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Self Enhancement Theory and Hierarchy of Self Enhancement, Study notes of Psychology

Self enhancemnet theory in define operational self enhancement, adaptiveness of self enhancement, structures of self enhancement and explain the diagrams.

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504
V.
SELF
AND
SOCIAL
PROCESSES
19.
Self-Presentation
of
Personality:
An
Agency-Communion
Framework
505
FIGURE
19.3.
Hierarchy of self-enhancement.
endorsement rates in straight-take adminis-
trations. The low endorsement rates for such
items permit room for manipulators to delib-
erately enhance impressiop.s
of
their agency.
Examples are
"I
am
very brave" and
"No
one
is
more talented
than
I."
Such items tend
not
to
be
claimed, even by narcissists, under
anonymous conditions. But the .endorse-
ment rate
is
higher under agency-motivated
conditions than under anonymous condi-
tions (Lonnqvist, Verkasalo, &Bezmenova,
2007).
The impression management
scales-
Agentic and Communal
Management-
appear
to
be most useful in tapping response
sets rather
than
response styles. They per-
form very well in capturing the degree
of
sit-
uational press
to
appear agentic
or
commu-
nal (Carey &Paulhus, 2008). Because scores
are influenced strongly by context subtleties,
these scales are
not
especially useful as indi-
vidual difference measurc;s. In private admin-
istrations, much
of
the individual-difference
variance represents actual contentdifferences
in positive qualities.
Summary
The traditional concern in the social desir-
ability literature
is
with self-presentation
on
questionnaires. Such concern led to the
development
of
numerous SDR scales mea-
suring the degree
to
which respondents ex-
aggerate their assets
or
minimize their social
deviance. The assumption
is
that
high scores
indicate dissimulation
not
only
on
the SDR
scale, but
on
all other questionnaires in the
same package.
A50-year history
of
structural analyses
of
SDR scales repeatedly confirmed
that
mul-
tiple underlying concepts were being tapped.
We
have argued here
that
aclearer under-
standing
of
this extensive literature emerges
from
our
two-level framework: audience
(public vs. private)
and
personality image
(agency
vs.
communal).
The SDR approach has been ofspecial
interest to personality psychologists because
of
their continuing reliance
on
self-report
questionnaires (Paulhus &Vazire, 2007;
Tracy &Robins, this volume). Nonetheless,
there remains some difficulty with confirm-
ing the degree
to
which SDR scales tap exag-
geration,
that
is, departure from reality.
SELF-ENHANCEMENT
Although the concept
of
self-enhancement
overlaps conceptually with SDR, its histori-
cal origins are quite distinct. It began with an
early study suggesting
that
positive self-biases
are maladaptive (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1939).
Forty years later, two methodologically su-
perior papers provided evidence
that
posi-
tive self-biases may
be
more adaptive than
accurate self-evaluations (Alloy &Abram-
son, 1979; Lewinsohn, Mischel, Chaplin,
&Barton, 1980). Those studies contributed
to Taylor and Brown's (1988) assertion that
positive illusions are both common and
adaptive.
Rather than SDR scales, this literature
employs measures such as social comparison
(e.g., better than average)
or
self-criterion
discrepancies. Because anormative compari-
son
is
involved, such measures promised to
do abetter job than do SDR scales in distin-
guishing distortion from truth.
Most writers follow Taylor and Brown
(1988) in defining self-enhancement as an
overly positive self-evaluation. The qualifi-
cation-overly
positive-is
of
central impor-
tance, given
our
requirement
of
inaccuracy
in defining self-presentation. There
is
little
dispute
about
the fact
that
some people har-
bor overly positive self-evaluations, whereas
others are more accurate. To date, minimal
attention has been paid to underestimated
evaluations (but
see
Zuckerman &Knee,
1996).3
Self-enhancement can be demonstrat-
ed even
on
anonymous self-descriptions
(Baumeister, 1982; Brown, 1998).
As
such,
the phenomenon corresponds to the private-
audience version of SDR. Because
of
its as-
sociation with illusions rather than purpose-
ful dissimulation, little attention has been
directed
at
the public-audience version of
self-enhancement
(see
Figure 19.3). Because
self-reports vary with degree and nature
of
the audience, scores
on
self-enhancement
measures should vary to the same degree as
do SDR measures (Carey &Paulhus, 2008).
Nonetheless, that issue has attracted less in-
terest, and the following focus
is
on
distor-
tion in private self-beliefs.
Three issues have dominated the self-
enhancement literature: One is how to
meJa-
sure self-enhancement; asecond addresses
the adaptiveness
of
self-enhancement; the
third concerns the breadth and structure
of
self-enhancement.
Operationalizing
Self-Enhancement
Although the concept might seem straight-
forward, much controversy has arisen over
the choice
of
operationalization. Here we
consider
five
types
of
operationalization that
warrant special attention.
Social
Comparison
The most popular choice has been to index
self-enhancement as the tendency to view
oneself more positively
than
one views oth-
ers. Following Kwan, John, Kenny, Bond,
and Robins (2004), we refer
to
this opera-
tionalization as social comparison. Awell-
replicated body
of
research indicates that a
majority
of
people tend
to
rate themselves
as above average
on
lists
of
evaluative traits
(e.g., Alicke, 1985). If pervasive, this tenden-
cy certainly implies an illusion: After all, it
is
not possible for alarge majority
of
people
to
actually be better than average.4
To index ageneral tendency, self-
enhancement scores are typically aggregated
across awide set
of
evaluative traits. Re-
spondents may be asked for separate ratings
of self and others or, alternatively, adirect
comparison
of
themselves relative
to
the av-
erage other. Anumber
of
studies have con-
firmed
that
individuals scoring high
on
such
indexes
of
self-enhancement tend
to
be
well
adjusted (Brown, 1986; Campbell, Rudich,
&Sedikides, 2002; Kurt &Paulhus, 2008;
Taylor, Lerner, Sherman, Sage, &McDowell,
2003).
Note, however,
that
this operational-
ization makes·it difficult
to
distinguish self-
enhancement from true differences in posi-
tive traits
(Klar&
Giladi, 1999; Robins &
John, 1997b). After all, many people are ac-
tually above average,even across a large set
oftraits (Block &Colvin, 1994). In short, the
social comparison operationalization lacks a
reality criterion against which the validity
of
the self-descriptions can be evaluated.
Criterion
Discrepancy
Thislimitationledanumber
of
otherresearch-
ers
to
operationalize self-enhancement as a
criterion discrepancy,
that
is, the overestima-
tion
of
one's positivity relative
to
acredible
criterion. This category
of
measures includes
both difference scores and residual scores.
Rather than absolute values, higher numbers
indicate the degree
to
which respondents'
self-ratings exceed their criterion scores.
Almost invariably, discrepancy measures
of
self-enhancement have shown negative asso-
pf3
pf4
pf5

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504 V. SELF AND SOCIAL PROCESSES 19. Self-Presentation of Personality: An Agency-Communion Framework 505

FIGURE 19.3. Hierarchy of self-enhancement.

endorsement rates in straight-take adminis-

trations. The low endorsement rates for such

items permit room for manipulators to delib-

erately enhance impressiop.s of their agency.

Examples are "I am very brave" and "No

one is more talented than I." Such items tend

not to be claimed, even by narcissists, under

anonymous conditions. But the .endorse-

ment rate is higher under agency-motivated

conditions than under anonymous condi-

tions (Lonnqvist, Verkasalo, & Bezmenova,

The impression management scales-

Agentic and Communal Management-

appear to be most useful in tapping response

sets rather than response styles. They per-

form very well in capturing the degree of sit-

uational press to appear agentic or commu-

nal (Carey & Paulhus, 2008). Because scores

are influenced strongly by context subtleties,

these scales are not especially useful as indi-

vidual difference measurc;s. In private admin-

istrations, much of the individual-difference

variance represents actual content differences

in positive qualities.

Summary

The traditional concern in the social desir-

ability literature is with self-presentation

on questionnaires. Such concern led to the

development of numerous SDR scales mea-

suring the degree to which respondents ex-

aggerate their assets or minimize their social

deviance. The assumption is that high scores

indicate dissimulation not only on the SDR

scale, but on all other questionnaires in the

same package.

A 50-year history of structural analyses

of SDR scales repeatedly confirmed that mul-

tiple underlying concepts were being tapped.

We have argued here that a clearer under-

standing of this extensive literature emerges

from our two-level framework: audience

(public vs. private) and personality image

(agency vs. communal).

The SDR approach has been of special

interest to personality psychologists because

of their continuing reliance on self-report

questionnaires (Paulhus & Vazire, 2007;

Tracy & Robins, this volume). Nonetheless,

there remains some difficulty with confirm-

ing the degree to which SDR scales tap exag-

geration, that is, departure from reality.

SELF-ENHANCEMENT

Although the concept of self-enhancement

overlaps conceptually with SDR, its histori-

cal origins are quite distinct. It began with an

early study suggesting that positive self-biases

are maladaptive (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1939).

Forty years later, two methodologically su-

perior papers provided evidence that posi-

tive self-biases may be more adaptive than

accurate self-evaluations (Alloy & Abram-

son, 1979; Lewinsohn, Mischel, Chaplin,

& Barton, 1980). Those studies contributed

to Taylor and Brown's (1988) assertion that

positive illusions are both common and

adaptive.

Rather than SDR scales, this literature

employs measures such as social comparison

(e.g., better than average) or self-criterion

discrepancies. Because a normative compari-

son is involved, such measures promised to

do a better job than do SDR scales in distin-

guishing distortion from truth.

Most writers follow Taylor and Brown

(1988) in defining self-enhancement as an

overly positive self-evaluation. The qualifi-

cation-overly positive-is of central impor-

tance, given our requirement of inaccuracy

in defining self-presentation. There is little

dispute about the fact that some people har-

bor overly positive self-evaluations, whereas

others are more accurate. To date, minimal

attention has been paid to underestimated

evaluations (but see Zuckerman & Knee,

Self-enhancement can be demonstrat-

ed even on anonymous self-descriptions

(Baumeister, 1982; Brown, 1998). As such,

the phenomenon corresponds to the private-

audience version of SDR. Because of its as-

sociation with illusions rather than purpose-

ful dissimulation, little attention has been

directed at the public-audience version of

self-enhancement (see Figure 19.3). Because

self-reports vary with degree and nature of

the audience, scores on self-enhancement

measures should vary to the same degree as

do SDR measures (Carey & Paulhus, 2008).

Nonetheless, that issue has attracted less in-

terest, and the following focus is on distor-

tion in private self-beliefs.

Three issues have dominated the self-

enhancement literature: One is how to meJa-

sure self-enhancement; a second addresses

the adaptiveness of self-enhancement; the

third concerns the breadth and structure of

self-enhancement.

Operationalizing Self-Enhancement

Although the concept might seem straight-

forward, much controversy has arisen over

the choice of operationalization. Here we

consider five types of operationalization that

warrant special attention.

Social Comparison

The most popular choice has been to index

self-enhancement as the tendency to view

oneself more positively than one views oth-

ers. Following Kwan, John, Kenny, Bond,

and Robins (2004), we refer to this opera-

tionalization as social comparison. A well-

replicated body of research indicates that a

majority of people tend to rate themselves

as above average on lists of evaluative traits

(e.g., Alicke, 1985). If pervasive, this tenden-

cy certainly implies an illusion: After all, it is

not possible for a large majority of people to

actually be better than average. 4

To index a general tendency, self-

enhancement scores are typically aggregated

across a wide set of evaluative traits. Re-

spondents may be asked for separate ratings

of self and others or, alternatively, a direct

comparison of themselves relative to the av-

erage other. A number of studies have con-

firmed that individuals scoring high on such

indexes of self-enhancement tend to be well

adjusted (Brown, 1986; Campbell, Rudich,

& Sedikides, 2002; Kurt & Paulhus, 2008;

Taylor, Lerner, Sherman, Sage, & McDowell,

Note, however, that this operational-

ization makes· it difficult to distinguish self-

enhancement from true differences in posi-

tive traits (Klar& Giladi, 1999; Robins &

John, 1997b). After all, many people are ac-

tually above average,even across a large set

of traits (Block & Colvin, 1994). In short, the

social comparison operationalization lacks a

reality criterion against which the validity of

the self-descriptions can be evaluated.

Criterion Discrepancy

This limitation led a number of other research-

ers to operationalize self-enhancement as a

criterion discrepancy, that is, the overestima-

tion of one's positivity relative to a credible

criterion. This category of measures includes

both difference scores and residual scores.

Rather than absolute values, higher numbers

indicate the degree to which respondents'

self-ratings exceed their criterion scores.

Almost invariably, discrepancy measures of

self-enhancement have shown negative asso-

506 V. SELF AND SOCIAL PROCESSES

19. Self-Presentation of Personality: An Agency-Communion Framework 507

ciations with long-term adjustment outcomes

(e.g., Colvin, Block, & Funder, 1995; John

& Robins, 1994; Kwan, John, Kenny, Bond,

& Robins, 2004; Paulhus, 1998a; Robins

& Beer, 2001; Shedler, Mayman, & Manis,

1993: but see Bonanno et aI.., 2002).

Overclaiming Technique

The overclaiming technique (Paulhus et aI.,

2003) also emphasizes departure from real-

ity, but in a different fashion. Respondents

are asked to rate their· familiarity with a set

of persons, places, items, or events. Twenty

percent of the items are foils: That is, they

do not actually exist. Such responses can be

scored via a signal detection method to yield

both accuracy· and bias scores for each re-

spondent.

Of great practical advantage is the fact

that the departure-from-reality aspect is in-

cluded in the questionnaire along with the

self-ratings. It is represented here by the an-

swer key distinguishing real ones from foils:

That is, a familiarity rating is accurate to the

extent that real items are claimed and foils

are disclaimed.

The original overclaimin.g questionnaire

comprised academic items such as philoso-

phy, history, literature, and science. On these

items, the accuracy index correlated sub-

stantially with IQ scores, whereas the bias

index correlated moderately with trait self-

enhancement measures such as narcissism

(Paulhus et aI., 2003). When the items con-

cerned lay topics such as sports, music, films,

etc., the bias link was subtler. Correlations

with narcissism were significant only for top-

ics that the respondent valued.

Krueger's Method

This method might be called the idiosyncrat-

ic weighting method (Krueger, 1998; Sinha

& Krueger, 1998). Each participant's self-

ratings are correlated with his or her desir-

ability ratings of the same items. Effectively,

the method weights each rating by the desir-

ability as judged by the rater. Other methods

assume implicitly that the social consensus

regarding the social desirability of each item

within a test is shared by all respondents.

The method also has the advantage of

adaptability because the weights can be ad-

justed to address context differences. For ex-

ample, judgments of social desirability differ

substantially across home, school, and lei-

sure contexts.

Kwan's Method

Three other operationalizations of self-

enhancement warrant mention here. Kwan's

method (K wan et aI., 2004) utilizes the statis-

tical sophistication of Kenny's (1994) social

relations model. The technique decomposes

self-perception into perceiver effect, target

effect, and unique self-perception compo-

nents.

The method is superior in controlling

for complex contamination factors inherent

in its competitors. The downside of this tech-

nique is that it can be applied only to round-

robin ratings: That is, all participants have to

rate each other.

Adaptireness of Self-Enhancement

Taylor and Brown's (1988) claim tor the

adaptiveness of self-enhancement ("posi-

tive illusions") was supported by research

such as the Brown (1986) study: He showed

that individuals who claimed to be above

average across a wide variety of traits also

scored' high on a standard self-esteem scale.

A number of subsequent studies have shown

the same pattern of adaptive outcomes (e.g.,

Campbell et aI., 2002; Sedikides, Rudich,

Gregg, Kumashiro, & Rusbult, 2004).

The Taylor-Brown proposition con-

flicted directly with traditional conceptions

of mental health that emphasize the impor-

tance of perceiving oneself accurately (e.g.,

Allport, 1960; Jahoda, 1958). Critics of

Taylor and Brown have tended to side with

the more traditional view. In their compre-

hensive rebuttal, for example, Colvin and

Block (1994) disputed both the logic and

evidence presented for the adaptive value

of self-enhancement. They acknowledged

that positive illusions might be helpful in

mood regulation and, therefore, might pro-

vide temporary relief from negative affect.

Unacceptable to these critics was the no-

tion that self-enhancement had sustained

benefits.

To dispute the putative evidence, critics

cited several specific faults with many of the

studies cited by Taylor and Brown (1988).

First was their use of the social comparison

operationalization, which lacks a reality cri-

terion against which the validity of the self-

descriptions can be evaluated (Robins &

John, 1997b).

Critics also pointed to the problem of

using self-report outcomes when studying

self-report predictors. If individual differ-

ences in self-favorability bias contaminate

both the predictor and outcome, this com-

mon method variance would induce an arti-

factual positive correlation (Colvin & Block,

1994). For that reason, many critics have in-

sisted that adaptiveness criteria be indepen-

dent external measures, such as peer-rated

adjustment (Paulhus, 1998a), expert ratings

of adjustment (Colvin et aI., 1995; Robins &

John, 1997b), or school grades (Gramzow,

Elliot, Asher, & McGregor, 2003; Robins &

Beer, 2001).

Finally, a combination of the above two

problems introduces an artifactual associa-

tion even when hard outcome measures are

used. If self-enhancement is operationalized

by self-report (e.g., the social comparison in-

dex), then high scores represent a composite

of true positive traits. But positive traits are

known to yield objectively better life out-

comes, including good adjustment (Block,

2002; Colvin & Block, 1994).

Such criticism led many researchers to

turn to the criterion-discrepancy operation-

alization of self-enhancement. 5 When exter-

nal criteria were used to evaluate outcomes,

discrepancy measures of self-enhancement

showed long-term maladaptive outcomes

(e.g., Colvin et aI., 1995; John & Robins,

1994; Paulhus, 1998a; Robins & Beer, 2001;

Shedler et aI., 1993). It is worth reviewing

the key studies reported by critics.

Key Studies

The first empirical response to Taylor and

Brown (1988) was the John and Robins

(1994) study of performance in a group

task. Each participant's self-rated perfor-

mance was compared against two criterion

measures: (1) others' ratings of the target's

performance and (2) a concrete measure of

success (money earned in the group exer-

cise). The discrepancy between self-ratings

and the two criterion measures provided

concrete indicators of self-enhancement.

Results showed that higher scores on both

indicators were negatively associated with

ratings of adjustment by 11 trained psychol-

ogists.

Colvin and colleagues (1995) went

further to conduct two longitudinal stud-

ies and a laboratory study. They assessed

self-enhancement by comparing partici-

pants' self-evaluations with trained exam-

iners' assessments of their personalities.

Self-enhancement scores were then corre-

lated with evaluations of adjustment from

another set of trained observers. Results of

their longitudinal studies showed that self-

enhancement was associated with poor so-

cial skills and psychological maladjustment 5

years before and 5 years after the assessment

of self-enhancement. The laboratory study

showed that, in a confrontational situation,

self-enhancers were rated negatively by both

expert raters and peers.

Even with the discrepancy operation-

alization, however, the outcomes of self-

enhancement are not uniformly negative. For

example, Paulhus (1998a) investigated reac-

tions to self-enhancers in two longitudinal

studies where small groups met weekly for

a total of 7 weeks. Results showed that, al-

though high self-enhancers were initially per-

ceived favorably, those perceptions became

more and more negative over time. Paulhus

concluded that self-enhancing tendencies

were a "mixed blessing" (p. 1207).

This mixed blessing was also evident in

later research reported by Robins and Beer

(2001). In two studies, they showed that

self-enhancing tendencies had short-term af-

fective benefits. However, long-term damage

was wrought to self-esteem and academic en-

gagement as disconfirmation of overly posi-

tive self-assessments became evident. On ob-

jective indicators of academic performance,

self-enhancement failed to predict higher

academic performance or higher graduation

rates. Gramzow and colleagues (2002) also

used college grades as the outcome criterion.

In two studies, higher discrepancies between

reported and actual grade-point average

(GPA) predicted poorer grades in the cur-

rent course. Even with concrete behavioral

criteria, then, the research seems to dispute

claims that self-enhancement has any long~

term adaptive outcomes.

510 V. SELF AND SOCIAL PROCESSES

19. Self-Presentation of Personality: An Agency-Communion Framework 511

dicators of departure from reality. That is,

high scores on both factors involve overly

positive self-descriptions.

Since publication of the Paulhus and

John (1998) paper, attention to agentic and

communal aspects of self-presentation has

burgeoned. For example, Campbell and col-

leaguest (2002) utilized the distinction to

clarify the difference between self-esteem

and narcissism. Others have applied it to

examining cultural differences in the struc-

ture of self-enhancement (Church et aI.,

2006; Kurman, 2001; Yik, Bond, & Paul-

hus, 1998). In search of a mechanism, Diji-

kic, Peterson, and Zelano (2005) found that

memory distortion is greater for agentic than

for communal self-enhancers. A variety of

other self-enhancement behaviors have been

shown to depend on the agency-eommunion

distinction (Lonnqvist et aI., 2007; Pauls &

Stemmler, 2003).

FINAL CONCLUSIONS

The vast research on self-presentation is scat-

tered across the literatures on social, clinical,

and industrial-organizational psychology as

well as personality, per see Even within the

latter, the literature is enormous and dis-

connected. In this chapter, we have tried to

integrate the disconnected units within a

two-level model. The first facet turns on the

nature of the audience: public versus private.

The second facet concerns the content of the

image presented: People tend to offer images

consistent with some combination of agen-

tic qualities (strong, competent, clever) and

communal qualities (cooperative, warm, du-

tiful). ,_

That two-level model allowed us to

organize three domains of research on self-

presentation: socially desirable responding,

self-enhancement, and, to a lesser extent,

underlying cognitive processes. Resonating

throughout the chapter is the historical fail-

ure of researchers to recognize the complex

nature of positivity. Individuals motivated

to self-present do not all behave the same

way because the definition of positivity has

(at least) two interpretations,' and different

audiences may differentially value those two

forms of positivity.

NOTES

  1. Abbreviating the term further to "social desir- ability" leads to misleading characterizations such as "high in social desirability." That ter- minology should be reserved for labeling indi- viduals who possess desirable attributes.
  2. Unfortunately confusion has ensured from the fact that Digman (1997) referred to similar factors as Alpha and Beta.
  3. Part of the problem is where to draw the line. The same self-evaluation can be viewed as overestimated, underestimated, or accurate, depending on the choice of observer (Camp- bell & Fehr, 1990).
  4. Although impossible if everyone were refer- ring to the same dimension, individuals tend to define evaluative traits (e.g., intelligence) in idiosyncratic fashion to ensure that they score high (Dunning, 2005). In that sense, everyone can legitimately report being above average.
  5. We use the term "discrepancy" to subsume difference scores and residual scores. Rather than an absolute values, we refer to directional values, with higher numbers indicating a self- rating greater than the criterion rating.
  6. This result emerged when Conscientiousness was measured as Dutifulness rather than Am-

bition (Jackson, Paunonen, Fraboni, & Goffin,

1996). Dutifulness is most faithful, conceptu- ally and empirically, to the Communal factor (Wiggins & Trapnell, 1990).

  1. This convergence also helps to address alle- gations that discrepancy methods may be en- tirely misguided (Griffin, Murray, & Gonzalez, 1999; Zuckerman & Knee, 1996).

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