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The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences Vol.^ 7,^ No.^ 1,^1990
The Approved and Disapproved Varieties
of Ra’y (Personal Opinion) In Islam
Moharnrnud Hashirn Kimali
While Islam emphasizes conformity to the directives of the Qur’an and Sunnah, one finds in the same sources a parallel emphasis on rational inquiry, exercise of personal opinion, and judgment. This essay looks into the evidence in support of this statement and the extent to which Islam validates the freedom to formulate and express an opinioq. It also examines the methodology and criteria that ascertain the validity of personal opinion and distinguishs the acceptable ru’y from that which is not tolerated. This essay also highlights how the detailed classification of ru’y by the ‘Ulama reflects a concern for latitude and tolerance on the one hand, balanced on the other by respect for recognized authority and values which are deemed essential to Islam. Freedom to express an opinion is probably the most important aspect of the freedom of speech, which also comprises such other varieties of speech as a simple narration of facts, comedy, and fiction. To express an opinion on a matter implies a level of involvement, commitment, and competence which may or may not be present in the factual narration of an event. This may partly explain why the phrase hurrsyah ul-m), (literally, freedom of opinion) is used in the Islamic scholastic tradition for freedom of speech, in preference to hurriyuh al-quwl, the more precise equivalent of “freedom of speech.” That scholars and jurists have consistently used hurriyh ul-my for freedom of speech perhaps signifies that ray, or personal opinion, is the most important aspect of this freedom.
Ra ’y has three main classifications-praiseworthy, blameworthy, and
doubtful personal opinion-which are further subdivided. The main varieties of praiseworthy opinion to be discussed here are m), that elaborates the Qur‘an and Sunnah, the opinions of the Companions, m), that consists of ijtihiid, and ru’y that is arrived at as a result of consultation. Blameworthy opinion is also divided into three types, namely bid‘uh (pernicious innovation), h w i i (caprice), and bughy (transgression). And, lastly, ru), that is the subject of doubt (ray ji mawdi‘ ul-ishtibiih) does not lend itself to classification or ~~ Mohammad Hashim Kamali is an Associate professor in the Faculty of Law at the International Islamic University, Selangor, Malaysia.
(^40) The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences Vol. 7, No. 1, 1990
evaluation in advance, and it is this type of my which often gives rise to
disagreement (ikhtihj).
Excluded from the scope of this discussion are certain subjects such as $mah (sedition) and such other instances of the violation of the freedom of speech such as libel, slander, and contempt. These may have some bearing on the abuses of my, yet they are not directly related to the main focus of this inquiry-the extent to which freedom of speech relates to the exercise of personal opinion in Islam. Ray is defined as opinion on a matter which has not been regulated by the Qur’an or the SUM&. It is a considered opinion arrived at as a result of thinking and self-exertion on the part of the individual who explores and searches for knowledge of something, about which there may exist only signs or indications. But the existing signs are such that may lead the investigator to different conclusions. There is an element of arbitrariness attached to ruy, in the sense that it is self-inspired and unrelated to the text of the Qur’an, the SUM&, and definitive ijm3 (consensus of opinion). In the usage of the Arabs, ray is applied to things which are not seen but are known through the application of reason, intuitive judgment and the light of one’s heart. Matters which are regulated by definitive factual or rational knowledge and matters on which all the signs are bound to concur such as the number of days in a week, or the virtue of telling the truth, are thus excluded from the proper application of ray. No one is thus expected to give or formulate an opinion over factual or rational matters which require no deliberation and thought. It is also clear from the foregoing that my is founded
on signs and indications (amiiriit). Hence when a person pronounces an opinion
concerning a matter pertaining to the realm of the unseen on which there are no signs whatsoever, what he or she says is not to be regarded as ruy. In this sense, ru5) is a preliminary to knowledge in that it must take its lead from signs which are open to investigation and rational conclusions.’ A person may express an opinion, arbitrary or otherwise. So long as he does not violate the law concerning blasphemy, sedition, etc., he is free to advance an opinion. Just as the law tolerates an arbitrary opinion, the latter has a role to play in the development of ideas and the quest for knowledge and truth. Often a sound opinion is invoked and stimulated by^ a weak, provocative, or misguided one. The juris corpus of fiqh, is, in fact, the embodiment of both my and authoritative tradition, but only the latter is deemed to provide criteria on which to judge the propriety or otherwise of
my. As already noted, rayahas a limited role vis-a-vis the clear ordinances
of divine revelation. But when no such guidance is available in the sources,
‘Cf. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyah, I‘liim al-Muwaqqi‘iin ‘anRabb al- ‘Alamln, ed. Muhammad Munir al-Dimashqi, (Cairo: Id&ah al-?b$ah al-MunirTyah), 4 vols, n.d., I, 55.
42 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences Vol.^ 7,^ No.^ 1,^1990
inferenee and deduction of the rules of law from the sources by recourse to reasoning and my. firthennore, the Hadith of Mu‘adh b. Jabal (q.v., below) provides specific authority for my in juridcal matters and the settlement of disputes. The Sunnah of the Prophet and the precedent of his companions leave no doubt on the point that judges and governors were appointed to distant places with the understanding that they would rely on their personal ray and ijtihad in matters on which they could not find any guidance in the sources. But beyond the scope of specific evidence in support of ray, it will be noted that many a principle and institution of the Shari‘ah takes for granted the individual freedom to formulate and express an opinion. The right/duty of the citizen to promote good and prevent evil (amr bil-mu‘ruf wa w h y ‘an al-munkar), his or her right to give sincere advice (nasihuh) to persons in authority or to anyone else, the right to monitor government activities, the right to a vote in electing a leader, and the right to be consulted in public affairs could only materialize when a citizen enjoys the freedom to formulate and express an opinion. According to one observer, “it would be totally in vain and would make no sense to say that the government in Islam is bound by the principle of consultation and yet it should have the liberty to deny the participants of shiirii (ah1 a 1 shiirii), the freedom to express an ~pinion.”~ Similarly, it would be impossible to discharge the Qur’anic obligation of commandng good and forbidding evil without the freedom of speech and the liberty to formulate and voice an opinion. On numerous occasions we note that the Qur’an invites people to investigate and explore the world around them and to draw rational conclusions, not in the manner of blind imitators who follow and accept what others have said, but through intelligent analysis and judgment. “This would not be possible,” as Abu Zahrah observes, “without the freedom to express one’s opinion and thought.”6To this we may add the rider that the Qur’an values rational endeavor which is accompanied by sincerity in the quest for truth and justice. No intellectual inquiry may begin on the premise of denying the fundamental truth of monotheism (tawhid) and clear guidance enunciated in divine re~elation.~Provided that these values are observed, rational inquiry and the quest for truth must be maintained even in the face of hostility from the masses. For the masses may be uninformed and may themselves be in
4Cf. Malpud Shaltut, Al-Islam, ‘Aqldah wa Shan’ah (Kuwait: Matjbi’ Dir al-Qalam,
S‘Abd al-Karim^ Zaydin Majmu‘ah Buhiith Fiqhiyah (Baghdad: Maktabah al-Quds,
6MuhammadAbu Zahrah, Tan.& al-Islam li al-Mujtama‘(Cairo:Matba‘ah Mukhaymar,
’Cf. Muhammad al-Bahi, Al-Dh wa al-Dawluh (Beirut: Dir al-Fikr, 1391/1971) p. 376.
c. 1966), p. 555.
1407/1986), p. 128.
n.d.), p. 194.
M. H. Kamali The Approval and Disapproved Varieties of R a y 43
need of enlightenment. This is the purport of the Qur‘anic ayah which proclaims that once clear guidance has been given, a mere conjecture, even if promoted by the masses, should not be allowed to obstruct it (al-An‘h, 6:116). Notwithstandingthe fact that obedience to lawful government is a Qur‘anic obligation, the very text which prescribes this duty (al-Nisa’, 4:59) follows on to provide in an address to the believers “should you dispute over a matter,
then refer it to God and to the Messenger.” The Qur’an here anticipates the
possibility of disputes arising between the ruler and ruled and it affirms that the duty of obedience does not overrule the right of the citizens to take issue with their leaders and government. Disputation or Jidiil is clearly permitted in the Qur’an. Indeed it is one of the major themes, as there are 25 occasions where the sacred text is expressive of a human being’s inclination as a rational being toward argumentation.8’On one such?occasion,the Qur’an refers to the narrative of a woman, Khawlah bint Tha‘labah, wife of Aws b. Thabit, who complained to the Prophet of abuse and insult she suffered at the hands of her husband. The following Qur’anic passage was consequently revealed: ‘Allah heard the speech of the woman who disputed with you concerning her husband; she
complained to Allah and Allah heard your conversation.” (al-MujSdalah, 58:l).
The woman was consequently granted the right to separate from her
husband by a form of separation which is referred to as zihiir. In the meantime,
this iiyuh recognized the right of the individual, a woman in this case, to argue her case with the Prophetam-head of state. There are words in this iiyuh, such as tujiidiluku (disputes with you), tushtuki (complains), and ta?ziiwurukumii (your conversation) which suggest that the plaintiff expressed herself forcefully on the occasion. This is perhaps borne out by the fact that the whole of the surah which begins with this passage bears the title, al-MujSdalah (disputation). The Qur’an also contains declarations which confirm differences of opinion or ikhtihf to be an inescapable fact of social
life: “If God had willed, He would have created the people as one nation,
but they cease not disagreeing among themselves.” (Hiid, 11:118) The Qur’an is also expressive of the limits within which freedom of speech and ikhtiliif must operate. One such limit is to avoid hurting others, as the text declares:
Allah Ioves not public utterance of hurtful speech except by
one who has been wronged (al-Nid, 4:148).
But even this limit is dropped, as the text itself provides, in the case
of an aggrieved person whose cry for justice must not be hindered in any way. Hurtfid speech may thus be uttered in public, or in the court of law, yA%hab ‘Abd al-Rahr& bint al-Shitj‘, AI-QurZn wa Q @ y i al-Insin (Fkirut: Dar al- ‘Itm li d-hlat&-~~,1982), p. 116.
M. H. Kamali The Approvaband Disapproved Varieties of R a y^45
being impudent, but the Caliph intervened and said, “It will be no good if they did not say so, and no good if we did not listen.” The Qur’an and Sunnah are replete with moral encouragement and guidance on the proper use of freedom of speech. While the Qur‘an compares pleasant or righteous speech & l i d &@buh) with a benevolent tree which is firm and healthy in both foundation and foliage (Ibriihim, 14:24), the Sunnah compares it to charity that every one can afford to give.15And then the recurrent Qur‘anic theme which encourages the uttemnce of courteous and elegant speech (quwlun mu‘nifun) to one’s parents (al-IsrZ, 17:23), to the indigent (al-NisZ, 4:8), to the ignorant (al-NisZ, 4:5), and to the people at large (al-Baqarah, 2:83; al-IsrZ, 17:53; al-NW, 16:l25; al-‘Ankabiit, 29:46) all in all confirm the truism that the law can at best penalize blatant abuse of the freedom of speech. Nurturing the proper use of this freedom and attaining beauty and excellence in speech in largely a matter of developing good moral and cultural standards. The Qur’an calls upon the wisdom and good judgment of the believer when he speaks (al-Al@b, 33:7). There may be, for example, instances where telling the truth may fail to achieve a good purpose. The speaker is therefore urged to be mindful of the end result that his speech is likely to obtain.’6 There are in fact instances where the Sunnah permits silence in regard to truth or even telling a white lie if it would serve a higher objective, such as saving an innocent life from imminent danger. And lastly the freedom of speech is subservient to the general principles of justice: “And when you speak, then speak with justice, even if it be against those who are close to you” (al-An‘h, 6:152). The Qur‘anic guidance here applies equally to a witness in the court, to the judge, to the head of the family, and to the people at large who are asked to be honest and fair when they speak to, or about, one another.
Varieties of Ra’y
Although the potential scope and subject matter of my defies the idea
of a predetermined framework, the ‘Ulama have nevertheless attempted to
divide ray into various types. To begin with, my is divided into four types, namely valid or praiseworthy opinion (ul-ru y ul-&ib), void opinion (ul-m y ~~ ~ “Abu Yuuf Ya‘qub b. IbrtWn, Kit& al-KhatGj, 2nd edn., (Cairo:al-Matba’ah al- Salafiyah, l352/1933), p. 13. 15Thus we read in a Hadith that ”righteous speech-al-kalimah al-qyibah-is a form of charity.” See Mulpyy al-Din al-Nawawi, _Riy$ af-i$n,_* 2nd ed., Muhammad &ir al- Din al-AIba;ni (Beirut: al-hktab al-Idami; 1404/1984), p. 284, Had& No. 699. I61he Hoiy Q u r h , T a , T m W m and C o r n w r y by ‘Abdullah Yusuf ‘Mi, footnote No. 975.
. 4 6 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences (^) Vol. 7, No. 1, 1990
al-biitil), blameworthy or objectionable opinion (al-ra > al-madhmiim), and opinion whose validity is in doubt ( a h > ji mawdi‘ al- ishtibiih)?’ The first, valid ray, is what is in accord with authoritative precedent and approved opinion of the ‘Ulama of the past, who have acted in harmony with it and accepted it in principle in their awn fatw8 and ijtihad?s In other words, its harmony with the accepted norms of Shari‘ah is not in question. The test here is necessarily retrospective, in that past authorities of proven validity are taken as the criteria on which to evaluate a fresh opinion. It is to be noted, however, that an opinion of this type may initially be uncertain and doubtful. Only when all doubt as to its pqriety is eliminated and resolved can it be classified as valid. The main process for this form of refinement known to the classical methodology of thought in Islam is ijmZ Once an opinion is accepted and supported by i j d , it becomes authoritativeand valid beyond question. Ijmii‘ puts the final seal of approval on an opinion which might have been disputed but which no longer remains open to it. Legislation and judicial decisions of htgher courts in modem times provide for a similar process in that once a proposal or opinion is adopted by proper legislative/judical authorities, its validity is, for practical purposes at least, no longer debatable. Collective and consultative resolutions by professional and representative bodies also enhance the authority and wight of an otherwise isolated opinion. Public opinion and the press in modem societies may likewise serve the purpose of identifying the direction of a possible consensus in favor or against a doubtful opinion whose validity cannot be readily ascertained by reference to the or ijmif. According to a well-known saying of the leading Companion, ‘Abd Allah b. Mas‘ud, ”what the Muslims deem to be good is good in the sight of God.”19 Should there be consultation among experts or public and representative bodies, and the opinion which emerges incorporates the views of the community leaders and the uhl ul-shiirii, the weight and authority of that opinion would be enhanced and in line with the Qur’anic principle of consultation. At the opposite pole of valid opinion stands the void opinion (al-my al-biiGl), one which carries no authority at all. Once again Ibn Qayyim wrote on a somewhat retrospective note that void opinion is clearly in discord with the approved precedent of past ‘Ulama. They would have denounced it in
“Cf. Ibn Qayyim, rkim, I, 55. ’%id. 19Thisis often quoted to be a Hadith of the Prophet. Both Sayf al-Din al-&nidi ( A l - w m
I, p. 214, and Abu Islpiq Ibrihim a l - s w b i , al-l’tisiim, (Cairo: Matba‘ah al-Manir, l332/1914), II,319 refer to it as such. It is, however, more likely to be a saying of the famous Companion, ‘AbdAllah Ibn Mdiid (see Ahmad Hasan, Ihe Doctrine 0fIjmi‘in Islam, (Islamabad:Islamic Research Institute, 1984), p. 37.
A U@l d - e , 2nd &., d.‘Abd al-Razziiq ‘Afifi, (Beit: al-Maktab al-Islami, 1402/1982),
48 The^ American^ Journal^ of^ Islamic^ Social Sciences^ Vol.^ 7, No.^ 1,^1990
God first, and if he or she hils to fmd the necessary guidance, then they look into the Sunnah of the Prophet and the precedent of his Companions. But if guidance sought still cannot be found then he or she formulates his or her own opinion and judgment in the same way as the Companions are known to have attempted on many issues. This is, in fact, the proc&ure laid down in the Hadith of Mu‘5dh b. Jabal, which is a standard authority on ijtihad. An opinion so formulated and expressed may be correct or otherwise, or it may appear at the time to be correct but the contrary emerges over time. The principle to apply here is that which is expounded in a letter from the Caliph ‘Umar b. al-Khattab, when he instructed his judges that “the mere fact that you have made a certain decision must not deter you from changing it, if it becomes clear to you that it was erroneous in the first place. For truth is timeless; nothing must overrule it and it is far better to return to the truth rather than persist in falsehood.”25This principle would seem to be of general application to all decisions,judicial or otherwise, and it clearly rejects the notions of sacrificing truth at the altar of consistency and the so- called credibility of judicial office. But the point that is most emphasized in all of this is sincerity and devotion to the cause of truth and justice, the essence of beneficience in any praiseworthy opinion. “Anyone who exerts
himself with the intention of gaining the pleasure of God and benefit to the
people will be counted as one of the m&iniin, as goodwill and sincerity in telling the truth embodies the highest value in t a q ~ i i. ’ ~ ~
As for m4, whose validity is open to doubt, it is equivalent to a conjecture
(zunn). This type of ray is accepted as a basis for judicial decision and legal
opinion (fatwa) in cases of emergency or where no better alternative may be known to exist. Unless it is adopted into a court decision, a doubtful opinion or a conjecture does not bind anyone. The ‘Ulama have neither approved it nor have they denounced it, but have left open the choice between acceptance or rejection.z7But since we do not always have the necessary knowledge of or access to truth, a considered opinion, which may amount to no more than a probability or a conjecture, is accepted as a basis of decision- making so as to avoid indefinite suspension and delay that the quest for knowledge and truth may entail. In the sphere of judicial decisions, however, there are checks and balances, especially with regard to the rules that govern admissibility of witnesses, which are designed to minimize the possibility of error. Decisions and opinions which are formed in conformity with correct procedures are therefore deemed to be valid, even if they partake in a measure of speculation or individual’bias of a tolerable sort.
Z5Jbid.,I, 72. Ybid., 11, 120. Z71bid.,I, 55:
M. H. Kamali (^) The Approval and Disapproved Varieties of Ray 49
From the viewpoint of its subject matter and relative value, m4, is once
again divided into three types. Firstly, ru4, on a juridicial, or shur'i, matter
which is validated and accepted only on the strength of the shur'i proof on which it is founded, regardless as to whether it is advanced by one person or by a multitude. Secondly, m4, concerning specialized matters which require technical knowledge, where the people at learge are not expected to be in a position to form an enlightened opinion on them. Only the expert opinion is to be^ taken into account on such matters and the value of that opinion is determined on an informed basis. And thirdly, ru4, on matters of practical nature which require public participation and compliance, such as election
of the head of state and opinion on public, constitutional, and municipal affairs
which concern the community as a whole. On matters of this nature, the preferred opinion is that of the majority of the people whose action and participation is of central importance to the opinion
Abuses of Rap
The blameworthy opinion (uZ-ru4, uZ-madhmiim) is a type of ru4, which is neither completely false nor totally invalid and yet it is misguided and reprehensible. It may occur in the form of a deviant innovation (bid'ah), transgression (bughy), or self-seeking desire (hawii). There is yet a fourth variety of reprehensible rub which is referred to as juhl (ignorance), as it is deemed to be no more than an unfounded extrapolation that originates
in ignorance. All of these hllunder restrictions on freedom of opinion primarily
because the right to free speech and expression does not extend to these areas. The term "restrictions" here does not necessarily mean prohibition. For as we shall see, the whole of this field is governed not by legal prohibitions as such but by moral sanctions-sincere and persuasive advice. Although
the precise legal position is not always clear on some forms of bid'& and
hawii, these are, broadly speaking, nonjustifiable violations of the freedom of speech. It will be noted at the outset that the whole of this classification is somewhat overlapping and scholars have sometimes used these terms almost interchangeably,presumably because the concepts of, for example, ignorance or transgression are often deemed to be present in some measure in the case of a carpricious opinion (hawii) and a pernicious innavation (bid'&). The main difference between the last two would appear to be that hwzi consists of a strong element of selfishness and pursuit of one's desire in disregard of clear guidance. Bid'uh, on the other hand, is distinguished by an attempt
*** T f.** Mahmud 'AM al-Majid a l - m i d i , AZ-ShGrC, (Beirut: Drlr al-Jil, 1404/1984), p. 91.
M. H. &ali The Appmval and Disapproved Varieties of Ra'y (^) 51
definition that the resemblance between bid'uh violates the established norms of Shari'ali. The defurtion also indicates that the intention behind bid'ah does not deviate fkom the norms of Shari'ah in the sense that the rules of Shari'ah
are generally intended to achieve benefits (mu@il@) and this is precisely what
the innovator intends to do. The good intentions behind bid'ah are, however, of no account, as al-shfttjbi explains, because the innovator amgates to himself the authority of the Lawgiver in such a manner as to frustrate the objectives of the law. Bid'ah is divided into two types, namely genuine bid'ah (al-bid'ah al- k i q i y a h ) ,for which no justification or support could be found in the Qur'an,
S-, or ijma', nor in any precedent or opinion of the learned, neither
wholly nor in part. It is in other words an innovation in the true sense of the word. The second type of bid'ah is known as al-bid'ah al-@fiyah, or partial innovation, which has tvm facets, one being identical with the genuine bid'ah in that it is unprecedented and indefensible. But there is another side to this type of bid'uh for which support can be fbund in the established m m. That is, bid'ah as an ambivalent innovation which can be accepted as part of the authoritative Sunnah or rejected completely, depending on how it is viewed. 32
Bid'ah i s once again divided into two types, namely bid'& of abandonment
(al-bid'ahal-tarkiyah), which consists of abandoning something, such as,
for example, when a person abandons, or advises others to abandon, Somethrng
which is lawful under the rules of Shari'ah. The opposite of this is al-bid'ah
ghayr al-tarkiyh, that is innovation, "whichdoes not consist of abandoning anything; it may involve a change or advance a different perspective which amounts to innovation but not aband~nment.~~ The hallmark of bid'uh is the pursuit of capricious and whimsical opinion (hawii) in preference to divine guidance. Thus we read in the Qur'an in an address to Prophet David:
0 David, we &we made you a virr?gerent in the earth, so rule
mng people righteously and follcrw not the dictates of haw6 which
lead you astray from the path of God. (!$%I, 38:26).
and
Who is more misguided than one who follows his own hwii in
disregard of the guidance that God has revealed? (al-Qws, 28:50)
'%id., I, 50. 32ibid.,I, 54. 3 3 b i d. , I, 38.
52 The^ American^ Journal^ of^ Islamic^ Social^ Sciences^ Vol.^7 ,^ No.^ 1,^1990
And then a person who chooses to follow the vagaries of haw5 is not to be obeyed by others, as the Qur‘an proclaims:
Obey not the one whose heart is negligent of our remembrance (‘an dhikrinii), one who follows his haw& and one who has exceeded all limits. (al-Kahf, 18:28)
While quoting the foregoing, al-shiiubi points out that in all of the three the matter is confined to two things, namely following the guidance (h&, dhikr), or following caprice (haw5). The innovator (mubtadi’) has chosen the latter; hence he or she is utterly misguided while thinking otherwise of their personal intent. The same author goes on to quote another Qur’anic passage which denounces those who attempt to confuse the meaning of the Qur’an through misguided and self-styled interpretation:
He it is who has sent down to thee the Book. In it are iiyiit which
are perspicuous; they are the foundation of the Book: Others are
allegorical. But those in whose hearts is perversity follow the part which is^ allegorical, seeking discord^ fltnah)^ and searching for its hidden meanings... (Al-‘Imriin, 3:7)
It is reported from ‘A’ishah that the Prophet read this ayah and then said: “when you see those who argue and dispute about the Qur‘an these are the ones that God has meant, and they should be shunned.” To this al-ShiiGbi adds: “The disputation that the Prophet has referred to concerns the pursuit of the Mutashiibih (intricate) in the Qur’an.” Disputation of this kind leads to disunity and deviation from the guidance of the Qur’an, in which we read further:
This is My way, leading straight, so follow it and follow not the paths which will scatter you away from it (al-An‘am, 6:W3)
The phrase “follow not the paths,” according to Qur’an commentators, refers to the ways of those who have deviated from the straight path and these are the innovators and the skeptics, the ah1 al-bida‘ wa al-shubhiit). 34 .While elaborating on some of these statements, al-Shiiubi adds: “the innovators distort the Shari‘ah in various ways, such as by upholding the manifest or appamt (qzdtir) in the Qur’an without looking into the objectives
and intentions of the Lawgiver.” In a reference to the Kharijites, the same
341bid., II, 54.
54 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences Vol. 7 , No. 1, 1990
the human body; wudu'(ab1ution) is said to mean following the awaited Imam,
and tayammum (ablution with clean earth where no water could be found)
is held to mean obedience to the deputy of the Imam in the absence of the
Imam himself; whereas ghusl (bathe) is held to mean renewal of one's pledge
of allegiance to the Imam.a7 It is perhaps due to thw and similar remote
and allegorical interpretations they have given to the Qur'an that the
Biitjdyah (proponents of the esoteric and the hidden) have derived their name. A more recent form of bid'ah, embraced by some Muslims, is to deny the authority of Sunnah and to take the view that the Qur'an, being self- contained, authentic, and comprehensive, is the only source of Shari'ah. This is the view taken by^ a faction calling itself al-Firqah al-Qur'm-yah^ (partisans of the Qur'an) whose views are known to have spread and found adherents in some Arab countries like Egypt and Libya.s Whereas some scholars have accepted the notion of a good bid'uh, Ibn
Taym-yah refutes the division of bid'ah into good and evil, as he maintains
that all bid'ah is evil. People have held different views on bid'& and some have divided it into two types, namely bid'uh qubiw and bid'uh &sun&,
saying that not all bid'ah is evil, that when a bid'ah is accepted and generally
approved by the community of believers it is no longer bid'uh. Ibn Taym-yah then goes on to refute this by saying that these views came into being only after the 3rd/lOth century; that all bid'uh is evil and that the Sunnah is completely clear on this point. The author then quotes three e t h which are: "All bid'& is misguided-kull bid'uh &diilah," "every innovation is bid'ah-kull ?m&hthuh bid'",'' and "the worst of things are the novel among them - innu shun-al%mi;rrn u. & h t W ." The examples which Ibn Bym-yah has given of bid'uh in this context pertain mainly to rituals of the faith, such
and festive celebrations (u'yiid) other thm those which are commonly
The view that some bid'ah is good originates in the precedent of 'Umar
b. al-Khathb, who is on record to have welcomed s&t al-tamwilz during Ramadan and refeed to it as nf'inul bid'uh (what a good bid'ah!). To this Ibn Taym-yah responds that tamw$z was not an innovation at all; rhat it
originated in the Sunnah of the Prophet and the Companions had practiced
it, but that the Prophet abandoned it after awhile k r fear of it lxxmnhg
obligatory. Hence what 'Umar Ibn al-Khattab is quoted to have said does
not at all contradict the Hdith that "all bid'uh is misguided." Ibn 'bym-yah
as h t h g on certain days of the year, unaubrizedprayer (@ al-- ),
recognized.
37Ahmadb. Hajar al-Bu$rni al-Ban", ZbMhir al-Muslimin 'an al-Ibtdci' wa al-Bid'ah
3Ibid., p. 41. 'Taqi* al-Din Ibn m - y a b , Iqti&'al-Sinit al-MIlstaqm li-Mukhla&h &?Gb al-Ja?im,
ji al-DSn, (Doha, Qatar): Matjib? 'Ali b. 'M, ?402fi983), pp. 3738.
ed., N&ir b. 'Abd a l - b i m d- 'Aql, ( R i y a , 1404 A.H.), I, 55.
I % M. H. Kamali The Approval and'Disappd Varieties of Ray 55
concludes that 'Umar must have used the word bid'& in its linguistic sense
of welcoming something that was forgotten; that he did not use the word in the sense of a bid'uh sh~r'iyah.~O I A l - G h d i divides the mubtadi' into tvm types: one who invites others to bid'uh, and the other who remains silent out of fear or personal choice. The first type of mubkdi'may be propagating somethmg which does not
amount to infidelity (ht) in which caie the matter rests between him or
her and God (fu umruh buynah WQ b u y Allah). But if that person invites the people to what may amount to hp, he or she can be even more harmful than the ka$r ub initio. For the evil of the latter is not contagious in the sense that the person is known as a n0n;believer and as such the believers are not likely to pay aitention. But the mubradi'who actively propagates bid'uh has a claim to righteousness and tries to spread corruption under the guise of truth and that kind of evil is contagious. This kind of mubfudi' must be denounced, his or her evil exposed, and people shopld openly show their
disapproval; they should turn away from him and refuse to respond to his
greeting (salam) in public and should m i d helping or cooperating with that person.
As for the commoner who indulges in bid'uh (ul-mubfudi'al- 'Zuni) but
is unable to persuade others and is unlikely to command any folluwing, he or she should, instead of stem treatmefit and humiliation, be given good
1 counsel (nuqi?zuh) and kind advice. But if ~ i ( u z h proves futile and shunning
i'raci) is called for, then this should be done. For if bid'uh is not denounced, it is likely to spread and give rise to evil in society. Al-Shiitibi advises reticence vis-a-vis b i d i t whose truth or falsehood is not known: "we are commanded not to disseminate such views until the
truth emerges.42In response to the suggestions by some 'Ulama that mubtadi'ibt
who propagage bid'uh should be severely p ~ s h e d ,al-Shitibi observes that they should be treated in accordance with the enormity of their conduct. If the bid'uh is a minor one, they should be punished lightly, but if it amounts to a grave violation, the punishment should be proportionately increased.
Al-Sh5tjbi also records the hint that the early scholars (rm&qa&&) divided
bid'uh into two types: that which is reprehensible (malauh) and bid'ah which falls under the category of h a m (forbidden). The author then concludes
that bid'uh is not a monolithic concept, nor is it a singular offense; that each
bid'uh should be viewed and evaluated individually; and that treatment or
\
I( -
401bid., I, 56; idem, Malmu' ah IpltGwCi Shaywl al-Islam Ibrt Taymlyah, ed., 'AM al- m n b. Qkim, (Beirut: Mu'assisah al-Ridah, 1398 A.H.), X, 37 l. 41Abu Himid Mulpmmad a l - G h d i , Kitab &b a1-S- wa al-Mu'rsshamh Ma'
&&if al-Khalq,ed. M- Sa'udal-Mu'ini, (BagMad: Matba'ah al- 'h, 1984), pp. 201-4.
4ZAl-Shi%.ibi, Al-Muw2faqGt, IV, 104.
M. H. Kamali The Approval and Disapproved Wieties of Ra’y (^) 57
A-zamakhshari elaborates the meaning of this Ijah: Follow the Shari’ah which is founded in proof and evidence and let not yourself be tempted by the views and arguments of the ignorant which are founded in caprice and
pernicious innovation (hawii wu bid‘~h).~~ Furthermore, the prophet is on
record to have addressed his followers that “None of you can be a true believer
unless your desire (hawii) is made subservient to (the guidance) I have brought forth.” According to another Hadith, “Nothing that is worshipped on this earth is hated by God more intensely than h ~ w i i. ” ~ ~ Another instance ofhawa that is clearly forbidden is when a person believes in the legality or prohibition of something, and then ignores it when it applies to himelf or his friends. To illustrate this, a person may be demanding his right of preemption (shun while believing in its validity, but when someone else demands the same right of him, he ignores it and claims that it is unproven and advances an opinion to that effect.48On a similar note, a person may denounce another for a certain activity such as listening to music, but when his friends do the same, he claims that the prohibition of such activity is not proven and that the subject remains open to ijtihad. The jurists have not specified any punitive measures for hawii and no particular punishment for the perpetrator of bid‘uh either, except for a form of social boycott (u2-hijr, also referred to as i‘m that is signified by refusing to greet, speak to, or approve of the views of such a person. The ‘Ulama have spoken of hijr as a moral obligation of the community regardless as to whether the perpetrator of bid‘uh is a relative, a neighbor, or a stranger, especially when the bid‘uh concerns the community at large and violates what is referred to as the Right of God (Huqq Allah). But if the bid‘uh relates to private rights (such as consisting of a form of slander or libel), then greeting is permitted and hijr is not required. There is no maximum limit on the
duration of hijr and it continues until the person repents and corrects him
or herself. The community is under moral obligation to denounce the bid’uh;
those who are able to produce evidence for its refutation, and those who are in possession of authority and able to put an end to it, must do The ‘Ulama have held it to be a duty of the head of state to prevent bid‘uh and hawii in the business of government. This is a part of the general obligation of the head of state to hcilitate transmission and dissemination
46Jir Allah Mahmud al-Zamakhshari, Al-Kashshrf ‘an Haqi’iq al-Tan& (Beirut: Dir al-Ma‘rifah, n.d.), III, 511. (’Both Hadiths are quoted by Abu ‘Abd Allah Muhammad al-Qurtubi in his Ta$ir al- Quvubi, (Cairo: Dar al-Kutub al- ‘Arabiyah, 1387/1967), XVI, 167. 4sZaydan, Majmu‘ah, p. 298; al-Sibi‘i, Zshtiraklyah, p. 54. 49Shamsal-Din b. ‘AM Allah Muhammad b. Malfal! al-Maqdisi al-Hanbali, Al-kiib al-Shar‘iyah wa a l - M i d al-Mar‘iyah, 2 vols., (Cairo:Matba‘ah a l - M e , 1348 A.H.), I, 183. Tbid., pp. 237, 269.
58 The American Jaurnal of Islamic Social Sciences Wl. 7, No. 1, 1990
of knowledge whenever necessary or when it is in the intemt (muqal&zh) of the community. Dissemination of knowledge, as a duty of the head of
state, comprises the following: (a) propagation of the hith by dekndmg it ,
against doubts and bid'uh and offering an adequate response to the promoters
of bid'& and huwii. (b) Inviting the disbelievers and the misguided to
righteousness and truth. (c) Investigating and bringing together the various views concerning bid'ah and huwii and trying to resolve disputes over them
by validating or authorizing a view that seems best. Whenever the Imam
exercises this form of ijtihad, or when he selects the ijtihad of others for the purpose of general practice, even if that ijtihad is of disputed validity, it becomes authoritative nevertheless and action upon it becomes obligatory. 51
Baghy (Transgression) And Zkhtiiiif (Disagreement)
Bughy means lawlessness, refusing to acknowledgethe truth, and exceedmg
the limits of things with corrupt intention, dishonesty, and arrogance.52 Bughy is also the opposite of obedience (@'ah) to lawful government. In this sense, bughy is defined as refusing to obey the lawful Imam who is not indulging in sin (ma>iyzh), whether or not such disobedience is based on an interpxetation or a particular point of view which is believed to be the truth. An instance of bughy which is frequently encountered is when a person or group of persons are engaged in a lawful pursuit but they are denounced for wrongdoing by their opponents. In the sphere of religious rituals such
as the call to prayer (iidhiin), standing to prayer (iqiimah) ,and even the contents
of the ritual prayer, the followers of different madhiihib observe them with shght variations. Basically all the variations are permissible as they all subscribe to the tenet of 'ibiidah; a mere difference of form does not justify any claim of superiority or preference of one over the other. And yet, owing to bughy, the follwers of some rmdhidzib have denounced and abused their counterparts in others for not following the rituals that they have themselves adopted. This is not even confined to rituals: in certain other spheres we know, for example, that the mystic has often criticized the jurist for the latter's zeal over the externalitiesof religion. The jurist has, in turn, criticized the mystic
"Yahyi Ism$& Manhaj 61-Sunnahfi al- 'Akiqah Bay al-H&im wa a l - M & k h , (Cairo: Dar al-Waf2, 1406/1986), pp. 330-32. 52Zaydk, Majmu'ah, p. 295. 53Whilethe Hanbali definition of baghy includes disobedience to an unjust ruler, the Hanafi's define it as disobedience to a just or lawful Imam only. See Mu&mmad Am-n Ibn 'Abidin, Radd al-MukhtGr ;41a al-Durml al-Mukhtir (also known as HGshiyah Ibn 'Abidn, 2nd edn., (Cairo: Matbdah al-Biibbi al-Halabi, 1386/1966), 111, 426; Y@yi I s d i l , Manhaj al-Swvlahfi al- W I a q a h Bayn al-H&m wa al-M-, (Cairo: Dir al-Wafi', 1406/1986), p. 147.
