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The use of Routine Activities Theory as a framework for understanding and reducing criminal activity. The theory, which emphasizes the convergence of motivated offenders, vulnerable targets, and lack of guardianship, has gained significance in modern criminology due to its relevance to GPS mapping of crime events. The document also discusses the limitations of traditional deterrence theory and the importance of addressing the most crucial element of the theory in efforts to reduce crime in hot spots.
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51
C H A P T E R
his chapter will discuss the early aggregate studies of deterrence in the late 1960s, then the perceptual studies of the 1970s, and finally, the longitudinal and scenario studies of the 1980s and 1990s to present. Other policy applications, such as increased penalties toward drunk driving, white-collar crime, and so on, will also be examined. The chapter will also discuss the development of rational choice theory in economics and its later application to crime. Finally, it will examine the use of routine activities or lifestyle theory as a framework for modern research and applications for reducing criminal activity. In Chapter 2, we discussed the early development of the Classical and Neoclassical Schools of crimino- logical thought. This theoretical perspective has been the dominant framework used by judges and practi- tioners in the practice of administering justice and punishment even in current times, but beginning in the late 19th century, criminological researchers dismissed the classical and neoclassical frameworks. Rather, criminological research and theorizing began emphasizing factors other than free will and deterrence. Instead, an emphasis was placed on social, biological, or other factors that go beyond free will and deter- rence theory. These theories will be discussed in later sections, but first, we will examine the recent rebirth of classical and neoclassical theory and deterrence.
52 CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY: THE ESSENTIALS
As discussed above, the Classical and Neoclassical School frameworks fell out of favor among scientists and philosophers in the late 19th century, largely due to the introduction of Darwin’s ideas about evolution and natural selection. However, virtually all Western criminal systems retained the classical and neoclassical frameworks for their model of justice, particularly the United States. Nevertheless, the ideology of Beccaria’s work was largely dismissed by academics and theorists after the presentation of Darwin’s theory of evolution in the 1860s. Therefore, the Classical and Neoclassical Schools fell out of favor in terms of criminological theorizing for about 100 years. However, in the 1960s, the Beccarian model of offending experienced a rebirth. In the late 1960s, several studies using aggregate measures of crime and punishment were published that used a deterrence model for explaining why individuals engage in criminal behavior. These studies revealed a new interest in the deterrent aspects of criminal behavior and further supported the importance of certainty and severity of punishment in deterring individuals from committing crime, particularly homi- cide. In particular, evidence was presented that showed that increased risk or certainty of punishment was associated with less crime for most serious offenses. Plus, it is a fact that most offenders who are arrested once never get arrested again, which lends some basic support for deterrence. Many of these studies used statistical formulas to measure the degree of certainty and severity of pun- ishment in given jurisdictions. One measure used the ratio of crimes reported to police as compared to the number of arrests in a given jurisdiction. Another measure of certainty of punishment was the ratio of arrests to convictions, or findings of guilt, in criminal cases. Other measures were also employed. Most of the studies showed the same result: The higher the likelihood of arrest compared with reports of crime, or the higher the conviction rate compared to the arrest rate, the lower the crime rate was in a jurisdiction. On the other hand, the scientific evidence regarding measures of severity, which such studies generally indicated by the length of sentence for comparable crimes or a similar type of measure, did not show much impact on crime. Additional aggregate studies examined the prevalence and influence of capital punishment on the crime rate in given states. 1 The evidence showed that the states with death penalty statutes also had higher murder rates than nondeath penalty states. Furthermore, the studies showed that murderers in death pen- alty states who were not executed actually served less time than murderers in nondeath penalty states. Thus, the evidence regarding increased sanctions, including capital punishment, was mixed. Still, a review of the early deterrence studies by the National Academy of Sciences concluded that, overall, there was more evi- dence for a deterrent effect than against it, although the finding was reported in a tone that lacked confi- dence, perhaps cautious of what future studies would show.^2 It was not long before critics noted that studies incorporating aggregate (i.e., macrolevel) statistics are not adequate indicators or valid measures of the deterrence theoretical framework largely because the model emphasizes the perceptions of individuals. Using aggregate or group statistics is flawed because
(^1) Daniel Glaser and Max S. Zeigler, “Use of the Death Penalty v. Outrage at Murder,” Crime and Delinquency 20 (1974): 333–338; Charles Tittle, Franklin E. Zimring, and Gordon J. Hawkins, Deterrence—The Legal Threat in Crime Control (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973); Johannes Andenaes, Punishment and Deterrence (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1974); Jack P. Gibbs, Crime, Punishment and Deterrence (New York: Elsevier, 1975). (^2) Alfred Blumstein, Jacqueline Cohen, and Daniel Nagin, eds., Deterrence and Incapacitation: Estimating the Effects of Criminal Sanctions on Crime Rates (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1978).
54 CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY: THE ESSENTIALS
organizations have been in violation of established practices for years before getting caught, so it is likely that they will continue to ignore the rules in the future more than organizations that have never violated the rules. As it was with drunk drivers, the certainty of punishment for white-collar violations is so low—and many would argue the severity is also quite low—that it is quite rational for businesses and business profes- sionals to take the risk of engaging in white-collar crime. It is interesting to note that white-collar criminals and drunk drivers are two types of offenders who are most likely to be deterred because they are mostly of the middle- to upper-level socioeconomic class. The extant research on deterrence has shown that individuals who have something to lose are the most likely to be deterred by sanctions. This makes sense: Those who are unemployed or poor or both do not have much to lose, and for them, or for some minorities, incarceration may not present a significant departure from the deprived lives that they lead. The fact that official sanctions have limitations in deterring individuals from drunk driving and white- collar crime is not a good indication of the effectiveness of deterrence-based policies. Their usefulness becomes even more questionable when other populations are considered, particularly the offenders in most predatory street crimes (e.g., robbery, burglary, etc.), in which offenders typically have nothing to lose because they come from poverty-stricken areas and are often unemployed. One recent study showed that being arrested had little effect on perceptions of the certainty of punishment; offending actually corre- sponded with decreases in such perceptions.^7 Some people don’t see incarceration as that much of a step down in life, given the three meals a day, shelter, and relative stability provided by such punishment. This fact epitomizes one of the most notable paradoxes we have in criminology: The individuals we most want to deter are the least likely to be deterred, primarily because they have nothing to fear. In early Enlightenment thought, Hobbes asserted that, although fear was the tool used to enforce the social contract, people who weren’t afraid of punishment could not effectively be deterred. That remains true in modern days. Along these same lines, studies have consistently shown that for young male offenders—at higher risk, with low emotional or moral inhibitions, low self-control, and high impulsivity—official deterrence is highly ineffective in preventing crimes with immediate payoffs.^8 Thus, many factors go into the extent to which official sanctions can deter. As we have seen, even among those offenders who are in theory the most
(^7) Greg Pogarsky, KiDeuk Kim, and Raymond Paternoster, “Perceptual Change in the National Youth Survey: Lessons for Deterrence Theory and Offender Decision-Making,” Justice Quarterly 22 (2005): 1–29. (^8) For a review, see Stephen Brown, Finn Esbensen, and Gilbert Geis, Criminology, 6th ed. (Cincinnati: LexisNexis, 2007), 201–204; Nancy Finley and Harold Grasmick, “Gender Roles and Social Control,” Sociological Spectrum 5 (1985): 317–330; Harold Grasmick, Robert Bursik, and Karla Kinsey, “Shame and Embarrassment as Deterrents to Noncompliance With the Law: The Case of an Antilittering Campaign,” Environment and Behavior 23 (1991): 233–251; Harold Grasmick, Brenda Sims Blackwell, and Robert Bursik, “Changes in the Sex Patterning of Perceived Threats of Sanctions,” Law and Society Review 27 (1993): 679–705; Pamela Richards and Charles Tittle, “Gender and Perceived Chances of Arrest,” Social Forces 59 (1981): 1182–1199; George Loewenstein, Daniel Nagin, and Raymond Paternoster, “The Effect of Sexual Arousal on Expectations of Sexual Forcefulness,” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 34 (1997): 209–228; Toni Makkai and John Braithwaite,“The Dialects of Corporate Deterrence,” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 31 (1994): 347–373; Daniel Nagin and Raymond Paternoster, “Enduring Individual Differences and Rational Choice Theories of Crime,” Law and Society Review 27 (1993): 467–496; Alex Piquero and Stephen Tibbetts, “Specifying the Direct and Indirect Effects of Low Self-Control and Situational Factors in Offenders’ Decision Making: Toward a More Complete Model of Rational Offending,” Justice Quarterly 13 (1996): 481–510; Raymond Paternoster and Sally Simpson, “Sanction Threats and Appeals to Morality: Testing a Rational Choice Model of Corporate Crime,” Law and Society Review 30 (1996): 549–583; Daniel Nagin and Greg Pogarsky, “Integrating Celerity, Impulsivity, and Extralegal Sanction Threats Into a Model of General Deterrence: Theory and Evidence,” Criminology 39 (2001): 404–430; Alex Piquero and Greg Pogarsky, “Beyond Stanford and Warr’s Reconceptualization of Deterrence: Personal and Vicarious Experiences, Impulsivity, and Offending Behavior,” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 39 (2002): 153–186; for a recent review and an altered explanation of these conclusions, see Greg Pogarsky, “Identifying ‘Deterrable’ Offenders: Implications for Research on Deterrence,” Justice Quarterly 19 (2002): 431–452.
Chapter 3 Modern Applications of the Classical Perspective 55
deterrable, official sanctions have little impact because their experience of not being caught weakens the value of deterrence. The identification and understanding of the experiential effect had a profound effect on the evidence regarding the impact of deterrence. Researchers saw that, to account for such an experiential effect, any estimation of the influence of perceived certainty or severity of punishment must control for previous behaviors and experiences engaging in such behavior. The identification of the experiential effect was the primary contribution of the longitudinal studies of deterrence, but such studies faced even further criticism. Longitudinal studies of deterrence provided a significant improvement over the cross-sectional studies that preceded this advanced methodology. However, such longitudinal studies typically involved designs in which measures of perceptions of certainty and severity of punishment were collected at points in time that were separated by up to a year apart, including long stretches between when the crime was committed and when the offenders were asked about their perceptions of punishment. Psychological studies have clearly established that perceptions of the likelihood and severity of sanctions vary significantly from day to day, let alone month to month or year to year.^9 Therefore, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a new wave of deter- rence research evolved, which asked study participants to estimate their immediate intent to commit a criminal act in a given situation, as well as their immediate perceptions of certainty and severity of punish- ment in this same situation. This wave of research was known as scenario (vignette) research.^10 Scenario research (i.e., vignette design) was created to deal with the limitations of previous method- ological strategies for studying the effects of deterrence on criminal offending, specifically, the criticism that individuals’ perceptions of the certainty and severity of punishment changed drastically from time to time and across different situations. The scenario method dealt with this criticism directly by a providing a spe- cific, realistic (albeit hypothetical) situation, in which a person engages in a criminal act. The participant in the study is then asked to estimate the chance that he or she would engage in such activity in the given circumstances and to respond to questions regarding perceptions of the risk of getting caught (i.e., certainty of punishment) and the degree of severity of punishment they expected. Another important and valuable aspect of scenario research was that it promoted a contemporaneous (i.e., instantaneous) response about perceptions of risk and the severity of perceived sanctions. In compari- son, previous studies (e.g., aggregate, cross-sectional, longitudinal) had always relied on either group or individual measures of perceptions over long periods of time. However, some argue that intentions to commit a crime given a hypothetical situation are not accurate measures of what one would do in reality. Studies have shown an extremely high correlation between what people report doing in a given scenario and what they
(^9) Icek Ajzen and Martin Fishbein, Understanding Attitudes and Predicting Social Behavior (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1980); Martin Fishbein and Icek Ajzen, Belief, Attitude, Intention, and Behavior (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1975); Icek Ajzen and Martin Fishbein, “Attitude-Behavior Relations: A Theoretical Analysis and Review of Empirical Research,” Psychological Bulletin 84 (1977): 888–918; for a recent review, see Pogarsky et al., “Perceptual Change.” (^10) Loewenstein et al., “The Effect of Sexual Arousal”; Nagin and Paternoster, “Enduring Individual Differences”; Piquero and Tibbetts, “Specifying the Direct”; Paternoster and Simpson, “Sanction Threats”; Ronet Bachman, Raymond Paternoster, and Sally Ward, “The Rationality of Sexual Offending: Testing a Deterrence/Rational Choice Conception of Sexual Assault,” Law and Society Review 26 (1992): 343–372; Harold Grasmick and Robert Bursik, “Conscience, Significant Others, and Rational Choice: Extending the Deterrence Model,” Law and Society Review 24 (1990): 837–861; Harold Grasmick and Donald E. Green, “Legal Punishment, Social Disapproval, and Internalization as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 71 (1980): 325–335; Stephen Klepper and Daniel Nagin, “The Deterrent Effects of Perceived Certainty and Severity of Punishment Revisited, Criminology 27 (1989): 721–746; Stephen Tibbetts and Denise Herz, “Gender Differences in Students’ Rational Decisions to Cheat,” Deviant Behavior 18 (1996): 393–414; Stephen Tibbetts and David Myers, “Low Self-Control, Rational Choice, and Student Test Cheating,” American Journal of Criminal Justice 23 (1999): 179–200; Stephen Tibbetts, “Shame and Rational Choice in Offending Decisions,” Criminal Justice and Behavior 24 (1997): 234–255.
Chapter 3 Modern Applications of the Classical Perspective 57
of Cornish and Clarke’s book, as well as the timing of other publications, such as Katz’s, led to an influx of criminological studies in the late 1980s to mid-1990s based on the rational choice model.^15 These studies on rational choice showed that while official or formal sanctions tend to have some effect on individuals’ decisions to commit crime, they almost always are relatively unimportant compared to extralegal or informal factors. The effects of people’s perceptions of how much shame or loss of self-esteem they would experience, even if no one else found out that they committed the crime, was one of the most important variables in determining whether or not they would do so.^16 Additional evidence indicated that females were more influenced by the effects of shame and moral beliefs in this regard than were males.^17 Recent studies have shown that levels of personality traits, especially low self-control and empathy, are likely the reasons why males and females differ so much in engaging in criminal activity. 18 Finally, the influence of peers has a profound impact on individual perceptions of the pros and cons of offending by significantly decreasing the perceived risk of punishment if people see their friends get away with crimes.^19 Another area of rational choice research dealt with the influence that an individual’s behavior would have on those around them. A recent review and test of perceived social disapproval showed that this was one of the most important variables in decisions to commit crime. 20 In addition to self-sanctions, such as feelings of shame and embarrassment, the perceived likelihood of how loved ones and friends, as well as employers, would respond is perhaps the most important factor that goes into a person’s decision to engage in criminal activity. These are the people we deal with every day and may be the source of our livelihoods, so it should not be too surprising that our perceptions of how they will react affect strongly how we behave. Perhaps the most important finding of rational choice research was that the expected benefits, particu- larly the pleasure offenders would get from offending, had one of the most significant effects on their deci- sions to offend. Many other conclusions have been made regarding the influence of extralegal or informal factors on criminal offending, but the ultimate conclusion that can be made is that these informal deterrent variables typically hold more influence on individual decision making regarding deviant activity than the official or formal factors that were emphasized by traditional Classical School models of behavior. The rational choice model of criminal offending became the modern framework of deterrence. Official authorities acknowledged the influence of extralegal or informal factors, which is seen in modern efforts to incorporate the family, employment, and community in rehabilitation efforts. Such efforts are highly consis- tent with the current state of understanding regarding the Classical School or rational choice frameworks, namely that individuals are more deterred by the impact of their actions on informal aspects of their lives as opposed to the formal punishments they face by doing illegal acts.
(^15) Stephen Tibbetts and Chris Gibson, “Individual Propensities and Rational Decision-Making: Recent Findings and Promising Approaches,” in Rational Choice and Criminal Behavior, eds. Alex Piquero and Stephen Tibbetts (New York: Routledge, 2002), 3–24. (^16) Grasmick and Bursik, “Conscience”; Pogarsky, “Identifying ‘Deterrable’ Offenders”; Tibbetts, “Shame and Rational Choice”; Nagin and Paternoster, “Enduring Individual Differences”; Tibbetts and Herz, “Gender Differences”; Tibbetts and Myers, “Low Self-Control”; Harold Grasmick, Brenda Sims Blackwell, and Robert Bursik, “Changes Over Time in Gender Differences in Perceived Risk of Sanctions,” Law and Society Review 27 (1993): 679–705; Harold Grasmick, Robert Bursik, and Bruce Arneklev, “Reduction in Drunk Driving as a Response to Increased Threats of Shame, Embarrassment, and Legal Sanctions,” Criminology 31 (1993): 41–67; Stephen Tibbetts, “Self-Conscious Emotions and Criminal Offending,” Psychological Reports 93 (2004): 101–131. (^17) Tibbetts and Herz, “Gender Differences”; Grasmick et al., “Changes in the Sex Patterning”; Finley and Grasmick, “Gender Roles”; Pogarsky et al., “Perceptual Change”; Stephen Tibbetts, “Gender Differences in Students’ Rational Decisions to Cheat,” Deviant Behavior 18 (1997): 393–414. (^18) Nagin and Paternoster, “Enduring Individual Differences”; Grasmick et al., “Changes Over Time”; Tibbetts, “Self-Conscious Emotions.” (^19) Pogarsky et al., “Perceptual Change.” (^20) Pogarsky, “Identifying ‘Deterrable’ Offenders.”
58 CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY: THE ESSENTIALS
Routine activities theory is another contemporary form of the Classical School framework in the sense that it assumes a rational decision-making offender. The general model of routine activities theory was originally presented by Lawrence Cohen and Marcus Felson in 1979. 21 This theoretical framework emphasized the presence of three factors that come together in time and place to create a high likelihood for crime and victimization. These three factors are: motivated offender(s), suitable target(s), and lack of guardianship. Overall, the theory is appropriately named, in the sense that it assumes that most crime occurs in the daily routine of people who happen to see—and then seize— tempting opportunities to commit crime. Studies tend to support this idea, as opposed to the idea that most offenders leave their home knowing they are going to commit a crime; the latter offenders are called hydraulic and are relatively rare compared to the opportunistic type. Regarding the first factor noted as being important for increasing the likelihood of criminal activity—a motivated offender—the routine activities theory does not provide much insight. Rather, the model simply assumes that some individuals tend to be motivated and leaves it at that. Fortunately, we have many other theories that can fill this notable absence. Instead, the strength of routine activities theory is in the elaboration of the other two aspects of a crime-prone environment: suitable targets and lack of guardianship. Suitable targets can include a variety of situations. For example, a very suitable target can be a vacant house in the suburbs, which the family has left for summer vacation. Data clearly show that burglaries more than double in the summer when many families are on vacation. Other forms of suitable targets range from an unlocked car to a female alone at a shopping mall car- rying a lot of cash and credit cards or purchased goods. Other likely targets are bars or other places that serve alcohol. Offenders have traditionally tar- geted drunk persons because they are less likely to be able to defend themselves, as illustrated in a history of rolling drunks for their wallets that extends back to the early part of the 20th century. This is only a short list of the many types of suitable targets that are available to motivated offenders in everyday life. The third and final aspect of the routine activities model for increased likelihood of criminal activity is the lack of guardianship. Guardianship is often thought of as a police officer or security guard, which often is the case. There are many other forms of guardianship, however, such as owning a dog to protect a house, which studies demonstrate can be quite effective. Just having a car or house alarm constitutes a form of guardianship. Furthermore, the presence of an adult, neighbor, or teacher can be an effective type of guard- ing the area against crime. In fact, recent studies show that the presence of increased lighting in the area can prevent a significant amount of crime, with one study showing a 20% reduction in overall crime in areas randomly chosen to receive improved lighting as compared to control areas that did not.^22 Regardless of the type of guardianship, it is the absence of adequate guardianship that sets the stage for crime; on the other
(^21) Lawrence Cohen and Marcus Felson, “Social Change and Crime Rates: A Routine Activities Approach,” American Sociological Review 44 (1979): 214–241. (^22) David P. Farrington and Brandon C. Welsh, “Improved Street Lighting and Crime Prevention,” Justice Quarterly 19 (2002): 313–343.
▲ Image 3.1 Marcus Felson, 1947– , Rutgers University, Author of Routine Activities Theory
60 CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY: THE ESSENTIALS
There are numerous policy implications that can be derived from the theories and scientific findings in this chapter. Here, we will concentrate on some of the most important policies. First, we look at the policy of broken windows, which has many assumptions similar to those of routine activities and rational choice theories. The broken windows perspective emphasizes the need for police to crack down on more minor offenses to reduce more major crimes.^26 Although many cities have claimed reductions in serious crimes by using this theory (such as New York and Los Angeles), the fact is that crime was reduced by the same amount across most cities during the same time (the late 1990s to mid 2000s). Still, other policies that can be derived from theories in this chapter include the three-strikes-you’re-out policy, which assumes that offenders will make a rational choice not to commit future offenses because they could go to prison for life if they commit three felonies; the negatives certainly outweigh the expected ben- efits for the third crime. For deterrence to be extremely effective, punishment must be swift, certain, and severe. Where does the three-strikes policy fall into this equation? The bottom line is that it is much more
(^26) James Q. Wilson and George Kelling, “Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety,” Atlantic Monthly (March 1982): 29–38.
Figure 3.1 Routine Activities Theory
Motivated Offender(s) (e.g., drunk male)
Lack of Guardian (e.g., no police or security)
Vulnerable Target (e.g., unlocked car)
“Hot Spots” Places in which these 3 elements converge in time and place (e.g., bars, malls, bus depots)
Chapter 3 Modern Applications of the Classical Perspective 61
severe than it is swift or certain. Given the Beccaria’s philosophy (see Chapter 1), this policy will probably not work because it is not certain or swift. However, it is severe in the sense that a person can be sentenced to life if they commit three felony offenses over time. A controversial three-strikes law was passed by voter initiative in California, and other states have adopted similar types of laws. 27 It sends third-time felons to prison for the rest of their lives regardless of the nature of that third felony. California first requires convictions for two strikeable felonies, crimes like murder, rape, aggravated assault, burglary, drug offenses, and so on. Then, any third felony can trigger a life sentence. The stories about some nonviolent offenders going to prison for the rest of their lives for stealing pieces of pizza or shoplifting DVDs, while rare, are quite true. The question we are concerned with here is, does the three-strikes policy work? As a specific deterrent, the answer is clearly yes; offenders who are in prison for the rest of their lives cannot commit more crimes on the streets. In that regard, three-strikes works very well. Some people feel, however, that laws like three- strikes need to have a general deterrent effect to be considered successful, meaning that this law should deter everyone from engaging in multiple crimes. So, is three-strikes a general deterrent? Unfortunately, there are no easy answers to this question because laws vary from state to state, the laws are used at different rates across the counties in a given state, and so forth. There is at least some consensus in the literature, however. One study from California suggests that three-strikes reduced crime, 28 but the remaining studies show that three-strikes either has no effect on crime or that it actually increases crime.^29 How could three-strikes increase crime? The authors attributed the increase in homicide, following three-strikes, to the possibility that third strikers have an incentive to kill victims and any witnesses in an effort to avoid apprehension. Although this argument is tentative, it may be true. 30 This is just one of the many policy implications that can be derived from this chapter. We expect that readers of this book will come up with many more policy implications, but it is vital that they examine the empirical literature in determining these policies’ useful- ness in reducing criminal activity. Other policy implications regarding the theories and findings discussed in this chapter will be discussed in the final section of this book. In a strategy that is also strongly based on the rational choice model, a number of judges have started using shaming strategies to deter offenders from recidivating.^31 They have ordered everything from publicly posting pictures of men arrested for soliciting prostitutes to forcing offenders to walk down main streets of towns wearing signs that announce they committed crimes. These are just two examples of an increasing trend that emphasizes the informal or community factors required to deter crime. Unfortunately, to date, there have been virtually no empirical evaluations of the effectiveness of such shaming penalties, although studies of expected shame for doing an act consistently show a deterrent effect.^32
(^27) David Shichor and Dale K. Sechrest, eds., Three Strikes and You’re Out: Vengeance as Social Policy (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1996). (^28) Joanna M. Shepherd, “Fear of the First Strike: The Full Deterrent Effect of California’s Two- and Three-Strikes Legislation,” Journal of Legal Studies 31 (2002): 159–201. (^29) See Lisa Stolzenberg and Stewart J. D’Alessio, “Three Strikes and You’re Out: The Impact of California’s New Mandatory Sentencing Law on Serious Crime Rates,” Crime and Delinquency 43 (1997): 457–469; Mike Males and Dan Macallair, “Striking Out: The Failure of California’s ‘Three-Strikes and You’re Out Law,” Stanford Law and Policy Review 11 (1999): 65–72. (^30) Thomas B. Marvell and Carlisle E. Moody, “The Lethal Effects of Three-Strikes Laws,” Journal of Legal Studies 30 (2001): 89–106; see also Tomislav Kovandzic, John J. Sloan III, and Lynne M. Vieraitis, “Unintended Consequences of Politically Popular Sentencing Policy: The Homicide-Promoting Effects of ‘Three Strikes’ in U.S. Cities (1980-1999),” Criminology and Public Policy 1 (2002): 399–424. For a review of empirical evaluations of three- strikes laws, see John Worrall,“The Effect of Three-Strikes Legislation on Serious Crime in California,” Journal of Criminal Justice, 32 (2004): 283–296. (^31) Piquero and Tibbetts, Rational Choice. (^32) Tibbetts, “Gender Differences in Students’ Rational.”
Chapter 3 Modern Applications of the Classical Perspective 63
Cross-sectional studies
Experiential effect
Rational choice theory Routine activities theory (lifestyle theory)
Scenario (vignette) research
64 CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY: THE ESSENTIALS
Modern Testing of Deterrence http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
Rational Choice Theory http://www.answers.com/topic/rational-choice-theory-criminology
Routine Activities and Lifestyle Theory http://www.popcenter.org/learning/pam/help/theory.cfm