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The restructuring of Iberia: a flight plan plagued
by turbulence
ROCÍO GONZÁLEZ SÁNCHEZ
Universidad Rey Juan Carlos
SONIA MEDINA SALGADO
Universidad Rey Juan Carlos
S u m a r i o :
- 16.1. Introduction: a brief history
- 16.2. The spanish airline industry in the new millennium
- 16.3. The merger with British Airways: the birth of IAG o 16.3.1. Background o 16.3.2. Process o 16.3.3. And after the merger…
- 16.4. The restructuring of Iberia o 16.4.1. The 2012-2015 transformation plan
- CASE QUESTIONS
- SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION SOURCES Case overview Through to the end of 2013, Iberia, the flagship of the Spanish airline industry and part of the IAG holding, has recorded the sharpest downturn in its income statement and cashflow since it was created in 1927. There are numerous factors that have led to this situation; these include a significant fall in the number of bookings, the greater use of high-speed trains, a steep rise in airport taxes, and the major expansion of low-cost carriers, all of which have been played out against a backdrop of profound economic crisis. The current scenario has forced Iberia to adopt a restructuring plan, financed through its own resources in order to reduce its cost base and return to profit, which is proving to be difficult to implement. Case objectives
- Analyse Iberia’s restructuring strategy and the impact of its conflicts with stakeholders.
- Reflect upon Iberia’s strategic errors and the merger process.
- Analyse the strategic changes made in Iberia following the latest corporate operations. Keywords Restructuring, merger, strategic change, airline industry.
Theoretical references for preparing the case GUERRAS MARTÍN, L. A.; NAVAS LÓPEZ, J. E. (2007), «La Dirección Estratégica de la Empresa. Teoría y Aplicaciones» , Thomson Reuters-Civitas, Cizur Menor, 4th^ edition: chapters 12 and 14. NAVAS LÓPEZ, J. E.; GUERRAS MARTÍN, L. A. (2013), «Fundamentals of Strategic Management» , Thomson Reuters-Civitas, Cizur Menor: chapters 6 and 7. 16.1. INTRODUCTION: A BRIEF HISTORY Iberia, once Spain’s largest airline in terms of passenger numbers, faces the worst deterioration of its income statement and cashflows since it was created. In the first quarter of 2013, it recorded a loss of 513 million euros (pre-tax), and that same year it carried 16.5% fewer passengers. Iberia was incorporated on 28 June 1927, with an initial fleet of three aircraft and flying between Barcelona and Madrid. It was not until 1939 that it began its first medium-haul flights, initially between Madrid and Lisbon and, subsequently, to North Africa. In 1944, it acquired the status of public company when it became part of Spain’s Instituto Nacional de Industria (INI), the state-owned financing and industrial holding company. A year later, it operated its first long-haul flight to Buenos Aires. These were to be the foundations for its future leadership in Latin America, providing the bridge with Europe. In the 1960s, the airline expanded to include new destinations in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Towards the end of 1977, Iberia underwent a major corporate and financial restructuring process, with the ensuing change of image, as a response to the new stage in the company’s trajectory at a time of crisis in the aeronautics industry and of political and social change in Spain. This restructuring addressed internal aspects, such as a reduction in expenditure, the control of investments and the incentivation of the workforce to improve Iberia’s service. The planned growth on the back of the purchase of carriers in Latin America, in line with the merger process affecting airlines throughout the world, did not have the expected outcome. This, together with an unstable environment, caused by the 1991 Gulf War, pushed the company into a string of poor results that was unsustainable for the Spanish government. This meant that a privatisation process was launched in 2000 that would culminate with the company being floated on the stock market in
- At around this time, nonetheless, Iberia had already begun dealings with major international carriers - British Airways and American Airlines, among others- when in 1999 it joined the Oneworld alliance. Its special relationship with British Airways would plant the seed of a commitment that was to shape its future history. At the beginning of 2014, Iberia as a corporate group encompassed several businesses that were all closely related. Although its core operations involved the transport of passengers, it also has a highly significant presence domestically in handling operations, through Iberia Airport Services, and in the business of aircraft engineering and maintenance through Iberia Mantenimiento (Maintenance). Another business through which it provides services, albeit on a much less intensive basis, is the one involving IT systems for air transport. Although this business has played a vital role for Iberia over the past decades, it has been losing ground. Over these
instead will remain unchanged until 2018. There will, however, be more discounts – lower charges for the passengers of airlines that contribute to the overall growth in air traffic and for those carriers opening new routes. Accordingly, the state-owned company responsible for managing Spain’s airports, AENA (the Spanish acronym for Spanish Airports and Air Traffic), has been operating according to the «single-till» principle, whereby the funds collected at busier airports are used to underwrite their loss-making counterparts, being referred to as a «cross-subsidy». This arrangement may be detrimental to those airlines whose operating centres are located at major airports, as opposed to low-cost carriers that are clearly focused on secondary airports. Airports and their management are important for the industry, not only because of the charges levied on the airlines but also because they have a highly significant impact on companies’ performance through the so-called slots. Slots are the allocations of takeoff and landing rights according to the timetable and type of aircraft at the airports. The possibility of numerous rights at very busy airports is a competitive advantage for companies when providing their flights and services and, therefore, becomes a crucial factor for competing and growing. Indeed, recognised auditing firms such as Deloitte consider that slots should be assets recognised on airline balance sheets, especially as they may now be bought or sold, following the European Union’s authorisation in 2008. The price of slots is constantly rising due to the saturation of certain major airports and the liberalisation of air transport between the European Union and the United States. Furthermore, Terminal 4 at Adolfo Suarez Madrid-Barajas, Iberia’s traditional operating hub, has recorded a 12.1% drop in passengers in 2013, with 10.8% fewer operations. The main reasons for these negative figures are, amongst others, the fact that Madrid has been unable to consolidate its position as an attractive tourist destination to rival Barcelona. According to Spain’s Institute of Tourist Studies (IET), Madrid recorded a 5.3% drop in the number of international visitors in 2013. What’s more, Barcelona’s El Prat airport has a low-cost airline that has now become an industry benchmark, namely, Vueling. In the meantime, Iberia Express, whose operating hub is at Barajas, has yet to consolidate its position, with its growth flat- lining. Competitive rivals: low-cost and traditional companies. Iberia’s main competitors on medium and short-haul routes are the low-cost carriers. These companies operate with extremely low costs and are highly competitive as regards the traditional airlines. Furthermore, their workforce is more productive across the board. Spain has the highest rate of low-cost flights, which has a particular bearing on Iberia, with 40% of its sales being made in the domestic market. In terms of long-haul flights, the traditional carriers are the ones that share out the air space. On routes of this kind, competitors may be identified by whether the flights are to North America, Latin America, Africa or Asia. In Asia’s case, certain airlines such as Qatar Airways or Emirates, with more clearly differentiated services in terms of quality, have already managed to reroute a large part of the Asia-Europe traffic through their hubs. Finally, regarding the Latin American routes in which Iberia has been a pioneer and, traditionally, the benchmark company, there is now growing competition due to the greater presence of Latin American carriers, such as those belonging to the LATAM
Airlines Group (LAN Chile and TAM, among others), which have reinforced their financial performance in recent years in the wake of major restructurings. Substitute service: the high-speed train. Elsewhere, the growing network of high- speed trains is stealing passengers from the airlines. In Spain’s case, since the introduction of the AVE (meaning bird, this acronym stands for Spanish High Speed) this service has managed to draw 4.5 million passengers in domestic traffic away from Barajas Airport. Although many experts do not consider it to be a major competitor, seeing it instead as offer that complements air travel, for Iberia it has become a substitute for its point-to-point domestic flights. Nevertheless, the current chairman of Iberia considers that if the AVE were to stop at Terminal 4 in Barajas, thereby helping to bolster the number of passengers travelling to Madrid to catch long-haul flights, the high-speed train would become an ally rather than a competitor. Dependence on fuel. According to IATA, the consumption of fuel now accounts for 30% of airlines’ overall operating costs. In spite of their usual financial strategy of hedging against higher fuel prices through their operations on the derivatives market, the sustained increase in oil prices in recent years has further weakened the carriers’ cost structure. Their exposure to fluctuations in the price of oil has meant that airlines have looked for other mechanisms to reduce their dependence in terms of costs. On the one hand, this has involved renewing their fleets with more efficient aircraft in terms of energy consumption and, on the other, increasing their organisational size in order to reinforce their negotiating position with fuel suppliers. This factor is compounded by the industry’s recent inclusion in the EU’s Emissions Trading Directive, whereby companies are required to pay for their CO 2 emissions at European airports when they take off or land. 16.3. THE MERGER WITH BRITISH AIRWAYS: THE BIRTH OF IAG 16.3.1. BACKGROUND Both British Airways and Iberia had been left behind in the consolidation process taking place in Europe, where Air France and KLM had agreed to merge, and Lufthansa was creating a huge airline group based on the acquisition of satellite companies, many of which were in difficulties and would not survive on their own. In July 2008, and after ten years of cooperation between the two within Oneworld, Iberia and British Airways decided to start negotiating with a view to merging in order to combine their strengths and complement one another to become one of the strongest airline groups in global civil aviation: the world’s sixth largest, and Europe’s third. Regarding the advantages for the two companies, the merger project provided for the following:
- Exploitation of synergies estimated to amount to around 400 million euros for 2015, albeit yet to be specified.
- Improvement in strategic positioning thanks to the complementary nature of their operating routes. Iberia held a position of leadership in traffic between Europe and Latin America, while BA prevailed in Europe-North Atlantic routes.
AXA S.A. 4.85% Legal & General Group 4.07% Grupo Iberia 33,500 5,223 500 32 119 9.97% Caja Madrid 22.99% British Airways 13.15% SEPI 5.16% El Corte Inglés, S.A. 3.37% (a) Earnings before interest and taxes; (b) Net profit; (c) Number of aircraft Source: Author’s own work based on the consolidated annual accounts In July 2010, with the European Commission’s blessing for the merger, the final step was taken to start the actual process of joining the two companies together. Furthermore, and on that same date, the Commission also granted permission to include American Airlines in the cooperation on ticket pricing and the programming of scheduled transatlantic routes among the three airlines. 16.3.2. PROCESS As stated in the Registration Document that the newly incorporated company, IAG, presented to the Spanish National Securities Market Commission (CNMV) in October 2010, the merger for creating the group involved an operation consisting of several transactions that would be undertaken over the following three months. These operations included, among others, the creation of IAG, as a merger by takeover, and the operations of the Nationality Structure that would permit the two companies to operate separately, keeping their brands and their route flying rights in their respective countries. In formal terms, the merger operation involved two companies: Iberia Líneas Aéreas de España S.A. and British Airways Holding & Co., created accordingly to be the holders of the shares and maintain the traffic and air rights in Spain and the United Kingdom, respectively. This ensured that there would be 50.1% of domestic shareholders in each country, upholding political rights but not economic ones in practice, in order to safeguard their route flying rights with countries outside the European Union. In order to arrange the share swap, determination was made, based on figures at December 2009, of the net equity of the two companies absorbed: 1.5 billion euros for Iberia and 2.1 billion pounds sterling for British Airways. The former shareholders of British Airways were assigned 56% of IAG’s capital, and those of Iberia received
44%. Nevertheless, and as widely reported in the media and acknowledged by the pilots’ union SEPLA, British Airways recognised in IAG’s Registration Document that one of its serious risks involved its obligations contracted by its two defined benefit pension schemes. These schemes, upon which the UK Pensions Regulator might impose obligations of financial support on the recently formed holding, even then contained estimated losses of more than three billion pounds. It is still not clear whether this financial risk affecting British Airways was truly considered when formulating the equation for the swap involved in the merger. This situation, together with a share portfolio in Iberia held by BA that was slightly higher than Iberia’s holding in BA, placed Iberia at a slight disadvantage as regards the merger, even though it had a sounder economic-financial position. The operation, undertaken on an equal footing in terms of governing bodies, with seven representatives appointed by each one of the parties on IAG’s board of directors, was approved by the General Meetings of both companies^1 and received the approval of all the regulatory bodies in Spain and the United Kingdom, as well as of the European Union. One of the most significant and widely discussed aspects of the merger agreement, and one that might play a crucial role as from 2015, is the so-called Assurances Agreement^2. This agreement stipulates that for the first five years after the Merger Effective Date, no action shall be taken (or omitted) by IAG, British Airways or Iberia that would result in a breach of the assurances. The aforementioned agreement contains ten assurances to be upheld, with the following main points: the companies will retain separate operating licences and air operator’s certificates, as well as their brands; all collective bargaining agreements and employment contracts shall continue to be negotiated and organized within British Airways and Iberia, respectively; a network strategy will be developed in a way that reflects the importance of London-Heathrow and Madrid-Barajas, which shall remain as fundamental parts of the multi-centre strategy of the IAG Group as a whole; avoid giving the Pensions Regulator in the United Kingdom any grounds on which it would be reasonable for it to impose an obligation on either Iberia or IAG to make any payment to, or otherwise assume liability for, any pension scheme sponsored, operated or contributed to by British Airways. Nevertheless, there are also the so-called Assurances Commitment Exceptions that permit the undertaking of actions, or their omission, provided they are treated as exceptions and are approved by at least seven of Iberia’s directors. These exceptions, explicitly provided for in clauses 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 of the Assurances Agreement, refer to actions or omissions that are expressly considered in the first joint business plan for the IAG Group, are expressly required by any applicable law, or have been approved by at least seven of the British Airways directors (when referring exclusively to the business of British Airways) or by the Iberia directors (when referring exclusively to the business of Iberia) or by at least seven British Airways directors and seven Iberia directors (when referring to both businesses)». (^1) In Iberia’s case, 99.97% of its shareholders supported the move. (^2) For more information, see the definitive Registration Document of IAG on the Group’s website at http://www.iagshares.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=240949&p=irol-mergerdocs
The Bank of N.Y. Mellon 3.99% El Corte Inglés, S.A. 3.37% (a) Earnings before interest and taxes; (b) Net profit; (c) Number of aircraft Source: Author’s own work based on the consolidated annual accounts Thus, in 2009, and after recording losses of 220 million ponds, British Airways implemented a new restructuring plan that included a reduction in capacity, the cancellation of unprofitable routes, a wage freeze, an increase in productivity, and fewer cabin crew on long-haul flights, among other measures. Nevertheless, the data for 2010 show that these measures did not in fact put BA on the path to recovery before the merger. Iberia’s situation was very different following the arrival of Antonio Vázquez as chairman and of Rafael Sánchez-Lozano as CEO in 2009. They both placed Iberia in a stronger financial position, at the same time as they oversaw the merger process. Despite the competition from the low-cost airlines, they managed to keep the company in a financially healthy position by reducing operating costs and the size of the workforce, with the purchase of five new aircraft. 16.3.3. AND AFTER THE MERGER… By 2013, IAG was already a consolidated group with an annual turnover of 18 billion, 60,000 employees, and its stock market value exceeded its rivals such as Lufthansa and Air France-KLM. In IAG, both Iberia and British Airways operate with separate income statements from their hubs in London and Madrid, respectively. Since the end of 2013, with Luis Gallego at the helm in Iberia and as the right-hand man to Willie Walsh, IAG’s CEO, and Keith Williams as his counterpart in the British company, the Group has continued to increase its stock market value. Nevertheless, what has become of Iberia since the creation of IAG through to the present day? Immersed in a restructuring process overseen by the Group’s leadership, based on a reduction in the workforce and fewer routes; committed to the success of a low-cost carrier such as Iberia Express, set up in early 2011, and posting operating losses through to the third quarter of 2013 when it finally returned to profit; Iberia has been developing the guidelines of a strategic plan that will ensure its brand remains, but which may question its future as Spain’s traditional «flag carrier». Along these lines, there are a number of significant events that reflect this loss of hegemony in Spain’s airline industry. Thus, for example, one such highlight is IAG’s decision to launch a public takeover bid (PTO) for 100% of Vueling’s capital, when 46% of its stock was already held by Iberia. Likewise, it is interesting to note that Iberia, the holder of almost half the capital of a low-cost airline such as Vueling, should launch Iberia Express, especially when Vueling operates through the airports
in Madrid and Barcelona (where it is the leading airline), whereas Iberia Express operates only through Madrid. On the other hand, the clear success IAG has had in convincing Iberia to reduce the number of routes has jeopardised the situation of Terminal 4 at Barajas, which is now oversized for the traffic passing through it, raising doubts about the very future of Adolfo Suarez Madrid-Barajas airport and its position as Iberia’s hub. Finally, albeit no less significantly, it is worth mentioning the divestments that Spanish shareholders are making as regards the airline. Thus, Bankia, pressurised mainly by Brussels, offloaded 12.1% of its investment in the company. Its position, probably maintained to keep pressure on the holding, has been lost. The EU gave it four years to sell off its packet of shares. Throughout 2013, El Corte Inglés, too, has been reducing its investment in the Group. Finally, towards the end of 2013, the CNMV reported the information provided by SEPI on its intention to divest from IAG as a significant event. 16.4. THE RESTRUCTURING OF IBERIA In September 2009, Iberia was Spain’s largest airline in terms of passenger numbers. However, in 2010 it was overtaken by Ryanair and, in 2012, also by Vueling. In 2013, it fell back into fourth place, behind Air Europa. 1.2 million people flew with Iberia in September that year, a 32% drop on the figure for the same month the prior year, according to data provided by AENA. Furthermore, Iberia’s «Premium» market (business travel) is smaller than its competitors’ and has a lower revenue from supplementary services, called ancillaries, which means significant differences in unitary income; a drop that amounts to 30% in Iberia’s case as regards its competitors in long-haul flights. On the other hand, its dependence on connections means that Iberia has to corner traffic in other markets at the expense of selling at cheaper prices – fares with connecting flights are lower than point-to-point fares. 16.4.1. THE 2012-2015 TRANSFORMATION PLAN Following the completion of the merger process, the new goal was to achieve a competitive company and reduce its major operating costs in order to follow the path to profit. Accordingly, Iberia’s management rolled out the «The 2012 - 2015 Transformation Plan» by the hand of its parent company IAG, which includes major structural changes to all its business areas and which will be financed entirely with the company’s own funds. The following are the plan’s main pillars:
- The short-term aim is to improve the cost differential with competitors, drawing a comparison with those that have a low-cost profile, with a view to improving productivity. This means, on the one hand, restructuring inefficient long-haul routes and reducing the size of the fleet, improving unitary income, while on the other, a major reduction in the workforce and wage adjustment, adopting a flexible approach to the working conditions of flight crew, ground staff and auxiliary services.
- Along these same lines, a far-reaching restructuring of non-core businesses is planned, such as, for example, maintenance and handling, to ensure
Source: Author’s own work Much of the success of this restructuring process will depend on the final agreement on the workforce negotiation following a redundancy programme that has caused a major conflict with employees, several strikes, and even forced the government to mediate. The considerable strength of the unions, mainly SEPLA (a Spanish acronym for the Spanish Union of Airline Pilots), has forced the company to negotiate complex productivity agreements. The roots of this industrial conflict are to be found in the creation of Iberia Express at the end of 2011, as the main step towards a low-cost model for short and medium- haul flights. Iberia considered the need to cut salaries and streamline the organisation of the workforce in order to fully develop the new company. An agreement was reached with all the groups involved, except SEPLA. The pilots, besides enjoying good working conditions, are the main pressure group thanks to their power to decide on whether flights go ahead or not. Although two years of talks had passed without a breakthrough, Iberia unilaterally decided to launch Iberia Express. This led to a series of pilot strikes that have cost the company close to 50 million euros and a major loss of image. Furthermore, the growth of Iberia Express is currently restricted by an arbitration ruling that obliges the company to hire Iberia pilots and uphold their working conditions until 31 December 2014. Following several months of turmoil at the airline, at the end of 2013 it announced a reorganisation and rationalisation of its upper echelons of management and the office of the chairman, Luis Gallego, a successful manager of low-cost airlines and with the name for being a peacemaker. The company claimed that any failure to secure the wage agreements on the table would threaten the viability of the project for restructuring Iberia, due to the weight of the payroll in the cost structure of the various airlines. As the chairman affirmed, keeping the cost structure of Iberia Express and successfully extending it to the rest of Iberia is an essential requirement in order to be able to compete both in transatlantic flights and in the attraction of point-to-point passengers, the core business of its low-cost competitors. In mid February 2014, Iberia and SEPLA subscribed the coveted agreement that would permit the company to adjust its payroll to market conditions over the coming years. One of the more significant points in the agreement reached involves the removal of the «single salary table». This measure means that Iberia co-pilots may be hired as pilots by Iberia Express until 2017 with no change to their privileges. In other words, they will be paid a low-cost salary that will be compensated by Iberia with assurances of their re-hiring and respect for their years of service. Once this three-year period has ended, Iberia Express will be able to hire new-recruit pilots at a lower cost. In addition, and as regards Iberia’s workforce, the agreement contains, among others, the following aspects: increase in the number of flying hours up to the legally permitted maximum, the removal of the third pilot on certain routes to Latin America, and the maintenance of the clause that blocks Vueling’s access to Terminal 4 at Barajas^3. Nevertheless, the strategic line that is unfolding through the recent agreement is not shared by certain industry experts. If Iberia Express were truly nothing more than a company designed to compete separately from Iberia with low-cost carriers, it should (^3) This clause refers to the business restriction on Vueling at this terminal above the 4% that has already been agreed.
have its own structure for income and expenditure. This means that the «cut-backs» approach should not affect Iberia’s operations or its business vision without a real development plan. In short, one might well ask whether Iberia can pursue long-term differentiation strategies with the same low-cost structure with which it plans to compete in its subsidiary. Talks are set to be held once again in 2017 to negotiate working conditions and salaries. Meanwhile, pay remains frozen until 2015, and from then on any possible salary increases will be linked to performance and results. b) The operational restructuring of the transport business - fleet and routes: Iberia’s current cost structure makes it impossible to compete on short and medium-haul routes in Spain and Europe, which have been fully taken up by low- cost carriers, and increasingly more so in Spain by the high-speed train on certain routes. This does not only have an impact on the actual routes themselves, which are all loss-making, but also extends this inefficiency to long-haul routes, as 65% are fed by these connections. In view of this, the restructuring plan involves a 15% reduction in its less profitable routes and the shrinking of the fleet by 25 aircraft ( for short and medium-haul services and five for long-haul). This restructuring also extends to other underperforming businesses, such as aircraft maintenance and handling, which are to be outsourced. An overall analysis of IAG traffic reveals that Iberia’s loss of passengers is apparent in the evolution of its business with Latin America. As regards its routes with this continent, the group has lost passengers (-11%), users by kilometre travelled (-11%), seats by kilometre operated (-9.8%) and occupancy ratio (-1.3%). This has led to the cancellation of routes to Athens, Cairo, Istanbul, Santo Domingo, Havana and Johannesburg. A further issue of some controversy involves the renewal of Iberia’s fleet, something that many experts think should have taken place prior to the merger with British Airways. The maintenance of older aircraft has a major impact on its costs structure, as their fuel consumption is less efficient than newer models. Furthermore, the type of aircraft available to an airline largely conditions the competitive strategy the company seeks to apply. Thus, the type of aircraft will affect the following: capacity in terms of seats available, flight range, and cabin comfort, among other aspects; all these are key factors in the provision of quality services. Accordingly, in August 2013, IAG announced the purchase of 62 Airbus 320 for its low-cost subsidiary, Vueling, as part of a joint order for 98 aircraft that was approved by the Extraordinary General Meeting held in April that same year, but which did not include any aircraft for Iberia. That same order however, included 18 A350 and 18 Boeing 787 for the major routes operated by British Airways. As regards the rationale for renewing Iberia’s fleet, it should be noted, on the one hand, that the aircraft ordered before the merger, and which it received in 2013, were seven Airbus A320 and two Airbus A1. Curiously enough, these are two types of aircraft that are similar to those purchased for Vueling to compete with the low-cost carriers. On the other hand, the eight A320 ordered by IAG as a result of the merger were designed to cater for its long-haul service. Apart from these investments, the purchase of new aircraft for Iberia has been subject to the progress made in its restructuring plans. In the words of its most senior executive, Luis Gallego, no new
CASE QUESTIONS
- Analyse the reasons behind the merger of the airlines Iberia and British Airways and the type of merger involved. Identify the main problems Iberia faces as a result of its membership of the IAG Group.
- Identify and analyse the possible reasons for Iberia posting losses and its difficulties in recovering.
- Based on the answer to the preceding question, analyse Iberia’s restructuring strategy and the role you think the creation of the IAG Group has played.
- Identify the main stakeholders and their objectives in Iberia’s restructuring process, assessing each one’s importance. Discuss the impact that industrial conflict has had on Iberia’s situation. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION SOURCES Interest webpages
- Iberia: http://grupo.iberia.es/portal/site/WebCorporativa/
- El País: http://economia.elpais.com
- Boletín Financiero: http://www.boletinfinanciero.es/
- AENA: http://www.aena.es/
