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Millennials' Economic Mobility: Trends in Occupational Mobility, Slides of Social Anthropology

The decline in economic mobility, specifically occupational mobility, among millennials compared to previous generations. The analysis is based on data from the general social surveys and focuses on the difference in occupational status between parents and their children. The findings suggest that millennials have experienced less upward mobility than previous generations, which can be attributed to the economy not providing enough opportunities for millennials in white-collar and professional sectors, as well as the fact that millennials come from more accomplished parents.

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PATHWAYS | THE POVERTY AND INEQUALITY REPORT 2019
29
STATE OF TH E UNION
Americans have been worried about social
mobility for a long time. In 1982, Billy
Joel nostalgically sang, “Every child had
a pretty good shot, to get at least as far as their
old man got.” This was a reference to changes in
Allentown, Pennsylvania, a rust belt manufactur-
ing city, but of course that city stood in for all of
blue-collar America.
The early 1980s were a transitional time for
the U.S. economy. The month when Joel’s record
came out, the United States had its highest
unemployment rate since the Great Depression.1
Services had become the largest sector in the labor
market, as manufacturing depended ever more on
robots and computers.2 Inequalities in pay, fam-
ily income, and wealth had increased. Ordinary
people felt that the chance to move up the eco-
nomic ladder had passed them by; experts expected
mobility to slow.3
The purpose of this chapter is to examine
whether those born during this period—the
so-called millennials—indeed experienced less
mobility than prior generations. Although esti-
mates of trends in absolute economic mobility
have been recently reported, trends in absolute
occupational mobility—the focus of this chapter—
have not been widely reported.4
Trends in mobility
Estimates of upward mobility can be calculated by
comparing people’s current occupations with their
parents’ occupations when they were growing up.
These comparisons are based on socioeconomic
scores of occupations that measure the general
social standing of occupations. If both parents
were present and employed, mobility is the differ-
ence between the person’s current occupational
score and the weighted average of their parents’
occupational scores.5 If the father was a sole
breadwinner or the only parent in the household,
mobility is the difference between the person’s
occupational score and his score; if the mother was
a sole breadwinner or the only parent in the house-
hold, it is the difference between the person’s
occupational score and her score.6
The resulting estimates confirm that the
opportunity to move up declined across cohorts,
beginning with the earliest cohorts for which we
have full data, those born in the 1930s (Figure 1).
The decline occurred slowly and steadily through
the most recent data; for men it was nearly linear
across cohorts.
Millennials might be the first American genera-
tion to experience as much downward mobility
as upward mobility, though they are still young
enough to make up lost ground. Among Ameri-
cans born in the late 1980s, 44 percent were in
jobs with higher socioeconomic status than their
parents, and 49 percent were in jobs with lower
socioeconomic status than their parents (5%
matched their parents’ status).
Although millennials are distinctive in the
KEY FINDINGS
American men and women born since 1980—the millennials—have been less upwardly mobile than
previous generations of Americans.
The growth of white-collar and professional employment resulted in relatively high occupational status
for the parents of millennials. Because that transition raised parents’ status, it set a higher target for
millennials to hit.
This target is not frequently hit, in part because the economy is not providing enough opportunities for
millennials in the white-collar and professional sectors.
SOCIAL MOBILITY
Michael Hout
pf3
pf4

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STATE OF TH E U N ION^29

A

mericans have been worried about social mobility for a long time. In 1982, Billy Joel nostalgically sang, “Every child had a pretty good shot, to get at least as far as their old man got.” This was a reference to changes in Allentown, Pennsylvania, a rust belt manufactur- ing city, but of course that city stood in for all of blue-collar America. The early 1980s were a transitional time for the U.S. economy. The month when Joel’s record came out, the United States had its highest unemployment rate since the Great Depression.^1 Services had become the largest sector in the labor market, as manufacturing depended ever more on robots and computers.^2 Inequalities in pay, fam- ily income, and wealth had increased. Ordinary people felt that the chance to move up the eco- nomic ladder had passed them by; experts expected mobility to slow.^3 The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether those born during this period—the so-called millennials—indeed experienced less mobility than prior generations. Although esti- mates of trends in absolute economic mobility have been recently reported, trends in absolute occupational mobility—the focus of this chapter— have not been widely reported.^4

Trends in mobility

Estimates of upward mobility can be calculated by comparing people’s current occupations with their parents’ occupations when they were growing up. These comparisons are based on socioeconomic scores of occupations that measure the general social standing of occupations. If both parents were present and employed, mobility is the differ- ence between the person’s current occupational score and the weighted average of their parents’ occupational scores.^5 If the father was a sole breadwinner or the only parent in the household, mobility is the difference between the person’s occupational score and his score; if the mother was a sole breadwinner or the only parent in the house- hold, it is the difference between the person’s occupational score and her score.^6 The resulting estimates confirm that the opportunity to move up declined across cohorts, beginning with the earliest cohorts for which we have full data, those born in the 1930s (Figure 1). The decline occurred slowly and steadily through the most recent data; for men it was nearly linear across cohorts. Millennials might be the first American genera- tion to experience as much downward mobility as upward mobility, though they are still young enough to make up lost ground. Among Ameri- cans born in the late 1980s, 44 percent were in jobs with higher socioeconomic status than their parents, and 49 percent were in jobs with lower socioeconomic status than their parents (5% matched their parents’ status). Although millennials are distinctive in the

KEY FINDINGS

  • American men and women born since 1980—the millennials—have been less upwardly mobile than previous generations of Americans.
  • The growth of white-collar and professional employment resulted in relatively high occupational status for the parents of millennials. Because that transition raised parents’ status, it set a higher target for millennials to hit.
  • This target is not frequently hit, in part because the economy is not providing enough opportunities for millennials in the white-collar and professional sectors.

SOCIAL MOBILITY

Michael Hout

Figure 1. Millennials experience less upward mobility than previous generations. Figure 2. The occupational status of millennials dropped despite their higher-status origins. Note: People 25–74 years old, raised in the United States, and born 1910–1990. Excluding people whose parents worked in agriculture. Source data on both parents: General Social Surveys, 1994–2016; source data on fathers: General Social Surveys, 1972–2016. Both parents’ combined socioeconomic index Father’s socioeconomic index Note: People 28–32 years old, raised in the United States, and born 1950–1990. Excluding people whose parents worked in agriculture. Source data on both parents: General Social Surveys, 1994–2016; source data on fathers: General Social Surveys, 1972–2016. 70 60 50 30 40 1910 1930 1950 1970 19901910 1930 1950 1970 1990 Upwardly mobile relative to parent status (%) Men^ Women Year of birth Men Women Year of birth Parent(s) 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 48 46 42 44 Socioeconomic index at age 30 sense that they are probably experiencing less mobility than prior generations, there is nothing in Figure 1 suggesting a qualitative break in the trend line for millennials. Rather, Figure 1 sug- gests an ongoing decline in upward mobility, a decline that predates the entry of millennials into the labor market. Are there gender differences in the trend? For men, the birth cohorts around 1930 had upward mobility rates of about 62 percent, after which there was an 18 percentage-point drop over the full time series. For women, the decline is less prominent. Women born since the mid-1960s have experienced about the same upward mobility as men born in the same year; for earlier cohorts, women had substantially less upward mobil- ity than men. This makes for a less precipitous decline for women than for men. Older data included information about father’s occupation but not mother’s occupation. The lon- ger time series based on fathers (shown in Figure 1 with dotted lines) indicates that men’s upward mobility increased for cohorts born between 1910 and 1930, and women’s upward mobility increased for cohorts born between 1910 and 1948. The evidence is pretty clear that the most upwardly mobile cohort of American men was born during the Great Depression; the most upwardly mobile women were early baby boomers. The men born during the Depression turned 30 years old in the early-to-mid-1960s; the women born early in the baby boom entered the workforce as women’s employment began to diversify and women often benefited from unprecedented opportunities.^7

What accounts for these trends?

The preceding gross mobility trends reflect four factors. They reflect, perhaps most important, trends in the status of jobs: Did the available jobs in the U.S. become higher or lower status over time? They also reflect the status of parents’ occupations, age differences between parents and children (at the time of measuring mobility), and, crucially, the degree to which occupational outcomes depend on parents’ status.^8 In other words, millennials may be less upwardly mobile than baby boomers because (a) the economy is not supporting an ongoing increase in occupational status to the extent that it once was, (b) the millen- nials come from more accomplished parents than did baby boomers (thus making it more difficult to surpass them), (c) the millennials are younger and just starting out in the world of work (and hence

set by their parents. The upshot is that millennials are facing challenges on many fronts. We have no evidence, it should be stressed, of change in intergenerational persistence slopes within any of these family subgroups (two earner, father only, mother only).^10 The problem that the millennials face—when it comes to intergenera- tional persistence—is wholly a compositional one in the sense that millennials increasingly emanate from a type of family (i.e., mother only) that is characterized by reduced persistence.

Conclusions

At least since the 1980s, Americans have wor- ried that the United States is no longer the “land of opportunity” it once was. Data presented here show a slow, steady decline in the probability of moving up. Even for the most mobile cohorts, upward mobility was far from universal—only about 60 percent of men born in the 1930s had better jobs than their parents. This translates into a mobility problem for millennials. The growth of white-collar and professional employment was a major factor in past mobility and resulted in relatively high occupational status for the parents of millennials. Because that transition raised parents’ status, it set a higher target for millennials to hit. When it comes to absolute mobility, a key prob- lem that millennials face is thus the success of their parents. Although we usually think it’s good for children to be born into privilege, it poses an absolute mobility problem in an economy, such as our own, that is not generating enough ongo- ing occupational upgrading. Without this ongoing growth, it is now especially difficult to ensure that the current generation does better than the one preceding it. Michael Hout is Professor of Sociology at New York University.

Data

All data are from the General Social Survey (GSS), a biennial survey of a representative sample of U.S. households. Employed people answer these questions: “What kind of work do you do? That is, what is your job called? What do you actually do in that job? Tell me, what are some of your main duties?” Formerly employed people answer similar questions asked in the past tense. Total sample size was 20,509; for single-year cohorts, samples were between 69 and 625. All data were smoothed using locally estimated regression (LOWESS) methods because the sampling errors varied so much in the observed data. Details about occupational coding and family types are in Hout, 2018.

Notes

  1. Hout, Michael, Asaf Levanon, and Erin Cumberworth. 2012. “Job Loss and Unemployment.” In The Great Recession , eds. David B. Grusky, Bruce Western, and Christopher Wimer. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 59–80.
  2. Fernandez, Roberto M. 2001. “Skill Biased Technological Change and Wage Inequality: Evidence from a Plant Retooling.” American Journal of Sociology 107, 273-320.
  3. See Hout, Michael. 2004. “How Inequality May Affect Intergenerational Mobility.” In Social Inequality , ed. Kathryn M. Neckerman, Ch. 26, for a dissenting view. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
  4. See Chetty, Raj, David B. Grusky, Maximilian Hell, Nathaniel Hendren, Robert Manduca, and Jimmy Narang. 2017. “The Fading American Dream: Trends in Absolute Income Mobility Since 1940.” Science 356(6336), 398–406.
  5. Hout, Michael. 2018. “Americans’ Occupational Status Reflects the Status of Both of Their Parents.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 115 (38), 9527–9532.
  6. Occupational scores for farmers are controversial, so the calculations exclude people whose parents were farmers.
  7. England, Paula, Andrew Levine, and Emma Mishel. 2019. “Is the Gender Revolution Stalled? An Update.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences , forthcoming.
  8. Hout, Michael. 2015. “A Summary of What We Know About Social Mobility.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 657, 27–36.
  9. Hout, 2015.
  10. Hout, 2018.