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POLM Colombi Vera 5.05.
To what extent did the Arab Spring alter regional
relations within the Maghreb?
INTRODUCTION What Led to the Uprising and Its Consequences From December 2010 through mid-2013, six countries of the Arab Spring—Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, Libya, and Syria— showed similar trends in terms of general discontent but displayed significant variations in outcomes. The prevailing feature was the occurrence of "uprisings," which were characterized by collective actions of multiple days, non-violent protests, different locations, and the takeover of public spaces by protesters, such as Tahrir Square in Cairo, Bourguiba Avenue in Tunis, and the Pearl Roundabout in Bahrain. The Arab Spring began on December 17, 2010, with the spread of news across Tunisia via social media about a young man named Mohamed Bouazizi, who set himself on fire in front of the governorate headquarters. The motivation behind this extreme act was the dire living conditions of the young man, unemployed and without income. The news of Mohamed Bouazizi's gesture spread mainly on Twitter. The
effect was disruptive: images from Sidi Bouzid acted as a catalyst for popular discontent, especially among the youth. Mistrust and discontent were the two main triggers which resulted from an increase in youth unemployment and worsening economic conditions, coupled with rising prices of essential goods. All these factors set the stage for the beginning of significant protests in Tunisia against President Ben Ali. The protests, already at the end of 2010, spread beyond Tunisian borders. In fact, following what happened in Tunisia, various groups of protesters in Egypt also organized to take to the streets due to economic and social issues. However, at the beginning, the power of President Hosni Mubarak did not seem to be in question. The first violent protest in Egypt occurred on January 25, 2011, in Cairo's Tahrir Square, marked by clashes and brutal demonstrations. In less than a month, the Arab world witnessed the political downfall of two untouchable leaders: Ben Ali in Tunisia and Mubarak in Egypt. In Algeria , in 2010 alone, 10,000 riots happened but it did not escalate. The regime found a temporary solution in cutting duties and redistributing the profits from sales of hydrocarbons. Nevertheless, the regime's capacity to mitigate discontent through financial means does not entirely elucidate why Algerians have not risen to emulate the actions of Tunisians, Egyptians, Libyans, Yemenis, and Syrians. One potential explanation is rooted in the fact that Algerians have undergone two traumatic events in their recent history which are the war of liberation from France and the “red decade” of the 1990s, resulting in the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians 1. The “red decade” was likely the most significant deterrent against the revolt. (^1) Zoubir Y. (2011), p.
This essay aims to explore the consequences of the Arab Spring on intra-Maghreb relations. To discern the changes following the uprisings, this essay will examine three primary factors that contributed to the momentum of the Arab Spring and continue to influence the situation in the MENA region today. Therefore, it will examine the economic challenges, the dynamics of the oil market, and the evolution of authoritarianism through a comparative lens, examining the situation before and after the Arab Spring. The focus will remain on the Magreb countries, despite the uprising extended to the Gulf region as well. After analyzing how the Arab Spring altered regional dynamics within the Maghreb, the essay will pivot to a specific case study examining Morocco-Algeria relations and their conflict in the Sahel region, which significantly influences intra-Maghreb stability. Does a closed border mitigate certain types of conflicts, or does it perpetuate and intensify underlying rivalries between nations? Does this separation between Morocco and Algeria reinforce divisions between nations and contribute to a sense of isolation. This essay will explore the potential outcomes of this specific border and rivalry, which have fostered mistrust and hostility between neighboring states, impacting the broader Maghreb region and its prospects for unity. Economic Dynamics in the Maghreb: Challenges and Opportunities As already described above, citizens in north African countries were struggling day after day due to a lack of stability and wealth. Speaking about economic policies, before the Arab Spring, governments failed in translating the policies into tangible growth and development. Generally, the economic structure in the Magreb region was primarily focused on primary and low value sectors such as foodstuffs, cereals,
cement, textiles, with statistics indicating that Tunisia was the leading exporter of high-tech goods accounting for only 5 percent of total exports 3. Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco, despite possessing diversified structures, had all a greater emphasis on manufacturing and tourism 4. Libya and Algeria, instead, were both relying almost entirely on the export of oil and gas, with significant involvement from state-owned enterprises 5. However, before the uprising, most of the the Arab transition countries, which are Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen, had implemented a series of market-oriented reforms to varying extents. These reforms were planned in the 1990s and based on the policy reform called Washington Consensus 6. The main goal was to empower the private sector and make it play a leading role in economic development. These reforms were crucial in constraining the public sector and restructuring financial systems. However, when international crises occurred, the newfound economic openness in the Maghreb exposed the same countries to high risks. Indeed, during the global crisis of 2008-2010, the economies of the Maghreb suffered in both the more 'resilient' sectors, such as tourism, raw materials extraction, oil and in the 'weak' sectors, like manufacturing. The latter suffered from lack of demand which either declined, particularly from Europe and America, or shifted towards production in Asia 7. (^3) Ansani, A. and Daniele V. (2012), p. (^4) Ansani, A. and Daniele V. (2012), p. (^5) Ansani, A. and Daniele V. (2012), p. (^6) Khan, M. (2014), p. (^7) Ansani, A. and Daniele V. (2012), p.
despite political and security concerns. To create new job opportunities, they prioritize the education system to reduce the skills gap between graduates from schools and universities. Governments implemented infrastructure development and business regulation to encourage the growth of private companies but the only immediate method that several countries pursued to generate jobs was through the enlargement of public employment. For instance, Tunisia's 2013 funds were allocated for an additional 23,000 government positions, while Egypt created around 400,000 government sector jobs in 2011-12 9. This marked a clear inversion of the trend observed before the uprisings, which aimed to downsize the public sector and decrease government employment. Presently, the public sector continues to be the largest employer across the Maghreb countries. Furthermore, trade openness has decreased, probably because of the general weakness in global economic activity. Despite the presence of institutional arrangements, intra-Maghreb trade remains limited, and it is characterized by only a few flows. Some data from 2016 of intraregional trade are: iron, steel, and clothing from Morocco to Algeria; gas and oil exports from Algeria to Morocco and Tunisia; iron and steel from Tunisia to Algeria; and animal and vegetable oil from Tunisia to Libya 10. Maghreb trade represents 3,6 per cent of its total trade 11 , indicating that trading is more active with the rest of the world. One of the significant factors influencing limited trade within the Maghreb is restrictive trade policies and tariffs imposed by the Maghreb countries on one another’s goods. Europe does not require so many restrictive policies and (^9) Khan, M. (2014), p. (^10) Kireyev, Alexei P. (2019), p. 10 (^11) Lounnas, D. and Messari, N. (2018), p.
Maghreb countries encounter lower tariffs when trading with Europe compared to the intra-Maghreb trade 12. Geopolitical factors have contributed to regression and constrained regional integration. The fundamental causes of tensions are numerous and vary across countries. Concerns about terrorism have also prompted stricter border controls. The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) has remained inactive for years due to disputes between members, particularly between Morocco and Algeria, which has undermined the relations within the Maghreb regional system. The absence of political will and resolution from member countries, various regulatory and logistical difficulties impede businesses in the Maghreb from conducting trade or engaging in commerce with the wider region. However, despite complex political dynamics, difficult economies and mistrust, a general demand has spread to revive the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and quicken economic progress 13. Hence, the members have recently begun to take steps toward regional integration, making inter-cooperation a challenging goal to achieve. However, trade flows and capital among AMU member countries haven’t increased much despite the effort to facilitate inter-regional trade by promoting the implementation of shared policies and strategies across various sectors. Intra-Maghreb trade has become crucial for achieving economic independence from external sources within the MENA region and fostering economic growth internally. Greater trade integration brings numerous advantages such as economic growth, a bigger market and the creation of jobs, particularly among young people. (^12) Kireyev, Alexei P. (2019), p. 14 (^13) BMICE, (2019).
expenses due to the diversion of Middle East cargoes, but it would not have led to a decrease in oil volumes 15. Furthermore, the oil production did not suffer enormously from the uprisings because most protests and violent episodes occurred in the capital away from the gas and oil fields 16. Egypt's oil market did not undergo significant upheaval following the Arab Spring, but it also did not benefit from substantial investments or developments. This has left the country vulnerable and reliant on GCC countries for support. Undoubtedly, Libya, which is an important oil and gas exporter, has experienced the most significant impact of the Arab Spring on oil production 17. Libya has historically been a significant oil exporter in the Maghreb region. However, during the Arab Spring in the summer of 2011, there was a disruption in production which had strong effects on the regional economy. Here, strikes and protests occurred at fields and export terminals, unlike Egypt, and the consequences had a significant impact on the oil sector. This market managed to resume production and exports in 2012 but experienced another downturn in 2013 due to political instability and other protests. Some researchers have claimed that the sharp rise in oil prices after the uprisings was not a direct consequence of the uprisings. Yet, due to the political complexities associated with the volatile situation in the MENA region, nowadays the analysis of oil price trends includes a focus on the geopolitical dimension. The political dynamics have highlighted the short-term impact of the Arab Spring on both oil and gas markets. However, thanks to the (^15) Darbouche, H, Fattouh B.(2011) p. 5 (^16) El–Katiriv L., Fattouh and Mallinson (2014), p. 11 (^17) El–Katiriv L., Fattouh and Mallinson (2014), p. 11
region's oil production capacity and reduced demand from Europe, the economic effects have been mitigated. Despite the considerable uncertainty surrounding oil market dynamics following the financial crisis, improvement and developments have increased along with global relations. For example, Algeria has brought on collaborations with partners in Europe, United States, India and China in the natural gas and oil market. It also cooperates with the EU and US on regional and global security matters, remaining uninvolved in the disputes and conflicts within the Maghreb region. Nowadays, Algeria holds the largest share in the gas imports of Italy and Spain and stands as Europe’s third-largest supplier of gas, trailing behind Russia and Norway. The Maghreb countries have also witnessed an improvement in internal relations, propelled by a mutual dedication to securing economic and political stability. An example to prove political and commercial cooperation between countries in the Magreb in the oil sector is the relations between Algeria and Libya. Despite persistent suspicious, these countries signed a convention during the visit of the NTC president to Algiers in mid-April 2012, outlining a roadmap to enhance bilateral cooperation, among other agreements 18. As a result, nowadays, an Algerian oil company known as Sonatrach holds substantial interests in Libya, while Libya has made investments in various sectors within Algeria. The resurgence of authoritarianism (^18) Y.H. Zoubir (2012),p.
democratization. These scholars have discovered that the presence of oil intersected with regional politics creates diverse dynamics in the relationships between rulers and their subjects. As a result, certain Arab monarchs have been practicing "popular rentierism," cultivating support from the citizens and eventually earning authentic mass endorsement, rather than solely relying on “despotic rentierism" to sustain their authority 21. In the GCC countries, unlike MENA, people seem satisfied thanks to the gulf governments’ funds which are distributed directly and indirectly to citizens for health care, housing, and free education 22. Hence, Oil-generated wealth has being utilized to ensure citizen satisfaction and prevent unrest which ensured satisfaction and did not cause demand among people to change regime of countries. After the tumultuous aftermath of the popular uprisings, advocates for democracy in the Arab world had to choose among the autocratic parties and the majoritarian Islamists. This political outcome has shown a broader dynamic of political power in the region. They decided to support the formers option, even though there wasn’t much hope towards improvement, particularly considering increasing domestic reluctance about democracy and external pressure for democratic reforms 23. Another political dynamic in the region in terms of power relates to the state violence that emerged as a pivotal point in the Arab Spring. In fact, regimes only experienced a decline when military forces took control against autocratic rulers. The state's ability to exert coercion was defined by Michael Mann (1984) as "despotic power”, which in (^21) Brownlee, J., Masoud, T. and Reynolds, A. (2015), p. (^22) Sdü, F., Fakültesi and Aydin, A. (2013), p. (^23) Alaoui, H., King, S.J. and Maghraoui, A.M. (2019), p.
other words is the ability of a state to directed policies without consulting with society 24. Like other modern nations, despotic power evolved through historical events and international dynamics. These historical paths of repression set the Middle East apart from other developing countries. Security concerns among the Maghreb countries Several years after the onset of the Arab revolts in 2011, the Maghreb region is based on uncertainty and insecurity in an environment that has reinforced authoritarian tendencies along with a backdrop of instability in the geopolitical landscape. This context is marked by rivalries, disputes, tensions, and threats, further complicating the region's trajectory. For instance, due to security apprehensions, Tunisia has often closed the national border with Libya since 2011. In 2016, the Tunisian defence minister, troubled by the situation after the jihadist attacks and the threats from ISIS to reach the southern Tunisia, opted to erect a fortified border fence and close again the border between the two countries 25. Egypt instead has always left the border close with Libya since October 2013 due to security concerns with sporadic openings to regulate the movement of workers, especially from Egypt to Libya, and to facilitate the Libyan help and assistance to the militia led by General Khalifa Haftar. To exacerbate the already precarious dynamics among these nations, military interventions took place in Libya. In 2017, Egyptian airstrikes conducted by Marshal el-Sisi, ostensibly conducted in self- (^24) Brownlee, J., Masoud, T. and Reynolds, A. (2015), p. (^25) Alaoui, H., King, S.J. and Maghraoui, A.M. (2019), p.
The shifts in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt have pushed the governments in Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania to embark on political reform processes. For example, Mohamed VI, King of Morocco has announced significant constitutional reforms granting greater freedom and leeway to the parliament and political parties within Moroccan politics 29. Despite a broader effort to reconfigure the political landscape in the region, the rise of Islamists has further strained the already delicate relations among the Maghreb countries. Tunisia is now a democratic country governed by an Islamist-led administration. This political position has been fundamental in rejuvenating the Union of the Arab Maghreb (UMA), which comprises Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria and Mauritania 30. Across the Arab Maghreb Union, Tunisia, alongside other member states, recognizes the opportunity to tackle its domestic issues by recommitting to the UMA. Each of these countries is characterized by distinct political systems, inter-state relations, economic structures, and social dynamics and whether genuine or forced, the social, economic and political changes occurring in the Maghreb region have motivated the regimes to pursue cooperation. Yet, the complexities of regional integration during this transitional period that they are experiencing are difficult to overcome but despite varying motivations, all five UMA countries are striving towards the Union's revival. Case study: Morocco and Algeria Despite the optimism surrounding the revival of the UMA, fundamental differences and obstacles remain unsolved. One of the main causes of (^29) Hendry, K. (n.d.), p. (^30) Zoubir Y. (2012) , p.
the ongoing failure of the AMU can be attributed to the rivalry between Algeria and Morocco 31. The unfriendly relation concerns the Saharan issue and the Algerian support to the national liberation movement called POLISARIO in a region over which Morocco claims sovereignty. Algeria has repeatedly tried to deter Rabat from getting involved in the Sahel, contending that Morocco does not have sovereignty in that area. Morocco, instead, asserts that the Sahel falls under its purview and is part of the country. Algeria has grown suspicious of Morocco's intentions in the Sahel and fears that Morocco as a potential mediator in the region will restrict its own influence in the region. Even though Morocco can enter the Sahel from the Sahara, Algeria does not recognise the power of Morocco over this zone. For this reason, Algeria did not invite Morocco to attend to a meeting of the CEMOC (Comité d'état-major opérationnel conjoint) 32. The conflict finds its origin in the 1975 agreement when Morocco, in accord with Spain, claimed the Sahel territory and Algeria disagreed and started supporting the Sahrawi rebel group, the Polisario Front, in seeking independence 33. In the past, Morocco has engaged in actions to mediate conflicts, resolve disputes, and support certain indigenous tribes in the area, such as its intervention between Tuareg factions in 2014. However, from the Algerian perspective, these initiatives are perceived as efforts to expand its sphere of influence 34. On the other hand, according to Morocco, Algeria has always regarded the Sahel region as its own sphere of influence. Indeed, the Sahel has gradually emerged as a new (^31) Allouche Y. (2019), p. 9 (^32) Lounnas D., Messari N (2018), p. (^33) ADF (2024) (^34) ADF (2024)
protests in 2018, AMU has not been able to proactively seek resolutions. The Moroccan regime insists that the closure of the border is harmful for humanitarian concern, economics and intra-Maghreb relations. Morocco, believing that communication across the border would also contribute to reducing tensions, has frequently requested its reopening. However, Algeria refuses, asserting that the current relations between the countries have not sufficiently improved. Consequently, as highlighted earlier, the region's economic development and integration have been compromised, along with the overall stability of the Maghreb region. To exacerbate the situation, in January 2017, during an African Union summit in Addis Ababa, Morocco's King Mohammed VI claimed that the Arab Maghreb Union was not the solution; rather, he claimed it was dead. Algeria's Foreign Minister Abdelkader Messahel responded to the King's comments by reaffirming Algeria's belief in "Maghreb integration for historical, cultural, political, and economic reasons” 38. In 2018, the overall situation worsened due to a dispute between Rabat and the POLISARIO, where Morocco threatened military intervention against the POLISARIO and, consequently Algeria, if it did not withdraw from Guerguerat, which is a demilitarised zone in the Sahara. These tensions between the North African neighbours have persisted for decades but recently they have escalated. For instance, in 2011, Algeria claimed that its diplomatic relations with Morocco were strained, citing a series of hostile actions by the latter. In 2023, Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune stated that the worsening relations between the countries had reached a point from which there was no (^38) Allouche Y. (2019), p.
return 39. Despite experts' belief that the probability of military conflict between Morocco and Algeria is low, it remains imperative for the Maghreb region and its countries to recognise themselves as a regional system where interacting units influence each other 40. The case of Morocco and Algeria clearly highlights the need to find a middle ground to rejuvenate the Maghrebi ideal and cooperation, which are fundamental for stability. Morocco's actions, including joining the African Union and applying for membership in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), suggest that it has, at least temporarily, set aside the Maghrebi ideal and is exploring alternatives on the African continent 41. What is evident is Morocco's attempt to assert its interests and be resolute in safeguarding them. Conclusion and Proposed Solutions In much of the Maghreb today, the Islamist parties, the military, or populist leaders continue to stand as the primary credible political options, as if the revolts of the Arab Spring never took place. Despite ongoing calls from citizens for justice, equality and improved living standards within the Maghreb, reforms for a democratic government or for a fairer political system continue to lack strength. Authoritarianism at the societal level has persisted beyond the uprisings of the Arab Spring and has even strengthened in the Maghreb, as well as in other regions of the Arab world. (^39) ADF (2024) (^40) Zoubir Y. (2000) (^41) Lounnas D., Messari N (2018), p.
