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SOUTH DAKOTA v. DOLE
Syllabus
SOUTH DAKOTA v. DOLE, SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS (^) FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT No. 86-260. Argued April 28, 1987-Decided June 23, 1987
Title 23 U. S. C. § 158 (1982 ed., Supp. III) directs the Secretary of Trans- portation to withhold a percentage of otherwise allocable federal high- way funds from States "in which the purchase or public possession ... of any alcoholic beverage by a person who is less than twenty-one years of age is lawful." South Dakota, which permits persons 19 years old or older to purchase beer containing up to 3.2% alcohol, sued in Federal District Court for a declaratory judgment that § 158 violates the con- stitutional limitations on congressional exercise of the spending power under Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, of the Constitution and violates the Twenty-first Amendment. The District Court rejected the State's claims, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: Even if Congress, in view of the Twenty-first Amendment, might lack the power to impose directly a national minimum drinking age (a question not decided here), § 158's indirect encouragement of state action to obtain uniformity in the States' drinking ages is a valid use of the spending power. Pp. 206-212. (a) Incident to the spending power, Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds. However, exercise of the power is sub- ject to certain restrictions, including that it must be in pursuit of "the general welfare." Section 158 is consistent with such restriction, since the means chosen by Congress to address a dangerous situation-the in- terstate problem resulting from the incentive, created by differing state drinking ages, for young persons to combine drinking and driving-were reasonably calculated to advance the general welfare. Section 158 also is consistent with the spending power restrictions that, if Congress de- sires to condition the States' receipt of federal funds, it must do so un- ambiguously, enabling the States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation; and that conditions on federal grants must be related to a national concern (safe interstate travel here). Pp. 206-209. (b) Nor is § 158 invalidated by the spending power limitation that the conditional grant of federal funds must not be independently barred by other constitutional provisions (the Twenty-first Amendment here). Such limitation is not a prohibition on the indirect achievement of objec-
OCTOBER TERM, 1986
Syllabus 483 U. S.
tives which Congress is not empowered to achieve directly, but, instead, means that the power may not be used to induce the States to^ engage^ in activities that would themselves be unconstitutional. Here, if South Dakota were to succumb to Congress' blandishments and^ raise^ its^ drink- ing age to 21, its action would not violate anyone's constitutional^ rights. Moreover, the relatively small financial inducement offered^ by^ Con- gress here-resulting from the State's loss of only 5%^ of^ federal^ funds otherwise obtainable^ under certain^ highway^ grant^ programs-is^ not^ so coercive as to pass the point at which pressure turns into compulsion. Pp. 209-212. 791 F. 2d 628, affirmed.
REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, STEVENS, and SCALIA, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., post, p. 212, and O'CONNOR, J., post, p. 212, filed dissenting opinions.
Roger A. Tellinghuisen, Attorney General^ of^ South^ Da- kota, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Craig M. Eichstadt, Assistant Attorney^ General. Deputy Solicitor General Cohen argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Willard, Andrew J. Pin- cus, Leonard Schaitman, and Robert V. Zener.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Colo- rado et al. by Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr.,^ Attorney^ General^ of^ Ohio,^ Wil- liam Damsel and Shawn H. Nan, Assistant Attorneys^ General,^ Joel S. Taylor, and Nancy J. Miller, joined by^ the Attorneys^ General^ for^ their respective States as^ follows:^ Duane^ Woodard^ of^ Colorado,^ Warren^ Price HI of Hawaii, Robert T.^ Stephan^ of^ Kansas,^ William^ J.^ Guste,^ Jr.,^ of^ Loui- siana, Mike Greely of Montana,^ T.^ Travis^ Medlock^ of^ South^ Carolina,^ W.^ J. Michael Cody of Tennessee, Jeffrey L. Amestoy of Vermont, and Joseph B. Meyer of^ Wyoming;^ for^ the^ Mountain^ States^ Legal^ Foundation^ et^ al.^ by Hal Stratton, Attorney General of New Mexico,^ Constance^ E.^ Brooks,^ and Casey Shpall; for the National Conference of State Legislatures et al.^ by Benna Ruth Solomon, Beate Bloch, and Larry L.^ Simms;^ for^ the^ National Beer Wholesalers' Association et^ al.^ by^ E.^ Barrett Prettyman,^ Jr.,^ John G. Roberts, Jr., and John F.^ Stasiowski;^ and^ for Phillip^ J.^ MacDonnell et al. by Morton Siegel,^ Michael^ A.^ Moses,^ Richard^ G.^ Schoenstadt,^ and James L. Webster. Briefs of amici curiae urging^ affirmance^ were^ filed^ for^ the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety et al. by Andrew R. Hricko, Michele McDow-
OCTOBER TERM, (^1986)
Opinion of the Court 483 U. S.
that core power. The Secretary in response asserts that the Twenty-first Amendment is simply not implicated by § 158; the plain language of § 2 confirms the States' broad power to impose restrictions on the sale and distribution of alcoholic beverages but does not confer on them any power to permit sales that Congress seeks to prohibit. Brief for Respond- ent 25-26. That Amendment, under this reasoning, would not prevent Congress from affirmatively enacting a national minimum drinking age more restrictive than that provided by the various state laws; and it would follow a fortiori that the indirect inducement involved here is compatible with the Twenty-first Amendment. These arguments present questions of the meaning of the Twenty-first Amendment, the bounds of which have escaped precise definition. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U. S. 263, 274-276 (1984); Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 206 (1976). Despite the extended (^) treatment of the question by the parties, however, (^) we need not decide in this case whether that Amendment would prohibit an attempt by Congress to legislate directly a national minimum drinking age. Here, Congress has acted indirectly under its spending power to encourage uniformity in the States' drinking ages. As we explain below, we find this legislative effort within constitu- tional bounds even if Congress may not regulate drinking ages directly. The Constitution empowers Congress to "lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States." Art. I, §8, cl. 1. Incident to this power, Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds, and has repeatedly employed the power "to further broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient with federal statu- tory and administrative directives." Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 474 (1980) (opinion of Burger, C. J.). See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563, 569 (1974); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U. S. 275, 295 (1958); Oklahoma
SOUTH DAKOTA v. DOLE
203 Opinion of the Court
v. Civil Service Comm'n, 330 U. S. 127, 143-144 (1947); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548 (1937). The breadth of this power was made clear in United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 66 (1936), where the Court, resolving a longstanding debate over the scope of the Spending Clause, determined that "the power of Congress to authorize expen- diture of public moneys for public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitu- tion." Thus, objectives not thought to be within Article I's "enumerated (^) legislative (^) fields," id., (^) at 65, may (^) nevertheless be attained through the use of the spending power and the conditional grant of federal funds. The spending power is of course not unlimited, Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17, and n. 13 (1981), but is instead subject to several general re- strictions articulated in our cases. (^) The first of these limita- tions is derived from the language of the Constitution itself: the exercise of the spending power must be in pursuit of "the general welfare." See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619, 640-641 (1937); United States v. Butler, supra, at 65. In considering whether a particular expenditure is intended to serve general public purposes, courts should defer sub- stantially to the judgment of Congress. Helvering v. Davis, supra, at 640, 645.2 Second, we have required that if Con- gress desires to condition the States' receipt of federal funds, it "must do so unambiguously... , enabl[ing] the States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the conse- quences of their participation." PennhurstState School and Hospital v. Halderman, supra, at 17. Third, our cases have suggested (without significant elaboration) that conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated "to the federal interest in particular national projects or pro- grams." Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U. S. 444, 461 (^2) The level of deference to the congressional decision is such that the Court has more recently questioned whether "general welfare" is a judi- cially enforceable restriction at all. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 90-91 (1976) (per curiam).
SOUTH DAKOTA v. DOLE
203 Opinion of the Court
This goal of the interstate highway system had been frus- trated by varying drinking (^) ages among the States. A Presi- dential commission appointed to (^) study alcohol-related acci- dents and fatalities on the Nation's (^) highways concluded that the (^) lack of uniformity in the States' drinking ages created (^) "an incentive to drink and drive" (^) because "young persons com- mut[e] to border States where (^) the drinking age is lower." Presidential Commission on (^) Drunk Driving, Final Report 11 (1983). By enacting § 158, (^) Congress conditioned the receipt of federal funds in a way (^) reasonably calculated to address this particular (^) impediment to a purpose for which the funds are expended. The remaining question about the (^) validity of § 158-and the basic (^) point of disagreement between the parties -is whether the Twenty-first Amendment constitutes (^) an "independent constitutional bar" to the conditional (^) grant of federal funds. Lawrence County (^) v. Lead-Deadwood School Dist., supra, at 269-270. (^) Petitioner, relying on its view that the Twenty- first Amendment (^) prohibits direct regulation of drinking ages by Congress, asserts that "Congress (^) may not use the spend- ing power (^) to regulate that which it is prohibited from regu- lating (^) directly under the Twenty-first Amendment." Brief for Petitioner (^) 52-53. But our cases show that this "inde- pendent constitutional bar" (^) limitation on the spending power is not of the kind petitioner (^) suggests. United States v. But- ler, supra, (^) at 66, for example, established that the constitu- tional limitations (^) on Congress when exercising its spending power are less exacting than those on (^) its authority to regulate directly.
rectly to the purpose of the expenditure (^) to which it is attached. See Brief for National Conference (^) of State Legislatures et al. as Amici Curiae 10. Because petitioner (^) has not sought such a restriction, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 19-21, and because (^) we find any such limitation on conditional federal grants satisfied in this case in any event, we do not address whether (^) conditions less directly related to the particular purpose of the expenditure might be outside the bounds of the spending power.
OCTOBER TERM, 1986
Opinion of the Court 483 U. S.
We have also held that a perceived Tenth Amendment limi-
tation on congressional regulation of state affairs did not con-
comitantly limit the range of conditions legitimately placed
on federal grants. In Oklahoma v. Civil Service Comm'n,
330 U. S. 127 (1947), the Court considered the validity of
the Hatch Act insofar as it was applied to political activities
of state officials whose employment was financed in whole or
in part with federal funds. The State contended that an
order under this provision to withhold certain federal funds
unless a state official was removed invaded its sovereignty
in violation of the Tenth Amendment. Though finding that
"the United States is not concerned with, and has no power
to regulate, local political activities as such of state officials,"
the Court nevertheless held that the Federal Government
"does have power to fix the terms upon which its money allot-
ments to states shall be disbursed." Id., at 143. The Court
found no violation of the State's sovereignty because the
State could, and did, adopt "the 'simple expedient' of not
yielding to what she urges is federal coercion. The offer
of benefits to a state by the United States dependent upon
cooperation by the state with federal plans, assumedly for
the general welfare, is not unusual." Id., at 143-144 (cita-
tion omitted). See also Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301
U. S., at 595 ("There is only a condition which the state
is free at pleasure to disregard or to fulfill"); Massachusetts
v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 482 (1923).
These cases establish that the "independent constitutional
bar" limitation on the spending power is not, as petitioner
suggests, a prohibition on the indirect achievement of objec-
tives which Congress is not empowered to achieve directly.
Instead, we think that the language in our earlier opinions
stands for the unexceptionable proposition that the power
may not be used to induce the States to engage in activities
that would themselves be unconstitutional. Thus, for exam-
ple, a grant of federal funds conditioned on invidiously dis-
criminatory state action or the infliction of cruel and unusual
punishment would be an illegitimate exercise of the Con-
OCTOBER TERM, 1986
O'CONNOR, J., dissenting 483 U. S.
ory but in fact. Even if Congress might lack the power to impose a national minimum drinking age directly, we con- clude that encouragement to^ state^ action^ found^ in^ §^158 is^ a valid use of the spending^ power.^ Accordingly,^ the^ judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting.
I agree with JUSTICE O'CONNOR that regulation of the
minimum age^ of^ purchasers^ of^ liquor^ falls^ squarely^ within^ the ambit of those powers reserved to the States^ by^ the^ Twenty- first Amendment. See post, at 218. Since States^ possess this constitutional power, Congress cannot condition a fed- eral grant in a manner that abridges this right. The^ Amend- ment, itself, strikes the proper balance between federal and state authority. I therefore dissent.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, dissenting. The Court today upholds the National Minimum Drinking Age Amendment, 23 U. S. C. § 158 (1982 ed., Supp. III),^ as^ a valid exercise^ of^ the^ spending power^ conferred^ by Article^ I, § 8. But^ §^158 is^ not^ a^ condition^ on^ spending^ reasonably^ re- lated to the expenditure of federal funds and cannot be justi- fied on that ground. Rather, it is an attempt to^ regulate^ the sale of liquor, an^ attempt^ that^ lies^ outside^ Congress'^ power^ to regulate commerce because it falls within the ambit of § 2 of the Twenty-first^ Amendment. My disagreement with^ the^ Court^ is^ relatively narrow^ on the spending power issue: it is a disagreement about^ the^ ap- plication of a principle rather than a disagreement on^ the principle itself. I agree with the Court that Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds to further "the federal interest in particular national projects or pro- grams." Massachusettsv. United States, 435 U. S. 444, 461 (1978); see Oklahoma^ v.^ Civil^ Service^ Comm'n,^^330 U.^ S. 127, 143-144 (1947); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548 (1937). I also subscribe to the established proposition
SOUTH DAKOTA v. DOLE
203 O'CONNOR, J., dissenting
that the reach of the spending power "is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution." United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 66 (1936). Finally, I agree that there are four separate types of limitations on the spending power: the expenditure must be for the general welfare, Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619, 640-641 (1937), the conditions imposed must be unambiguous, Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17 (1981), they must be reasonably related to the purpose of the expenditure, Massachusetts v. United States, supra, at 461, and the legislation may not violate any independent con- stitutional prohibition, Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School Dist., 469 U. S. 256, 269-270 (1985). Ante, at 207-
- Insofar as two of those limitations are concerned, the Court is clearly correct that § 158 is wholly unobjectionable. Establishment of a national minimum drinking age certainly fits within the broad concept of the general welfare and the statute is entirely unambiguous. I am also willing to as- sume, arguendo, that the Twenty-first Amendment does not constitute an "independent constitutional bar" to a spending condition. See ante, at 209-211. But the Court's application of the requirement that the condition imposed be reasonably related to the purpose for which the funds are expended is cursory and unconvincing. We have repeatedly said that Congress may condition grants under the spending power only in ways reasonably related to the purpose of the federal program. Massachusetts v. United States, supra, at 461; Ivanhoe IrrigationDist. v. Mc- Cracken, 357 U. S. 275, 295 (1958) (the United States may impose "reasonable conditions relevant to federal interest in the project and to the over-all objectives thereof"); Stew- ard Machine Co. v. Davis, supra, at 590 ("We do not say that a tax is valid, when imposed by act of Congress, if it is laid upon the condition that a state may escape its operation through the adoption of a statute unrelated in^ subject^ matter to activities fairly within the scope of national policy and power"). In my view, establishment of a minimum drinking
SOUTH DAKOTA v. DOLE
203 O'CONNOR, J., dissenting
terstate highways. It is under-inclusive because teenagers pose only a small part of^ the^ drunken^ driving^ problem^ in^ this Nation. See, e. g., 130 Cong. Rec. 18648 (1984) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) ("Eighty-four percent of all highway fatali- ties involving alcohol occur among those whose ages exceed 21"); id., at 18651 (remarks of Sen. McClure) ("Certainly, statistically, if you use that one^ set^ of^ statistics,^ then the mandatory drinking age ought to be raised at least to 30"); ibid.^ (remarks^ of^ Sen.^ Symms)^ ("[M]ost^ of^ the^ stud- ies point out that the drivers of age 21-24 are the^ worst offenders"). When Congress appropriates money to build a highway, it is entitled to insist that the highway be a safe one. But it is not entitled to insist as a condition of the use of high- way funds that the State impose or change regulations in other areas of the State's social and economic life because of an attenuated or^ tangential^ relationship^ to^ highway^ use or safety. Indeed, if the rule were otherwise, the Congress could effectively regulate almost any area of a State's social, political, or economic life on the theory^ that^ use^ of^ the^ inter- state transportation system is somehow enhanced. If, for example, the United States were to condition highway mon- eys upon moving the state capital, I suppose it might argue that interstate transportation^ is^ facilitated^ by^ locating^ local governments in places easily accessible to^ interstate^ high- ways-or, conversely, that highways might become overbur- dened if they had to carry traffic to and from the state capital. In my mind, such a relationship is hardly more attenuated than the one which the Court finds supports § 158. Cf. Tr. of Oral Arg. 39 (counsel for the United States conceding that^ to condition a grant upon adoption of a unicameral legislature would violate the "germaneness" requirement). There is a clear place at which the Court can draw the line between permissible^ and^ impermissible^ conditions^ on^ federal grants. It is the line identified in the Brief for the National Conference of State Legislatures et al. as Amici Curiae:
OCTOBER (^) TERM, 1986
O'CONNOR, (^) J., dissenting 483 U. S.
"Congress has the power to spend for the (^) general wel- fare, (^) it has the power to legislate only for delegated purposes.... "The appropriate (^) inquiry, then, is whether the spend- ing requirement or prohibition is a condition (^) on a grant or whether it is regulation. (^) The difference turns on whether the requirement (^) specifies in some way how the money should be spent, so that Congress' (^) intent in mak- ing the grant will be (^) effectuated. Congress has no power (^) under the Spending Clause to impose require- ments on a grant that go beyond (^) specifying how the money should (^) be spent. A requirement that is not such a specification is not a condition, but a regulation, (^) which is valid only if it falls within (^) one of Congress' delegated regulatory powers." Id., at 19-20.
This approach harks back to United (^) States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1 (1936), the last case in which this Court (^) struck down an Act of Congress as beyond the authority (^) granted by the Spending Clause. There the Court wrote that "[t]here (^) is an obvious difference (^) between a statute stating the condi- tions upon which moneys shall be expended (^) and one effective only upon assumption (^) of a contractual obligation to submit to a regulation which otherwise (^) could not be enforced." Id., at 73. The Butler Court saw the Agricultural (^) Adjustment Act for what (^) it was -an exercise of regulatory, not spend- ing, power. The error in Butler (^) was not the Court's conclu- sion that the Act was essentially regulatory, but rather its crabbed view of the extent (^) of Congress' regulatory power under the Commerce Clause. (^) The Agricultural Adjustment Act was regulatory but it was regulation that today would likely be considered (^) within Congress' commerce power. See, e. (^) g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U. S. 294 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111 (1942). While Butler's authority is questionable insofar as it as- sumes that Congress has no regulatory power over (^) farm pro-
OCTOBER TERM, 1986
O'CONNOR, J., dissenting 483 U. S.
This case, however, falls into neither class. As discussed above, a condition that a State will raise its drinking (^) age to 21 cannot fairly be said to be reasonably (^) related to the ex- penditure of funds for highway (^) construction. The only possi- ble connection, highway safety, (^) has nothing to do with how the funds Congress has appropriated are expended. Rather than a condition determining (^) how federal highway money shall be expended, (^) it is a regulation determining who shall be able to drink (^) liquor. As such it is not justified by the spend- ing power. Of the other possible sources of congressional authority for regulating the sale of liquor only the commerce power comes to mind. But in my view, the regulation of the age of the purchasers of liquor, just as the regulation of the price at which liquor may be sold, falls squarely within the (^) scope of those powers reserved to the States by the Twenty-first Amendment. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U. S. 691, 716 (1984). As I emphasized in 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U. S. 335, 356 (1987) (dissenting opinion):
"The history of the Amendment (^) strongly supports Jus- tice Black's view that the Twenty-first Amendment was intended to return absolute control of the liquor trade to the States, (^) and that the Federal Government could not use its Commerce Clause powers to interfere in any manner with the States' exercise of the power conferred by the Amendment."
Accordingly, Congress simply lacks (^) power under the Com- merce Clause to displace state regulation of this kind. Ibid. The immense size and power of the Government of the United States ought not obscure its fundamental (^) character. It remains a Government of enumerated (^) powers. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 405 (1819). Because 23 U. S. C. § 158 (1982 ed., Supp. III) cannot be justified as an exercise of any power delegated to the Congress, it is not authorized by the Constitution. The Court errs in holding it to be the law of (^) the land, and I respectfully dissent.
