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An introduction to the concept of language, discussing its definition, origin, and development. various aspects of language, including writing, language families, and the debate between instinct and invention. It also touches upon the relationship between language and thought.
Typology: Lecture notes
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This book is an introduction to the study of human language across the planet. It is concerned with the immense variety among the languages of the world, as well as the common traits that cut across the differences. The book presents a number of analytic tools for comparing and contrasting different languages, and for seeing any one particular language in a larger linguistic perspective. The book attempts to avoid eurocentrism , the excessive focus on European languages often found in introductions to linguistics. Although, for ease of presentation, examples are often drawn from English, a large variety of languages from all continents are drawn into the discussion whenever this helps to broaden our perspective. This global focus is reflected in the choice of topics. Apart from a chapter introducing the four traditional branches of linguistics (semantics, syntax, morphology and phonology), this book is primarily interested in the following seemingly simple questions:
Like most modern studies of linguistics, this book is descriptive rather than prescriptive. It is not within the scope of the book to judge which of the following sentences is the more correct: A. I can't get no satisfaction. B. I can't get any satisfaction. It is within the scope of the book, however, to describe the fact that different speakers of English will form different judgements regarding the acceptability of these sentences under different circumstances. In addition to descriptions, the book will also seek explanations. Why do languages across the world have certain traits in common, such as the tendency for the subject to precede the object? Why are certain features systematically linked to each other, so that, for instance, languages where the verb precedes the object tend to have prepositions, while languages where the verb follows the object tend to have postpositions? In such cases, we shall try to consider alternative explanations without theoretical prejudice.
Human beings can communicate with each other. We are able to exchange knowledge, beliefs, opinions, wishes, threats, commands, thanks, promises, declarations, feelings – only our imagination sets limits. We can laugh to express amusement, happiness, or disrespect, we can smile to express amusement, pleasure, approval, or bitter feelings, we can shriek to express anger, excitement, or fear, we can clench our fists to express determination, anger or a threat, we can raise our eyebrows to express surprise or disapproval, and so on, but our system of communication before anything else is language. In this book we shall tell you a lot about language, but as a first step towards a definition we can say that it is a system of communication based upon words and the combination of words into sentences. Communication by means of language may be referred to as linguistic communication , the other ways mentioned above – laughing, smiling, shrieking, and so on – are types of non-linguistic communication. Most or all non-human species can exchange information, but none of them are known to have a system of communication with a complexity that in any way is comparable to language. Primarily, they communicate with non-linguistic means resembling our smiling, laughing, yelling, clenching of fists, and raising of eyebrows. Chimpanzees, gorillas, and orangutangs can exchange different kinds of information by emitting different kinds of shrieks, composing their faces in numerous ways, and moving their hands or arms in different gestures, but they do not have words and sentences. By moving in certain patters, bees are apparently able to tell their fellow workers where to find honey, but apparently not very much else. Birds sing different songs, whose main functions are to defend their territory or to attract a mate. Language – as defined above – is an exclusively human property. Among the characteristics that make a relatively clear distinction between linguistic and non- linguistic communication meaningful, two are particularly important: double articulation and syntax.
of signs that a human being is able to remember. It would not be very practical for a language to have separate signs for meanings like ‘man killed lion’ and ‘lion killed man’. The total number of isolated signs in a human language is generally limited to roughly 10 000–20 000, and with this number of signs we cannot talk about an infinite number of meanings – unless we combine them. The ingenious invention that enabled human beings to talk about everything they can imagine, is syntax. Syntax is used to put together signs expressing relatively simple meanings into sign combinations expressing more complex meanings. To express a meaning like ‘man killed lion’, we combine signs meaning ‘man’, ‘kill’, ‘past’, and ‘lion’, and we combine the same signs in a different way to express the meaning ‘lion killed man’. The English sign sequences man kill-ed lion and lion kill- ed man are sentences , and the number of sentences in a language is infinite. Take any sentence in a language, and it is always possible to make it longer: man killed lion ⇒ the man killed the lion ⇒ the woman said that the man killed the lion ⇒ the old woman said that the young man killed the lion ⇒ the old woman said that the young man killed the lion that ate the antelope ⇒ the girl believed that the old woman said that the young man killed the lion that ate the antelope – and so on infinitely. Syntax is a mechanism that enables human beings to utter or understand an infinite number of sentences constructed from a finite number of building blocks. Without syntax, we would not be able to express other meanings than those associated with isolated signs, and the number of different meanings we would be able to express would be equal to the number of signs in the “language”.
Biologists refer to the modern human as homo sapiens , Latin for ‘wise man’, but the possession of language is such an important part of the definition of the modern human that homo loquens ‘talking man’ would be an equally appropriate name. Since humans are the only creatures on Earth that possess language, this system of communication must by necessity be younger than the split between the human lineage and that of our closest modern non-human relative, the chimpanzee. This split is generally assumed to have taken place 5 to 7 million years ago. The oldest creatures in the human lineage are called hominids , while the first individuals belonging to our own genus, Homo , appeared about 1.9 million years ago. Few researchers – if any at all – believe language to be close to 2 million years old, but before we discuss in more detail the upper limit or the maximum age of language, let us take a closer look at the lower limit or the minimum age of language.
We shall discuss the minimum age of language on the basis of writing, historical reconstruction, oral tradition , and archeology.
In many parts of the world – France, India, Zimbabwe, and elsewhere – cave drawings and bone carvings have been discovered that were made during the archeological period referred to as the Upper Paleolithic in Europe and Asia and the
Middle Stone Age in Africa. Roughly, this period lasted from 35 000 until 10 000 BP (= before present). Some researchers interpret these drawings and carvings as the earliest precursors of writing. The relevance to us of such claims is that writing depends upon language, since it can be defined in the following way: Writing is a set of visible or tactile signs used to represent units of language in a systematic way. On the basis of this definition, writing is much younger. It is tempting – and quite reasonable – to propose that those ancient drawings and carvings cannot have been made by humans without language, but they do not constitute direct evidence of language. Writing in the strict sense started around 5 300 BP in Mesopotamia with the cuneiform writing system, and the first language ever written was Sumerian. About 300 years later, the hieroglyphic writing system appeared in Egypt. In China, writing started not more than 1 000 years later, around 4 000 BP. In the Americas, the oldest writing system is that of the Maya civilization, and the oldest documents have been dated to 2 200–2 100 BP. However, most languages in the world were not written down until the 19th^ and the 20th^ century. It is almost an understatement that language must have existed for a considerable time before humans started to write, so that nobody would question the claim that language is much more than 5 300 years old. Still, it is important to remember that we do not have any documentation of language from an earlier date.
Today, about 6 900 languages are spoken throughout the world – more than 2 000 languages in Africa, 1 000 in the Americas, more than 2 250 in Asia, about 220 in Europe, and more than 1 300 in Australia and the Pacific. These languages can be grouped into more than 90 language families. A language family is defined in the following way: A language family is a group of languages with a common origin. The common origin is postulated to have been a single language, referred to as a proto-language , that was spoken at a certain time in the past. Through the ages that proto-language broke up into dialects. As time went by, these dialects become increasingly more different from each other, ending up as different languages, primarily due to geographical distance. These languages developed dialectal differences, and the whole cycle was repeated, many times. The major language families in the world are Afro-Asiatic (353 languages spoken i Africa and Asia), Austronesian (1 246 languages spoken in Asia and Oceania), Indo-European (430 languages spoken in Asia and Europe, and in European settlements in other parts of the world), Niger-Congo (1 495 languages spoken in Africa), Sino-Tibetan (399 languages spoken in Asia), and Trans-New Guinea (561 languages spoken in New Guinea and adjacent islands). Linguists have developed quite reliable methods to reconstruct proto- languages – for example, Proto-Indo-European – spoken before writing was introduced. The reason why we can call the methods reliable is that in several cases reconstructions have been supported by written texts discovered after the reconstructions were made.
Many scholars therefore believe that language emerged not earlier than the completed development of anatomically modern humans, 120 000–100 000 BP, and not later than the completed development of behaviorally modern humans, 60 000– 40 000 BP. While modern humans have existed in Africa for 130 000 years, it was only after the development of the behaviorally modern humans that they spread to other parts of the world. Fossil and archeological evidence indicate that they reached Australia 50 000 BP, West Asia 47 000 BP, New Guinea 45 000 BP, Europe 40 000 BP, East Asia 39 0 00 BP, the Americas considerably later, but at least 14 500 BP. Western parts of Oceania were settled by modern humans approximately 30 000 BP, while eastern parts were settled within the last 3 500 years. We do not know whether language has arisen several times ( polygenesis ) or only once ( monogenesis ) in the prehistory of man. Monogenesis implies that all languages in the world are related to each other, in an ancient family of languages, all of which have descended from a proto-language that some linguists call Proto-World. To the extent that this question is being discussed, linguists can be divided into two groups, those that defend monogenesis and those – probably the overwhelming majority – that regards themselves as «agnostics». Whatever the right answer, it is highly probable that those modern humans that left Africa 50 000–40 000 years BP had language. In this perspective, we’re all Africans speaking African languages!
But we have nothing resembling hard evidence that precludes the existence of language before the period before the anatomical and behavioral development of modern humans was completed in the period 130 000–40 000 years BP. The Neanderthals, who lived in Europe and Western Asia from around 250 000 years BP until 28 000 years BP, might well have had some kind of language. The Neanderthals are regarded as descendants of Homo heidelbergensis , that first appeared – as descendants of Homo erectus (1.9 million to 27 000 years BP) – in Africa about 1 million years BP. There were Neanderthals in Europe until 12 000 years after modern humans had settled there, and they may simply have been absorbed by the modern humans, and Europeans may count Neanderthals among their ancestors. As stated by John Gribbin and Jeremy Cherfas write in The First Chimpanzee. In Search of Human Origins (p. 86): Neanderthal people were certainly intelligent – they used tools, they painted pictures in caves, built shelters and even buried their dead with ritual, judging by the evidence of a flower-bedecked grave found in Iraq. In the preceding paragraphs we have presented some hopefully «informed guesses» about the age of human language as we know it, but we hesitate to write anything about how it all started, despite the fact that many «theories» have been presented through the ages. Much has also been written about the question whether the ancestors or close relatives of modern man, like Homo erectus and Homo neanderthalensis , had any kind of language.
After our discussion of the minimum age of language, we may conclude that we have not found any hard evidence that language is more than 10 000 years old, but few scholars would doubt that it is considerably older, and at least 40 000–50 000 years old. Now we shall take a different perspective and ask about the maximum possible age of language. While the discussion about the minimum age is primarily governed by cultural phenomena, that is, inter alia writing, language reconstruction, oral tradition, and art, the discussion about the maximum age will primarily be dominated by anatomy. We do not know how large and complex a brain has to be to make language possible. May be chimpanzee’s brain is too small for language, but whether the brain obtained the necessary size in Homo erectus , Homo heidelbergensis , Homo neanderthalensis , or not until Homo sapiens , will at our present state of knowledge be nothing but conjecture. Claims have often been made since the 19th century to the effect that modern humans have a «language center» in their brain, and we shall come back to this in section 1.3. Psychologists have tried to teach chimpanzees human language. After some unseccessful attempts 40–50 years ago to teach them spoken language, some chimpanzees have been taught parts of American Sign Language , the language used by deaf people in the United States. The reasons why chimpanzees did not manage to learn to speak are probably quite numerous. They may not have sufficiently developed articulatory organs; they may lack the ability to perceive and later to articulate sounds in a particular sequence; they may lack a sufficiently developed brain in a more general sense; or all of this may be true. When the chimpanzees were allowed to use their eyes, hands and arms instead of the ears and mouths, they were more successful. Linguists have been arguing ever since how much they learnt, and we shall get involved in that discussion. Instead, we shall take a look at research around the following question: Did the Neanderthals have an anatomy that enabled them to speak?
Several attempts have been made to reconstruct the vocal tract of Homo neanderthalensis , that is, tongue, mouth cavity, pharynx (throat), and larynx. On the basis of some early reconstructions – which have been heavily criticized as wrong – it was first concluded that a human vocal did not fit into the skull of a Neanderthals, who therefore had to be unable to speak. Among other things, it was believed that modern humans have a significantly lowered larynx (of which the Adam's apple is a part), which was believed to be a necessary prerequisite for speech. This allegedly lowered larynx was even regarded as a human evolutionary adaption to language. Later it has been shown that the lowered larynx is found in adult males only, and not in children and adult females – who nevertheless have the same ability to speak. The lowered larynx seems to be an evolutionary specialization of males after puberty, and its main function is to give the males a darker voice that frightens potential attackers and competitors.
to our species and to this domain. […] the language faculty is a part of human biology, tied up with the architecture of the human brain, and distinct in part from other cognitive faculties. This alleged «richly structured and biologically determined capacity» for language is referred to as an innate language faculty , a language instinct , or a language organ , an «organ» that is compared to other organs like the visual system, which inter alia includes the eyes, the optic nerves, and the visual cortex, and which without any doubt is the result of a long biological evolution. The main advocate for the view that human beings has this capacity is the well- known American linguist Noam Chomsky, who has presented several arguments in favor of an innate language faculty, and we shall take a look at three of them, as an illustration of Chomsky’s argumentation:
Chomsky has claimed that language is acquired in «a remarkably short period», and that the speed would not be possible if the human did not have an innate language faculty. Critics have pointed out that in order to assess this argument, we need to know what it means to acquire language in a remarkably short period, and that this information has never supplied by the «nativists».
Chomsky has claimed that «the language each person acquires is a rich and complex construction hopelessly underdetermined by the fragmentary evidence available», that is, the grammar acquired by children is much more complex than one should expect on the basis of the language data the children is exposed to from people around them. Geoffrey Sampson points out that «Chomsky originally made statement about the child’s data being quantatively poor years before anyone had done serious research on the nature of the speech addressed to children», and that later research has not supported Chomsky’s statement.
All languages in the world are claimed to resemble each other in a remarkable way from a structural point of view. Notice that we are talking about the grammatical structure of sentences, and for example not about words, since there is no particularly
striking resemblance between the word meaning ‘book’ in English ( book ), French ( livre ), Arabic ( kita\b ), and Chinese ( _shu_ ). Chomsky says that languages resemble each other in structural features that are not necessary properties of a languag, and that these universal structural properties must be explained on the basis of innate knowledge. In Geoffrey Sampsons view, the number of language universals is not that impressive, and not large enough to justify the postulation of an innate language faculty. Sampson also expresses agreement with the American linguist Martin Joos, who wrote in 1957 that «languages […] differ from each other without limit and in unpredictable ways.»
According to an alternative view, language is primarily a cultural phenomenon and not a biological one, and explanations of the structure of language should be sought in language functions and general aspects of human cognition. In this perspective, language is invented by human beings, and through exaptation different parts of the human body have acquired a linguistic function, primarily in addition to other and primary functions that still survive. Theories about an innate language faculty cannot be defended before serious attempts have been made to account for more or less universal properties of language in this general cognitive perspective.
Most people see language as a vehicle for the expression of thoughts that are already there independently of the words and grammatical structures that express them, as seems to be implied in Saussure's model of the speech situation. But it has also been claimed that language contributes to the shaping of thought, and that different languages do so in different ways. This idea is often referred to as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (or just Whorfianism), after the linguists Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf. There are two versions of this hypothesis. The stronger version, called linguistic determinism , asserts that thought is completely determined by language, while the weaker version, called linguistic relativity , asserts instead that ways of thinking tend to be partly shaped by language. Linguistic determinism would leave little room for creative thinking that transcends the limitations of language, and this view has been largely discredited. Linguistic relativity is a much more plausible idea. In a later chapter, we shall discuss such perspectives in relation to the typology of motion verbs (see 3.?.?). In the following, we shall look at a number of studies that seem to support the idea of linguistic relativity.
A number of psychological studies indicate that linguistic labels do make a difference for thinking, especially for memorizing and problem-solving.
These and other experiments indicate that providing a name to an object does influence our ability to remember the object and to solve problems involving the object, as well as our tendency to distort our memory of it. The problem is to determine the consequences of this for natural languages, which are infinitely more complex than the experimental situations just described.
In contrast to English, the Mexican Indian language Tarahumara does not have one term for ‘green’ and one for ‘blue’, but instead has a single term, siyóname , that covers both. In other words, where English has two concepts, ‘green’ and ‘blue’, Tarahumara has only one. How does this difference affect the perception of colours among speakers of the two languages? In one experiment, speakers of both languages were presented with three colour chips at a time. Each time, all three chips, say, A, B and C, were of different shades of colour on the scale from green to blue, with chip B being somewhere in between chips A and C: A B C
The subjects were asked to determine whether the distance in colour between chips A and B was greater than the distance between chips B and C or the other way around. It turned out that when the borderline between English green and blue went between chips B and C, the English speakers tended strongly to feel that the distance between chips B and C was greater than that between chips A and B, even when the actual distance between chips A and B, as measured independently, was greater. Speakers of Tarahumara did not make a similar systematic distortion. The proposed explanation for this is that English speakers solve a difficult problem (that of determining distances between colours) by resorting to a “name strategy”. If chip A and B are both called green, while chip C is called blue, the name strategy prompts the English speaker to decide that chip C is more different from chip B than chip A is, even when the opposite is in fact the case. This strategy is not available to Tarahumara speakers, since their vocabulary does not distinguish between ‘green’ and ‘blue’. In a second experiment, English speakers were presented with the same triads of colour chips, but in a way that only enabled them to see two chips at a time, either A and B or B and C. When they were shown chips A and B, the experimenter said: "You can see that this chip (points to A) is greener than this chip (points to B)." Everybody agreed. And when they were shown chips B and C, the experimenter said: "You can see that this chip (points to C) is bluer than this chip (points to B)." Again everybody agreed. Thus, all subjects were prompted to use both the terms green and blue to refer to chip B. When they were subsequently asked to judge the relative distance between A and B as opposed to B and C, the systematic distortion found in the first experiment had disappeared. The proposed explanation is that the name strategy was no longer available, since they had already referred to chip B by both terms. This suggests that the use of the name strategy was indeed the correct explanation for the systematic distortion in the first experiment. To sum up, whether or not a language distinguishes between ‘green’ and ‘blue’ does seem to influence the perception of these colours. To some extent, language influences the way we perceive the world.
Children from East Asian countries have been generally shown to perform better at mathematics tests than children from Western countries. Many explanations have been proposed, including parental emphasis, pedagogical techniques and cultural differences. One suggested explanation is the different way numerals are constructed in the languages of the two areas. In general, numerals in Chinese, Japanese and Korean are more systematically transparent than numerals in English and other European languages. This is especially true of numbers between 11 and 99, as shown in the following table, where East Asian numerals are directly translated into English for ease of comparison, and Japanese pronunciations are given as one East Asian example:^1 (^1) In some respects, the Japanese system is more complex than both the English and the Chinese ones, since virtually every numeral has at least two different pronunciations, one indigenous and one borrowed from Chinese. With the exception of 4 and 7, the borrowed pronunciation is the preferred one.
like paper or cloth. In general, Navaho-speaking children use these verb forms correctly as early as the age of three. Thus, the grammar of Navaho classifies objects according to form or shape in a way that English grammar does not. In an experiment, Navaho children from the same reservation and living under similar circumstances were divided into two groups according to whether English or Navaho was their dominant language. Both groups were given pairs of objects where each object differed from the other in two respects, such as colour and size, colour and shape/form, or size and shape/form. For instance, one of the pairs consisted of a yellow stick and a piece of blue rope of comparable size, differing from each other in both colour and shape/form: Then they were given a third object, which differed from each of the two others in only one respect, such as a piece of yellow rope, which differed from the yellow stick in shape/form and from the piece of blue rope in colour: The children were asked which of the original objects went best with the new one. Children that grouped the piece of yellow rope with the yellow stick were noted as classifying objects on the basis of colour, while children that grouped the piece of yellow rope with the piece of blue rope were noted as classifying objects on the basis of shape/form. As predicted, Navaho-speaking children tended more strongly to classify objects on the basis of shape/form than English-speaking children. In both groups, classification based on shape/form increased with age, but later and less marked in children speaking English than in children speaking Navaho. These results seem to confirm the linguistic relativity hypothesis. When, however, the same experiment was performed on English-speaking white middle-class children in Boston, their performance was more similar to the Navaho-speaking children than to the English-speaking children from the reservation. Their preference for shape/form-based classification was slightly weaker in the earliest age group, but later was actually stronger than that of the Navaho-speaking children. The proposed explanation is that other non-linguistic factors associated with social class overrule the effect of language. This explanation seems to be confirmed by a later experiment with English-speaking schoolchildren in lower-class Harlem, whose performance was very close to the English-speaking children in the Navaho reservation.
In English, there is a clear distinction between count nouns and mass nouns. Count nouns, such as horse, share the following characteristics:
In contrast, mass nouns, such as smoke , share the following characteristics:
substances, while simple objects like the kidney-shaped object made of clay were treated like in-between cases. Similar results have been found when contrasting English with other languages without a clear-cut distinction between count nouns and mass nouns, such as the Mexican Indian language Yucatec.
English, like many other languages, makes a distinction between open and counterfactual conditionals: Open conditional If the doctor has arrived, we can talk to him. Counterfactual conditional If the doctor had arrived, we could have talked to him. The if clause of an open conditional may be true or false (the doctor may or may not have arrived), while the if clause of a counterfactual conditional is implied to be false (the doctor has not arrived). In English, this distinction is marked by the form of the verb. In Chinese, the distinction between open and counterfactual conditionals is usually left unmarked, and both of the above sentences may be translated as: Ru2guo3 yïshe1ng da4o le, wo3men jiu4 ke3yî ge1n ta1 ta2n. if doctor arrive PERF we then can with he talk This sentence may be used both when the speaker does not know whether the doctor has arrived (open conditional) and when the speaker knows that the doctor has not arrived (counterfactual conditional). Does this linguistic difference make it more difficult for speakers of Chinese to make consistent hypotheses counter to fact? Does it influence their ability to produce abstract reasoning? Is this linguistic feature, along with other traits that point in the same direction, part of the reason why modern scientific thought developed in Europe rather than in China? In one study, speakers of English and speakers of Chinese were asked to read a text about the 18th^ century German philosopher Bier. The text stated explicitly that Bier could not read Chinese, but it went on to discuss at some length what would have happened if he had been able to do so. For instance, the text says that he would have been able to bring to focus the interrelationships between natural phenomena (as in Chinese philosophy), instead of only viewing such phenomena as distinct individual entities (as in Western philosophy). After reading the story, the subjects were asked to judge which among a number of statements about Bier were true. One of the statements was: "He led Western philosophy to pay attention to the mutual interrelationships among natural phenomena." Subjects who understood the counterfactual logic of the text would know that this was not implied to be true, but only represented an abstract hypothesis of what would have happened had Bier known Chinese.
While virtually all speakers of English responded correctly to the test, only about half of the Chinese speakers did.^4 It seemed that they had more difficulty understanding the counterfactual logic of the text. In a similar study, speakers of English and Chinese were given the following question in their own language: If all circles were large and this small triangle '' were a circle, would it be large? While 83 percent of the English speakers answered yes, only 25 percent of the Chinese speakers did. Although a small triangle is clearly not a large circle, the English-speaking subjects were more willing to enter into the counterfactual mode of reasoning than speakers of Chinese, even when the result is absurd. It seems likely that the lack of a distinction between open and counterfactual conditionals in the Chinese language is at least part of the reason why speakers of this language seem less prone to think counterfactually than speakers of English. It has been suggested that a similar contrast exists in the realm of reification of properties and actions. English has standard ways of deriving abstract nouns from adjectives and verbs: hard --> hardness important --> importance accept --> acceptance generalize --> generalization Such devices are found in Chinese as well, but their use is much more restricted and often associated with a westernized style. As in the case of counterfactuals, Chinese seem less prone to use an abstract way of speaking—and possibly also less prone to use abstract ways of thinking. The attempt to explain the rise of science in the West on the basis of linguistic peculiarities of European languages remains highly speculative, to say the least. It is possible, however, that English in its present form is more conducive to abstract, theoretical modes of thinking than Chinese is.
Experimental situations are far removed from the complexities of real life, and it is difficult to know how to interpret the results of the studies above. In some cases, it is uncertain whether it is language that influences thought, thought that influences language, or some other factor that influences both language and thought. On the whole, however, the studies do provide support for linguistic relativity. Language does seem to have a certain influence on thought. How does this influence take place? In other words, which aspects of thought are influenced by language, and which aspects of language may influence thought? The psychological studies referred to in 1.4.1 indicate that providing a linguistic label to an object reinforces (and sometimes distorts) our memory of that (^4) This applies to the responses to version 3 of the text. The Chinese translations of versions 1 and 2 are less felicitous and produced much worse results for the Chinese speakers.