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The historical development of the concepts of liberty in republicanism and liberalism, focusing on the role of law in protecting individual rights and the common good. It discusses the distinctions between these two political ideologies and their approaches to government, popular sovereignty, and the rule of law.
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Typology: Summaries
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LAW (^) JOURNAL
Liberalism, and the Law
BY MORTIMER SELLERS*
INTRODUCTION
"[A] republic signiffies] only a government, m which all men, rich and poor, magistrates and subjects, officers andpeople, masters and servants, the first citizen and the last, are equally subject to the laws. [I]t signifie[s] a government, m which the property of the public, or people, and of every one of them, [is] secured and protected by law. This idea implies liberty; that the property and liberty of all men, not merely of a majority, should be safe; for the people, or public, comprehends more than a majority, it comprehends all and every individual; and the property of every citizen is a part of the public property, as each citizen is a part of the public, people, or community." John Adams'
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and constitutional thought.^2 Some lawyers contrast the liberalism that regards legislation as a necessary evil with republican visions of cultural self-expression through law.^3 This misstates the historical origins and best usage of both terms. Properly understood, republicanism and liberalism do not conflict, and both endorse law as the necessary vehicle of social justice. Republicanism is the parent of liberalism in Western Europe. They share a fundamental commitment to liberty and differ only m their relative ambition. Liberalism grew out of republican theory and has never found stability or security without the protection of republican structures of government.
By "republicanism" I mean the legal theory of republican Rome, as
m George Washington's North America, and reanimated by the French revolution.^4 The most important authors m this tradition include Polybius, Marcus Tullius Cicero, Titus Livy, Niccol6 Machiavelli, James Harrington, Algernon Sidney, John Adams, James Madison, and Jean- Jacques Rousseau.^5 Essential elements of a republican legal system include (in approximate order of inportance): (1) pursuit of the common good, through (2) popular sovereignty and (3) the rule of law, under (4)
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 159-60 (1788). 2 See JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTs AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (^) (William Rehg trans., 1996); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERiCA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996); Jirgen Habermas,Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls's PoliticalLiberalism, XCII J. OF PHIL. 127-128 (1995); John Rawls, Reply to Habermas, XCII J. OF PHIL. 179 (1995); see also Morton J. Horwitz, (^) Republicanism and Liberalism in American ConstitutionalThought, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv 57 (1987-1988); Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Symposium, Roads Not Taken: Undercurrents of Republican Thinking in Modern Constitutional Theory, 84 Nw. U. L. REv 1 (1989); Symposium, 41 FLA. L. REV 409 (1989). 3 See Horwitz, (^) supra (^) note 2, (^) at 73. 4 See M.N.S. Sellers, Republican Liberty, in JURISPRUDENCE OF LIBERTY (Sun Ratnapala & G.A. Moens eds., 1996). ' See Mortimer Sellers, The Republican Legal Tradition, INT'L J. OF CLASS. TRAD. (forthcoming 1997).
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When any one element in this republican formula of government is missing, there is no republic, in the usual sense of the term, because (republicans believe) the common good and liberty cannot be preserved. Popular sovereignty without balance is simple democracy, and no republic - the majority will abuse unprotected minorities;' 6 the rule of law can advance the tyranny (^) of despots;' 7 and senators and magistrates may exploit their (^) authority m the manner of Caesar, the Long Parliament, Cromwell, or Napoleon." So although republicans praise and require popular sovereignty, the rule of law, and balanced government, no one of these by itself is fully "republican" without the others. All exist to promote the common good, and to prevent "corruption" in the govern- ment or courts.' 9
"Liberalism" as such (^) was not. known before the nineteenth century and first emerged in the wake of the French revolution to accommodate those partisans of liberty who, having reconciled themselves to constitu- tional monarchy, could not be "republicans" any longer, m the strictest sense of the term.^20 Tis required a new conception of liberty, articulat- ed most influentially in 1819 by Benjamin Constant m his speech distinguishing the "liberty of the ancients" from the "liberty of the modems." 2 ' Constant defined the liberty of the ancients as actual
16 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison). '7 See I (^) ADAMs, (^) supra note 1. 18 See id. at iv; 365-371. Cf. "Cato" (pseudonym for John Trenchard & Thomas Gordon), Letter No. 25 (Apr. 15, 1721), in CATO'S LETTERS OR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, CivIL AND RELIGIOUS, AND OTHER IMPORTANT SUBJECTS 179- (Ronald Hamowy ed., 1995) (1720-23) [hereinafter (^) CATO'S LETTERS] ("All should proceed by fixed and stated rules, and upon any emergency, new rules should be made. This is the constitution, and this is the happiness of Englishmen "Id. at 186). "Corruption" is a techmcal term in republican discourse, denved from Roman political vocabulary, meaning public action motivated by anything other than the common good. See, e.g., CORNELIUS TACITUS, ANNALiUM AB ExCESSU DIVI AUGUSTI LIBRI, at I.27 "[l]amque non modo in commune sed in singulos hommes latae quaestiones, et corruptissima re publica plunnmae leges." Id. 20 For the earliest English uses (^) of "liberal" and "liberalism," and their dependence on France, see 8 THE OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 881-83 (2d ed. 1989). For the French Liberals, see Louis GIRARD, LES LiBARAUX FRANqAIs: 1814-1875 (1985). 21 BENJAMIN CONSTANT, POLITICAL WRITINGS 310-11 (Biancamana
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participation m government, while the liberty of the modems meant the rule of law, and specific protections of the individual, including^ freedoms of opinion, property, association, speech, and religion - not popular sovereignty, but "peaceful enjoyment and private independence." 22 '^ For Constant, this "[ifndividual independence is the first need of the modems: consequently one must never require from them any sacrifices to establish political liberty^ " Defining "liberalism" remains difficult, as with any partisan term,^24 but Constant was not alone m considering individual freedom "the true modem liberty "^25 This attitude belongs more to England than to France, and English authors soon embraced the French term to describe their own tradition of limited government under the rule of law. John Stuart Mill explicitly criticized European liberalism as too solicitous of the power of the people,^26 and set out to formulate a more specific test of the propriety of government action.^27 He concluded that "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against Is will, is to prevent harm to others."2 8 ' When scholars now speak of "liberal" legal principles they generally think of this formula and the British tradition of individual rights behind it," running back through John Trenehard and Thomas Gordon to John Locke 1 and Sir Edward Coke. 2 Mill distinguished this move- ment towards "political liberties" or "rights" from the parallel and largely unsuccessful pursuit of "constitutional checks" and popular sovereign-
24 For some (^) attempts to put the term into bistoncal (^) context, see, for example, GuiDo DE RUGGIERO, THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN LmERALIsM (R.G.
MODERN SocIETy: A HISTORICAL ARGUMENT (1992). 2s CONSTANT, POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 21, at 323. 26 See generally John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in JOHN STUART MILL. ON LIBERTY WITH THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN AND CHAPTERS ON SOcIALISM (Stefan Collim ed., 1989). 27 See id. at 12. 28 Id. at 13. 29 See id. at 75. 30 See CATO'S LETRS, supra note 18.
student ed., 1988) (1690). 32 See generally SiR EDWARD COKE, INsTIrUTEs (London, 1628-1644).
to the duly enacted laws of a legislature established by consent, and independent of any private will.4 1^ The legislative power itself should be "limited to the publick good" of society 4 2^ Benjamin Constant saw "liberty" m England, France, and the United States of America as "the right to be subjected only to the laws" and never to the "arbitrary will of one or more individuals."' These definitions simply repeat the old republican conception of liberty as service to the common good, under the rule of law. Republican vocabulary had^ distinguished liberty from^ "license'^ (licentia),^ meaning the unrestrained power to do what one wants.' Locke endorsed this distinction, 45 and castigated the monarchist theorist Sir Robert Filmer for identifying "freedom" as the ability 'for every one to do what he lists, to live as he pleases, and not to be tyed by any Laws 1546 Locke's liberty required having "a standing Rule to live by, common to every one of that^ Society,^ and^ made^ by^ the^ Legislative^ Power^ erected in^ it.^^197 This republican distinction between "liberty" and "license" becomes hard to sustain without recourse to popular sovereignty and the proce- dures of balanced government. The early liberal commitments to law and the common good came into conflict once legislatures lost the legitimacy of their republican foundations. If the public good sets the "utmost [b]ounds" of the legislature's power, 48 then laws that contravene the public good are void. But liberals need a new techique to distinguish the boundaries of valid legislation. This was the purpose of Mill's harm principle, and remains the central dilemma of liberal theorists ever since. What is liberty, if not the simple ability to do what one wants? But who would be free with neighbors who could do whatever they wanted?
IV RIGHTS
The United States of America and its famous Bill of Rights^49 inherited the British tradition of restricted government, which the Umon
(^42) Id. at I.XI.135.
43 CONSTANT, PoLrrIcAL WRiTINGS, supra note 21, at 310. " See LivY, supra note 7, at 1H.9.5, 11.67.6.
41 Id. at II.IV.22. (^47) d.
49 U.S. CONST. (^) amends. I-X (ratified (^) Dec. 15, (^) 1791).
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imposed on its component states after the American Civil War,"°^ and onto the rest of the world through the United Nations after (^) World War
l'homme et du citoyen,"^2 based on the Declaration of Rights of the Commonwealth of Virgma. 3 These documents constitute (^) the central political accomplishments (^) of the liberal legal tradition and supply a provisional list of the fundamental requsites of liberty under liberal conceptions of government. Mill saw an implied conflict between rights and popularly (^) elected governments. 54 Since "liberalism" (as (^) such) originated m the failure of the French revolution, there always has been a liberal tendency (^) to contrast rights with the political participation of the people.^55 This is the basis on which more recent scholars have opposed "liberal" to (^) "republican" institutions.5 6^ Their views would have some basis (^) if "republicansm" simply meant (^) "democracy" Maximng majority power implies minimzing minority rights, and Mill was right to fear the (^) "will" of the
50 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (ratified July 9, 1868). 51 UNIVERSAL (^) DECLARATION OF (^) HuMAN RIGHTS, adopted (^) and proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations, (^) December 10, 1948. Compare
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, both of which (^) appeared in an annex to a resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (^) on December 16, 1966, and entered into force on January (^) 3, 1976 (Economic) and March 23, 1976 (Political). See G.A. Res. A/RES/2200 (XXI), (^) U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 21st Sess., Annex, Agenda (^) Item 62. 52 DtCLARATION (^) DES DROITS DE (^) L'HOMME ET DU (^) CITOYEN, first adopted by the National Assembly on August 26, 1789. 53 THE VIRGINIA (^) DECLARATION OF RIGHTS (^) (A DeclarationofRights Made By the Representativesof the Good People of Virginia, Assembled in Full and Free (^) Convention; Which Rights Do Pertainto Them and Their Posterity,as the Basis and Foundation of Government) (^) (adopted unanimously by the Virgima provincial congress on June 12, 1776). For the (^) links between France and Virginia, see R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, AN HISTORICAL (^) INTRODUCTION TO WESTERN CoNsTITUTONAL (^) LAW (1995). " See Mill, supra (^) note 26, at 7-8 ("The 'people' who exercise the power are not always the same people with [sic] those over whom it is exercised; and the 'self-government' spoken (^) of is not the (^) government of each (^) by himself, but of
each by all the rest."). 55 See generally CONSTANT, POLITICAL WRITINGS, (^) supra note 21, (^) at 310- (comparing the new meaning of liberty "with that of the (^) ancients").
Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV L. REv 17-23 (1986-1987).
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The history of liberalism until this century has been the European history of privileges wrested from power, and the (^) gradual compilation of lists of violations that the (^) state must never visit on its citizens. Law feasted on (^) the corpse of philosophy, and reformers fought for practical guarantees in the absence of moral agreement. Moral (^) pluralism yielded these minimum protections in Europe, while moral (^) unanimity produced the same result (^) in the United States.^66 This gradually created a new and narrower conception of liberty, (^) as the area in which a person is "left to do or be what he wants to do or be, without interference. (^1967) Isaiah Berlin called this "negative" freedom - the freedom simply to be left alone.^6 1 "Negative liberty" is greatest (^) when people have the most protection against coercion by the (^) State or anyone else in society - the most "rights" against interference by others. This (^) new sense of the word "liberty" followed naturally from Constant's separation (^) of law and politics. However, it offers no obvious formula for what will count as "coercion," (^) or who should be coerced when one individual's desires conflict with another's. Berlin adapted (^) his vocabulary from Thomas Hobbes and other (^) opponents of liberty, who used "freedom" to describe what even John Locke would have recognized as "license" and undesirable. 69 Hobbes (^) often went much further, defining "liberty" or "freedom" simply as "the absence of external impediments of motion" (^) applied to "inanimate creatures." 7 So fear and necessity are entirely compatible with Hobbes's (^) sense of "corporal liberty," which ended only with physical restraint, chains or (^) imprison- ment. 71 Hobbes (^) specifically reprobated the "specious name" of tradition-
66 Although there was never a "liberal movement" or "liberal party" in the United States until after the Second World War, (^) the protection of individual rights provided a unifying ideology (^) from the beginning. See Louis HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA. AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION 10- 11, 47 (1955). (^67) ISAIAH BERLIN, TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY: AN INAUGURAL LECTURE 7 (1958). 68 See id. 69 See LOCKE, supra note 31, at II.IV.22. 70 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (^139) (J.C.A. Gaskin ed., Oxford Umv.
Press 1996) (1651). 71 See id. at 141.
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al liberty m his hostility to "popular states" or "Greek and Latin" proposals to restrain and balance the monarch's absolute and sovereign power.
72
Defining "liberty" as pure absence of restraint lowers its value as a social ideal. Liberty stops being a status to be sought and be- comes a retained privilege, perhaps too often granted or properly withheld.^73 Jeremy Bentham (^) considered "liberty" to be opposed to "government" 74 '^ and hIs disciple John Austin confirmed that liberty is "altogether incompatible with law, the very idea of which implies restraint and obligation."'75^ So negative "political or civil liberty is the liberty from legal obligation, which is left or granted by a sover- eign government to any of its own subjects." 76 '^ One should not be surprised at John Austin's scorn for "ignorant and bawling fanatics who stun you with their pother about liberty, ' 7^ since Austin considered liberty "to be conceptually distinct from public (^) welfare, and the State. 78 Of course Berlin, Bentham, Hobbes and the rest may use words however they like. Perhaps negative liberty follows naturally from liberal theory, and liberty itself has limited value beyond some "mmnimum (^) area of personal freedom." 79 '^ But few liberals have really thought so. Austin proposed a form of "civil liberty" that would serve the government in its 'furtherance of the common weal.""^0 Bentham proposed "utility" as the measure of our negative freedom." Mill argued for hIs harm princi- ple, 2 and even Berlin, who made Hobbesian views popular,' lacked
(^72) Id. at 143.
recogmsed general principles, liberty is often granted where it should be withheld, as well as withheld where it should be granted."). (^74) See JEREMY BENTHAM A FRAGMENT ON GovERNMENT 93 (J.H. Bumrns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Cambridge (^) Umv. Press, 1988) (1777). 75 JoHN (^) AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE (^) OF JURISPRUDENCE (^) DETERMINED (^160) (Wilfrid 76 E. Rumble ed., 1995) (1832). Id. at (^) 223. 7 Id. (^) at (^) 224. 78 Id. 79 BERLIN, (^) supra (^) note 67, at (^) 11. 80 AUSTIN, supra note 75, at 224. 81 BENTHAM, supra note 74, at 99.
be nightfifly exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his
Reducing liberty to the positive or negative ability to do what one wants does not resolve what to do when people's wants (^) conflict. Berlin criticizes Spinoza, (^) Locke, Montesquieu, and Kant for believing the subject of a commonwealth free, "because the common interests must include his own."" Instead, he insists, m agreement with Bentham, that "liberty to do evil" is liberty too and deserves public protection. "'Every
Berlin's sense of "positive" liberty borrows something (^) from Constant's "liberty of the ancients," in that it concerns who is to
a public-regarding procedure to limit private initiatives violates Berlin's negative conception of liberty because it implies controlling what (^) people may do, for their own good,^9 ' and so violates Mill's dictum that "'t]he only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good
When everyone pursues (^) his or her own good in Ins or her own way there will be collisions that need to be resolved. (^) Berlin criticizes the conception that a free state should be governed by laws that rational persons would accept. 95 In other words, he (^) rejects Cicero's republican aim of constructing institutions that will harmoize citizens' interests m order to give everyone a worthwhile life.^96 But it is hard to see where else to draw the boundary between citizens' desires. (^) As Berlin noted, Spinoza (^) has suggested that "'[tihe subject of a true commonwealth is no slave, because the common interests must include his own."' 97 This (^) is not the sentiment (^) of a "Jacobin" or a "commiumst," as Berlin would have it, but the common sense observation that we all have an interest in
regarded as a more 'real' subject of attributes than the empmcal self."). 1990 Id. at 32. Id. at 33 (quoting Jeremy Bentham). 91 See zd. at 7 (asserting that (^) positive liberty "is involved in the answer to the question 'What, or who, is the source of control or interference, that can determine someone (^) to do, or be, one thing rather than another?"'). 92 See id. at 14. (^93) 94 (^) Id. at 17
11 See id. at 30.
propositum, ut eadem sit utilitas umus cuiusque et universorum; quam si ad se quisque rapiet, dissolvetur omms humana consortio."). 97 BERLIN, supra (^) note 67, at (^32) (quoting Spinoza).
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protections against each other, through (^) which no individual citizens will be preferred above the rest. Setting out to harmonize private interests for (^) the public good does not imply that there is "only one correct way of (^) life.""^8 It is an unavoidable task. "Negative (^) liberty" leads to conflicts between private interests. 'Tositive liberty" does too. Yet decisions must be made. (^) A responsible theory of liberty will explain how to make them. One solution might be a despotism of the best and wisest, as in Mozart's Temple of Sarastro in The Magic Flute.^99 But the "best and wisesg' have interests of their own. °°^ The (^) republican formula has been to seek systems of popular sovereignty that will harness (^) the reason of all citizens in search of a just
"The fathers of liberalism," Mill and Constant, sought the greatest amount of government non-interference that would be consistent with the basic requirements of social life.'^0 But even Mill's notion of a liberty limited only by the danger of (^) doing harm to others requires a definition of harm. The French revolution illustrates the dangers of unfettered majorities, but its worst (^) excesses bypassed the sovereign people.' 2 Isaiah Berlin himself concedes that political "positive" rights may protect the liberals' "ultimate value"^ of^ "individual^ -^ 'negative'^ -^ liberty^ " The liberal fear of democracy derives in large part from a belief that "human goals are many, not all of them commensurable, and in perpetual rivalry with one another.""' This may be true, but it should not rule out the search for synthesis. The ideal (^) of freedom to live as one wishes, and the pluralism of values connected with it, need not lead to the war of all against all. "Liberty" (^) to be oppressed by one's neighbor is no liberty at all. Hobbes cheapened the language when he redefined 'liberty" as unfettered action: Liberals make a profound mistake when they adopt ins vocabulary
(^98) Id. at 36. "In this way the rationalist argument, with its assumption of the
single true solution, has led from an ethical doctrine of individual responsibility and individual self-perfection, to an authoritarian state obedient to the directives of an 61ite of Platomc guardians." Id. at 37
'00 Cf. Madison, supra note 16.
102 For Berlin's strictures on government by the people, quoting Mill and
Constant, see id. at 48.
'04 Id. at 56.
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liberals' ability to question arbitrary decisions. (^) Their triumphs in England relied on the natural "reason" of judge-made (^) law, and recent history in the United States repeats this pattern.
VII. PosItE LAW
Prominent liberal lawyers once (^) munmized the connection between law and justice or morality, (^) including law's role as the arbiter between liberty and license. Their (^) commitment to the rule of law as a fence against oppression led (^) some liberals to deny the incorporation of moral standards into law, fearing ambiguity and unwanted administrative discretion.116 The utilitarians Jeremy Bentham and John (^) Austin sought to establish a sharp distinction between law "as it is" and law "as it ought to be,"' 17 notwithstanding the traditional view of law (found in Black- stone) that human enactments contrary to justice are void and not law at all.
18
Self-identified liberals such as H.L.A. Hart accepted (as they had to) that courts (^) may be asked to incorporate morality into their decisions, but still praised "positivism" as having "'delivered law from the dead body of morality """9 Although liberals such as Hart admitted that laws (^) confer rights, they also claimed that rules can confer rights without being moral. 20 These arguments aimed at separating moral or natural rights from law, viewing bad decisions by judges about rights as bad law, but law nonetheless.' Social policies may influence judges, but are not themselves "law" to positivists, who suppose that maintaining this distinction makes law easier to criticize and reform." Restricting the conception of what constitutes a "legal (^) rule!' so as to exclude "policy" or 'morality" protects the determmacy of law and a core of settled meaning through which rules can control (^) the judiciary." Liberal positivism developed to protect the rule of law against judicial
116 See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Positivismand the SeparationofLaw and Morals,
in EssAYs iN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOsoPHY 49-87 (1983). 117 For a discussion of the antecedents of this viewpoint, see id. at 50. 118 See id. at 52. 1'^9 Id. at 55 (quoting AMOS, THE SCIENCE OF LAW 4 (5th ed. 1881) (who attributed tis statement to Ins predecessor, Austin)). 10 See HART, supra note 116, at 62. 121 See id. at 68. ,22 See id. at 69. '2' See id. at 71.
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usurpation and maintain the conviction that rules have authority 24 As positivists understand it, the spiritual message of liberalism lies in opposing bad laws openly, not in making bad laws good through judicial chicanery 12 Direct appeals or references to morality by judges assume a greater union of social alms and judgment than liberals either expect or endorse. 2 6^ This does not mean that they deny the existence of moral truths, but rather that these truths should be used to judge the law In positivist theory such truths are never part of the law itself." 7 Legal positivism represents a seriously altered liberalism in its effort to curb judicial activism. English liberalism began as a battle by English judges to enforce natural justice against the kings. Judicially-mterpreted bills of rights constitute the liberals' first great triumph and most lasting legacy Positivism arose when liberals began to^ question^ the^ authority^ of judges, as they had questioned kings and parliaments before. Where judges once had "found" the law, now liberals wished them to follow it, wnch meant that legal decisions must be determinable by reference to facts alone, facts concerning the intentions of authorities who promulgat- ed the laws involved.'
liberals placed their^ faith^ in^ judges,^ nghts,^ and^ the^ rule^ of^ law,^ positivist liberals with their "sources thesis" squarely face questions of legitimacy and the basis of legislative authority 129 So long as "law" meant "right reason," liberals could endorse the rule of law without further explanation and avoid questions of political legitimacy But as soon as law comes to be seen as obedience to some particular person's authority, that authority needs justification. The rule of law ceases to be a universal moral imperative and applies only to certain societies, meeting certain determ- nate criteria. This leaves liberals unable to escape the issues their progenitors first disavowed republicanism to avoid, and particularly the question, which system of^ legislation^ will^ most^ likely^ get^ law^ right.^
130
121 See id. at 75.
127 See Id. at 82. 12' See Joseph Raz, Authority, Law, and Morality, in ETHICs IN^ THE^ PUBLIC
DoMAIN: EssAYs IN THE MORALrrY OF LAW AND PoLITIcs 194-221 (1994) [heremafter ETHICS INTHE PUBLIC DOMAIN].
0 See, e.g., Joseph Raz, The Politics of the Rule of Law, in ETHICS INTHE
PUBLIC DOMAIN, supra note 128, at 354-62.
references to "truth" may preclude agreement.' 43
[hereinafter RAwLs, PoLrICAL LiBERALISM]. 134 See RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 133, at 446-52. ,35 See RAWLS, (^) POLITICAL (^) LIBERALISM, supra (^) note 133. 36 See, e.g., id. at 36- 137 See RAWLS, (^) A THEORY OF (^) JUSTICE, supra note (^) 133, at 303. 138 See id. at 53. 131 See, (^) e.g,, (^) id. at (^) 36- '" See id. at 62. 141 See id. at 63. 142 See id. at 64. "s See id. at 94.
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"true 144 or "probably (^) true, 1 4^5 but the fundamentally (^) liberal view- point goes further, recogmzmg a wide range of views (^) as reasonable, even when mistaken.^1 46 Holding a political conception as true is exclusive, even sectarian, to the committed liberal and likely to foster political division.^147 The liberal return to politics reveals how liberal conceptions of human nature have diverged from their republican (and early liberal) antecedents. Republicans view all humans as possessing reason and a certain degree of humility, capable of being swayed by argument and deferring to^ reasonable deliberation, even^ when^ not^ fully^ convinced.
(^14 )
Early liberals, such as John Stuart Mill, agreed but feared this natural tendency towards consensus^ as^ leading^ to^ error^ and^ oppression.
1 49
Contemporary liberals, mostly in the United States, have developed a new view of citizens as inevitably and irredeemably divided by conflicting and incommensurable opinions about truth and morality 50 Liberals consider the psychic pain of being wrong too great to allow politics to prefer true doctrines over others which are widely believed.^151 The liberal search for political consensus depends on avoiding controversy, while republicans embrace it. A reasonable liberal respects wrong views. A reasonable republican is open to persuasion that his or her own views may themselves be wrong. Liberals want to apply their principle of uncritical acceptance to philosophy itself.'5 2^ Republi- cans tolerate wrong views, but encourage the search for truth when truth affects the common welfare of society The liberal conception of persons as self-directed individuals requires a new conception of political society, which forbids the creation of community through politics. 153 Since political liberalism avoids divisive issues, which may threaten social* harmony,^5 political liberals must
(^144) Id.
146 See id. at 127 (^147) See (^) id. (^) at 129.
STUD. 273 (1991). 149 See, e.g., MILL, supra note 26, at 8-9. 150 See, e.g., RAwLs, POLIcAL LIBERALISM, (^) supra note 133, at 133.
152 See d. at 152. (^1) See, e.g., (^) id. at (^146) n.13. 154 See id. at 157
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