Minds and Machines
spring 2003
The identity theory
1
24.119 spring 03
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Identity Theory: Understanding the Connection Between Minds and Machines, Slides of Philosophy of mind
The Identity Theory, a philosophical concept proposed by J.J.C. Smart and U.T. Place in the 1950s. The theory suggests that sensations, such as pain, are identical to specific brain processes, like c-fibers firing. The document also discusses William of Ockham's Nominalism and the type-type vs. token-token identity theories. Students will gain a deeper understanding of the philosophical underpinnings of the Identity Theory and its implications for the relationship between minds and machines.
What you will learn
- How does the Identity Theory explain the relationship between sensations and brain processes?
- How does the Identity Theory impact our understanding of the relationship between minds and machines?
- What is William of Ockham's Nominalism and how does it relate to the Identity Theory?
- What is the difference between type-type and token-token identity theories?
- What is the Identity Theory and who proposed it?
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Minds and Machines
spring 2003
The identity theory
24.119 spring 03
roadmap
argument D
Kripke’s
behaviorism
objection
the identity theory
we arehere
24.119 spring 03
“Sensations and brain
processes”
“the suggestion I wish to resist is…thatto say ‘I have a yellowish orange after-image’ is to report something irreduciblypsychical.
Why do I wish to resist this suggestion?
Mainly because of Occam’s razor…Thateverything should be explicable in termsof physics…except the occurrence ofsensations seems to me to be franklyunbelievable. Such sensations would be‘nomological danglers,’ to use Feigl’s expression.”
JJC Smart
24.119 spring 03
William of Ockham (1287-1347)
Nominalism: properties(or “universals”) don’texist
“Ockham’s razor”:entities are not to bemultiplied withoutnecessity
24.119 spring 03
from the philosophical toolkit:
types
and
tokens
this terminology is due to the “American Pragmatist” C. S. Peirce (1839-1914)
example 1 how many words in this sentence? ‘The cat sat on the mat’ 6 tokens, 5 types
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example 2
how many flags?
6 tokens, 3 types
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the Smart/Place theory is a “type-
type” identity theory
despite the terminology, “type-type” identity theoriesare not best understood in terms of the “type-token”distinction
it is better to think of the “type-type” theory asidentifying
properties
rather than types
(note that the American flag -- taken either as a type or a token -- is not a property) the property of being in pain = the property of havingfiring c-fibers
24.119 spring 03
the property of being in pain = the property of having firing c-fibers => every event of feeling pain is identical to an event of c-fibers firing (and vice versa)
so the so-called “type-type” identity theory implies a strong sort of token-token identity theory
24.119 spring 03
the experience vs. the object of
the
experience
the
object
of the experience is colored
orange, not the experience itself
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brain process
the
experience
= such-and-such
the identity theory does not identifythe
object
of the experience with a
brain process
24.119 spring 03
“I am not arguing that the after-image is a brainprocess, but that the experience of having anafter-image is a brain process…”
“There is, in a sense, no such thing asan after-image or a sense-datum,though there is such a thing as theexperience of having such an image”
24.119 spring 03
Minds and Machines
spring 2003
read Kripke
read the suggested
sections from Crane
problem set 3
24.119 spring 03