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A moot court memorial arguing against the criminalization of marital rape in india. It presents arguments based on the indian constitution, particularly article 14 (right to equality), and the sanctity of marriage. The memorial analyzes relevant case law and legal principles to support the respondent's position.
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**1. ¶ Paragraph
The petitioners had approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India under Article 32^1 of the Constitution of India, 1950 and the respondent humbly submits to the jurisdiction.
Nidhi and Subodh, aged 22 and 24 respectively, have been live-in partners since 2017 and love each other. 1 Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part (1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed (2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part (3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause ( 1 ) and ( 2 ), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause ( 2 ) (4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this Constitution 11 | P a g e
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It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that sexual intercourse without wife’s consent is not rape. Section 375 IPC nowhere specifies or demonstrates the term ‘sexual intercourse without wife’s consent.’ Thus, it is humbly submitted in the light of these judgments that identical treatment cannot be given to a married and unmarried woman. Moreover, if forceful intercourse will be termed as rape it will arbitrarily be against the men being violative of Art. 15 of the constitution. Therefore, it is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble bench that Section 375 of IPC draws a reasonable classification between married and the unmarried women. Thus, it is not violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India.
2. THAT THERE ARE MANY OTHER ALTERNATIVES UNDER WHICH THE WOMEN CAN COMPLAIN AND GET REMEDIES It is most humbly submitted before this honourable court that by declaring this very exemption clause as being violative of fundamental and human rights is not the sole option to be relied upon. Article 15(3) of the constitution of India states that “Nothing in this article shall prevent state from making any special provision for women and children.” It is pertinent to note that there are various constraints due to which the exemption clause is not being criminalised and also there are various other alternative remedies available under which aggrieved women can seek protection. 14 | P a g e
1.1 It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that sexual intercourse without wife’s consent is not rape. Section 375 IPC nowhere specifies or demonstrates the term ‘sexual intercourse without wife’s consent.’ 1.2 Therefore, rape u/s 375 is constituted only if the act falls under the seven exceptions of the offence. Firstly, against her will; Secondly, without her consent; Thirdly, when her consent is obtained by putting fear of death in her; Fourthly, when the consent is given under the belief that another man is her lawfully married husband; Fifthly, when consent given by the reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication etc.; Sixthly, with or without her consent, when she is under 16 years of age and Seventhly, when she is unable to convey her consent. 1.3 Moreover, while convicting a person u/s 375 of the IPC the two essential ingredients of Section 375 should be fulfilled as was observed by the court in the case of Suo Moto v. State of Rajasthan,^3 that there are two essential ingredients of rape under Section 375 IPC. Firstly, sexual intercourse by a man with a woman and secondly, the sexual intercourse must be under circumstances falling under any of the six clauses in this section. 1.4 THAT IT DOES NOT VIOLATE ART. 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 1.4.1 It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that Article 14 provides the right to equality and equal protections of the laws to every person within the territory of India. Article 14 is considered to be a part of the Golden triangle of the Constitution of India and is a fundamental right that stands above the rest.^4 3 Suo Moto v. State of Rajasthan, 2005 (4) INDIA.L.C. 163 (India). 4 Ashok Kumar Thakur v. U.O.I, (2008) 6 S.C.C. 1 (India). 16 | P a g e
1.4.2 Therefore, no person within the territory of India can be denied the “right to equality” and the enjoyment of “equal protection of laws.” The point to be noted is that the principle of equality does not mean that every law must have universal application for all^5 who are not by nature, attainment or circumstances, in the same position as the varying needs of different classes of persons often require separate treatment. 1.4.3 Our Constitution is wedded to the concept of Equality which is the basic feature of the Constitution and is a fundamental postulate of Republicanism.^6 Equality clause embodied in Article 14, does not speak of mere formal Equality before the law but is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be imprisoned within the traditional and doctrinaire limits Article 14, Article 19 and Article 21 must be read together.^7 1.4.4 It has been observed by the Hon’ble SC in the case of Delhi Development Authority v. Joint Action Committee,^8 that Article 14 is the heart and soul of the constitution. Article 14 guarantees to all persons in our country equality before the law and equal protection of the laws, which only means that all persons are equally and have a right to equal protection.^9 1.4.5 Moreover, the wording used in Article 14 suggests that right to equal protection of law is absolute. But, in reality, it is not so. It is now well established by a catena of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that it is subject to reasonable classification.^10 1.4.6 It was observed by the Hon’ble SC in the case of Anita Kushwaha v. Pushpa Sudan^11 that, “Equal protection of laws is not limited in its application to the realm of executive action that enforces the law-it is as much available in relation to the proceedings before courts and tribunal and adjudicatory or where law is applied and 5 Kedarnath v. State of INDIA.B, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 404 (406) (India). 6 Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2299 (India). 7 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597 (India). 8 Delhi Development Authority v. Joint Action Committee, (2008) 2 S.C.C. 672 (India). 9 Narain Das v. Improvement Trust (1973) 2 S.C.C. 265 (India). 10 E P Royappav v. State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 555 (India). 11 Anita Kushwaha v. Pushpa Sudan, (2016) 8 S.C.C. 509 (India). 17 | P a g e
1.4.10 What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the act under consideration.^20 It is pertinent to note in the case at hand that the classification India to maintain the sanctity of the institution of marriage. Therefore, the classification drawn by 375 is reasonable in nature because the classification is real and substantial and bears some just and reasonable relation to the object of the legislation.^21 It is humbly submitted that the classification between married and unmarried women is reasonable in nature as there is an intelligible differentia between the classifications based on procurement of the evidence. 1.4.11 ‘Equal protection of law’ does not mean that the same law should be made applicable to all persons or that every law must have universal application irrespective of difference of circumstances.^22 The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that Article 14 does not operate against rational classification.^23 Mere differentiation or inequality of treatment does not reason to attract the vice of Article 14 of the Constitution.^24 It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that a reasonable classification is inherent in the very concept of equality, because all the persons living on this earth are not alike and have different problems.^25 [¶ 1]. Moreover, it would become impossible to find the evidence to make out the offence of rape. The point to be considered is that any sexual act done by a husband with her wife is done behind the closed doors. Moreover, it was observed by the Hon’ble SC in the case of Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chand Pandey,^26 that cohabitation by husband and wife is an essential feature of valid marriage. [¶ 2]. In Rita das Biswas v. Trilokesh Das Biswas,^27 it was held that co-habitation is an essential ingredient for a valid marriage. The point to be taken into consideration is 20 Tulsipur Sugar Co. v. Govt of U.P, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 443 (India). 21 Ameeronisa v. Mahboob (1953) S.C.R 404 (India). 22 Jagannath Prasad v. State of U.P, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1245 (India). 23 Western U.P. Electric Power v. State of U.P, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 21 (India). 24 Jaila Singh v.State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1436 (India). 25 Pathumma v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 771 (India). 26 Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chand Pandey, (2002) 2 S.C.C. 73 (India). 27 Rita Das Biswas v. Trilokesh Das Biswas, A.I.R. 2007 Gau. 122 (India). 19 | P a g e
that procuring any evidence except the testimony of the prosecutrix, will become impossible. The Hon’ble SC has observed in plethora of cases that the statement of the prosecutrix holds a very high evidentiary value and is sufficient to convict a person. As was observed by the Hon’ble SC in the case of Uday v. State of Karnataka,^28 that the medical evidence of a girl or a woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation should not be viewed with doubt, disbelief or suspicion. [¶ 3]. Moreover, it was observed by the Hon’ble SC in the case of Garg v. U.O.I.,^29 that the reasonableness is to be judged with reference to the object of the legislation and not moral considerations. [¶ 4]. In all cases where the material adduced before the court in matters relating to Art. 14 is unsatisfactory, the court may have to allow the state to lean on the doctrine of initial presumption of constitutionality.^30 There is always a presumption in favour of the Constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon the person, who attacks it, to show that there has been a clear transgression of the Constitutional principles.^31 It must be presumed that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, that, its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that, its discrimination are based on adequate grounds.^32 [¶ 5]. The Courts always lean against a construction, which reduces the Statute to a futility. A Statute or any enacting provision therein, it is said, must be so construed as to make it effective and operative on the principle expressed in the maxim “ ut res magisvaleat quam pereat.”^33 Thus, it is humbly submitted that the legislature after taking into consideration the needs and ethos of the society has inserted the Exception in the impugned Section. It is further humbly submitted that criminalizing such a private affair between a married couple will go against the interests of the society at large. [¶ 6]. It is always observed that there is a presumption in the constitutionality of an enactment, since it is assumed that the legislature understands and correctly 28 Uday v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 4 S.C.C. 46 (India). 29 Garg v. U.O.I., A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 2138 (India). 30 Ratnaporva Devi v. State of Orissa (1964) 6 S.C.R 301 (India). 31 Subramanian Swamy v. Director, C.B.I., A.I.R. 2014 S.C. 2140 (India). 32 The Rule was enunciated by the American Supreme Court in Middleton v. Texas Power & L. Company, ( U.S. 152) quoted in Government of A.P. v. P.L. Devi, A.I.R. 2008 S.C. 1640 (India). 33 Saurabh Chaudri v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2004 S.C. 361 (India). 20 | P a g e