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On War: Is Clausewitz
Still Relevant?
JOHN E. SHEPHARD, JR.
C
arl von Clausewitz occupies a position of well-deserved prominence in the small pantheon of Western military theorists. He bequeathed to us, in his unfinished masterpiece Yom Kriege, I a trove of provocative ideas, many of which retain remarkable contemporary value. Studying those ideas today is a challenge well rewarded: though we must cull through dusty examples and outdated technical elaborations, we still discover abundant pearls of wisdom that have retained their sheen for more than a century and a half. But modern soldiers and statesmen cannot redeem the full value of Clausewitz's legacy if they fail to subject his propositions to serious debate. Unfortunately, Clausewitz is more often quoted than read, more venerated than understood. Many of his ideas on the purposes, nature, and conduct of war have been reduced to mere aphorisms to decorate the pages of field manuals. Clausewitz would hardly be pleased by this sort of idolatry. As an empiricist who tried to develop his theory scientifically, he was acutely aware of the need to test his hypotheses against reality. When the realities of warfare change over time, then old, previously accepted hypotheses need retesting and, if necessary, modification. One facet of Clausewitzian theory that warrants revisiting is his very concept of war. Is it sufficiently comprehensive for modern American war- riors and statesmen? I think not. For example, his singular concern for ground warfare was restrictive in its own time, let alone today when huge navies and air forces allow nations to project power far beyond the limits he could have imagined. This article will focus specifically on three important developments that defy neat inclusion in Clausewitz's construct. The first of these, modern nuclear weaponry, is only the most dramatic of a series of technological achievements that make possible methods of warfare radically different from
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resources (forces, materiel, etc.) may be unavailable or take excessive time to mobilize or develop. Allies may not cooperate. Physical barriers (vast distances, mountains, seas, etc.) may impede efforts to concentrate military power in space and time. "Culminating points" may be reached and action suspended.' Informa- tion and intelligence may be deficient or misused. Resolve and morale may be weak. Leaders may be daring, indecisive, or foolhardy. Chance interferes. "Fric- tion" complicates planning and retards action.' Treaties, international law, or custom may circumscribe options. All of these and other variables act to limit the conduct of warfare, which creates an antithesis to the theoretical gravitation of war toward absolute violence. Thus, according to Clausewitz, war has a dual nature and is pulled by opposing tendencies toward escalation and limitation. Given this duality, the degree of effort that should be made in war becomes a matter of judgment that requires a constant assessment of the probabilities of success in the light of known circumstances. Since success or failure can be measured only with respect to the political object-the original motive for war-political policy must be the state's supreme consideration in judging what military objective to pursue and what level of effort to mount for its achievement. This leads logically to Clausewitz's famous dictum that war is "a true political instru- ment, a continuation of political activity by other means.,, With the addition of this third dimension-the subordination of war to policy-to his earlier construct of a duality of war, Clausewitz refines his concept by concluding that "as a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a remarkable trinity."" The first tendency of war-its intrinsic tendency-is toward unlimited violence and enmity. The second is the play of chance that real individuals and circumstances interject (the uncertainty so generated must be managed by the commander and his army in the planning and conduct of battle). The third is the subjection of war to rational direction by the political leadership of the governments engaged. Each war finds some point of balance among these variable tendencies, "like an object suspended between three magnets.""
Clausewitz in the Nuclear Age
How does Clausewitz's elaborate concept accommodate the vast evolution in the ways and means of waging war that has occurred over the past century or so? The answer, I believe, is surprisingly well, considering the immensity of developments in such areas as science, ideology, and or- ganization that affect (or can affect) modern strategy and warfare. However, one struggles vainly trying to fit some of these changes into the Clausewitzian model. Take, for example, the current and future possession by several nations of nuclear weapons that can be delivered over great distances.
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"Nuclear weapons make possible a kind of war that simply obliterates key postulates underlying Clausewitz's concept of war."
In deriving his concept of war, Clausewitz assumed that war "never breaks out wholly unexpectedly, nor can it be spread instantaneously,"" and that "the very nature of war impedes the simultaneous concentration of all forces."" But these propositions would clearly lose validity in the context of a nuclear war. Nuclear weapons vastly reduce the limitations that moderate conven- tional warfare. They make "absolute war," which Clausewitz considered as only a theoretical paradigm, far more realizable." This argument is admittedly facile, but only because nuclear weapons make possible a kind of war that simply obliterates key postulates underlying Clausewitz's concept of war. To explore this point more deeply, consider three possible cases: (1) war between two belligerents,16 only one of which possesses nuclear weapons; (2) war between two nuclear powers, neither of which possesses a first-strike capa- bility"; and (3) war between two nuclear powers, one or both of which possess a first-strike capability. Case 1: Assume that A is a nuclear power capable of achieving the assured destruction of B, which possesses only conventional military cap- abilities." One can hardly imagine war under these conditions ever to be in B's iuterest,19 except: if B can achieve strategic surprise and quickly capture or neutralize A's nuclear weapons; or if B's war objective does not threaten A's vital interests and A chooses to exercise self-restraint; or if A is restrained
88 Parameters
If, as Clausewitz claims,
"war most closely resembles a game of cards,"
any nuclear exchange could
quickly resemble fifty-two pick-up.
influence over military operations that the Clausewitzian model assumes. 24 Clausewitz's postulate that war "always lasts long enough for influence to be exerted on the goal and for its own course to be changed in one way or another-long enough, in other words, to remain subject to the action of a superior intelligence"" -would not necessarily hold. Fear of such uncontrollable escalation gripped political leaders on both sides during the Cuban missile crisis, when the United States and Soviet Union stepped to the brink of nuclear war. Near the climax of the crisis, Nikita Khrushchev sent a message to President Kennedy warning that "contact of our ships ... can spark off the fire of military conflict after which any talks would be superfluous because other forces and other laws would begin to operate-the laws of war."" Kennedy apparently agreed. He later replied to Khrushchev that developments were "approaching a point where events could have become unmanageable."" Robert Kennedy's memoir captures the Pres- ident's agony over his belief that he "had initiated the course of events, ... [but] he no longer had control over them."" Clearly, at the height of the Cold War, Kennedy and Khrushchev did not share Clausewitz's high degree of confidence in the ability of political leaders to apply rational control to war-at least between nuclear powers. 29 Indeed, they apparently believed that nuclear weapons had created conditions in which war could "of its own independent will usurp the place of policy the moment policy had brought it into being; it would then drive policy out of office and rule by the laws of its own nature, very much like a mine that can explode only in the manner or direction predetermined by the setting.,, Quite naturally, Clausewitz dismissed such conditions as fantastic. Case 3: Assume antagonists A and D each possess enough nuclear weapons to effectively destroy the other, but D has the added advantage of a first-strike capability.31 This puts A in an unenviable position not unlike that of B in Case 1. Should a war that threatens either side's vital interests ensue, D would gain a decisive advantage by striking first against A's nuclear forces (thereby also extinguishing large portions of nearby population and industry).
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The war could conceivably end in this single spasm or continue under condi- tions and logic resembling Case I. But if A, fearing it might be disarmed by D, attempted to launch first (i.e. "use 'em or lose 'em,"), it could expect retaliation in kind from D. This would resemble Case 2 and would be similarly unamenable to Clausewitzian logic. And what if each side possesses not only sufficient nuclear capability to destroy the other, but also to disarm the other with a preemptive first strike? This would create the greatest instability, as it would give a decisive ad- vantage to haste (again, the image of August 1914 looms). As Thomas Schelling noted:
The statesman who, knowing his instrument to be ready on condition he strike quickly, knowing that ifhe hesitates he may lose his instrument and his country, knowiug his enemy to face the same dilemma, and seeing war not inevitable but a serious possibility, who hesitates to strike first is ... in an awful position ... that both he and his cnemy can equally deplore. If neither prefers war, either or both may yet consider it imprudent to wait. He is a victim of a special technology that gives neither side assurance against attack, neither such a clear superiority that war is unnecessary, and both sides a motive to attack, a motive aggravated by the sheer recognition that each other is similarly motivated, each suspicious that the other may jump the gun in 'self defense.,
Thus, the vulnerability of one side's nuclear forces to the enemy's quick, decisive preemption makes the task of controlling escalation im- measurably more complex than it had already been under Case 2. Once again, the Clausewitzian model, which presumes a substantial degree of rational political control in war, is found wanting. We should note, however, that as today's East-West detente broadens and the nuclear genie is lured part way back into the bottle, then the Clausewitzian model begins somewhat to reassert its relevance.
Clausewitz and Transnational Constabulary Warfare
The so-called war on drugs, into which the military services of the United States have been somewhat reluctantly conscripted," is only the latest instance of the use of American military troops as constabulary forces. Precedents include, for example, the war with the Barbary pirates of Tripoli from 1802 to 1805; much of the Army's 19th-century frontier experience fighting various Indian tribes; Army border patrol duty from 1910 to 1916; Pershing's 1916 Punitive Expedition into Mexico to pursue and disperse Pancho Villa's banditti ("with scrupulous regard for [the] sovereignty of Mexico"'4); and the extraordinary exploits of Marine Corps paladin Smedley D. Butler, who, for nearly three decades, sailed about with boatloads of
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operations, and political control of such a war in a way that today would surely surprise a time-traveling Clausewitz. And what of the political object itself? Crucial to Clausewitz's concept of war is the relationship between the political and military objec- tives; that is, the political object of a war "must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in magnitude and also in duration."" Underlying this proposition are at least two key assumptions. First, the ends to be achieved by war must be clearly established, tangible, obtainable, and understood by political and military leaders. According to Clausewitz, military commanders and staffs plan campaigns designed to achieve an operational objective that supports the desirable political end-state:
No one starts a war-or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so-without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose; the latter its operational objective. This is the governing principle which will set its course, prescribe the scale of means and effort which is required, and make its influence felt through- out down to the smallest operational detail. 42
Clearly implicit in this is a second assumption that any war has both a definable beginning and end. The end-the decision to make peace-is expected when either the operational objective supporting the desirable politi- cal end-state has been achieved or when "the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object."" This is another way in which war-at least as Clausewitz defined it-can be fundamentally distinguished from police activities. War is an extraordinary undertaking designed to achieve an extraor- dinary political object. It usually ends in what passes for victory or defeat. On the other hand, a police force usually operates continuously-reactively and proactively-to respond to this or that disturbance and to reduce crime in its precincts to some acceptable level. Its victories are typically small and ephemeral-an arrest today on this beat, a crime tomorrow on that. Does the current drug war comply with these two Clausewitzian as- sumptions? At this point, it seems fair to say that the political object-and hence the level of resources that ought to be devoted and the operational objectives that ought to be pursued by military (and paramilitary) forces-is ambiguous. There appears to be no defined end-state the achievement of which will entitle the US forces engaged to declare victory. If such a goal is eventually articulated, the appropriate test for determining whether Clausewitz's conditions are met is to see if there exists a reasonable measure of correspondence among operational objectives, the resources devoted to achieve them, and the established political object. However, if no desirable, attainable end-state is defined, military and other forces fighting transnational drug traffickers will be expected, like police forces, to operate more or less continuously, always vigilant and ready to stamp
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out criminal activity here and there as necessary. Yet Clausewitz's concept does not admit of such an endless war. Anti-narcotics operations represent merely one example of how American military forces can expect to be involved in transnational con- stabulary warfare. Anti-terrorist operations are another, and pose equally difficult problems for Clausewitzian theory. If anything, terrorist organiza- tions, networks, and splinter groups are even more amorphous, shadowy, motley, and dispersed than transnational drug enterprises (which, of course, may themselves engage in terrorism).
Clausewitz and Modern Statecraft
Nuclear weapons and new types of warfare are not the only develop- ments that challenge the Clausewitzian model. So do some important political changes. Among the most far-reaching of these is the high degree to which both the political and military vocations have become professionalized in the developed Western democracies and even in some totalitarian regimes, includ- ing the Soviet Union. The technical complexities of both modern warfare and national-level statecraft require more specialization than was typical during the wars studied by Clausewitz, when it was still common for monarchs such as Frederick and Napoleon to lead their armies on horseback. Seldom today can one find leaders highly competent in both political and military affairs. This increased specialization naturally creates difficulties now and then in integrating military objectives with, and properly subordinating them to, political objectives. Indeed, it is not uncommon for modern statesmen to ask generals for "purely military advice" or for modem military officers to express frustration about politicians (even those who are Commanders in Chief!) who "interfere" in "purely military" operations." Such attitudes would undoubtedly be nonsensical to Clausewitz, for whom war was an extension of politics." This is not by any means to suggest that Clausewitz was wrong in any prescriptive sense. Today, as then, war ought to be an extension of politics, not some separate realm of activity guided exclusively by generals. But Clausewitz assumed that political leaders, in matters of war, were less dependent on the technical advice of soldiers than they typically are today. Finally, the basic outline of government in the United States clashes with Clausewitz. In establishing a decentralized political system of separate institutions sharing powers, the US Constitution (which predated Clause- witz's writing but was unconnected to his education in the art and science of war) set up knotty arrangements for exercising civil control over the military that do not readily comport with important Clausewitzian assumptions. In positing that government provides the essential rational element of control over warfare, Clausewitz creates an image of the state as a person, from whom policy emerges "as the product of its brain."" He uses this image again in
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differing interpretations of constitutionally designated prerogatives. Hence the War Powers Act of 1973 and the continuing controversy that surrounds it.
Conclusions
The foregoing analysis suggests that, for the United States, some important historical developments in methods of warfare and statecraft are at variance with key assumptions underlying Clausewitz's carefully constructed concept of war. Among these are modern nuclear weaponry, transnational constabulary warfare, the increased specialization of both warriors and states- men, andthe Constitution of the United States. Clausewitz's concept of war assumes that considerable limitations in the ways, means, and purposes of war will moderate the natural tendency of war to escalate to extremes. Consequently, he postulates both a need and a substantial capacity for political leaders to subordinate war to their rational control to achieve the political objective that is the original motive for war. But nuclear weapons (and the means to deliver them quickly) remove many, perhaps most, of the limitations considered by Clausewitz and create the danger that uncon- trollable escalation will lead to spasms of destruction wholly disproportional to rational political objectives. 50 Clearly, nuclear weapons make possible a type of warfare inconceivable to Clausewitz, who believed that Napoleonic warfare approached the absolute extremities that war could achieve." The immense destructiveness of nuclear weapons and the consequent reluctance to use them (especially against a nation that could retaliate in kind) also created the conditions for the Cold War, in which powerful nations competed without fighting directly at al1. War by algebra, in which compara- tive figures of strength became the principal means of military competition between the world's superpowers, was the result, featuring both a tremendous mobilization of military and industrial might by each side and, from time to time, negotiations aimed at controlling the competition. In the United States, this algebraic war, the political object of which has not been military victory but deterrence (that is, persuading the enemy not to launch a real war), also spawned a new type of strategist-neither military man nor politician. These civilian defense intellectuals, applying new analytical techniques such as game theory and dynamic modeling, wrested from the military much of the claim to expertise in the art of strategy. All of these developments would undoubtedly shock the ghost of Clausewitz, should he descend to peek at how his theory is holding up in the late 20th century. War by algebra, already contemplated by some theorists who preceded Clausewitz, was dismissed by him as an "obvious fallacy."" Nuclear weaponry is an illustrative example, albeit an extreme one, of how technology has changed the nature of war to a degree not accommodated by Clausewitz's mode1. It has not rendered his theory wholly obsolete, however, any
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more than Einstein's discovery of relativity rendered Newton's laws of motion obsolete. Just as Newton's theory approximates reality under certain conditions, Clausewitz's theory explains much about conventional war even today. The wars in Vietnam, the Falklands, and Afghanistan showed that, at least under the conditions of Case I above, nuclear powers may fight without resort to their nuclear arsenals. Nevertheless, some emerging forms of non-nuclear warfare are also inconsistent with Clausewitz's paradigm. This is certainly the case with transnational constabulary warfare. Though Clausewitz supposed that wars were waged between states or nations, the dangers to national security inter- ests posed by such activities as narcotics trafficking or terrorism may make necessary warlike actions against autonomous, non-state organizations and transnational criminal networks. Certain types of transnational constabulary warfare may also fail to conform to other Clausewitzian premises: for ex- ample, his assumptions that wars are fought almost exclusively with military forces by means of combat, and that essential conditions for victory (and consequently for ending the war) would follow necessarily from the political object which was the original motive for war. One might argue, not unreasonably, that transnational constabulary warfare is aberrant-that it is not war per se, but only takes on some of the trappings of war in the context of what remains essentially a police action. But today, as the drug-trafficking problem demonstrates, some transnational criminal enterprises may be able to accumulate greater disposable wealth than some small countries (allowing them, among other things, to recruit their own armed forces and buy modern weaponry) and to achieve a level of sophistica- tion in command, control, and organization that makes them formidable opponents. Combat against such organizations may reach a level of intensity which renders it difficult to distinguish, at least at the tactical level, from more traditional forms of warfare. This holds true especially if one considers the further possibility that a transnational criminal network-of terrorists, for example-may someday acquire weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, given the spectacular turn of events in Eastern Europe today, it is likely that the US military will place increasing focus on expedi- tionary forces and transnational constabulary warfare. A theory of war which excludes, by definition, a form of warfare that may increasingly occupy modern American warriors and statesmen is surely inadequate. Neither does Clausewitz's model square with certain important political developments. Specifically, for modem industrialized nations the arts of both war and government have become far more technocratic and complex than Clausewitz could have imagined. Both fields have become so specialized that one is far less likely to find national political leaders who can claim competence in matters of war. Thus, they tend to rely more on military experts for advice,
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- Clausewitz, pp. 85 and 89. 22, This situation currently obtains between the United States and the Soviet Union.
- Clausewitz, p. 86,
- Ibid., p. 87.
- Ibid.
- Letter from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, 27 October 1962, US Department of State Bulletin, 12 November 1962, pp. 741-43, cited in Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), p. 132. See also Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), p. 87.
- Letter from President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev, 28 October 1962, US Department of State Bulletin, 12 November 1962, pp. 745-46, cited in Allison, p. 132.
- Robert F. Kennedy, pp. 69-71.
- Perhaps both Khrushchev and Kennedy exaggerated their concerns over the unmanageability of the crisis to instill uncertainty and caution in the opponent. However, several reexaminations of the affair by participants and analysts have persuaded me that the concerns were genuine.
- Clausewitz, p. 87.
- Again, the belligerents may be single nations or coalitions.
- Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale Vniv. Press, 1966), p. 224. 33, Legal constraints continue to restrict military forces largely to a supporting role. Clearly, however, many officials expect the military's current involvement in drug-fighting missions to expand. See, for example, William Matthews, "Drug Fight: What Kind of War?" Army Times, 18 December 1989, pp, 14-16.
- The Mexican goverrunent nonetheless considered the expedition a profound violation of Mexican sovereignty. Frank Tompkins, Chasing Villa (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Co., 1934), p, 70.
- See Lowell Thomas, Old Gimlet Eye: Adventures of Smedley D. Butler (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1933),
- A post-Civil War law ("Posse Comitatus") restricts federal military forces from engaging in domestic police activities, including searches, seizures, and arrests.
- The incident involved a Marine Corps reconnaissance unit that exchanged fire with drug smugglers along Arizona's border with Mexico.
- Clausewitz, p. 605.
- Ibid.
- Ibid., p. 95.
- Ibid., p. 92.
- Ibid., p. 579.
- Ibid., p. 92. Clausewitz recognized, of course, that the original political objects can change during the war.
- For example, see William Manchester's discussion of McClellan, Mitchell, and MacArthur in American Caesar (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978), pp. 629-77. See also Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy (New York: Dell, 1982), p. 136.
- Clausewitz,pp. 605~09.
- Ibid., p. 88.
- Ibid., p. 607.
- Today, of course, it is the prospect of adventurism, not tyranny, which most disturbs those who favor strong checks on presidential war powers.
- See George C. Edwards III and Wallace Earl Walker, eds., National Security and the US Constitution (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1988), esp. pp. 136-58. 50. Ironically, the recognition that nuclear escalation could usurp policy has prompted pOlitical leaders (at least in this country) to try to effect tighter control over military forces. Elaborate procedures and lines of authority have been established in an effort to prevent accidental precipitation of a nuclear crisis. In the Cuban missile crisis, the potential for a nuclear holocaust justified, and modern communications made possible, tighter personal control of military operations by political leaders than perhaps had been seen since the age of Clausewitz, when many monarchs still led their nations' armies in person.
- Clausewitz, pp. 592-93,
- Ibid., p. 76.
- See, for example, Michael I. Handel, "Clausewitz in the Age of Technology," in Clausewitz and Modern Strategy, ed. Michael I. Handel (London: Frank Cass, 1986), pp. 51-92. Handel suggests one way of incorporating technological and technocratic changes into the Clausewitzian model.
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