbitrary and irrational discrimination between people shall not be tolerated at any cost, there can be reasonable classification in order to promote equality in true sense of the term. Thus reservation of seats on the grounds of domicile, being meant to promote a particular class of backwards or under-developed area, shall be allowed so as to promote and achieve equality in true sense.

(14) Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India, (2003) 2 SCC 45

FACTS IN BRIEF :- The issue for deliberation in the present case was, whether lawyers have a right to strike and/or give a call for boycotts of Court/s? The Petitioners sought a declaration that such strikes and/or calls for boycott were illegal.

ARGUMENTS:- The Petitioners submitted that strike as a means for collective bargaining was recognized only in industrial disputes and lawyers who were officers of the Court could not use strikes as a means to blackmail the Courts or the clients. They further argued that the call for strike by lawyers was in effect a call to breach the contract which lawyers have with their clients. On the other hand, the legal fraternity submitted that lawyers retained the right to strike in rare cases in order to get their concerns communicated in the event of improper treatment being given to them.

JUDGMENT:- The Supreme Court declared that lawyers have no right to go on strike or give a call for boycott, not even on a token strike. The protest, if any is required, could only be made by giving press statements, TV interviews carrying out of the Court premises banners and/or placards, wearing black or white or any colour arm bands, peaceful protect marches outside and away from Court premises, going on dharnas or relay facts etc. The Court, acknowledging the fact that even those lawyers willing to attend the Court could not attend owing to the strike or boycott, asked the lawyers to boldly refuse to abide by any call for strike or boycott. The Court also declared that no lawyer could be visited with any adverse consequence by the Association or the Council and no threat or coercion of any nature including that of expulsion can be held out in an event of his refuse to attend to the strike/boycott.

The Court also observed that an Advocate is an officer of the Court and enjoys special status in society. They have obligations and duties to ensure smooth functioning of the Court and they also owe a duty to their client. Strikes are an interfere with administration of justice, disrupt Court proceedings and put interest of their clients in jeopardy. Thus the Court imposed a blanket ban on strikes by lawyers.

FOR COMMON MAN:- In consequence of this decision the legal position is that lawyers cannot go on strike. This judgment has given relief to thousands of helpless people involved in litigation. This case clearly lays down that if an advocate does not appear before a court by reason of a call for strike or boycott, then on a complaint from a client against an advocate for non-appearance, the Supreme Court can take disciplinary action under Section 38 of Advocates Act.

(15) Forum, Prevention of Envn. and Sound Pollution v. Union of India, (2005) 5 SCC 733

FACTS IN BRIEF :- In this case a public interest litigation was filed before the Supreme Court complaining of noise created by the use of the loudspeakers being used in religious performances or singing bhajans and the like in busy commercial localities on the days of weekly offs. It was submitted that such musical interruptions had become nuisance for residential areas and had made life miserable.

JUDGMENT:- Agreeing with the menacing level of noise pollution prevailing even in the Residential areas, the Supreme Court discussed the legal issues dealing with noise pollution in India, the level of in-effectivity of the environmental laws in India, the methodology of how it was dealt with in other jurisdictions, the environmental standards

ARGUMENTS:- The Petitioner relied on various legal instruments namely, the Constitutional provisions ( Articles 14, 15(3), 16(1), 21, 23, 24 38 39(f), 45 and 46), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 (Article 1, 4 and 6) and Declaration of Right of Child (to which India is a signatory) etc. Stressing on the above instruments, an attempt was made to draw the attention of the judicial system towards this hard truth of society which had been persisting in different forms since ages sometimes in name of religion like devdasi or jogin, and sometimes for commercial aspects.

JUDGMENT:- The court after study of the variant statistical data and factual situation in society, went on to offer solution from two objectives- (a) through the Juvenile Justice Act, it proposed to better the condition of these children by bringing them within the manifold of neglected children ; recognizing the cause behind such state of the children to be family tradition, custom, illiteracy, coercive trapping, ignorance, poverty, scare of social stigma, and also the recent trend of ladies from high strata of society entering into this job to sustain their luxury demands, the court recommended the scheme for children of prostitutes and children associating with prostitutes and prostitution- Child Development and Care Centers for management and coordination of entrustment to NGOs so as also to promote voluntary initiatives against this germ of society. (b) The aspect of prostitutes was sought to be cured, apart from action by NGOs, through the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 by expanding the horizon of the term „prostitution‟ by adding the word „abuse‟ so as to cover any act contrary to good order; also the legislation was understood widely even to address a „brothel‟ as any premise wherein a female indulges in act of offering her body for promiscuous sexual intercourse for hire, thereby actual intercourse or repeated visits were not made pre-requisites, even a single instance proved by surrounding circumstances was held to be sufficient to invoke the law.

For Common Man -: The judiciary took a serious note of the widespread disease of prostitution which has being continuing in the society in a vicious cycle. A prostitute in the course of catering to customers gives birth to an innocent infant, and to bear the costs of child and to bring her up as a responsible citizen, she incurs high debt from her customers, but finally she leaves the burden of those unsatisfied debt on the shoulders of the child who grows up in that environment and compulsion to repeat her mothers life. Thus the court relied on the concept of 3C‟s i.e. counseling, cajoling and coercion to enforce the legislations as well as voluntary initiatives to curb the menace before it engulfs the social fabrics.

(17) Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar , (1983) 4 SCC 45

FACTS IN BRIEF :- The Appellant was a company engaged in the manufacture and sale of various medicines and life saving drugs throughout India including the State of Bihar. It had branch or sales depot at Patna registered as a dealer and effected sales of their manufactured products through wholesale distributors/stockists in the districts of Bihar who in turn sold them to retailers through whom the medicines and drugs reached the consumers. Almost 94% of the medicines and drugs sold by them were at the controlled price exclusive of local taxes under the Drugs (Price Control) Order, 1979,

issued by the Central Government under Section 3(1) of the Essential Commodities Act and they were expressly prohibited from selling these medicines and drugs in excess of the controlled price so fixed by the Central Government from time to time which allows the manufacturer or producer to pass on the tax liability to the consumer.

Sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 provided for the levy of surcharge on every dealer whose gross turnover during a year exceeds Rs. 5 lakhs, in addition to the tax payable by him, at such rate not exceeding 10 per centum of the total amount of the tax, and of Sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Act which prohibited such dealer from collecting the amount of surcharge payable by him from the purchasers. The Appellant challenged the constitutional validity of the said sections, placing on record their printed price-lists of their well-known medicines and drugs manufactured by them showing the price at which they sell to the retailers as also the retail price, both inclusive of excise duty. It appeared from the terms of the contract that sales tax and local taxes would be charged wherever applicable. The High Court upheld the constitutional validity and the same was challenged in appeal.

ARGUMENTS:- The Appellants argued,

 Sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Act providing that no dealer shall be entitled to collect the surcharge levied on him must yield to Section 6 of the Essential Commodities Act which provided that any order made under Section 3 of the Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment. It was argued that applying the doctrine of occupied field and the concept of federal supremacy, it was clear that the Union legislation shall prevail in a case of conflict between List II and List III.  Sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Act, which provided that no dealer shall be entitled to collect the amount of surcharge levied on him, clearly falls within Entry 54 of List II of Schedule VII and was repugnant to the scheme of the Drug (Price Control) Order 1979 so far as price fixation of drugs was concerned and particularly with para 21 which enabled the manufacturer of drugs to pass on the liability to pay sales tax to the consumer. In this event of repugnance between the Control Order (made under Section 6 of the Essential Commodities Act i.e. a central enactment) State law must prevail.  The provision contained in Sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Act were ex facie and patently discriminatory.  The restriction imposed by Sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Act which prevented the manufacturers/producers of medicines and drugs from passing on liability to pay surcharge was confiscatory and casted a disproportionate burden on such manufacturers/producers and stipulated an unreasonable restriction on the freedom to carry on their business guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g).  Sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Act was ultra varies the State Legislature of Bihar in so far as it took into account the manufacturer‟s gross turnover as defined in Section 2(j) of the Act, which included transactions relating to sale or purchase of goods which had taken place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce or outside the territory of India.