Download Traditional Mechanism of Crime Control and more Lecture notes Sociology of Crime and Punishment in PDF only on Docsity!
SALEM UNIVERSITY NIGERIA
LECTURE NOTE ON:
Traditional and Informal mechanisms of Crime Control: LECTURE: Dr. ISIAKA HARUNA INTRODUTION Traditional and informal mechanisms of crime control are a very pertinent aspect of studies in crime and delinquent acts as a social menace in the society. The various discourses that will be examined in this unit, to introduce you to various concepts, definitions, as well as the different connections and disconnections between “informal and traditional mechanism of crime control and formal means of combating crime. TRADITIONAL AND INFORMAL DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES The study of traditional informal mechanisms of crime control is marked by terms such as “traditional,” “customary,” “indigenous,” “informal,” “non-state,” “local,” “community,” “popular,” “participatory,” often conflated in both discourse and practice. In some instances they essentially seek to capture the same social phenomenon, while in others their meanings are quite different. This unit explains those specificities and the reasons for the choice of the expression “traditional and informal mechanisms of crime control” as the most encompassing. It also explores further, different ways of understanding the notion of “tradition” as well as the different connections and disconnections between “informal” and “formal” systems. Informal Mechanisms Informal mechanisms refer to “dispute resolution mechanisms falling outside the scope of the formal justice system. The term does not fit every circumstance as it’s been
describe. Such as (traditional, indigenous, customary, restorative, popular), and it is difficult to use a common term to denote the various processes, mechanisms and norms around the world. The term informal justice system is used here to draw a distinction between state-administered formal mechanism systems and non-state, administrated informal mechanism.” (Richard L. Abel, 1982). Another way to define informal mechanism is to refer to its key attributes. It is said to be unofficial (dissociated from state power) non-coercive (dependent rather than force), non-bureaucratic, decentralized, relatively undifferentiated, and non-professional; its substantive and procedural rules are imprecise, unwritten, democratic, flexible, ad hoc, and particularistic. No concrete informal legal institution will embody all these qualities, but each will exhibit some. (Abel; 1982).The main problem with qualifying a justice mechanism as “informal” is that the term may imply that it is simplistic, inferior, or ad hoc, lacking in substantive or procedural guidelines. In fact many of these justice mechanisms apply a highly developed system of rules and follow well- established procedures. (Huyse & Mark, 2008) Informal vs. traditional Mechanism There is an important distinction to be made between “traditional” and “informal.” Some “traditional” mechanisms in post-conflict settings are not “informal” in the sense of being outside the legal framework of the state, but are instead incorporated into the formal justice system. A clear example of this are the gacaca court s in post-genocide Rwanda, which, though conceptually based on pre-colonial customs of dispute resolution, applies codified state law. Traditional versus Indigenous versus customary and local justice systems Four terms are used extensively, and often times inter-changeable in discussions on traditional or formal mechanism in post-conflict societies: “traditional,” “indigenous,” “customary, ” and “local.” However, it is important to highlight the suitable, yet significant distinctions between these terms as well as linkages between the realities they intend to encapsulate.
the strong influence of colonization. In some instances, so called “customary law” may have been essentially invented by colonial rulers and their local counterparts, to “order” colonized communities according to colonial imperatives (Mahmood 1996). The essentialist notion of organically generated customs may thus be more of a figment of our imagination and the product of colonialism than a historically accurate depiction of “customary law” Local justice Some scholars and practitioners prefer to use the term “local” because of its apparent neutrality (in particular in comparison to “traditional” and “informal”). Others see a pragmatic value in this term. By using the term local, they suggests immediate peripheral meaning both temporally and spatially, scholars and practitioners seek to bypass the thorny debate about what is “traditional.” The key element, scholars’ view, is to observe what justice practices are being carried out by people in a particular post- conflict community. Despite the merits of this approach, the term “local” seems to lack precision. In particular, it does not tell us whether a non-state justice practice is informal, traditional, and the nature or degree of its association with the formal justice system. In addition, in the language of interventional law, “local” may mean national or state law, whereas nationals may see “local” as referring to the community. Indigenous and Foreign Law Enforcement in postcolonial Africa Just as in other aspects of social control, justice, and law n indigenous Africa, there is strong evidence that the traditional mechanisms for security maintenance, crime prevention, and general law enforcement remain strikingly relevant in modern Africa. In pre-colonial Africa, the details of the mechanisms varied from one community to another. Nevertheless, the general theme was the furtherance of control, justice, and law in the African societies by using the applicable indigenous strategies and techniques. The indigenous strategies of control, justice, and law in each pre-colonial Africa society had grown out of the society’s traditions, customs, and native laws. Some aspects of social control in contemporary Africa are similar to the pre-colonial practices. In traditional Africa, security maintenance, crime prevention, and general law enforcement are based on each society’s historical circumstances and desires. Thus,
most members of each society willfully partake in programs and activities to prevent and control crimes and deviances. Community members, individually and collectively, play roles in each society’s law enforcement efforts. Community members generally accept the group’s methods and procedure for security maintenance, crime prevention, and general law enforcement. One of the main reasons for the wide acceptance and celebration of the indigenous methods and procedures is that the citizens tend to know their society’s control, justice and law personnel well. The citizens have a reasonable knowledge of each office holder’s morals, values, and ethics. Since the citizens of an indigenous society have direct and indirect influences on their control, justice and law personnel, persons whose morals, values, and/or ethics are at variance with the general societal standards are unlikely to occupy or remain in their assigned positions. The security maintenance, crime prevention, and general law enforcement duties in a traditional African community devolve on various community institutions, groups, and members. The obligations fall on such community structural levels of government as the Family, the Extended Family, the village, the village Group, the Town, and the Community of Towns based on well understood geographical and subject matter jurisdictional considerations. At each government and administration level, there are provisions for security maintenance, crime prevention, and general law enforcement by the entire community acting together or, as is more often the case, through their elected or appointed representatives as well as by specialized agencies, such as the Age Grades. For instance, a Young Men’s Age Grade among the Igbos of Nigeria may be charged with the responsibility of security of security maintenance and general law enforcement. Community members may mandate and expect the Young Men’s Age Grade to use commonly sanctioned vigilantism to prevent Security maintenance, crime prevention, and general law enforcement in postcolonial Africa This involve contests and struggles between indigenous and foreign (colonially imposed European) ideals (Okereafoezeke, 202; 2006). The official governments of modern African countries have either adopted the colonially imposed European models or created such foreign ideals in the respective postcolonial countries. Whatever its form, the prevailing situation gives rise to many systematic conflicts between indigenous and foreign models of social control, justice, and law in Africa. For
were traveling to a wholesale market to purchase goods for resale (see “Three policemen to die for setting traders ablaze”, in The Guardian, April 3, 2001) A case such as that of the three murderous police officers contributes a lot to the citizens’ lack of trust in the official police. Hammer (1993) reports that in one case in Kenya a woman is robbed of jewelry worth fifty thousand dollars. She reports the crime at the local police station. To her consternation, she recognizes that the police officer recording her report is wearing one of her stolen diamond rings! Can a crime victim in such a situation have faith in the police? In the Nigerian example, the negative images of the country’s official police lead directly to the intended or unintended exclusion of m of law enforcement and social control. Several other factors compound the divide between Africa’s official security and law enforcement systems, on the one hand, and the indigenous systems, on the other hand. These factors include unjustified official unitary policing, official decent citizens from official policing. And so less honest and less effective people generally staff Nigeria’s official law enforcement system. I suspect that this is similar to the situation in many other African countries. The fact that many of these official police organizations employ far less than the number of officers and personnel needed to adequately police their countries worsens the situation. Also of critical importance is the fact that most of the official governments in Africa run their police organizations as unitary agencies often to be manipulated to serve the shortsighted interests of the prevailing regime, rather than as broad-based democratic institutions to be used to maintain public security, prevent crime, and generally enforce laws for the greater public good. While professing constitutional federalism, many African governments, such as Nigeria’s, insist on rigidly unified official police. Such an organization, no matter how large, answers to one person. As in the colonial era, the unitary model makes it easier for the rulers to dominate and control their population. If any objective Nigeria had any illusion about the quality of law enforcement by the NPF, that illusion should have disappeared after the so-called 2007 Election in the country. In the April 14 and 21, 2007 election exercise, Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo, leader of the ruling political party and two other primary actors of the elections, professor Maurice Iwu, who headed the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), and Sunday Ehindero, the Inspector General of the Nigerian
Police Force (NPF), together manipulated the outcomes of the general elections in Nigeria. Local (Nigerian) and international elections observes have expressed shock and unanimous condemnation of the exercise, President Obasanjo had described the coming elections as “a do or die affair” for him and his party. A couple of days after his comment, the media pressed him for clarification of his earlier statement. He barefacedly repeated his assertions without apologies. True to his political beliefs, the president lived up to his prophecy of “winning” the elections for the majority of his selected candidates at all costs. The NPF and INEC’s roles in actualizing the Obasanjo script are shameful and damning. The NPF helped the PDP thugs to steal ballot boxes and papers to be thumb- printed for the preferred PDP candidates. Where the thumb printing could not be completed quickly, INEC wrote fictitious election results declaring PDP candidates as the winners, regardless of the votes. The extent of the official corruption among the PDP, INEC and the NPF was so brazen that the INEC felt comfortable in declaring the PDP governorship candidate in Anambra State, Emmanuel Andrew Uba, as the winner, twice. The first time, the number of votes allocated to him was so high that the alleged votes exceeded the number of registered voters in the state; so that even if there had been 100% voting by the registered voters in the state (an impossibility) the allocated cotes would have been higher. INEC Chairman Maurice Iwu and his hatchet men, realizing their stupidity in not being able to count and total figures, revised and figures to suit the PDP. Even in the circumstances of the official corruption called Nigeria, the impunity of the NPF, PDP, and INEC actions in the 2007 Elections is beyond the place. In particular, the IGP Sunday Ehindero’s NPF’s willingness to myopically and slavishly serve the narrow, criminal Obasanjo monstrous shadow and his vehicle (PDP) is stunning. crimes by identifying, apprehending, and processing persons suspected of committing crime. The Age Grade’s other responsibilities may include enforcement of judicial decisions, such as by means of oriri iwu (retrieving Judgment fine) or igba ekpe (publicly shaming and humiliating a criminal) (Okereafoezeke, 1996; 2002). Also as in the pre-colonial era, the mmanwu (masquerade) in postcolonial Igbo has, among other things, the task of law and order maintenance in some cases:
Use of local languages: the language(s) used in traditional/control systems is local and thus familiar to the average person, whereas the formal system generally uses only the official language(s) of the state, which may be unfamiliar to many people living in rural communities. Geographical proximity: institutions of the formal control systems are usually located in the capital city or regional capitals, and are thus geographically remote from people living in rural communities. Traditional/informal control systems, on the other hand, are located in villages and are geographically easily accessible to people. o Cultural relevance : formal legal proceedings can be complicated and confusing, whereas traditional/informal ones are more familiar and easily understood; it has also a better chance to fit the priorities of the communities and local implications of a conflict. Therefore, its verdicts may be better accepted. Costliness: referring to the formal control system can be costly and time- consuming because it often entails traveling long distances, paying transportation costs, and legal fees, all costs that are generally at the very least reduced with the traditional/informal control, this system can also be more efficient as it is generally not bureaucratic. In short, “informal control are often more accessible to poor and disadvantaged people and may have the potential to provide quick, cheap and culturally relevant remedies.” Moreover, in post-conflict societies, people may use traditional and informal control systems not only because these systems Social Trust and Community reintegration It is generally believed that a unique contribution of traditional/informal control systems is that they foster social trust and community reintegration in the aftermath of mass violence. This belief stems from the observation that traditional justice is almost invariably based on
communitarian notions of order and society, meaning that the primary issue at stake is the well-being of the community at large, and not only the interests of the victim. In such communities a dispute between individuals is perceived as “not merely…a matter of curiosity regarding the affairs of one’s neigbour, but in a very real sense a conflict that belongs to the community itself. Each member of the community is tied to varying degrees, to each of the disputants and, depending on the extent of these ties, will either feel some sense of having being wronged or some sense of responsibility for the wrong. In other words, “a conflict between two members of a community is regarded as a problem which afflicts the entire community. In order to restore harmony, therefore, there may be general satisfaction among the community at large, as well as the disputants, with the procedure and the outcome of the case. Public consensus is, moreover, necessary to ensure enforcement of the decision through social pressure.” Justice, in this view, is essentially concerned with the restoration of a community’s moral order and social harmony. Reasons for Not Using the Formal Control System Mistrust of the law, fear, and intimidation. Lack of understanding-language issues, unfamiliarity of formal procedures and court atmosphere, low legal literate.
