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Rationalism and Empiricism, Summaries of Epistemology

University of StirlingEpistemology

Rationalism and empiricism are two types of position that have been taken within epistemology―the branch of philosophy devoted to theorising about ...

Typology: Summaries

2021/2022

Uploaded on 09/27/2022

jimihendrix
jimihendrix 🇬🇧

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            

          

            
   
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             
      
           
        
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     
          
         
         
       
  
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           
          
     
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             
           

        
   
          

             
          
              
         
      
         



 
            
  
           
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Rationalism and Empiricism Guy Longworth University of Warwick Rationalism and empiricism are two types of position that have been taken within epistemology—the branch of philosophy devoted to theorising about knowledge—and also within psychology (including linguistics) and the philosophy of psychology. In epistemology, rationalism and empiricism are types of position that have been taken about the sources of knowledge, in particular the sources for the justification or warrant required for a state to count as knowledge. In psychology and its philosophy, empiricism and rationalism concern the sources of psychological states and capacities that may include, but are not confined to, states of knowledge. We can therefore distinguish epistemological empiricism and epistemological rationalism from psychological empiticism and rationalism. To a first approximation, a position is a form of empiricism insofar as it holds that knowledge (or other psychological states and capacities (henceforth: etc.)) about some particular subject matter, S, derives from experience of that subject matter, and a position is a form of rationalism insofar as it holds that knowledge (or other psychological states or capacities) about some particular subject matter, S, derives from the use of reason or, more generally, from our rational nature(s). Traditionally, these positions, and disputes amongst their proponents, have concerned knowledge (etc.) about mind-independent subject matters, about how the world is independently of particular views that we might take about it. Three major traditional points of dispute between empiricists and rationalists centre on the following three characteristic rationalist theses: @) knowledge of a particular subject matter is underwritten by intuition (or rational insight) and deductive reasoning, rather than by experience of that subject matter; (ii) knowledge of a particular subject matter is innate (very roughly, determined by nature rather than by e.g. the particular course of experience); and (iii) the concepts or ideas that constitute our abilities to think about a particular subject matter are innate. Rationalists about knowledge (etc.) about a particular subject matter characteristically endorse at least one of (i)-(iii) with respect to that subject matter. Empiricists about knowledge of a particular subject matter characteristically reject (i)—-(iii) with respect to that subject matter. Since epistemological forms of empiricism and rationalism concern the justification or warrant required for a state to count as knowledge, and not the sources of psychological states and capacities in general, it is possible to adopt psychological forms of each type of position without also adopting epistemological forms. For instance, one might hold that a particular belief is innate—and so be a psychological rationalist with respect to the belief—and also hold that in order to be justified or warranted the innate belief must be supplied with experiential support— and so be an epistemological empiricist with respect to the belief. Alternatively, one might hold that a particular belief is only acquired on the basis of experience, but that the justification or warrant for the belief derives from reason. In that case, one would be a psychological empiricist and an epistemological rationalist. Three points are worth noting about the approximate account of the two types of position, all pertaining to its lack of specificity. First, articulating the precise content of a form of empiricism is dependent upon further specification of the notion of experience employed in the approximate account. For instance, one form of empiricism holds that knowledge (etc.) about a particular subject matter derives solely