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Contemporary Theories of Consciousness: Dennett, Chalmers, and Churchland, Essays (university) of Philosophy

Middle Tennessee State University (MTSU)Philosophy

This essay provides a comprehensive analysis of three prominent contemporary theories of consciousness: daniel dennett's functionalist approach, david chalmers's property dualism, and patricia churchland's neurophilosophy. It delves into their respective metaphysical assumptions, methodologies, and substantive claims, highlighting the key differences and similarities between their perspectives. The essay explores the nature of consciousness, the role of qualia, and the relationship between the mind and the brain, offering valuable insights into this complex and enduring philosophical debate.

Typology: Essays (university)

2023/2024

Uploaded on 12/10/2024

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Theoretical Analysis
There are often many schools of thought when dealing with the mind and the idea of
consciousness and whether the soul is separate from the body. In this essay, I will outline the
essential features of Dennett’s, Chalmers's, and Churchland’scontemporary theories of
consciousness and provide each’s respectable assumptions, practices, and claims. The question
of consciousness tends to remain one of the most challenging and enduring issues in philosophy
and cognitive science. An even more difficult question is how do we define the soul. In a world
governed by physical laws, in which people’sphysical bodies and intangible consciousness
interact with one another, effectively creating the fabric of society, it is imperative to understand
the role and function of the individual consciousness. As such, many philosophers have spent a
significant portion of their work focused on the issue of consciousness and the idea of the soul as
it is the initial foundation for the framework that is contemporary philosophy.
In his book, Kinds of Minds, Daniel Dennett offers us a very simple functionalist and
materialist approach, focusing on cognitive science and the role of complex brain processes on
consciousness. Using Dennett’s theory of consciousness, consciousness is not an elusive
intangible entity, rather it is a vital property that is created from complex cognitive and neural
processes. Dennett’s metaphysical assumptions are grounded in his rejection of Cartesian
dualism, the idea that the body and mind are separate entities, simplifies consciousness into
merely another function of the brain. Using this framework, he introduces the “Multiple Drafts
Model” of consciousness which poses the idea that consciousness is a stream of parallel,
distributed processes in which the brain's cognitive functions edit, discard, and reinterprets the
world around us. Dennett’s methodology strongly advocates for a detached third-person
perspective when analyzing consciousness. Additionally, Dennett poses that both cognitive
science and artificial intelligence bestow key insights into the inner workings of consciousness
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Theoretical Analysis

There are often many schools of thought when dealing with the mind and the idea of consciousness and whether the soul is separate from the body. In this essay, I will outline the essential features of Dennett’s, Chalmers's, and Churchland’scontemporary theories of consciousness and provide each’s respectable assumptions, practices, and claims. The question of consciousness tends to remain one of the most challenging and enduring issues in philosophy and cognitive science. An even more difficult question is how do we define the soul. In a world governed by physical laws, in which people’sphysical bodies and intangible consciousness interact with one another, effectively creating the fabric of society, it is imperative to understand the role and function of the individual consciousness. As such, many philosophers have spent a significant portion of their work focused on the issue of consciousness and the idea of the soul as it is the initial foundation for the framework that is contemporary philosophy. In his book, Kinds of Minds, Daniel Dennett offers us a very simple functionalist and materialist approach, focusing on cognitive science and the role of complex brain processes on consciousness. Using Dennett’s theory of consciousness, consciousness is not an elusive intangible entity, rather it is a vital property that is created from complex cognitive and neural processes. Dennett’s metaphysical assumptions are grounded in his rejection of Cartesian dualism, the idea that the body and mind are separate entities, simplifies consciousness into merely another function of the brain. Using this framework, he introduces the “Multiple Drafts Model” of consciousness which poses the idea that consciousness is a stream of parallel, distributed processes in which the brain's cognitive functions edit, discard, and reinterprets the world around us. Dennett’s methodology strongly advocates for a detached third-person perspective when analyzing consciousness. Additionally, Dennett poses that both cognitive science and artificial intelligence bestow key insights into the inner workings of consciousness

rejecting the primacy of the subjective first-person experience. Ultimately, Dennett argues that our minds are fundamentally computational systems that help us to survive. His intentional stance, the philosophical practice of interpreting systems as having beliefs and desires regardless of their composition, extends the concept of consciousness to machines, animals, and anything else with a cognitive system. Dennett’s most controversial substantive claim is that the majority of what individuals experience as consciousness is fabricated. However, Dannett’sview is not necessarily simple. His view on consciousness is that it is a complex web of cognitive systems interacting with one another to fabricate the illusion of a continuous experience. Furthermore, Dennett also rejects the existence of qualia, along with the subjective and qualitative aspects of experience which other philosophers deem the key to understanding consciousness. Ultimately the approach that Dennett took to elucidate the mystery of consciousness was to interpret the functional and informational processes that generate behavior, thoughts, and experiences without appealing to the subjective properties. Conversely, David Chalmers presents a true dualist account of consciousness in his book, The Conscious Mind. The distinction between the “hard” and “easy” problems of consciousness was explained by Chalmers to be that “hard” problems entail explaining the subjective experience itself (qualia) while “easy” problems involve explaining the functional aspects of the mind such as memory and the processing of information. While “easy” problems are challenging in their own right, they can for the most part be addressed via neuroscience and cognitive science. Chalmers's theory rests upon the metaphysical assumption of property dualism. Despite agreeing with both Dennett and Churchland that there is a physical basis for cognition and behavior, Chalmers asserts that no amount of mere physical elucidation can fully account for subjective experience. In Chalmers’ eyes, consciousness possesses both physical and non- physical properties. The physical properties correspond to the neural processes that enable

neuroscience terms. Additionally, she advocates for eliminative materialism, which offers the idea that many of the traditionally speaking mental states posited by folk philosophy will be eventually replaced with neuroscientific descriptions of brain processes. From Churchland’s perspective, the brain is the key to understanding consciousness. Churchland’s metaphysical assumptions are embedded in strict physicalism. Her argument is that all aspects of consciousness, including qualia, can be explained by brain activity. Churchland believes that as neuroscience advances the mysteries of the consciousness will be unveiled via a deeper understanding of the brain's biochemical and electrical activity. Additionally, she rejects the idea of a distinct “hard” problem of consciousness, arguing that consciousness is an intricate but ultimately explainable product of regular brain function. Methodologically, Churchland heavily relies upon neuroscientific research, emphasizing the need for objective, empirical investigation of the brain while dismissing purely philosophical speculation as insufficient. Third-person empirical methods dominate Churchland’s approach, as her belief in scientific inquiry into the brain will reveal the mechanisms underlying conscious experience. From Churchland’s perspective, consciousness is no different from any other biological phenomenon and assuch should be studied. She utilizes the plasticity of the brain to elucidate how consciousness arises and changes over time, suggesting that the brain's ability to recognize itself plays a key role in the development and maintenance of the conscious experience. Patricia Churchland’s substantial claim is that consciousness is nothing more than mere neural processes. As advances in neuroscience are made, the folk-philosophical terms generally used to describe mental states will be replaced by neuroscientific terms. For example, what we currently refer to as “pain” or “fear” will be eventuallyexplained in terms of specific brain activity. Churchland also accentuates the importance of learning and memory in shaping consciousness, arguing that these cognitive functions are imperative to understanding how the brain generates conscious experience.

The contemporary theories of consciousness proposed by Dennett, Chalmers, and Churchland present us with a spectrum of philosophical positions, ranging from materialist functionalism and neurophilosophy to dualism. Despite Dennet and Churchland both adopting a materialist stance, Dennett’s functionalist approach emphasizes the computational nature of the brain, while Churchland’s neurophilosophy primarily targets the brain's physical processes. Conversely, Chalmer’sproperty dualism posits that consciousness has irreducibly non-physical aspects, posing a fundamental challenge to their materialist theories. Despite their differences in perspective, all three theorists contribute significantly to the ongoing debate on the nature of consciousness, offering us valuable insights into the metaphysical, methodological, and substantive dimensions of this complex phenomenon.