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54 Army Space Journal 2008 Spring Edition
& the Realities of
Carl von Clausewitz’s Theories
of “Fog and Friction”
Realities of
he advent of Space force enhancement 1 capabilities,
as applied directly to improving the effectiveness
of forces across the full spectrum of operations by
providing worldwide operational assistance to com-
bat elements, 2 potentially reduces the effects of Carl
von Clausewitz’s famous “fog and friction” of war.
The Space assets utilized in Space force enhance-
ment can be critical combat multipliers by providing
combatant commanders with real time information
that greatly enhances situational awareness and deci-
sion-making. But a cautionary note accompanies
these technological advances. Satellite technologies
provide a commander with a wealth of data, which,
if not properly synthesized, have the potential to
overwhelm. Thus, modern “fog and friction” can be
caused by having to decipher too much information,
just as it arises when leaders possess too little data
to make measured decisions.
Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) described the
essence of war in his famous work, “On War”:
E
VERYTHING IN WAR IS VERY SIMPLE ,
BUT THE SIMPLEST THING IS DIFFI -
CULT. THE DIFFICULTIES ACCUMULATE AND
END BY PRODUCING A KIND OF FRICTION
THAT IS INCONCEIVABLE UNLESS ONE HAS
EXPERIENCED WAR... FOG CAN PREVENT
THE ENEMY FROM BEING SEEN IN TIME , A
GUN FROM FIRING WHEN IT SHOULD , A
REPORT FROM REACHING THE COMMAND -
ING OFFICER .” 3
MAJ Rodger Pitt is an FA40 (Space Operations)
officer serving in the National Reconnaissance
Operations Center as the National
Reconnaissance Office’s enterprise interface
with external agencies (Service Components,
Combatant Commands, the Intelligence
Community and the Joint Staff) for compart-
mented programs. His previous tour was at the
Naval Post Graduate School where he com-
pleted two Masters of Science Degrees: Space
Systems Operations and Physics. His thesis
research topic was “Mitigating Plasma-Induced
Communication Signal Attenuation for Hyper-
Sonic Reentry Vehicles.” He is en route to the
1 st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kan., to stand
up their Space Support Element.
Space Age
<< about the author
<< story
By Rodger S. Pitt MAJ, Military Intelligence Army Space Operations Officer National Reconnaissance Office
“
T
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56 Army Space Journal 2008 Spring Edition
As a result of this success, the Army has dedicated, trained
Space operations officers who are permanently assigned to the
Space Support Element at every Division in the Army. These
Space operations officers integrate Space force enhancement
and Space control 10 operations by working closely with the
entire battle staff to ensure Space support is optimized for
all six warfighting functions.^11 In order to better understand
how Space systems affect Clausewitzian “fog and friction,”
one must first grasp Space-based capabilities.
● Global Position System (GPS)
o GPS Constellation Status (accuracy predictions).
o Space-based navigation signals for precision-guided munitions.
o GPS and Satellite Communications are both used to track supply movements from embarkation at continental United States facilities through points of debarkation to the Soldiers intended to use the supplies.
● Space-based Remote Sensing
o Space-based imagery are provided to enhance analysis of optimum staging areas and lines of communication.
o Hyperspectral (such as Hyperion) and multispectral (such as LANDSAT) imagery for intelligence, terrain analysis and targeting analysis.
● Satellite Communications (SATCOM)
o Access to dedicated, secure SATCOM on the Defense Satellite Communications System and the MILSTAR (a.k.a. Military Strategic and Tactical Relay) constellation for long-haul communications that are critical to command and control.
o Alternate communications through other Space systems such as Iridium, International Maritime Satellite, and International Telecommunications Satellite Organization.
● Space-based Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (Space assets that find and identify targets)
● Space control (in-theater negation and surveillance)
● Satellite reconnaissance advanced notice products
● Space-based Blue Force Tracking
● Theater Missile Warning (TMW)
● Space environmental status
● Space assets that provide global weather situational awareness
● Protect friendly Space assets and capabilities
2008 Spring Edition Army Space Journal 57
The warfighter can communicate, navigate, tar-
get, find, and fix the enemy using a variety of different
communication, Global Position System (GPS), and
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance satel-
lites, respectively. Other satellites can provide data that
help anticipate weather and protect friendly forces. The
military also endeavors to control Space so adversar-
ies cannot overcome the United States’ asymmetrical
advantages in Space.^12
Space-enabled capabilities are sophisticated combat
multipliers that are used to help warfighters shape the
following operations: shaping the operational environ-
ment; prompt response; mobilizing the Army; forcible
entry operations; and sustained land dominance. The fol-
lowing Space force enhancement capabilities 13 “are vital
to overall military mission accomplishment, provide the
advantages needed for success in all joint operations, and
support the principles of war.” 14 These Space-enabled
capabilities provide the warfighter with a greatly increased
situational awareness within the battlespace and make
that knowledge available in near real time. Furthermore,
the Army’s FM 3-14 states:
T
HE A RMY OF TODAY LEVERAGES S PACE
CAPABILITIES TO ACCOMPLISH A WIDE VARIETY
OF MISSIONS. S PACE-BASED AND S PACE-ENABLED
COMMUNICATIONS ; POSITION , VELOCITY AND
TIMING ; ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING ; INTEL -
LIGENCE , SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE
(ISR); AND MISSILE WARNING SUPPORT ARE ROBUST
CAPABILITIES THAT CONTINUE TO BE NECESSI -
TIES FOR SUCCESS ON THE BATTLEFIELD. R OBUST
SPACE CAPABILITIES ARE A PREREQUISITE FOR THE
A RMY OF THE FUTURE. THEY ENHANCE INFORMA -
TION SUPERIORITY AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS,
AIDING HIGH - TEMPO , NONCONTIGUOUS , SIMULTA -
NEOUS DISTRIBUTED OPERATIONS .” 15
Even though Space professionals provide tremen-
dous leverage to warfighting capabilities by utilizing
and exploiting these Space-enabled capabilities, caution
must be taken as these capabilities make an exponential
amount of additional information available to all levels
of operations. The astronomical amount of information,
“
provided by Space-based and Space-enabled
assets, is vastly challenging to synthesize into
useful intelligible knowledge that will aid in
a leader’s decision making. Joint Intelligence
doctrine states that:
I
NTELLIGENCE IS NOT AN EXACT SCIENCE ;
THERE WILL ALWAYS BE SOME UNCER -
TAINTY IN THE MINDS OF INTELLIGENCE
ANALYSTS AS THEY ASSESS THE ADVERSARY ,
AND THE COMMANDER AND STAFF AS THEY
PLAN AND EXECUTE OPERATIONS. LIKEWISE ,
INTELLIGENCE , AS SYNTHESIS OF QUANTI -
TATIVE ANALYSIS AND QUALITATIVE JUDG -
MENT , IS RARELY UNEQUIVOCAL AND IS
THEREFORE SUBJECT TO COMPETING
INTERPRETATION .”^16
However, the required information must
be available at the right time and in the right
format for leaders to understand. Therefore,
this vast amount of information must be
filtered, processed, analyzed and produced
into timely, actionable intelligence so that
leaders can take full advantage of it. Until
this plethora of information can be truly
synthesized, Clausewitz’s fog and friction will
simply move from a lack of information to
a lack of synthesized information. In other
words, data from the battlefield is available,
but full knowledge of the battlefield is not
yet realized by the commander or it is deci-
phered too late.
The fog and friction shift between lack of
information to lack of synthesized information
may change as the military and intelligence
communities move further and further into
the digital age with technological sophistica-
tion that stretches “the battlefield into multi-
dimensional battlespace, which includes the
land, sea, air, outer Space and the electron.” 17
The later term denotes that the form of war
is becoming information-oriented. Timothy
Thomas, a Department of the Army civilian
“
2008 Spring Edition Army Space Journal 59
1 Space Force Enhancement – Combat support operations to improve the effectiveness of military forces as well as support other intelligence, civil, and commercial users. The Space force enhancement mission area includes: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; integrated tactical warning and attack assessment; command, control, and communications; position, velocity, time and navigation; and environmental monitoring. (Joint Publication (JP) 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, 9 August 2002)
2 FM 3-14 (Space Support to Army Operations) Headquarters, Department of the Army, May 2005, 2-1.
3 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 119-120.
4 Ibid. 119-121.
5 Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War”, International Security, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Winter, 1992-1993), 76-77.
6 Barry D. Watts, “Clausewitzian Friction and Future War”, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, McNair Paper 52 (October 1996), 37.
7 FM 3-14 (Space Support to Army Operations) Headquarters, Department of the Army, May 2005, 1-1.
8 JP 3-14 (Joint Doctrine for Space Operations), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9 August 2002, II-4.
9 FM 3-14.10 (Space Brigade Operations) Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 2007, 1-1.
10 Space Control – Combat, combat support, and combat ser- vice support operations to ensure freedom of action in Space for the United States and its allies and, when directed, deny an adversary freedom of action in Space, The Space control mis- sion area includes; protection of US and friendly Space systems; prevention of an adversary’s ability to use Space systems and services for purposes hostile to US national security interests; negation of Space systems and services used for purposes hostile to US national security interests; and directly supporting battle management, command, control, communications, and intel- ligence. (Joint Publication (JP) 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, 9 August 2002)
11 Warfighting Functions are: 1) movement and maneuver; 2) intelligence; 3) fires; 4) sustainment; 5) command and control; and 6) protection. These six warfighting functions are multiplied by leadership and complemented by information to make up the eight elements of combat power. (FM 3-0, Army Field Manual for Operations, February 2008, 4-1) This sentence is paraphrased from FM 3-14 (Space Support to Army Operations) Headquarters, Department of the Army, May 2005, D-1 & D-2.
12 Ibid. Foreward.
13 Ibid. 1-11 thru 1-14.
14 JP 3-14 (Joint Doctrine for Space Operations), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9 August 2002, ix.
15 FM 3-14 (Space Support to Army Operations) Headquarters, Department of the Army, May 2005, 1-1 & 1-2.
16 JP 2-0 (Joint Intelligence), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 22 June 2007, I-3.
17 China’s National Defense in 2002, white paper (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, December 2002), available at <http://www.aseansec. org/ARF/ARF-DWP/China-2002.doc>.
18 INEW – A series of combat operations that use the integration of electronic warfare and computer network warfare measures to disrupt the normal operation of enemy battlefield informa- tion systems while protecting one’s own, with the objective of seizing information superiority—similar to the U.S. definition of IO [Information Operations]. (Timothy L. Thomas, “Chinese and American Network Warfare, National Defense University, 16 March 2008, 77, available at <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/ press/jfq_pages/1538.pdf>)
19 Network-centric warfare (NCW) – An information superiority- enabled concept of operations that generates increased combat power by networking sensors, decision-makers, and shooters to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of self-synchronization. In essence, NCW translates information superiority into combat power by effectively link- ing knowledgeable entities in the battlespace. (David S. Alberts, John Garstka, et al., Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leverage Information Superiority (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1999), 2.)
20 Timothy L. Thomas, “Chinese and American Network Warfare, National Defense University, 16 March 2008, 77 available at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/jfq_pages/1538.pdf.
21 Ibid. 78.
22 Perfect Information – A term used in economics and game theory to describe a state of complete knowledge about the actions of other players that is instantaneously updated as new information arises. (Wikipedia, available at <http://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/Perfect_information>)
23 Keithly, David M. and Ferris, Stephen P., “Auftragstaktik, or Directive Control, in Joint and Combined Operations” Parameters Autumn (1999): 118-133.
24 Barry D. Watts, “Clausewitzian Friction and Future War”, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, McNair Paper 52 (October 1996), 126.
—Endnotes —
