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Freedom of Reason and Enlightenment: Kant's Perspective on Self-Imposed Immaturity, Study Guides, Projects, Research of Political Theory

In this text, immanuel kant explores the reasons why people remain in a state of immaturity despite being released from external guidance. He argues that the public's enlightenment is inevitable with freedom, specifically the freedom to use reason publicly. Kant discusses the importance of this freedom in various aspects of life, including religious matters, and its impact on the principles of government. He emphasizes that every individual has the inherent right to make intellectual, political, and religious decisions for themselves.

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An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?[1]
IMMANUEL KANT
(1784)
Translated by Ted Humphrey
Hackett Publishing, 1992
1. Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-imposed immaturity.[2] Immaturity is
the inability to use one’s understanding without guidance from another. This immaturity
is self-imposed when its cause lies not in lack of understanding, but in lack of resolve and
courage to use it without guidance from another. Sapere Aude![3] “Have courage to use
your own understanding!”--that is the motto of enlightenment.
2. Laziness and cowardice are the reasons why so great a proportion of men, long after
nature has released them from alien guidance (natura-liter maiorennes),[4] nonetheless
gladly remain in lifelong immaturity, and why it is so easy for others to establish
themselves as their guardians. It is so easy to be immature. If I have a book to serve as
my understanding, a pastor to serve as my conscience, a physician to determine my diet
for me, and so on, I need not exert myself at all. I need not think, if only I can pay: others
will readily undertake the irksome work for me. The guardians who have so benevolently
taken over the supervision of men have carefully seen to it that the far greatest part of
them (including the entire fair sex) regard taking the step to maturity as very dangerous,
not to mention difficult. Having first made their domestic livestock dumb, and having
carefully made sure that these docile creatures will not take a single step without the go-
cart to which they are harnessed, these guardians then show them the danger that
threatens them, should they attempt to walk alone. Now this danger is not actually so
great, for after falling a few times they would in the end certainly learn to walk; but an
example of this kind makes men timid and usually frightens them out of all further
attempts.
3. Thus, it is difficult for any individual man to work himself out of the immaturity that
has all but become his nature. He has even become fond of this state and for the time
being is actually incapable of using his own understanding, for no one has ever allowed
him to attempt it. Rules and formulas, those mechanical aids to the rational use, or rather
misuse, of his natural gifts, are the shackles of a permanent immaturity. Whoever threw
them off would still make only an uncertain leap over the smallest ditch, since he is
unaccustomed to this kind of free movement. Consequently, only a few have succeeded,
by cultivating their own minds, in freeing themselves from immaturity and pursuing a
secure course.
4. But that the public should enlighten itself is more likely; indeed, if it is only allowed
freedom, enlightenment is almost inevitable. For even among the entrenched guardians
of the great masses a few will always think for themselves, a few who, after having
themselves thrown off the yoke of immaturity, will spread the spirit of a rational
appreciation for both their own worth and for each person's calling to think for himself.
But it should be particularly noted that if a public that was first placed in this yoke by
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An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?[1] IMMANUEL KANT (1784) Translated by Ted Humphrey Hackett Publishing, 1992

  1. Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-imposed immaturity .[2] Immaturity is the inability to use one’s understanding without guidance from another. This immaturity is self-imposed when its cause lies not in lack of understanding, but in lack of resolve and courage to use it without guidance from another. Sapere Aude ![3] “Have courage to use your own understanding!”--that is the motto of enlightenment.
  2. Laziness and cowardice are the reasons why so great a proportion of men, long after nature has released them from alien guidance ( natura-liter maiorennes ),[4] nonetheless gladly remain in lifelong immaturity, and why it is so easy for others to establish themselves as their guardians. It is so easy to be immature. If I have a book to serve as my understanding, a pastor to serve as my conscience, a physician to determine my diet for me, and so on, I need not exert myself at all. I need not think, if only I can pay: others will readily undertake the irksome work for me. The guardians who have so benevolently taken over the supervision of men have carefully seen to it that the far greatest part of them (including the entire fair sex) regard taking the step to maturity as very dangerous, not to mention difficult. Having first made their domestic livestock dumb, and having carefully made sure that these docile creatures will not take a single step without the go- cart to which they are harnessed, these guardians then show them the danger that threatens them, should they attempt to walk alone. Now this danger is not actually so great, for after falling a few times they would in the end certainly learn to walk; but an example of this kind makes men timid and usually frightens them out of all further attempts.
  3. Thus, it is difficult for any individual man to work himself out of the immaturity that has all but become his nature. He has even become fond of this state and for the time being is actually incapable of using his own understanding, for no one has ever allowed him to attempt it. Rules and formulas, those mechanical aids to the rational use, or rather misuse, of his natural gifts, are the shackles of a permanent immaturity. Whoever threw them off would still make only an uncertain leap over the smallest ditch, since he is unaccustomed to this kind of free movement. Consequently, only a few have succeeded, by cultivating their own minds, in freeing themselves from immaturity and pursuing a secure course.
  4. But that the public should enlighten itself is more likely; indeed, if it is only allowed freedom, enlightenment is almost inevitable. For even among the entrenched guardians of the great masses a few will always think for themselves, a few who, after having themselves thrown off the yoke of immaturity, will spread the spirit of a rational appreciation for both their own worth and for each person's calling to think for himself. But it should be particularly noted that if a public that was first placed in this yoke by

the guardians is suitably aroused by some of those who are altogether incapable of enlightenment, it may force the guardians themselves to remain under the yoke--so pernicious is it to instill prejudices, for they finally take revenge upon their originators, or on their descendants. Thus a public can only attain enlightenment slowly. Perhaps a revolution can overthrow autocratic despotism and profiteering or power-grabbing oppression, but it can never truly reform a manner of thinking;[5] instead, new prejudices, just like the old ones they replace, will serve as a leash for the great unthinking mass.

  1. Nothing is required for this enlightenment, however, except freedom; and the freedom in question is the least harmful of all, namely, the freedom to use reason publicly in all matters. But on all sides I hear: “ Do not argue !” The officer says, “Do not argue, drill!” The tax man says, “Do not argue, pay!” The pastor says, “Do not argue, believe!” (Only one ruler in the world[6] says, “ Argue as much as you want and about what you want, but obey !”) In this we have [examples of] pervasive restrictions on freedom. But which restriction hinders enlightenment and which does not, but instead actually advances it? I reply: The public use of one’s reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among mankind; the private use of reason may, however, often be very narrowly restricted, without otherwise hindering the progress of enlightenment. By the public use of one's own reason I understand the use that anyone as a scholar makes of reason before the entire literate world. I call the private use of reason that which a person may make in a civic post or office that has been entrusted to him.[7] Now in many affairs conducted in the interests of a community, a certain mechanism is required by means of which some of its members must conduct themselves in an entirely passive manner so that through an artificial unanimity the government may guide them toward public ends, or at least prevent them from destroying such ends. Here one certainly must not argue, instead one must obey. However, insofar as this part of the machine also regards himself as a member of the community as a whole, or even of the world community, and as a consequence addresses the public in the role of a scholar, in the proper sense of that term, he can most certainly argue, without thereby harming the affairs for which as a passive member he is partly responsible. Thus it would be disastrous if an officer on duty who was given a command by his superior were to question the appropriateness or utility of the order. He must obey. But as a scholar he cannot be justly constrained from making comments about errors in military service, or from placing them before the public for its judgment. The citizen cannot refuse to pay the taxes imposed on him; indeed, impertinent criticism of such levies, when they should be paid by him, can be punished as a scandal (since it can lead to widespread insubordination). But the same person does not act contrary to civic duty when, as a scholar, he publicly expresses his thoughts regarding the impropriety or even injustice of such taxes. Likewise a pastor is bound to instruct his catecumens and congregation in accordance with the symbol of the church he serves, for he was appointed on that condition. But as a scholar he has complete freedom, indeed even the calling, to impart to the public all of his carefully considered and well- intentioned thoughts concerning mistaken aspects of that symbol,[8] as well as his suggestions for the better arrangement of religious and church matters. Nothing in this can weigh on his conscience. What he teaches in consequence of his office as a servant of the church he sets out as something with regard to which he has no discretion to teach in accord with his own lights; rather, he offers it under the direction and in the name of

lawgiving authority rests on his unification of the people's collective will in his own. If he only sees to it that all genuine or purported improvement is consonant with civil order, he can allow his subjects to do what they find necessary to their spiritual well-being, which is not his affair. However, he must prevent anyone from forcibly interfering with another's working as best he can to determine and promote his well-being. It detracts from his own majesty when he interferes in these matters, since the writings in which his subjects attempt to clarify their insights lend value to his conception of governance. This holds whether he acts from his own highest insight--whereby he calls upon himself the reproach, “ Caesar non eat supra grammaticos ”[10]—as well as, indeed even more, when he despoils his highest authority by supporting the spiritual despotism of some tyrants in his state over his other subjects.

  1. If it is now asked, “Do we presently live in an enlightened age ?” the answer is, “No, but we do live in an age of enlightenment .” As matters now stand, a great deal is still lacking in order for men as a whole to be, or even to put themselves into a position to be able without external guidance to apply understanding confidently to religious issues. But we do have clear indications that the way is now being opened for men to proceed freely in this direction and that the obstacles to general enlightenment--to their release from their self-imposed immaturity—are gradually diminishing. In this regard, this age is the age of enlightenment, the century of Frederick.[11]
  2. A prince who does not find it beneath him to say that he takes it to be his duty to prescribe nothing, but rather to allow men complete freedom in religious matters—who thereby renounces the arrogant title of tolerance —is himself enlightened and deserves to be praised by a grateful present and by posterity as the first, at least where the government is concerned, to release the human race from immaturity and to leave everyone free to use his own reason in all matters of conscience. Under his rule, venerable pastors, in their role as scholars and without prejudice to their official duties, may freely and openly set out for the world's scrutiny their judgments and views, even where these occasionally differ from the accepted symbol. Still greater freedom is afforded to those who are not restricted by an official post. This spirit of freedom is expanding even where it must struggle against the external obstacles of governments that misunderstand their own function. Such governments are illuminated by the example that the existence of freedom need not give cause for the least concern regarding public order and harmony in the commonwealth. If only they refrain from inventing artifices to keep themselves in it, men will gradually raise themselves from barbarism.
  3. I have focused on religious matters in setting out my main point concerning enlightenment, i.e., man's emergence from self-imposed immaturity, first because our rulers have no interest in assuming the role of their subjects' guardians with respect to the arts and sciences, and secondly because that form of immaturity is both the most pernicious and disgraceful of all. But the manner of thinking of a head of state who favors religious enlightenment goes even further, for he realizes that there is no danger to his legislation in allowing his subjects to use reason publicly and to set before the world their thoughts concerning better formulations of his laws, even if this involves frank criticism of legislation currently in effect. We have before us a shining example, with

respect to which no monarch surpasses the one whom we honor.

  1. But only a ruler who is himself enlightened and has no dread of shadows, yet who likewise has a well-disciplined, numerous army to guarantee public peace, can say what no republic[12] may dare, namely: “ Argue as much as you want and about what you want, but obey !” Here as elsewhere, when things are considered in broad perspective, a strange, unexpected pattern in human affairs reveals itself, one in which almost everything is paradoxical. A greater degree of civil freedom seems advantageous to a people's spiritual freedom; yet the former established impassable boundaries for the latter; conversely, a lesser degree of civil freedom provides enough room for all fully to expand their abilities. Thus, once nature has removed the hard shell from this kernel for which she has most fondly cared, namely, the inclination to and vocation for free thinking , the kernel gradually reacts on a people’s mentality (whereby they become increasingly able to act freely ), and it finally even influences the principles of government , which finds that it can profit by treating men, who are now more than machines , in accord with their dignity. *****

Immanuel Kant, Konigsberg in Prussia, 30 September 1784

***** Today I read in Büsching’s Wöchentliche Nachtrichten for September 13th^ a notice concerning this month’s Berlinischen Monatsschift that mentions Mendelssohn’s answer to this same question. I have not yet seen this journal, otherwise I would have withheld the foregoing reflections, which I now set out in order to see to what extent two persons thoughts may coincidentally agree.

pens restrict one another so as not to lose their freedom)—is the sole protector of the people’s rights. To want to deprive citizens of this right is not only tantamount to depriving them of all claim to rights in relation to the supreme commander (according to Hobbes), but it also denies him, whose will commands subjects as citizens only because it represents the general will of the people, all knowledge of such matters as he would himself change if he knew about them; and denying such freedom places the commander in a self-contradictory position. Encouraging the leader to suspect that unrest might be aroused by men thinking out loud and for themselves is to awaken in him both distrust in his own power and hate for his people. The general principle by which a people may judge, though merely negatively, as to whether the supreme legislature has not decreed with the best of intentions is contained in this proposition: Whatever a people cannot decree for itself cannot be decreed for it by the legislator.

[8] Kant distinguishes between two classes of concepts, those that we can schematize, i.e., directly represent in experience (intuition), and those that we must symbolize, i.e., indirectly represent in experience (intuition). Symbolized concepts, such as the one we have of God, are those for which no experience can provide adequate content; consequently, experience can only be used to indicate the content we intend. All religious concepts have this character. By symbol in this context, then, Kant means those beliefs and practices in which a group expresses the content of this concept of the divine ( Critique of Judgment , 351-54).

[9] This would seem a peculiarly political expression of the Categorical Imperative, particularly as it is expressed in Groundings , 428-29.

[10] “Caesar is not above the grammarians.” See Perpetual Peace , 368 f.

[11] Frederick II (the Great), King of Prussia.

[12] The term Kant uses here is Freistaat , which is idiomatically translated “republic.” However, Kant never again uses the Germanic rooted word in the essays included in this volume (Hackett’s Perpetual Peace and Other Essays ). In all the other essays he uses the Latin loan word Republic. I point this out because what Kant says here about a Freistaat is inconsistent with what he says elsewhere about a Republic.