The principle of utility determines the rightness of acts (or rules ..., Study Guides, Projects, Research of Ethics

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MILLThe principle of utility determines the rightnessof acts (or rules of action?) by their effect on thetotal happiness.

Metaethical starting points ^ Mill begins with a few comments on [what later was termed]metaethics, claiming that ethics and other (“practical”) theoriesconcerning action run in the reverse order from scientific theory.^ ^ The general principles have to come first, rather than being derived fromparticular observations (i.e. judgments of cases), since we need some wayof deciding cases consistently.^ ^ What determines rules of action must be the ultimate end of action –which he’ll go on to identify with happiness.^ ^ He notes that the^

ultimate^ end of action isn’t subject to proof in the strictsense, since the only way of justifying an end (= goal) is as a means tosome further end. But he’ll later give considerations in its favor (ch. 4).

Responses to misunderstandings ^ of hedonism:^ ^ pleasure an aim worthy of swine (pp. 55ff.). Higher, distinctively human,pleasures outweigh mere bodily pleasures shared with swine.^ ^ happiness an inappropriate aim (pp. 59ff.). The aim isn’t ecstasy but just tominimize pain and achieve a comfortable mix of pleasures. Total happiness, notjust one’s own, is the standard of right action (vs. motive of the virtuous agent). ^ of utilitarianism [“proper”]:^ ^ leaves no room for beauty, ornament, amusement (p. 54). popular misconception^ ^ a “godless” doctrine (p. 68). Spells out what a benevolent God would want.^ ^ undercuts “principled” adherence to rules (pp. 68ff.): Rule-breaking is almostalways forbidden because of harmful side-effects. Established rules sum up thegeneral tendencies of acts to promote utility. We should limit direct appeal to theprinciple of utility to cases where the rules conflict.

Acts vs. motives ^ Mill holds that we need to settle first which acts are right beforeraising questions about the worth of persons or their motives. ^ How can we recognize virtuous persons or motives, except by the actsthey do or lead to? ^ In footnote [B], in response to a counterexample -- of saving someonefrom drowning just in order to torture him – he distinguishes betweenmotives and intentions. ^ Intentions are really

part^ of the act being judged – what one is tryingto do -- not a further aim the one hopes to achieve by doing it, i.e. amotive.

Mill’s “proof” ^ In ch. 4 Mill grants that a principle about ultimate ends is really no morecapable of proof than are claims about the bases of empirical knowledge, i.e.about immediate sense experience. ^ But we can take desire as analogous to sensation and use it as the basis for atwo-stage argument [for the hedonistic aspect of Mill’s view]:1.^ Happiness is desirable [= good, an end]: established by the fact that we desire it2.^ Nothing other than happiness is desirable: anything else is originally desiredonly as a means to happiness – or, later, as part of it, as in the case of virtue andother, less admirable aims (e.g., money, power) that eventually come to be valuedfor their own sake, as

ingredients^ of happiness.

^ Mill even goes on to claim that “desirable” and “pleasant” can be seen to benames for the same idea. On two further assumptions – that the totalhappiness must be desirable for everyone taken together, and that the endfor which we act is the criterion of right action – this yields an argument forMill’s utilitarianism.

Twentieth-century objections ^ to hedonism^ ^ from interpersonal comparisons: It’s impossible to measure oneperson’s pleasure or pain against another’s.^ ^ from objective good: We also care about whether our pleasurableexperiences correspond to reality (Nozick’s “experience machine”). ^ to utilitarianism [“proper”]^ ^ from justice: Utilitarianism allows for “interpersonal trade-offs,” or thesacrifice of some to the total good (cf., e.g., trolley cases, “telishment,”distribution of wealth).^ ^ from moral emotion: Utilitarianism would involve too much detachmentfrom emotions essential to moral agency (Williams on “integrity”).

Moral wrong ^ Mill argues that our sense of justice, which is based on the primitiveurge to retaliate for harm, depends for its content and “binding”moral status on utilitarianism. ^ His initial review of the types of things that count as unjust, alongwith etymology, reveals that they have in common reference toviolation of a law, real or ideal. But it also brings out conflictinginterpretations. ^ He notes that an act is

morally wrong^ (= a violation of moralobligation, or duty) only if it deserves punishment, at least by socialdisapproval or conscience. ^ So some acts that fail to maximize the good may not really be wrongbut just “inexpedient” – in the broader sense in which Mill uses theterm here [as “non-optimal” = not the best].

Injustice ^ Whether a wrong act counts as unjust depends on something further thatjustice adds to moral obligation:^ ^ Certain general rules that are essential to our basic security give us duties towardspecific persons. Completely specified duties are known as “perfect” duties; thepersons or groups toward whom we have such duties are said to have

rights.

^ The particularly strong sense of obligation associated with justice (as opposed togenerosity or benevolence, say) results from our natural retaliatory sentiments,but it becomes a moral sentiment of justice only when our urge toward self-defense is extended by sympathy to reflect concern for the social good.  The upshot is that justice is explained by the principle of utility, but asapplied to general^ rules^ rather than acts. However, Mill still says that therules can be overridden in extreme circumstances, though we may not thinkof the result as a violation of justice [or even as wrong].