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Roger's diffusion of innovation theory describes the patterns and speed in which new ideas, practices and product spread through the population.
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Marcus Peixoto^1 Ana Célia Castro^2 Petula Ponciano Nascimento^3 Abstract Rural advisory services (RAS) have played an important role in the Brazilian rural and agricultural development along the last fifty years. Since the sixties Roger’s theory of diffusion of innovations has set the foundations for policies and strategies for technological changes in agriculture. However, in the last thirty years in Brazil, as well as in many other developing countries, the public organizations created to provide such services faced many critics, due to the fact that most small and family farmers hadn’t developed technologically as expected and so remained poor. Most critics rested on the fact that the diffusion of innovations process itself would not be sufficient to guarantee the technological development of all farmers. Critics correctly argued that many other circumstances and institutions affect the pace of rural development, such as public policies, generation of adequate technologies, supply of rural credit, market prices of agricultural goods, market structures (such as oligopolies), climate and soils conditions, how well organized supply chains are, and the educational, organizational and cultural characteristics of rural population. These conditions visibly favored mostly bigger farmers and exported crops, in an environment of supply chains leaded by empowered multinational companies. So, public RAS organizations have undergone a structural crisis along the nineties and the initial decade of current century. Only recently progressive changes on regulation, increasing funds to public RAS provision and the creation of a national RAS organization pointed to the reconstruction of a public RAS System, although still incapable of advising all 4.36 million Brazilian family famers. The article aims to analyze how much the principles of Roger’s Theory of Diffusion of Innovations are still important in the shaping of institutions that support public and private RAS services in Brazil.
EMBRATER (officially created on 1975). Together, states companies and the federal Embrater constituted the Brazilian RAS System (named SIBRATER). Embrater had amongst its main roles, capacitating RAS agents and distributing federal budget to state companies. From the 50s to 70s, Brazil faced a huge transition in which, from frankly agrarian, with export- based economy, mainly in coffee, turned into industrial. Simultaneously to the industrialization process, with the adoption of a rural development model based on the diffusion of modernizing technological packages advocated by the Green Revolution, the modernization of Brazilian agriculture was characterized by the consumption of raw materials (such as fertilizers, pesticides, genetically improved seeds) and industrial equipment. The intensive mechanization freed rural hand labor for industrial and construction sectors. The public policies for agricultural research, rural credit and RAS aimed at strengthening this model, and the political-economic structures favored large production for export products or raw material for industrialized goods for domestic consumption. In the field of agricultural research, it is important to mention the creation of the Brazilian Agricultural Research Company (EMBRAPA), on 1973, which became one of the world’s biggest and most successful company in this field of knowledge. Embrapa (which alongside universities and states research companies formed the National Agricultural Research System) played a fundamental role in developing science and technologies to explore the Cerrado ecosystem, on the Midwest region of Brazil. However, on the 80s and later on the 90s, public RAS in Brazil faced the same obstacles that emerged in other countries around the world, such as reducing budgets and accusation of inefficiency. Sibrater played an important role on the modernization of Brazilian agriculture, providing the link between rural credit and imported or national technologies, developed by Brazilian research system^5. For it was interpreted that the biggest rural development problem was the technical delay of agriculture, the early and main focus of public RAS was the diffusion of agricultural innovations. It was assumed that bigger farmers should firstly adopt the technical innovations, and playing a multiplier role, would naturally be later imitated by smaller farmers. However, this did not happen on the expected way. Many farmers lingered to adopt the more costly technologies, due to the lack of access to rural credit, or even to many of the simplest or cheapest ones, due to the lack of access to information or continuous and qualified RAS, or to educational, infrastructure and organizational deficiencies. In consequence of this evaluation, many authors criticized the Brazilian agricultural modernization model of being economically, centered on the technological development of bigger farmers and export commodities, setting aside small farmers from public policies of rural credit and public RAS. Other paradigms were developed, pointing to a more demand driven public RAS, to the use of locally adapted technologies, elimination of organizational gaps, and participatory strategies of development. Much of the failures of modernization model were credited to the diffusionist model that public RAS adopted. But, although the problems that conditioned the development of small farmer should be considered by public policies, this poses an important question. Despite the need of a more complex set of public policies, should the RAS policy makers take into account that the diffusion of innovation process still naturally occurs and must be considered on the formulation of such policies? Or is diffusion of innovation theory obsolete and should be discharged from agricultural or rural development strategies? This article aims to present the diffusion of innovation theory, by reviewing some of the literature that focuses this subject, and to evaluate whether it is still worth to the agricultural development policies, and more specifically, the public RAS policies that are being set in Brazil. 5 ^ Brazilian agriculture research system is composed of Brazilian Agricultural Research Company (EMBRAPA), founded on 1973, and several state agricultural research companies.
7. Education - how knowledge can be shared so that it is understood, used and valued. 8. Geography - how knowledge is spread and adopted spatially, particularly how geographical structures and land structures influence the spread and use of knowledge. 9. Business Studies - the organisational characteristics that enhance the innovativeness of organisations as well as the ways in which innovations can be effectively marketed. 10. Political Science - how policies are implemented, including how centralised and decentralised governmental structures influence the implementation of policy. 11. Technology Transfer - how technology can be used and adapted for use in various practices.
from experts to users, science pushed. Centralised systems provide central quality control over innovations to diffuse and can diffuse innovations for which there is as yet no felt need. But such system can encounter user resistance to central control, and may result in inappropriate adoption because of low adaptation to local circumstances. In comparison, in a highly decentralised system there is a wide sharing of power and control among members of the diffusion system; peer diffusion of innovations through horizontal networks; and a high degree of local adaptation as innovations diffuse among adopters. Users tend to like such system, which promotes closer fit between innovations and user needs and problems. But in decentralised systems ineffective innovations may be diffused due to lack of quality control, and it depends on local users, who control the system, having knowledge about other users’ problems and about the innovations available that could solve them. Rogers’ conclusion is that decentralised systems are most appropriate when innovations do not require a high level of newly acquired technical expertise and when users are relatively heterogeneous. But the potential for users to run their own diffusion system is greatest when the users are highly educated and technically competent practitioners. It seems that a decentralised approach to diffusing innovations is likely to encounter less user resistance than a centralized approach. It is also likely to result in a greater level of reinvention (which concept will be discussed ahead) – although whether this is desirable will in turn depend on both the nature of the innovation and the knowledge/capabilities of the re-inventors. The classical diffusion paradigm has been criticized for reifying expert-driven, top-down or science push approaches to address problems and thus, by default, overlooking, ignoring and rejecting local solutions. Diffusion of innovation experts now increasingly acknowledge the value of local expertise and wisdom in finding culturally-appropriate solutions to community problems (Rogers et alii, 2008). One such inside-out approach to innovation diffusion is exemplified by the positive deviance approach , that questions the role of outside expertise and enables communities to discover the wisdom they already have, and then to act on it. Social change experts, usually, make a living discerning of the deficits in a community, prioritizing the problems, and then trying to implement outside solutions to change them. In the PD approach, the role of experts is to identify the uncommon but effective things that positive deviants do, and then to make them visible and actionable to the community. Evaluations of PD initiatives show that PD works because the community owns the problem, as well as its solutions, changing themselves with the help of outside expertise and facilitation. The positive deviance approach to innovation diffusion is located at the intersection of theory, method, and praxis. Many of the early models of the diffusion process were criticised for presenting an overly rational view of how change is achieved. However, when a simple innovation is borrowed or adapted from an external source, the stages tend to occur in the expected order, while when innovations are complex and/or originate within an organisation, stages tend to be more muddled and overlapping. However, a linear stage model still remains at the heart of many studies. Whereas classical theories of innovation have tended to define innovations, evidence and organisations in fixed and unproblematic ways, newer perspectives, focusing on the innovation process, have begun to recognise the fluidity of boundaries between social contexts, objects and knowledge. Certainly those who advocates of an evidence based practice are interested in diffusing an ideology: the objective is to win over the hearts and minds of practitioners, to get them to adopt a frame of reference that values research evidence. But we need to recognise the limitations of the predominant focus on rationality and linear stage models of decision making within the diffusion of innovation literature. Such models may not necessarily provide accurate maps of an empirical reality.
There is a recognition on the need to pay more attention to the institutional context and norms than so far.
Figure 1: The Rate of Adoption for a Usual Innovation For Rogers, adoption is a decision of full use of an innovation as the best course of action available and rejection is a decision not to adopt an innovation. The newness characteristic of an adoption is more related to the three first steps (knowledge, persuasion, and decision) of the innovation-decision process, above commented. As Sahins (2006) states, uncertainty is an important obstacle to the adoption of innovations. An innovation’s consequences may create uncertainty: consequences are the changes that occur in an individual or a social system as a result of the adoption or rejection of an innovation. To reduce the uncertainty of adopting the innovation, individuals should be informed about its advantages and disadvantages to make them aware of all its consequences. Moreover, Rogers claimed that consequences can be classified as desirable (functional) versus undesirable (dysfunctional), direct (immediate result) versus indirect (result of the immediate result), and anticipated (recognized) versus unanticipated (intended or not). 5.1. Characteristics of the adopters Adopter categories which have been developed are classifications of members of a social system on the basis of their innovativeness. Only adopters of successful innovations generate this curve over time, so incomplete adoption and non-adoption do not form this adopter classification. The S-shaped curve becomes a normal curve when plotted as the incidence of people adopting at various points in time rather than the prevalence of people who have adopted up to that point. The normal curve is used to delineate five different categories of adopters according to where they fall under the curve:
1. Innovators – usually are willing to experience new ideas and, prepared to cope with unprofitable and unsuccessful innovations. They have complex technical knowledge, but admit a certain level of uncertainty about the innovation and are the gatekeepers bringing the innovation in from outside of the social system. Innovators may not be respected by other members of the social system because of their venturesomeness and close relationships outside the social system. 2. early adopters - more limited with the boundaries of the social system, they are more likely to hold leadership roles in the social system. Other members come to them to get advice or information about the innovation, and their leadership in adopting the
innovation decreases uncertainty within the social system about the innovation in the diffusion process.
3. early majority , - although they have a good interaction with other members of the social system, they do not have the leadership role. However, their interpersonal networks are still important in the innovation-diffusion process. 4. late majority , - includes one-third of all members of the social system who wait until most of their peers adopt the innovation. Although they are skeptical about the innovation and its outcomes, economic necessity and interpersonal networks of close peers should persuade or pressure them to the adoption of the innovation. 5. laggards - have the traditional view and they are more skeptical about innovations and change agents, and their interpersonal networks mainly consist of other members of the social system from the same category. They do not have a leadership role and have limited resources and the lack of awareness-knowledge of innovations. Laggards’ innovation- decision period is relatively long. Of course, no one is an innovator or a laggard about all new ideas. In reality, most people are majorities about most things, and innovators or laggards about only certain specific things (NUTLEY, 2006). So the figure 2 below shows where the categories of adopters on the S-Curve: Figure 2. The Diffusion S-Curve When plotted on a frequency basis, the number of adopters over time formed a normal, bell- shaped curve (which later scholars utilized to divide the variable of innovativeness into the five adopter categories in a standard way), as seen in the figure 3.
both financing mechanisms and a pool of competent human resources, and a ready market of educated and informed consumers. However, as an innovation spreads from early adopters to majority audiences, face-to face communication therefore may become more essential to the decision to adopt. This principle is embodied in the Frank Bass Forecasting Model (see figure 4 below), which illustrates how face-to- face communication becomes more influential over time, and mass media less influential. Figure 4 - The Bass Forecasting Model. Source: Mahajan, Muller and Bass (1990), in Robinson (2009) 5.2. Characteristics of an innovation In addition to the characteristics of the adopters, the perceived characteristics of an innovation are also considered to affect its adoption. Five innovation attributes are typically identified as being important for rapid diffusion:
Other attributes have also been identified as being potentially important, such as: adaptability , centrality to the day-to-day work of the organisation, and little requirement for additional visible resources (NUTLEY et alii, 2002). Moreover, Rogers categorized innovations into two types:
6. Key findings from diffusion of innovation research More recent studies have characterised innovation as a journey that is not sequential or orderly, but messy and unpredictable. More recent research on diffusion of innovation has drawn upon institutional theory to counter the rationalist tendencies and has moved towards thinking in terms of non-linear dynamic processes. Diffusion of innovations research promises to enhance our understanding of how social change occurs, a fundamental issue for all scholars of society. There is no reason to expect that the scholarly popularity of diffusion research by communication (and other) scholars will decrease in the foreseeable future. Innovations continue to be generated and studied. The overwhelming focus on the individual as the unit of adoption needs to be broadened to the levels of organizations and communities-of-practice. 6.1. Transfer, convergence and translation In a recent paper Stone (2012) looks backwards to the political science diffusion literature, and forwards to the expanding multi-disciplinary social science literatures on policy ‘learning’, ‘mobilities’ and ‘translation’ which qualify many of the rationalist assumptions of the early diffusion / transfer literatures. According to this author, it is more likely to encounter an American trained scholar using the term and framework of ‘diffusion’ whereas Europeans often work with the term ‘transfer’. While the approaches share many similarities, transfer studies tend to prioritize proactive knowledge utilization or ‘lesson-drawing’ from policy developed elsewhere. Early policy transfer studies targeted the role of agency in transfer processes and decision- making dynamics internal to political systems, and embodied the notion that transfer is a voluntary process undertaken by civil servants and politicians seeking to emulate ‘best practice’. Nevertheless, there was relatively quick recognition that transfers can be more or less coercive. There are some modalities of transfer (Stone, 2012): 1. transferring policy ideals or goals at a broad level. Here the focus is on achieving a common outcome; 2. transfer of institutions. This is the most familiar understanding of policy transfer. It involves the creation of similar structures; 3. regulatory, administrative or judicial tools can be transferred. 4. ‘transfer of ideas and ideologies’. A broad category, such transfers are difficult to map but are intuitively known. It is distinguishable from the first modality because ideas and ideologies are inputs to policy development rather than outcomes. 5. ‘transfer of personnel’ is apparent with short term staff exchange and longer term In political economy, particularly in the new-institutionalism framework, there has been stronger interest in explaining why there has been convergence. Scholarly thinking on ‘ policy
The new Law n. 12.188 (named General RAS Law) was quickly approved in January, 2010. Among others, it has an important innovation, which is the institution of monitoring and evaluation of results. However, this policy has still faced innumerous problems in its implementation, including insufficient funds to extend access to RAS from all small farmers, and until now there’s no available data regarding the outcomes or its implementation. Moreover, there is a deficiency on Brazil’s RAS policy. Because public RAS funded through federal budget needs to be provided freely, at no charge (this is determined by Agricultural Law and charging is almost a paradigm), the process of accreditation and contracting public (states) and private (NGOs) RAS providers is totally controlled by federal government. However, federal government institutions have no structural conditions and enough bureaucrats to well perform their duties. Because of this, and despite the increasing in public funds to public RAS, debates raised on the necessity of creation and empowerment of a national organization whose role should be the coordination of reconstruction of Brazil’s RAS National System (similar to Embrater^8 in the past). In 2013 the federal government sent to the National Congress another act project, by the same urgency process, creating the National Agency for RAS (named ANATER^9 ), with the responsibility to coordinate the RAS National System. The new Act n. 12.897 was approved on the end of 2014, but the Agency hasn’t any structure, budget or bureaucracy yet. At best, it will begin its activities by 2016 (PEIXOTO, 2014). So it will take some years until we may have any information about its development and the public RAS policy under its responsibility. Brazilian recently experienced strong social discussion and political pressures, involving diverse organizations and social movements, which resulted in an effective commitment of authorities in renewing the existing public policies on RAS, after many years of disruption. The discourse and rhetoric of these social movements points do the importance of the value of local expertise and wisdom in finding culturally-appropriate solutions to community problems. But the direction of the new public RAS policy points to a highly public and centralized system. This new policy doesn’t take proper account of international trends in RAS policies, like pluralization of RAS providers and cost recovery systems. Brazil’s agriculture has an enormous heterogeneity of social actors and even among family farmers there are big differences that impose different strategies in funding and providing RAS. A centralized diffusion of innovations system may not be the best way to address RAS to all farmers. The positive deviance approach and a demand driven RAS model should be reinforced and much more power on decision of how to access RAS should have been addressed to farmers and their organisations. That is why some important law projects that are being processed at the National Congress should get attention from policy makers, RAS providers and farmers. These projects change the public credit policies to enforce the federal government to provide public funds to contracting private RAS providers directly by farmers at the market. The eventually resulting laws could provide necessary cost recovery strategies and would decentralize and reduce the government tutelage of farmers on process of contracting RAS. Why should farmers be able to pay credits for buying inputs and equipments to their activities, but RAS should be totally free? Why should the knowledge needed to apply such innovations be necessarily free? This imposition of free RAS impedes even access to 8 (^) Embrater was the Brazilian Company of Technical Assistance and Rural Extension, founded on 1974 and extinct on 1990. However, thougj it was a state company subordinated to the Ministry of Agriculture, it did not provide direct RAS, being responsible only to foster RAS at states level, delivering them federal and financial support. 9 (^) Anater is not a regulation agency, but a promotion one.
knowledge on innovations that doesn’t require any input or equipment, but result in significant improvements for rural activities, such as managerial and organizational changes. It is quite early to judge if the current public RAS policy of Brazil will be effective, but it’s clear that it won’t be able to provide access in the short run to RAS for all family and medium size farmers, that amount 5,1 million farmers. References NUTLEY, Sandra, DAVIES, Huw, WALTER, Isabel. Conceptual Synthesis 1: Learning from the Diffusion of Innovations. ESRC UK Centre for Evidence Based Policy and Practice: Working Paper 10. Department of Management University of St Andrews. November 2002. Available at: https://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/politicaleconomy/research/cep/pubs/papers/assets/wp10.pdf
. Accessed on August 20, 201 5 PEIXOTO, M. Avaliação da PNATER : uma análise do Relatório de Auditoria do TCU, Congresso da SOBER - Sociedade Brasileira de Economia, Administração e Sociologia Rural. Goiânia - GO, 27 a 30 de julho de 2014. Available at <www.sober.org.br>. Accessed on August 20, 2015 ROGERS, Everett M, SINGHAL Arvind, QUINLAN Margaret M. Diffusion of Innovations. in STACKS. Don and SALWEN. Michael (Eds) (in press). An integrated approach to communication theory and research. New York: Routledge. 592 pages, 2 edition (November 9,