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The Impact of Space Force Enhancements on Carl von Clausewitz's 'Fog and Friction' of War, Schemes and Mind Maps of Communication

How the advent of Space force enhancements has affected the 'fog and friction' of war, as described by Carl von Clausewitz. The article discusses how Space assets provide real-time information and situational awareness to combat commanders, reducing the effects of 'fog and friction'. The document also touches upon the importance of synthesizing the vast amount of information made available by Space systems to avoid creating new sources of uncertainty.

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  • How does the use of Space force enhancements impact the 'fog and friction' of war, as described by Carl von Clausewitz?

Typology: Schemes and Mind Maps

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54 Army Space Journal 2008 Spring Edition
& the Realities of
Carl von Clausewitzs Theories
of Fog and Friction
Realities of the
he advent of Space force enhancement1 capabilities,
as applied directly to improving the effectiveness
of forces across the full spectrum of operations by
providing worldwide operational assistance to com-
bat elements,
2
potentially reduces the effects of Carl
von Clausewitz’s famous “fog and friction” of war.
The Space assets utilized in Space force enhance-
ment can be critical combat multipliers by providing
combatant commanders with real time information
that greatly enhances situational awareness and deci-
sion-making. But a cautionary note accompanies
these technological advances. Satellite technologies
provide a commander with a wealth of data, which,
if not properly synthesized, have the potential to
overwhelm. Thus, modern “fog and friction” can be
caused by having to decipher too much information,
just as it arises when leaders possess too little data
to make measured decisions.
Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) described the
essence of war in his famous work, “On War”:
E
VERYTHING
IN
WAR
IS
VERY
SIMPLE
,
BUT THE SIMPLEST TH ING IS DIFFI-
CULT. THE DIFFICULTIES ACCUMULATE AND
END
BY
PRODUCING
A
KIND
OF
FRICTION
THAT
IS
INCONCEIVABLE
UNLESS
ONE
HAS
EXPERIENCED WAR . . . FOG CAN PREVENT
THE
ENEMY
FROM
BEING
SEEN
IN
TIME
,
A
GUN
FROM
FIRING
WHEN
IT
SHOULD
,
A
REPORT FROM REACHING THE COMMAND-
ING OFFICER.3
MAJ Rodger Pitt is an FA40 (Space Operations)
officer serving in the National Reconnaissance
Operations Center as the National
Reco nn aissa nc e Office’s enterprise interface
with external agencies (Service Components,
Combatant Commands, the Intelligence
Community and the Joint Staff) for compart-
mented programs. His previous tour was at the
Naval Post Graduate School where he com-
pleted two Masters of Science Degrees: Space
Systems Operations and Physics. His thesis
research topic was “Mitigating Plasma-Induced
Communication Signal Attenuation for Hyper-
Sonic Reentry Vehicles.” He is en route to the
1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kan., to stand
up their Space Support Element.
Space Age
<< about the author
<< story
By Rodger S. Pitt
MAJ, Military Intelligence
Army Space Operations Officer
National Reconnaissance Office
T
pf3
pf4
pf5

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54 Army Space Journal 2008 Spring Edition

& the Realities of

Carl von Clausewitz’s Theories

of “Fog and Friction”

Realities of

he advent of Space force enhancement 1 capabilities,

as applied directly to improving the effectiveness

of forces across the full spectrum of operations by

providing worldwide operational assistance to com-

bat elements, 2 potentially reduces the effects of Carl

von Clausewitz’s famous “fog and friction” of war.

The Space assets utilized in Space force enhance-

ment can be critical combat multipliers by providing

combatant commanders with real time information

that greatly enhances situational awareness and deci-

sion-making. But a cautionary note accompanies

these technological advances. Satellite technologies

provide a commander with a wealth of data, which,

if not properly synthesized, have the potential to

overwhelm. Thus, modern “fog and friction” can be

caused by having to decipher too much information,

just as it arises when leaders possess too little data

to make measured decisions.

Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) described the

essence of war in his famous work, “On War”:

E

VERYTHING IN WAR IS VERY SIMPLE ,

BUT THE SIMPLEST THING IS DIFFI -

CULT. THE DIFFICULTIES ACCUMULATE AND

END BY PRODUCING A KIND OF FRICTION

THAT IS INCONCEIVABLE UNLESS ONE HAS

EXPERIENCED WAR... FOG CAN PREVENT

THE ENEMY FROM BEING SEEN IN TIME , A

GUN FROM FIRING WHEN IT SHOULD , A

REPORT FROM REACHING THE COMMAND -

ING OFFICER .” 3

MAJ Rodger Pitt is an FA40 (Space Operations)

officer serving in the National Reconnaissance

Operations Center as the National

Reconnaissance Office’s enterprise interface

with external agencies (Service Components,

Combatant Commands, the Intelligence

Community and the Joint Staff) for compart-

mented programs. His previous tour was at the

Naval Post Graduate School where he com-

pleted two Masters of Science Degrees: Space

Systems Operations and Physics. His thesis

research topic was “Mitigating Plasma-Induced

Communication Signal Attenuation for Hyper-

Sonic Reentry Vehicles.” He is en route to the

1 st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kan., to stand

up their Space Support Element.

Space Age

<< about the author

<< story

By Rodger S. Pitt MAJ, Military Intelligence Army Space Operations Officer National Reconnaissance Office

T

Report Documentation Page

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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

Realities of Space Age & the Realities of Carl von Clausewitz’s Theories

of ’Fog and Friction’

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56 Army Space Journal 2008 Spring Edition

As a result of this success, the Army has dedicated, trained

Space operations officers who are permanently assigned to the

Space Support Element at every Division in the Army. These

Space operations officers integrate Space force enhancement

and Space control 10 operations by working closely with the

entire battle staff to ensure Space support is optimized for

all six warfighting functions.^11 In order to better understand

how Space systems affect Clausewitzian “fog and friction,”

one must first grasp Space-based capabilities.

● Global Position System (GPS)

o GPS Constellation Status (accuracy predictions).

o Space-based navigation signals for precision-guided munitions.

o GPS and Satellite Communications are both used to track supply movements from embarkation at continental United States facilities through points of debarkation to the Soldiers intended to use the supplies.

● Space-based Remote Sensing

o Space-based imagery are provided to enhance analysis of optimum staging areas and lines of communication.

o Hyperspectral (such as Hyperion) and multispectral (such as LANDSAT) imagery for intelligence, terrain analysis and targeting analysis.

● Satellite Communications (SATCOM)

o Access to dedicated, secure SATCOM on the Defense Satellite Communications System and the MILSTAR (a.k.a. Military Strategic and Tactical Relay) constellation for long-haul communications that are critical to command and control.

o Alternate communications through other Space systems such as Iridium, International Maritime Satellite, and International Telecommunications Satellite Organization.

● Space-based Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (Space assets that find and identify targets)

● Space control (in-theater negation and surveillance)

● Satellite reconnaissance advanced notice products

● Space-based Blue Force Tracking

● Theater Missile Warning (TMW)

● Space environmental status

● Space assets that provide global weather situational awareness

● Protect friendly Space assets and capabilities

2008 Spring Edition Army Space Journal 57

The warfighter can communicate, navigate, tar-

get, find, and fix the enemy using a variety of different

communication, Global Position System (GPS), and

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance satel-

lites, respectively. Other satellites can provide data that

help anticipate weather and protect friendly forces. The

military also endeavors to control Space so adversar-

ies cannot overcome the United States’ asymmetrical

advantages in Space.^12

Space-enabled capabilities are sophisticated combat

multipliers that are used to help warfighters shape the

following operations: shaping the operational environ-

ment; prompt response; mobilizing the Army; forcible

entry operations; and sustained land dominance. The fol-

lowing Space force enhancement capabilities 13 “are vital

to overall military mission accomplishment, provide the

advantages needed for success in all joint operations, and

support the principles of war.” 14 These Space-enabled

capabilities provide the warfighter with a greatly increased

situational awareness within the battlespace and make

that knowledge available in near real time. Furthermore,

the Army’s FM 3-14 states:

T

HE A RMY OF TODAY LEVERAGES S PACE

CAPABILITIES TO ACCOMPLISH A WIDE VARIETY

OF MISSIONS. S PACE-BASED AND S PACE-ENABLED

COMMUNICATIONS ; POSITION , VELOCITY AND

TIMING ; ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING ; INTEL -

LIGENCE , SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE

(ISR); AND MISSILE WARNING SUPPORT ARE ROBUST

CAPABILITIES THAT CONTINUE TO BE NECESSI -

TIES FOR SUCCESS ON THE BATTLEFIELD. R OBUST

SPACE CAPABILITIES ARE A PREREQUISITE FOR THE

A RMY OF THE FUTURE. THEY ENHANCE INFORMA -

TION SUPERIORITY AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS,

AIDING HIGH - TEMPO , NONCONTIGUOUS , SIMULTA -

NEOUS DISTRIBUTED OPERATIONS .” 15

Even though Space professionals provide tremen-

dous leverage to warfighting capabilities by utilizing

and exploiting these Space-enabled capabilities, caution

must be taken as these capabilities make an exponential

amount of additional information available to all levels

of operations. The astronomical amount of information,

provided by Space-based and Space-enabled

assets, is vastly challenging to synthesize into

useful intelligible knowledge that will aid in

a leader’s decision making. Joint Intelligence

doctrine states that:

I

NTELLIGENCE IS NOT AN EXACT SCIENCE ;

THERE WILL ALWAYS BE SOME UNCER -

TAINTY IN THE MINDS OF INTELLIGENCE

ANALYSTS AS THEY ASSESS THE ADVERSARY ,

AND THE COMMANDER AND STAFF AS THEY

PLAN AND EXECUTE OPERATIONS. LIKEWISE ,

INTELLIGENCE , AS SYNTHESIS OF QUANTI -

TATIVE ANALYSIS AND QUALITATIVE JUDG -

MENT , IS RARELY UNEQUIVOCAL AND IS

THEREFORE SUBJECT TO COMPETING

INTERPRETATION .”^16

However, the required information must

be available at the right time and in the right

format for leaders to understand. Therefore,

this vast amount of information must be

filtered, processed, analyzed and produced

into timely, actionable intelligence so that

leaders can take full advantage of it. Until

this plethora of information can be truly

synthesized, Clausewitz’s fog and friction will

simply move from a lack of information to

a lack of synthesized information. In other

words, data from the battlefield is available,

but full knowledge of the battlefield is not

yet realized by the commander or it is deci-

phered too late.

The fog and friction shift between lack of

information to lack of synthesized information

may change as the military and intelligence

communities move further and further into

the digital age with technological sophistica-

tion that stretches “the battlefield into multi-

dimensional battlespace, which includes the

land, sea, air, outer Space and the electron.” 17

The later term denotes that the form of war

is becoming information-oriented. Timothy

Thomas, a Department of the Army civilian

2008 Spring Edition Army Space Journal 59

1 Space Force Enhancement – Combat support operations to improve the effectiveness of military forces as well as support other intelligence, civil, and commercial users. The Space force enhancement mission area includes: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; integrated tactical warning and attack assessment; command, control, and communications; position, velocity, time and navigation; and environmental monitoring. (Joint Publication (JP) 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, 9 August 2002)

2 FM 3-14 (Space Support to Army Operations) Headquarters, Department of the Army, May 2005, 2-1.

3 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 119-120.

4 Ibid. 119-121.

5 Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War”, International Security, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Winter, 1992-1993), 76-77.

6 Barry D. Watts, “Clausewitzian Friction and Future War”, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, McNair Paper 52 (October 1996), 37.

7 FM 3-14 (Space Support to Army Operations) Headquarters, Department of the Army, May 2005, 1-1.

8 JP 3-14 (Joint Doctrine for Space Operations), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9 August 2002, II-4.

9 FM 3-14.10 (Space Brigade Operations) Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 2007, 1-1.

10 Space Control – Combat, combat support, and combat ser- vice support operations to ensure freedom of action in Space for the United States and its allies and, when directed, deny an adversary freedom of action in Space, The Space control mis- sion area includes; protection of US and friendly Space systems; prevention of an adversary’s ability to use Space systems and services for purposes hostile to US national security interests; negation of Space systems and services used for purposes hostile to US national security interests; and directly supporting battle management, command, control, communications, and intel- ligence. (Joint Publication (JP) 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, 9 August 2002)

11 Warfighting Functions are: 1) movement and maneuver; 2) intelligence; 3) fires; 4) sustainment; 5) command and control; and 6) protection. These six warfighting functions are multiplied by leadership and complemented by information to make up the eight elements of combat power. (FM 3-0, Army Field Manual for Operations, February 2008, 4-1) This sentence is paraphrased from FM 3-14 (Space Support to Army Operations) Headquarters, Department of the Army, May 2005, D-1 & D-2.

12 Ibid. Foreward.

13 Ibid. 1-11 thru 1-14.

14 JP 3-14 (Joint Doctrine for Space Operations), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9 August 2002, ix.

15 FM 3-14 (Space Support to Army Operations) Headquarters, Department of the Army, May 2005, 1-1 & 1-2.

16 JP 2-0 (Joint Intelligence), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 22 June 2007, I-3.

17 China’s National Defense in 2002, white paper (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, December 2002), available at <http://www.aseansec. org/ARF/ARF-DWP/China-2002.doc>.

18 INEW – A series of combat operations that use the integration of electronic warfare and computer network warfare measures to disrupt the normal operation of enemy battlefield informa- tion systems while protecting one’s own, with the objective of seizing information superiority—similar to the U.S. definition of IO [Information Operations]. (Timothy L. Thomas, “Chinese and American Network Warfare, National Defense University, 16 March 2008, 77, available at <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/ press/jfq_pages/1538.pdf>)

19 Network-centric warfare (NCW) – An information superiority- enabled concept of operations that generates increased combat power by networking sensors, decision-makers, and shooters to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of self-synchronization. In essence, NCW translates information superiority into combat power by effectively link- ing knowledgeable entities in the battlespace. (David S. Alberts, John Garstka, et al., Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leverage Information Superiority (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1999), 2.)

20 Timothy L. Thomas, “Chinese and American Network Warfare, National Defense University, 16 March 2008, 77 available at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/jfq_pages/1538.pdf.

21 Ibid. 78.

22 Perfect Information – A term used in economics and game theory to describe a state of complete knowledge about the actions of other players that is instantaneously updated as new information arises. (Wikipedia, available at <http://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/Perfect_information>)

23 Keithly, David M. and Ferris, Stephen P., “Auftragstaktik, or Directive Control, in Joint and Combined Operations” Parameters Autumn (1999): 118-133.

24 Barry D. Watts, “Clausewitzian Friction and Future War”, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, McNair Paper 52 (October 1996), 126.

—Endnotes —