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Bruno cassara's short paper explores the challenges of teaching philosophy in an age of scientism, where students view psychology and science as undisputed authorities. He shares an anecdote about a student who questioned augustine's inquietum cor nostrum and the absolute confidence in the student's claim, which came from a psychology textbook. Cassara argues that this mindset is a result of scientism and advocates for the phenomenological method, which involves staying faithful to our experiences and suspending our prejudices. He discusses the importance of recognizing and putting aside prejudices to be truly faithful to our experiences of the true, the good, and the beautiful.
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Hello everyone, my name is Bruno Cassara and my short paper today is titled “Phenomenology: Faithfulness to Experience.” I’d like to begin with an anecdote. One day, during my very first semester of teaching, my students and I were discussing the first two books of Augustine’s Confessions. I made it a point to stress, in that context, Augustine’s celebrated inquietum cor nostrum , the restless heart that remains restless until it rests in God. A student immediately raised their hand to respond. They were a first-semester freshman at that point, only just beginning their college studies. They said something along the lines of, “Augustine is never going to be happy that way. In psychology we learned that people with an internal locus of reliance are happier than people with an external locus of reliance.” I was taken aback. I asked the student to clarify for the rest of the class what they meant, and they explained that it means that people who expect their happiness to come from their own effort are, in fact, happier than people who look for their happiness outside of themselves. What struck me most about this was not the content of this claim, debatable as it is, but rather the absolute confidence with which the claim was asserted. The authority of this claim came not from the student, but from psychology class, from a psychology textbook. It is no different, ultimately, from those articles that pop up on social media with titles like “scientists say that people who swear a lot are smarter” or “here are fifteen ways to convince people you’re right, according to
science.” For my student, just as for many readers of these articles, “psychology” and “science” function as an undiscussed authorities, as fact-producing machines. Those who question “science” are irrational. To disagree with the claims of “science” is to forfeit the right to have any beliefs at all. This is the way that I see scientism in my experience as a teacher: as an argument from authority, as the undebatably correct worldview. This is why I started to teach my students, unofficially, the phenomenological method. Unofficially in the sense that I don’t really thematize it or assign readings about it. Unofficially also in the sense that I don’t enter into scholarly debates about whose phenomenological method is the right one, whether Husserl or Heidegger is right, etc. To me, the phenomenological method is essentially the effort of staying faithful to our experience. It is, to say it with Husserl, to go “back to the things themselves,” to suspend our prejudices about what is real and what is true, and to take seriously everything that we experience because we experience it. This may sound obvious, but it is obvious only insofar as we do not take up question-worthy experiences. In my ethics class, I try to work out this distinction in terms of facts and values. I ask my students to explain the difference between these two statements: “This is a chair”; “chocolate is the best flavor of ice cream.” They end up working out the difference by setting up oppositions between facts and opinions or between
the phenomenological method, this suspension of prejudice that allows us to take more seriously all aspects of our experience, has truly been essential to my philosophical teaching in this age of scientism.