Phil/Ling 375: Meaning and Mind
[Handout #19]
Saul Kripke: Naming and Necessity, Lecture I
Professor JeeLoo Liu
Saul Kripke: Naming and Necessity, Lecture I
[Pp. 30-60]
§ Proper Names
___ We will use the term 'name' so that it does not include definite descriptions, but only
those things which in ordinary language would be called 'proper names.' If we want a
common term to cover names and descriptions, we may use the term 'designator.'
§ The Case of Moses [Wittgenstein]
“Consider this example. If one says “Moses did not exist,” this may mean various things. ...
Have I decided how much must be proved false for me to give up my proposition as false? Has
the name “Moses” got a fixed and unequivocal use for me in all possible cases?”
§ Giving the Meaning vs. Fixing the Reference:
Q: What is the function of those descriptions associated with a proper name?
[A]. The descriptions associated with the name give the meaning of the name itself:
e.g. ‘Moses’ means {the man called ‘Moses’ (by us); the man who led the Hebrews out of
Egypt; the man who received the Ten Commandments from God,….}
[B]. The descriptions associated with the name fix (determine) the referent of the
name:
e.g. When we use the name ‘Moses,’ we refer to the man who led the Hebrews out of
Egypt; the man who received the Ten Commandments from God,….
Example: Moses doesn't exist.
Under [A]:
(i) “Moses” means the same “the man who did such and such”.
(ii) “ Moses did not exist” = “The man who did such and such did not exist” or “that no
one person did such and such.”
Under [B]:
(i) ‘Moses’ refers to the man who did such and such.
(ii) “Moses did not exist” = ? (the set of descriptions do not refer?)
Q: How would a description theorist analyze this statement?
